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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the policy of junior secondary education expansion in Tanzania 
between 2004 and 2012, implemented through a large-scale process of community 
mobilisation. It uses a political economy approach that defines education systems as social 
constructs, products of history, with material and ideological dimensions, embroiled in the 
politics and economy of a country and forged at the intersection of internal and external 
factors. The primary analytical vantage point is the elite. Four main dimensions of the 
policy are studied. First, the thesis sheds light on the politics of educational policy-making. 
The expansion policy is the outcome of intra-ruling class conflicts tied to competing 
modernisation philosophies. Yet, elites’ educational choices are also underpinned by a 
widely shared symbolic system, rooted in the ideological history of the country but 
entwined with contemporary global discourses. Second, the thesis investigates the budget 
for secondary education, pitting the stated desire of elites for quality secondary education 
for all against their actual financial effort. Donors’ interventions are also scrutinised to 
understand how they have contributed to shaping the policy and its narrow fiscal space. 
The thesis then examines local renegotiation of the policy at district level and unveils 
power struggles unleashed by its implementation in the local arena. Finally, this work 
studies the relationship between education and the economic sphere through an 
investigation of the textbook sector and documents the formation, at district level, of a 
politico-business complex around educational resources. The secondary education 
expansion occurred against a background of job scarcity, quasi-universal primary education 
and quality private education available to the wealthy. In this context, the thesis argues that 
under-resourced and under-performing community secondary schools may be interpreted 
as a renewed educational settlement to attempt to resolve the structural tension inherent in 
education systems between the integration of the youth and social differentiation. 
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Chapter One  
 
The Tanzanian ward secondary schools policy: An introduction 
 
 
The 2012 edition of UNESCO’s Education for All Global Monitoring Report called for an 
international commitment to achieve universal lower secondary education (i.e., four years’ 
post-primary education) by 2030. This objective is likely to be integrated in the post-2015 
agenda. After two decades of international focus on primary education, this attention to 
secondary education marked an important change in the global education agenda. In 2004, 
Tanzania, which had one of the lowest secondary gross enrolment ratios1 among developing 
countries, started its own journey towards mass secondary education. The Tanzanian 
government began the implementation of the Secondary Education Development Plan 
(SEDP) with financial support from the World Bank. But in 2006, the government, led by 
Prime Minister Edward Lowassa, decided to accelerate the expansion and to act on an 
electoral promise inscribed in the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Manifesto for the 2005 
presidential elections: to build a lower secondary school in each ward (the administrative 
level between district and villages). This ward secondary schools policy called for a 
partnership between the state and communities: the latter would build the school 
infrastructures; the state would provide the roofing, teachers and running expenses. This 
decision unleashed a rapid expansion of lower secondary schooling of an extraordinary 
magnitude. Between 2004 and 2012, the number of secondary schools increased fourfold 
and the number of students enrolled at O Level increased by 348 per cent. The gross 
enrolment ratio for lower secondary education rose dramatically from 12.4 per cent in 2004 
to 51.4 per cent in 2012. However, from a learning perspective, this movement brought 
adverse outcomes.  Between 2007 and 2012 the failure rate in the Certificate of Secondary 
Education Examination rocketed from 9.7 to 56.2 per cent.2  
 
Why did Tanzanian authorities decide to expand secondary education at such a rapid pace, 
risking alienating international aid agencies and, in a context of scarce financial resources, to 
                                                 
1 The Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) is defined as the total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, 
expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a given 
school-year. 
2 The research focuses on Tanzania mainland. In primary and secondary education, Zanzibar is autonomous, only higher 
education is a Federation matter. 
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generate entirely predictable poor learning achievements? To tackle this empirical puzzle, 
the human capital framework, that exerts a hegemonic influence over the research agenda 
on education and development in sub-Saharan Africa, is analytically unsatisfactory: in rates 
of return studies or in macro-economic analyses of the growth-education link education 
policy-making and the politics of implementation remain ‘black boxes’. By contrast, this 
thesis uses a political economy approach to decipher an education policy that has 
profoundly modified the Tanzanian educational landscape in recent years. It defines 
education systems as social constructs, products of history, steeped in the politics and the 
economy of a country, with material and ideological dimensions and forged at the 
intersection of international and national dynamics.  
 
This research can only cover some aspects of the policy. For instance, it does not address 
the implications of greater secondary school enrolment for the labour market and wage 
levels. It also leaves aside questions related to the social and pedagogical relations that have 
formed inside ward secondary schools and classrooms. Furthermore, it examines this policy 
chiefly through an elite lens, only touching on the role played by the rest of the population, 
parents, students, communities and civil society. Finally, it does not take a normative 
perspective on educational policy-making and does not formulate any policy 
recommendations. It is more interested in the question of ‘how development works’ than 
with the issue of ‘whether development works’.3 Nevertheless, the partial story it tells allows 
for an unpacking of important facets of Tanzania’s education system. It demonstrates how 
dominant discourses of education policy, sustained by populist politics and by references to 
economic theory, are in fact ideological and mask unequal material interests.  
 
The remainder of this chapter describes key features of the ward secondary schools policy, 
exposes the research questions and presents the thesis outline. 
 
1. An exceptional enrolment expansion 
 
Between 2000 and 2012, the Tanzanian education system experienced major changes: the 
abolition of school fees at primary level in 2001 led to a dramatic increase in primary school 
enrolment (Figure 1.1), the setting-up of a cost-sharing scheme in higher education (with 
                                                 
3 A distinction made by Gould (2004a) borrowed from Mosse (2003).  
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the creation of the Higher Education Students' Loans Board in 2005), and the expansion of 
pre-primary education with the decision to create a pre-primary stream in every primary 
school. In 2012, Tanzania was among the very few sub-Saharan African countries that were 
close to universal primary education (UNESCO 2012).4  
 
Figure 1-1: Primary school enrolment in Tanzania (private – public), 2000-2012 
 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a, Basic Education Statistics of Tanzania) 
 
The rapid expansion of secondary education within the Secondary Education Development 
Plan (SEDP) constituted another salient phenomenon. The growth in the total number of 
secondary schools – from 1,291 in 2004 to 4,328 in 2012 - was chiefly led by the 
construction of community (or ward) schools (Figure 1.2). 
 
                                                 
4 In 2010 Tanzania received a Millennium Development Goal Award for sustaining a primary net enrolment ratio above 
95 per cent for five years. However, the primary GER declined from 112.3 per cent in 2008 to 98.4 per cent in 2012. 
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Figure 1-2: Number of secondary schools (government and non-government) 2004-
2012 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a). NB: ‘government’ refers to ‘old’ public secondary schools 
(unchanged in number since 1994) and ward/community schools. 
 
The rise in secondary enrolment was equally impressive: the total number of students 
enrolled at O Level grew from about 400,000 in 2004 to more than 1,800,000 in 2012 
(Figure 1.3). 
Figure 1-3: Enrolment in secondary schools (government and non-government) 
2004 - 2012 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a) 
The gross enrolment ratio for lower secondary education drastically improved from 12.4 
per cent in 2004 to 51.4 per cent in 2012. The GER for upper secondary level (A Level) did 
not follow suit: it increased only slightly from 1.9 per cent in 2003 to 5.1 per cent in 2012. 
The dynamism of secondary education was accompanied by an expansion of higher 
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education enrolment that grew by 440 per cent between 2003 and 2011 (Figure 1.4). In sum, 
since the beginning of the 2000s, the Tanzanian education system has experienced a 
tremendous expansion, with the upper secondary level remaining the capacity bottleneck.  
 
Figure 1-4: Enrolment in higher education 2003-2011 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a) 
By all comparisons, the rate of expansion of junior secondary education since 2004 qualifies 
as exceptional. 
 
In the West, the expansion of secondary education, specifically at lower level, was a very 
gradual process. According to Briseid and Caillods (2004), in most European countries 
universal primary education was achieved before the end of the 19th century. However, 
these countries did not consider expanding secondary education before the 1940s/1950s 
and only implemented the expansion in the 1960s/1970s for lower secondary and the 1980s 
for upper secondary. Sweden took twenty-two years (1950-1972) to implement its education 
reform extending compulsory schooling to age 16. In France, a similar reform – extension 
of compulsory schooling and comprehensive lower secondary education – took 16 years 
(1959-1975) and mass expansion of upper secondary education started in 1985. The pattern 
of expansion in the USA was different. The ‘high school movement’ started much earlier: 
between 1910 and 1940, the total secondary GER grew from about 12 per cent to 72 per 
cent (Goldin 1997: figure 1). Qualified as a ‘swift’ and ‘spectacular educational 
transformation’ (ibid: 0), its rhythm of expansion did not, however, match the pace recently 
adopted in Tanzania. 
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Two Asian countries – South Korea and India - experienced a similarly progressive 
expansion of secondary education. India took 20 years to go from a 13 per cent secondary 
GER in 1965 to 35 per cent in 1985. Starting from a similar point of departure Tanzania 
(11.2 per cent in 2005) took 5 years to reach a comparable level. South Korea took 5 years 
to reach a GER of 36 per cent in 1955 albeit starting from a relatively high level of 20 per 
cent in 1950.5 
 
Figure 1-5: Gross Enrolment Ratio at secondary level (all programmes) in India, 
South Korea, Kenya, Mauritius and Tanzania 2005-2010 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
%
India
South Korea
Kenya
Mauritius
Tanzania
Source: the author, based on UNESCO-UIS Statistical Year Books (several years) 
 
One may also compare Tanzania’s secondary education trajectory with two other African 
countries: Kenya is the gauge against which Tanzanian development has always been 
assessed, both by the international community and by Tanzanians themselves; and 
Mauritius, a rare educational success in sub-Saharan Africa, also provides an interesting 
standard of comparison. Kenya took 15 years to reach a GER of 30 per cent in 1980 from 4 
per cent in 1965. Mauritius, close to 100 per cent GER in 2010, recorded, like South Korea, 
a sharp increase in its secondary GER at the beginning of its economic take-off. 
Nevertheless, the rhythm of expansion was slower than Tanzania’s has been over recent 
years: Mauritius took a decade to go from a GER of 8 per cent to 35 per cent between 1950 
and 1960. 
 
                                                 
5 The differences would be more striking if budgetary allocations and share of GDP dedicated to education/secondary 
education were factored in.  
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As noted by Goldin (1997: 10), ‘making cross-country, cross-time comparisons in schooling 
is not a simple matter’, not least because of various definitions of official entry age and 
diverse organisations of each education sub-level. However, these international 
comparisons are not intended to unveil a correlation pattern between educational and 
economic development paths; they are rather meant to underline the striking nature of the 
educational policy choice made by the Tanzanian government. But this education ‘big bang’ 
has led to a deep ‘learning crisis’. 
 
2. Ward secondary schools and the Tanzanian ‘learning crisis’ 
 
In 2010, the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) estimated that about 
90 per cent of secondary schools required some form of rehabilitation, refurbishment or 
completion: in most cases, government construction standards for secondary schools were 
not strictly enforced (World Bank 2010: 3). The fieldwork in Lushoto and all accounts of 
the situation in other parts of the country confirmed the poor state of ward secondary 
school infrastructure.  
 
The increase in the number of secondary schools was not accompanied by a commensurate 
expansion of the teaching force. While enrolment in secondary schools (O and A levels) 
grew by 253 per cent between 2003 and 2008, the number of teachers only increased by 42 
per cent (Figure 1.6).  
 
Figure 1-6: Enrolment and teaching staff in secondary education 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a) 
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During the first years of implementation of the ward schools policy, the pupil-teacher ratio 
increased from 28:1 in 2006 to 44:1 in 2007; this general evolution concealed, however, 
greater deficits in specific disciplines like maths, sciences and English and the fact that 
many teachers were actually absent from school to continue further studies. The number of 
teachers required increased from about 24,000 in 2007 to 96,000 in 2009 (URT 2009a).  
 
To address the teacher shortage the government introduced, as a temporary measure, a 
‘crash programme’ or Induction Course: in 2006/2007, the government recruited 6,990 
Form Six leavers, provided them with a one-month training course and posted them in new 
ward secondary schools.6 These ‘licensed teachers’ continued their studies at The Open 
University of Tanzania as distance learners to get the required qualifications. In 2012, the 
‘crash-programme’ was officially stopped but these teachers continued to be recruited by 
schools to fill the gaps in the teaching force, especially for maths and science subjects. The 
overall shortage of teachers has been further complicated by the fact that newly recruited 
teachers tend to shy away from rural schools and teachers are unevenly distributed, with the 
greatest shortages occurring in remote rural schools (World Bank 2011). 
 
From a learning perspective, the secondary education expansion led to dramatic results. The 
pass rate in the Certificate of Secondary Education Examination plunged from 78.4 per 
cent in 2000 to 43.8 per cent in 2012. The decline was particularly acute for better grades, 
Division 1 to 3 (Figure 1.7): the share of ‘Division 4’ students among all ‘pass students’ rose 
steadily from 60 per cent in 2006 to 81 per cent in 2011.7 
 
                                                 
6 Source: World Bank (2008: 12). 
7 With a Division 4 grade, students cannot enroll in A Level schools. 
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Figure 1-7: Pass rate in Form Four Examination (CSEE) by division 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a) (only total pass rate available for 2012) 
 
This general decline in examination results concealed performance inequalities between 
school categories.8 Religious schools lie at the top of the quality hierarchy: they record the 
best results, followed by ‘old’ government-owned schools and non-seminary private schools. 
Ward secondary schools lay at the bottom (World Bank 2010a: 2). 
A parallel decrease in quality indicators was recorded at primary level: the Primary School 
Leaving Examination (PSLE) pass rate decreased from 70.5 per cent in 2006 to 53.5 per 
cent in 2010 and the Uwezo studies conducted in 2010, 2011 and 2012 revealed Tanzanian 
children’s low level of basic skills in literacy and numeracy.9 According to the 2012 Uwezo 
Report only one out of four Standard 3 children can read a Standard 2 level Kiswahili story, 
only four out of ten have Standard 2 numeracy skills and less than one out of ten have basic 
English literacy skills (Uwezo 2013).  
 
These indicators should be considered as simple proxies of a concept – quality education – 
which remains elusive; nevertheless, they can be seen as signs that Tanzania’s basic 
education system was not able to deliver ‘learning’ in a context of rapid expansion of mass 
education. These poor performances propelled a profound ‘learning crisis’ in the country, 
fuelling public debates in the media and Parliament. The 2012 Form Four examination 
                                                 
8 The organisation of secondary education is detailed in Chapter 3. 
9 Uwezo studies - an initiative by the NGO Twaweza - assess children’s literacy and numeracy performances across East 
Africa. They consist of household-based surveys carried out via tools developed in accordance with national curricula, to 
measure children’s ability to read (in English and Kiswahili) and to do basic arithmetic at the Standard 2 level (see 
http://www.uwezo.net/). 
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results were even nullified following an intense public row and the pass rate revised.10 ‘The 
Form Four results have left the nation shocked to the core.’ 11 
 
3. The ward secondary schools in historical perspective 
 
 
From a national perspective, the decision to widely expand public secondary education was 
at odds with the trajectory followed by the country for more than four decades. A specific 
educational settlement was forged during the Ujamaa period (1964-1985), within which 
secondary education occupied a particular position. The notion of ‘educational settlement’ 
is derived from the concept of ‘political settlement’ commonly used in political economy 
and referring to ‘the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and 
social classes on which any state is based’ (Di John and Putzel 2009: 4). More precisely, for 
Khan (2010), a political settlement describes how a society solves the problem of violence 
and achieves the minimum level of political stability and economic performance for it to 
operate as a society. Following Melling who stressed that ‘social policies of the state formed 
part of a wider political settlement at key moments of development’ (1991 quoted in Di John 
and Putzel 2009: 4), the conditions of distribution of educational rights and entitlements 
across social groups may be considered part and parcel of this political settlement. An 
educational settlement corresponds to a specific organisation of the access/quality/equity 
nexus, traditionally central to educational policy-making. The concept leads to questioning 
or investigating the mechanisms by which the coalition of interests that determines resource 
mobilisation and allocation for public education evolves or is reproduced.  
 
The patterns of educational enrolment at secondary level displayed in Figure 1.8 vividly 
illustrate the historical rupture provoked by the ward secondary schools policy. Its 
significance cannot be understood without a description of the post-independence 
educational settlement and its meaning in relation to the colonial legacy and within Ujamaa 
as a broader political project. 
 
                                                 
10 ‘Tanzania: Row Over Form Four Failures’ AllAfrica 17/05/2013   
(http://allafrica.com/stories/201305170098.html, accessed 06/02/2014). 
11 ‘EYE ON EDUCATION: If we don’t take action now, we’re doomed’, The Citizen 15/03/2013. 
3.1 Ward secondary schools: a rupture with the historical trajectory 
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Figure 1-8: Enrolment in secondary education (government – non government) 
Source: adapted from URT (2012a)  
 
 
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, formal education was first introduced by missionaries: the diffusion 
of elementary education was to serve the Church’s evangelising and civilising endeavours in 
the ‘dark continent’ (Sutton 1965). In the territory which was to become Tanganyika, 
educational activities conducted by Christian missionaries, present since the 1840s, 
expanded in the 1890s under the protection of the German colonial power (Buchert 
1994). 12  Formal education was from the outset associated with imported ideas of 
‘civilisation’ and ‘modernisation’. With the progressive involvement of the colonial power, 
secular purposes – to provide the colonial administration with indigenous auxiliary staff – 
became preeminent.13  
 
                                                 
12 The Germans ruled over Tanganyika from the 1880s to the end of the First World War when the British took over 
under a Society of Nations’ mandate. Tanzania was formed in 1964 from the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, a British 
protectorate since 1890. The first government schools were created in 1890 but the colonial power did not really start to 
get involved in education policies until 1900. 
13 Nevertheless, education never became a sphere reserved to the colonial power: mainly for budgetary reasons, the 
colonial administration discharged a large part of the African education burden on the Church. An enduring 
governmental habit - in March 2011, Tanzania’s President asked religious institutions to build secondary schools ‘to meet 
the demand’ (The Guardian 18/03/2011). 
3.2 Educational colonial legacy in Tanzania  
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Over time, British colonial discourses assigned different purposes to education14 but, in 
practice, Tanganyika’s education system was largely modelled to comply with the colonial 
strategy of economic specialisation of Tanganyika’s territory and organised to fulfil the 
needs of the emerging capitalist group. Historically, schools – governmental and missionary 
– were implanted in cash-crop areas, zones of European settlement, trade hubs or 
industrialising areas (Samoff 1979a, Oketch and Rolleston 2007). The education system was 
also racially differentiated with a segment delivering an academic and elitist education to 
Indians and Europeans, mainly in government schools. The segment dedicated to Africans 
delivered mass education, mainly in missionary and ‘bush’ schools led by indigenous local 
authorities:15 only a few Africans could access the elitist education system.16 On the eve of 
independence, the education system was stunted and highly differentiated along racial, 
social and regional lines (Buchert 1994).17 As in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, the ‘struggle 
to counter or correct or to maintain such imbalances [would be] at the heart of post-
colonial politics’ (Coleman 1965: 38). 
 
 
After independence in 1961, the new authorities gave priority to post-primary education. 
Their ‘manpower planning’ strategy, in a clear continuation of the British ‘Education for 
Modernisation’, put the emphasis on human resource development to accommodate the 
needs of economic growth and the Africanisation of the civil service (Samoff 1993; Buchert 
1994). This orientation was very much in line with the modernisation theory that dominated 
international thinking on development at the time.18 
 
In Tanzania, as with any other socialist project, the construction of an egalitarian society 
constituted a core objective of Ujamaa philosophy. Education was to play, ideologically and 
materially, a core role in the quest for social justice as well as national unity. In 1967, in the 
                                                 
14 The promotion of ‘native interests’ and the improvement of the living conditions of the majority, under the ‘Education 
for Adaptation’ policy (1919-1945) followed by the transmission of democratic values to prepare Africans to conduct 
their own affairs, under ‘Education for Modernisation’ (1945 – 1961). See Buchert (1994). 
15 Following the ‘indirect rule’ strategy, the British colonial power discharged the responsibility of managing local affairs 
to local indigenous authorities. 
16 In 1956, 95 per cent of Indian school-age children were enrolled at primary and secondary levels against 80 per cent for 
Europeans and 8.5 per cent for Africans (Buchert 1994). 
17 In 1959, there were only 4,132 students in secondary schools, 428 in higher education and 70 university graduates 
(Sutton 1965: 71). 
18 In his famous model for economic growth, Rostow (1960) identified secular education as one of the pre-conditions for 
take-off. 
3.3 The post-independence educational settlement and secondary education 
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Arusha Declaration, Education for Self Reliance was put at the heart of Ujamaa: education was 
understood to be the fundamental instrument for a radical social transformation (Samoff 
and Sumra 1994). The 1977 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania guaranteed the right 
to education for all citizens ‘up to the highest level according to his merits and ability’; the 
‘Government was made responsible for creating the conditions for realisation of this right’ 
(URT 1977). Thus, education was elevated to the status of a human right and the fulfilment 
of this right was a core duty of the state.19  
 
During Ujamaa, primary education and literacy programmes were regarded as the chief 
instruments for social equalisation. According to Nyerere, ‘Primary education is to the 
education of our nation what Agriculture is to the economy – the pivot on which 
everything else turns. It is not called Primary education for nothing; it is the education 
everyone has’ (Nyerere 1984: 150). Primary education was conceived as an end in itself: it 
was to prepare children for their role within the community rather than to give them 
automatic entry ticket to upper education levels. Secondary education was deliberately 
construed as education for a few but meritocratic, free and of quality. For decades, access to 
secondary education was restricted to a small minority. Between 1966 and 1981, primary 
education enrolment grew sixfold and the literacy rate increased from 20 per cent to 90 per 
cent; in 1977 the primary gross enrolment ratio reached 97 per cent. In the same period, the 
transition rate from primary to lower secondary education fell from 35 per cent in 1962 to 
2.6 per cent in 1981. ‘Tanzanian children (had) among the lowest probability of attending 
secondary school of all children in the developing world’ (Lassibille et al. 2000: 4). 
 
Nyerere consistently reiterated his conviction about Tanzania’s secondary education 
problem. The main rationale for a distorted educational pyramid – broad base and tiny 
summit – lay in Tanzania’s narrow economic base. Tanzania, as a poor country, could not 
afford to expand secondary education: ‘[Secondary education] is not the right of all 
Tanzanians as Primary Education is’ (Nyerere 1984: 153). This 1984 statement echoed 
earlier ones in 1971 – ‘The poverty of Tanzania does not allow for the kind of expenditure 
which would be necessary for such universal services [post primary education], however we 
                                                 
19 This commitment was reiterated in 2000 by E. Lowassa – then Minister of State to the Vice President’s Office: 
‘Tanzania believes that providing social services such as education, safe water and health, including reproductive health 
services to the population is a fundamental obligation of the state and is a human rights issue.’ (Statement at the Social 
Summit, June 2000; http://www.un.org/socialsummit/speeches/276tan.htm). 
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would like them. Priorities have to be worked out and strictly adhered to’ (Nyerere 1971: 
110) - and in 1967: ‘We cannot solve the “problem of primary school leavers” by increasing 
the number of secondary school places’ (URT 1967a: 78). The intrinsic contradiction 
between a right-based, egalitarian discourse on education and this restriction of the right to 
upper educational levels to a few privileged youth was pointed out by Nyerere himself: 
‘Publicly provided “education for education’s sake” must be general education for the 
masses. Further education for a selected few must be education for service to the many. 
There can be no other justification for taxing the many to give education to only a few’ 
(URT 1967a: 79). Secondary education expansion was only legitimate in relation to its 
service to primary education and the rest of the economy, ‘in providing a reservoir from 
which we can recruit teachers, agriculturalists, health workers, engineers, and so on. We 
have no other justification for providing secondary school education’ (Nyerere 1984: 153). 
During Ujamaa, the prevailing manpower policy derived the number of seats available in 
government secondary schools and university from the projected needs of the economy. 
 
Within a self-identified socialist regime aimed at reversing the colonial legacy, such blatant 
built-in elitism in the education system needed to be legitimised. It called for an ideological 
apparatus and organisational measures to make it acceptable to the vast majority who were 
barred from a resource critical for access to white collar jobs, power and wealth. First of all, 
a quota system assigned a specific number of places in public secondary schools to each 
region and to girls. In parallel, legal restrictions put on the expansion of private schools 
were meant to contain the distorted educational patterns inherited at independence (Samoff 
1979a, Buchert 1994). Secondary schools also played a critical role in the process of the 
‘reciprocal assimilation of elites’ (Bayart 1993): the fact that Tanzanian students attended 
secondary schools outside their region of origin forged within the elite a sense of national 
belonging that transcended tribal identities. This social blending process was a critical 
function that Nyerere attached to secondary schools.20 The implementation of Education for 
Self Reliance also implied critical changes in the curriculum aimed at inculcating students with 
a sense of serving the public and preparing them for their role as drivers of rural 
development. Work had to become an integral part of education and the secondary 
                                                 
20 Similarly, according to Benedict Anderson, the posting of officials to different parts of their countries helped promote 
the ‘imagined community’ underpinning nationalism (Anderson 1991). In his recent memoirs, There Was a Country, Chinua 
Achebe recalled his youth and elite education in the heyday of Nigerian national identity formation (Achebe 2012).  
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education curriculum was ‘vocationalised’ so as to make it relevant to students’ future life in 
the community. The continuity between the colonial education system and Education for Self 
Reliance – the philosophy and its practice – has already been pointed out (Coulson 1982; 
Mbilinyi 1979). What has been less emphasized, however, is how much these mechanisms, 
working against the idea of wealth or tribal belonging as the source of individual 
advancement, inscribed meritocracy at the heart of secondary education and therefore social 
promotion.  
 
Another facet of the Ujamaa secondary education model was ‘quality’, as acknowledged by 
many research respondents. A Member of Parliament stressed the quality of the Tanzanian 
former public secondary education system: ‘At that time, public schools were centres of excellence. 
All good teachers were teaching there. Both parents of rich and poor families had the opportunity to send 
their kids to school and get quality education’ (interview 83). This appreciation was shared by the 
international community. An education aid manager noted: ‘Back to the 1980s and 1970s, 
Tanzania used to have a high quality secondary education. The paradigm then, under Nyerere, was to 
produce very good graduates but there was no concern about numbers’ (interview 58). 
 
The economic liberalisation of the 1980s initiated a process of erosion and remodelling of 
the nation’s educational settlement. The 1985-1995 decade marked an upturn in the 
national educational ideology relating to the place granted to private education. However, it 
did not provoke any major upheaval in the distinctive functions respectively attributed to 
primary and secondary education. During this period, the increase in the transition rate 
from primary to secondary levels was chiefly driven by the growth of the private sector but 
in 1995 Tanzania still registered a very low 5 per cent secondary GER; 55 per cent of 
secondary students were enrolled in private schools against an average of 30 per cent in 
African countries (Lassibille et al. 2000: 5). The 1995-2005 decade was a phase of mass 
primary education, marked by the return to the 1970s’ ambition of Universal Primary 
Education. In 2004, when SEDP was launched, the secondary gross enrolment ratio was 
still only 9.5 per cent, the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa, and the government had not built 
any new secondary schools since 1980 (World Bank 2004: 5). The transition rate between 
primary level and lower secondary was 22 per cent compared with 50 per cent in Uganda 
(World Bank 2004: 3). According to national Household Budget Surveys, in 1991/1992 only 3.9 
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per cent of the adult population had benefited from an O Level education, a figure that, at 
4.6 per cent, was only slightly higher in 2000/2001 (URT 2009b: 20).21 
 
4. The ward secondary schools policy: emancipation from international aid 
agencies? 
 
The post-independence history of relationships between Tanzanian authorities and the 
international aid community was characterised by a succession of ‘love’ and ‘hate’ phases 
(Languille and Dolan 2012).  
 
During Ujamaa, despite the self-reliance rhetoric, donors supported the implementation of 
Nyerere’s education policies. SIDA, UNESCO and UNICEF, especially, were widely 
involved in the literacy and adult education programmes (King 1990). The World Bank 
supported the expansion of social services in accordance with its ‘basic needs’ strategy 
(Holtom 2005). Samoff and Sumra (1994) argue that the signing of the first structural 
adjustment programme in 1985 prompted a major shift in relations between Tanzanian 
education planners and aid agencies: now ‘priorities were set less by government and party 
leaders and more by what foreign government and their aid organisations were willing to 
finance’ (ibid: 33). Consistent with the World Bank and IMF’s recommendations, school 
fees were reintroduced in primary and secondary schools. The opening of private secondary 
schools, ‘earlier discouraged but tolerated’, was encouraged again by the government as of 
1986 (ibid: 20). The cost-sharing measures had a major negative impact on education 
performance that only picked up again after the new Education for All drive (Oketch and 
Rolleston 2007; Galabawa 2001).22 The 1995 Education and Training Policy, largely drafted 
under external influences, constituted a clear formalisation of the neoliberal turn of the 
mid-1980s: the document formally inscribed ‘the promotion of private education providers’, 
the ‘liberalisation of services‘ and the ‘decentralisation of education management’ at the 
heart of the organisation of Tanzanian education (URT 1995). The second half of the 1990s 
was a time of intense planning in which donors were heavily involved. In 1999, the World 
Bank reversed its position and promoted the abolition of primary school fees as a major 
measure to be included in Tanzania’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. In 2001 a 
SWAP programme, the Education Sector Development Plan (ESDP), was finalised and 
                                                 
21 Adult population being defined as 15 years old and above. 
22 The primary GER decreased from 98 per cent in 1980 to 77 per cent in 2000 (Oketch and Rolleston 2007: 17). 
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subsequently translated into sub-sector plans: the Primary Education Development Plan 
(PEDP), the Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP) and the Higher Education 
and Development Plan (HEDP). The same year, the PEDP basket-fund, financed by a 
coalition of donors, was launched.23 
 
At international level, in signing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)24 and the Accra 
Agenda for Action (2008), aid agencies and international NGOs committed to improving aid 
management through the enforcement of fundamental principles: harmonisation of donors’ 
practices, alignment with the recipient countries’ poverty reduction strategies, systems and 
procedures; beneficiary countries’ ownership; result-oriented policies and capacity building 
initiatives. Aid instruments were also reshuffled to abide by these new precepts with budget 
support becoming the emblematic instrument of this new aid regime. Tanzania became 
internationally praised for its exemplary implementation of the Paris Declaration through the 
invention of new aid management modalities. 
 
Yet the actual secondary expansion recorded by Tanzania between 2004 and 2012 largely 
diverged from the enrolment growth projected within the SEDP I (2004-2009). This 
programme was planned by the Ministry of Education in collaboration with different aid 
agencies and became the basis for the World Bank’s own support of secondary education. 
With the ward secondary schools policy, Tanzanian authorities had stepped aside from the 
joint policy-making arena that had taken shape since the mid-1990s. This drive was led by 
the new government that came to power after the 2005 elections; contrary to the previous 
Mkapa regime, rather sympathetic to the international community, the new ruling coalition, 
led by President Kikwete and Prime Minister Lowassa, adopted a more nationalistic stance 
and a less conciliatory attitude towards donors’ demands.  
 
5. Statement of the problems, research questions and dissertation outline 
 
To summarize, four main characteristics of the ward secondary schools policy make it 
worthy of an in-depth study.  
                                                 
23 See Annex A for a historical mapping of the various education policies. 
24 For the full document, see http://www.oecd.org. 
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i) First, the pace of expansion was exceptional, even from an internationally 
comparative perspective. What state/communities configuration and what funding 
arrangements (or fiscal space) made its tangible accomplishments – lower secondary 
schools spread all over the country and a dramatic increase in the enrolment figures – 
possible?  
ii) Second, this policy meant a profound reconfiguration of the post-independence 
educational settlement, a shift from a quality, free, elitist and meritocratic secondary 
education to mass secondary education of poor quality. It was also in obvious contradiction 
to Nyerere’s educational prescriptions. In a context where Nyerere remains a figure of 
worship and a mandatory reference in political and policy-making spheres (Fouere 2014), 
how could a policy that so profoundly contradicts Nyerere’s teaching be enacted? What 
main factors may explain the Tanzanian elites’ decision to significantly alter the country’s 
educational organisation?  
iii) Whereas, since the mid-1980s, education policy-making in Tanzania has largely been 
driven by the donor community, the ward secondary schools policy may qualify, at least in 
the first instance, as a home-grown educational policy. What does this policy, conducted 
against donors’ recommendations, reveal about power relations between the Tanzanian 
government and international aid agencies? At the same time, to what extent did donors 
contribute to shaping the ward secondary schools policy?  
iv) Finally, while post-primary education and quality (under the ‘learning’ label) are given 
increasing attention in international debates, the specific access-quality-equity nexus that the 
ward secondary schools policy gave rise to provides an interesting opportunity to study 
critical challenges that the post-2015 global educational agenda may well face in practice. 
The ward schools movement provides a telling illustration that ‘schooling ain’t learning’ 
(Pritchett 2013).  
 
Increasing resources for schools, improving teachers’ pay, working and training conditions, 
constructing infrastructures to decrease class size, providing textbooks and other learning 
materials or revising the curriculum have long constituted the core of educational policy-
making. Yet, a global diagnosis of the learning crisis is currently under formation that 
challenges the relevance of these traditional policies. An influential international compact 
made of scholars, aid agencies and philanthropic institutions is advocating for an alternative 
intervention package consisting of: randomised controlled trials to identify policies that 
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work to deliver learning; standardised measurement of learning performance and the 
dissemination of results to induce citizens-clients’ demands for learning; teachers’ salary and 
school funding tied to performances and replacing/supplementing state by private 
provision, in decentralised and autonomous units, financed through publicly funded 
vouchers (for instance Pritchett 2013; Barnerjee and Duflo 2011; World Bank 2011a). 
 
This research does not engage, systematically and thoroughly, with this emerging global 
learning agenda.25 As we will see, chiefly in Chapters 4 and 5, the international learning shift 
has had an impact in Tanzania at the very end of the research period; but donors’ 
interventions to translate the new strategic orientations mentioned above, on the ground 
and at secondary level, were at too early a stage to assess their impact in practice. 
Nevertheless, understanding how political economy factors have shaped the access-equity-
quality problem in the context of the ward schools policy constitutes a guiding thread of the 
present work.  
 
More generally, this research project was driven by six broad questions:  
- What are the main driving forces of  the educational policy choices made by elites? To 
what extent do labour market demands and economic considerations play a 
determining role (as predicted by human capital theory)? 
- What strategies do governments adopt to maximize education aid while securing their 
decision making power over national education choices? 
- What is the appropriate scale of the fiscal space and corresponding political unit to 
organise the funding of ‘public goods’? 
- To what extent are education policies renegotiated through implementation at local 
level? 
- What are the implications of an enrolment expansion for market-based production of 
educational goods?  
- How do ruling class’ capital accumulation strategies interact with the education system? 
 
The thesis is organised as follows: 
 
                                                 
25 Chapter 2, however, provides a critical analysis from a conceptual perspective.  
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Chapter 2 describes the core tenets of human capital theory and its evolution from rate of 
return studies to the recent cognitive skills enriched model. It highlights its key limitations, 
particularly with regard to its ability to account for educational policy-making and 
implementation. It also traces the genealogy of the global education agenda – specifically in 
relation to secondary education – and demonstrates its direct lineage from human capital 
theory. This exposition justifies the choice of an alternative analytical framework. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of the research and defines the key principles 
of the political economy approach adopted. It also accounts for various sources of 
theoretical inspiration in the sociology of education and the political economy tradition. 
The chapter also clarifies the meaning of two key concepts - ‘the state’ and ‘the elite’- and 
provides important contextual information. Finally, it describes the methodological 
framework, mostly qualitative. The fieldwork, conducted in Tanzania between September 
2011 and April 2012, encompassed about 180 in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
members of the elite at national level and in Lushoto district, the visit of 28 secondary 
schools and focus groups with parents, students and teachers.  
 
Chapter 4 sheds light on the politics of educational policy-making through an exploration 
of elite narratives. The Tanzanian state is not a homogeneous entity: the ward schools 
policy has been the outcome of intra-ruling class struggles, especially between politicians 
and technocrats. Nevertheless, in 2011-2012, elites deployed a homogeneous discourse to 
legitimize this education policy with controversial outcomes. Education – transmission of 
knowledge – was not the core concern of elites; youth domestication was their primary 
objective. Three main discursive resources were consistently mobilised: the policy was a 
response to a ‘social demand’, to the ‘youth ticking bomb’ threat and to the knowledge 
economy imperatives. This specific formulation of the equity/access/quality nexus 
resonates with global education discourses while being profoundly rooted in the country’s 
history: an instance of hybrid discursive construct. The growing consensus among donors 
and domestic elites about the inescapable demands of the global market – quality education 
defined as English, skills and sciences - built on shallow empirical evidence, conceals 
mechanisms of  social reproduction at play within the education system.  
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Chapter 5 investigates internal and external political economy factors that, beneath the 
technicalities of the budget, have moulded a negligible budget for ward secondary schools. 
Trapped within a global agenda focused on primary education, donors did not provide 
additional resources to support secondary education expansion, their own creature in many 
respects. Their effective response to the learning crisis – at the end of  the research period - 
fell short of the enormous fiscal challenge. On the other hand, elites’ egalitarian claims to 
legitimize the ward secondary schools did not provoke a realignment of their budget 
preferences. With a narrow budgetary room for manoeuvre, they favoured ‘productive 
sectors’ over education and higher education over basic education; resources were never 
ring-fenced for ward secondary schools. The social order imperative was revealed as a 
prominent parameter in elites’ budget decisions and prevailed over welfare considerations. 
Since 2009/10, donors and domestic elites’ converging concerns over quality have allowed 
marginal budgetary adjustments in favour of secondary education and quality-related inputs. 
The budget remained, however, the favoured locus for domestic elites to assert their 
sovereign power: within the asymmetrical power relations that characterise aid relations, 
they persistently and successfully deployed mechanisms to curtail donors’ attempts to 
structurally alter their budget preferences.  
 
Chapter 6 is dedicated to the politics of implementation in Lushoto District, in North East 
Tanzania, where the expansion was particularly dramatic. The policy was grounded in a 
‘self-help’ ideology and anchored to the decentralisation process: this chapter challenges this 
model of expansion, congruent with donors’ good governance agenda. The initial ‘social 
contract’ between communities and the state turned into a ‘fool’s game’: the state did not 
honour its part of the contract; peasants and parents, via consent or through coercion, bore 
a large share of the costs of the reform. All segments of the local elite, as brokers of the 
central state, played a pivotal role in the mobilisation of communities: they deployed 
coercive measures, ideological discourse and patronage practices to gain communities’ 
consent. At the same time, these community schools turned into a major political battlefield 
between members of the elite: spatial politics has been the main engine of the expansion, 
local politicians using the construction of new schools as a privileged route to prestige and 
power. Their opportunistic translation of the central state policy into a ‘village school 
policy’ led, however, to a hyper-fragmentation of the local policy space. Two specific local 
arenas - the district budget and school boards – are of particular interest in deciphering 
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competing interests among various segments of the elite and the process of power 
reconfiguration that the implementation of the ward schools policy unleashed. 
 
Chapter 7 explores the interactions between the textbook industry and secondary education 
expansion, at a time when Tanzania’s textbook sector was on the verge of collapse. The 
chapter examines Tanzania’s textbook publishing and distribution infrastructure and its 
historical embeddedness within political-economy dynamics. The opening of Tanzania’s 
textbook market (starting in the mid-1980s), imposed by donors, promoted Western 
publishing corporations’ interests but was not based on any evidence of a comparative lack 
of efficiency of the state-owned textbook publishing complex. Aid agencies’ practices – 
their direct support of Western publishing companies, their procurement procedures, the 
prevalence of the ‘transparency imperative’ and their utilitarian definition of quality 
education – have contributed enormously in shaping the Tanzanian textbook sector. The 
sovereign project of building an indigenous private publishing industry (as a substitute to a 
state-owned industry) has also been hampered by a specific distribution of power within the 
Tanzanian state. Finally, the chapter explores elite accumulation strategies harnessed to the 
textbook trade and unpacks intricate distributive networks woven around education 
resources, in national and district arenas. 
 
The ward schools movement occurred in a context of job scarcity, quasi-universal primary 
education and quality private education available for the wealthy. In conclusion, Chapter 8 
argues that, in this context, under-resourced and under-performing ward secondary schools 
can be interpreted as a renewed educational settlement to resolve the structural tension 
inherent in education systems between the integration of the youth and social 
differentiation. Despite its break with the past, the ward schools policy also displayed 
elements of  continuity: its modes of  legitimation and implementation were profoundly 
rooted in the country’s history. Donors’ ideology, funding and policy choices significantly 
influenced the shaping of  this policy and its narrow fiscal space. New aid modalities 
currently under consideration completely evade the structural question of the fiscal space 
for quality basic education for all and obscure the responsibility of  domestic and 
international elites to fund it. Far from sites of human capital accumulation, these public 
‘business’ secondary schools offered members of the elite a major site of power and capital 
accumulation. Yet, the functionalism of elites’ educational policy choices or the 
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homogeneity of the state and the donor community should not be overstated: educational 
policies and budgets are forged through conflict-ridden historical processes, underpinned 
by more or less unstable balances of power. Finally, the chapter sketches out a future 
research agenda that would tackle critical issues not covered in this research: the 
relationship between education and the labour market; the growth of private education 
provision; and the role of various actors – teachers, parents, students, teachers’ trade union 
or civil society organisation - in shaping, transforming or contesting the ward secondary 
schools policy and the educational settlement they embody. 
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Chapter Two  
 
Secondary education, human capital theory and the education aid 
agenda 
 
 
In her review of the state of research on comparative and international education 
Stromquist (2005: 29) noted ‘we know relatively little about policy formulation and 
subsequent implementation in developing countries […] Most policy analyses concentrate 
on the policy itself and give limited consideration to the historical and political context in 
which the policy functions’. While literature on education in Africa is abundant, the 
political economy of education reforms in sub-Saharan Africa has barely secured any 
research attention and secondary education policies even less so. As pointed out by 
Heyneman (2003: 506), ‘so much attention in research and policy literature has been paid to 
basic and higher education that the middle part, secondary education, has seemed like a 
relative orphan.’ 
 
This truncated research agenda is largely the result of the hegemonic influence of human 
capital theory. For the last three decades research on education in developing countries has 
been overwhelming influenced by this specific economic school and its underlying 
assumptions: individuals’ choice, ‘rates of return’ and education production functions. 
More recently, human capital literature has shifted the research agenda towards the role of 
cognitive skills in economic growth and their measurement. These analytical emphases 
have led to an evolving global education agenda: from a focus on access to primary 
education within the Millennium Development Goals framework to a recent emphasis on 
‘learning’. The specific position of secondary education within this trajectory – from 
disregard to a renewed centrality as privileged purveyor of marketable skills – has directly 
reflected these evolutions.  
 
This chapter pursues two aims. First, it highlights key limitations of human capital theory in 
relation to its ability to account for educational policy-making and implementation. This 
exposition will justify the choice of an alternative analytical framework to study the recent 
Tanzanian experience of secondary education expansion (Chapter 3). The second objective 
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is to trace the genealogy of the global education agenda – specifically in relation to 
secondary education – and demonstrate its direct lineage from human capital theory. This 
exercise of deconstruction provides the background for analyses that, in the rest of the 
dissertation, explore aid agencies’ specific interventions in Tanzania.  
 
The first section describes the core tenets of human capital theory from its inception in the 
1960s to the formulation of a cognitive skills enriched model at the end of the 2000s. The 
second section is dedicated to a critique of this theoretical framework. Three main issues 
are pointed out: its underlying utilitarian conception of education, its ‘one-size-fit all’ 
institutional model and its inability to account for the relationship between education and 
the economy. The third section focuses on the international education agenda and its 
treatment of secondary education. This vantage point provides an interesting lens for the 
examination of the direct lineage between human capital theory and the current global 
education agenda, that remains however a site of ideological battles. 
 
1. Human capital literature 1960-2012: core tenets and main alterations 
 
 
 
The roots of human capital theory can be traced to classical political economists who were, 
during the 17th and 18th centuries, already concerned with education and labour skills 
(Hanushek 2006). More recently, Schultz (1961), Mincer (1958) and Becker (1962, 1964) 
formalised the contribution of human capital to economic growth and the formation and 
distribution of individual earnings.  
 
Becker defined human capital as ‘activities that influence future real income through the 
embedding of resources in people’ (Becker 1962: 9). Human capital is not restricted to 
formal schooling; it also comprises ‘on-the-job training, medical care, vitamin consumption 
and acquiring information about the economic system’ (ibid). But subsequent literature 
mainly focused on formal education, professional experience, training within the firm and 
migration. From a macro-economic perspective, human capital theory was developed to 
explain the residual factor of growth, i.e. to account for the evidence that ‘the growth in 
capital per capita explains only a small part of the growth in per capita income’ (Becker 
1.2 The core theoretical framework: the fathers of the theory 
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1962: 9). From a micro-economic perspective, human capital theory departed from the 
traditional economic tenet that differences in the amount of physical capital retained by 
individuals would explain differences in individual economic wellbeing.  
 
Chronologically, Mincer (1958) showed that individuals are characterised by different 
propensities to invest in education in order to occupy qualified jobs: the skewed 
distribution of earnings reflects a skewed distribution of education levels. Schultz (1961) 
demonstrated that individuals can improve their productivity through voluntary 
investments. Becker (1964) developed the theoretical framework: human capital is 
considered in the same terms as physical capital and their dynamics are both driven by the 
‘rate of return’. The return to education investment, a notion central to human capital 
theory, is measured by the difference between all costs of education (direct and indirect, i.e. 
foregone earnings when studying) and future earnings. Mincer (1974) derived the effect of 
education investments on individual earnings: he modelled a relationship between earnings 
and years of schooling, which could be empirically tested. His earnings function 
determined the extra lifetime earnings an individual would be paid as a result of an extra 
year of schooling. Later, Woodhall (1987) introduced the distinction between private and 
social rates of return as measured by the difference between aggregated private earnings 
and total (private and external) costs. At the end of the 1980s, endogenous growth theory 
formally met human capital theory: Lucas (1988) showed that Solow and Denison’s 
neoclassical growth model could not account for cross-country differences in levels and 
rates of income per capita. He proposed an enriched model, which incorporated Becker’s 
and Schultz’ human capital concept: the acquisition of skills enhances workers’ productivity, 
induces additional investment in physical capital and thereby promotes economic growth.  
 
These early works have given rise to an abundant literature that has added to the 
sophistication of the original human capital analysis while remaining faithful to its core 
components: individuals’ rational choice, investment in education driven by rates of return 
to education and an education production function.   
 
 
 
45 
 
 
Following Mincer’s standard formulation, a vast amount of empirical work has been 
conducted, initially on developed countries. Myriad so-called ‘Mincerian regressions’ were 
carried out to empirically test the relationship between investment in education - as 
measured by school attainment - and its outcome - individual earnings. Variables were 
introduced to control for the potential effects of other possible determinant factors of 
earnings: individual ability as measured by IQ (Griliches and Mason 1972), family 
background (Leibowitz 1974) and school characteristics and environment (Hanushek 
1986).26  
 
Rate of Return to Education (RORE) studies were then extended to developing countries 
in a quest to identify criteria that would scientifically ground policy choices for education 
resource allocation. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) provided an extended review of 
RORE studies, covering 73 countries, which revealed worldwide patterns. They confirmed 
several classical results already discussed in Psacharopoulos (1994): rates of return to 
education fall when levels of economic development and education increase (diminishing 
returns); they would be higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region, investments 
in primary education would yield the highest return to investment; and, finally, private 
returns would be higher than ‘social’ returns.27  
 
As exposed by Johnston (2011), this ‘rates of return literature’ has been widely criticized 
and its classical patterns challenged. First of all, studies used in Psacharopoulos’ reviews of 
ROREs (1994 and 2004) revealed divergent patterns. For instance, studies conducted in 
Tanzania over the last thirty years, summarised in Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2008), tend to 
refute the universality of the pattern proposed by RORE orthodoxy. Mason and Khandker 
(1997), using the 1991 Labour Force Survey data, showed that the private rate of return for 
Tanzanian males was 7 per cent in primary, 12 per cent in junior secondary, 2 per cent in 
senior secondary and 12 per cent in higher education. Knight and Sabot (1981, 1990) used 
data from the 1971 and 1980 surveys of manufacturing sector employees and found a 2.1 
                                                 
26 For a comprehensive review see Schultz (1988). 
27 The authors acknowledged that this latter result was largely due to heavy subsidization of education and the difficulty of 
factoring in social externalities in the equation. 
1.2 Rate of Return studies or the elusive quest for scientific criteria for 
education resource allocation 
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per cent rate of return for primary education and 7.3 per cent for junior secondary 
education.  
 
Bennell (1996a) underlined some major methodological flaws of RORE studies. They omit, 
or treat inconsistently, variables with potentially independent effects on earnings (i.e. 
individual ability or family income background); they assume that primary education 
opportunity costs are as good as nil whereas the reality of African rural societies is that 
children commonly contribute to family income. Also, most studies reviewed by 
Psacharopoulos use very old data and consider age-earning profiles as stable in time, failing 
to take account of structural characteristics of sub-Saharan labour markets. Since the 1980s, 
labour market conditions in the region have recorded dramatic transformations: an increase 
in the level of wage employment in absolute terms albeit slower than the growth in the 
labour force; a reduction in the proportion of public sector wage employees and a rapid 
growth in the share of the ‘informal’ sector in total employment (Kingdon et al. 2005).28 In 
Tanzania the 2006 Integrated Labour Force Survey confirmed these trends: between 2001 and 
2006, the country achieved a labour-intensive growth - the number of individuals employed 
grew by 4 per cent a year - but the informal sector (12 per cent of employment in 2006) 
contributed an estimated 27 per cent of the employment growth (URT 2007). In this 
context, the over-reliance of RORE studies on earnings data in the formally recorded 
sector undermines their validity. In his critique of Knight and Sabot’s (1990) comparative 
study of rates of return in Kenya and Tanzania, Samoff (1992) points out that drawing 
general conclusions on the productivity of the entire labour force from results based on a 
sample of ‘an atypical segment of economically active adults’ - urban industrial workers - is 
questionable.   
 
A more recent wave of RORE studies attempted to improve the earnings equation and 
account better for both independent variables and the structure of sub-Saharan African 
labour markets. As reported by Johnston (2011), these studies (Schultz 2004 on Ghana; 
Lassibille and Tan 2005 on Rwanda) confirmed a changing pattern of RORE in sub-
Saharan Africa. Contrary to the orthodox pattern, higher education levels would yield the 
                                                 
28 Kingdon et al. (2005) analysed changes in labour demand between 1995 and 2005 in five sub-Saharan countries 
including Tanzania. For this country they used data from the 1991 and 2000 Labour Force Surveys. Data on labour 
markets in sub-Saharan Africa should be treated with caution (Cramer 2009). 
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highest private returns. A similar pattern was found for Tanzania in Al-Samarrai and 
Bennell (2007), corroborating the results on this country found in previous studies. 
 
The relationship between education and growth has also been revisited and the 
macroeconomic benefits of education reassessed (Johnston 2011). Bils and Klenow (2000) 
challenged the sense of the relationship between both variables as explained by the growth 
literature.29 The empirical relationship documented by Barro and others may partly reflect 
the impact of growth on schooling but also omitted other factors which need to be further 
investigated. Other empirical investigations questioned the very correlation between 
education (measured by school attainment) and economic growth. Famously, Pritchett 
(2001) asked ‘Where has all the education gone?’ as he found no relationship between the 
two variables; physical capital was more strongly correlated with growth outcomes. This 
lack of association between growth and education has been especially true for sub-Saharan 
Africa (where the rate of return to education ought to be most influential): between 1960 
and the mid-1980s, this region experienced the fastest education expansion in the world 
but on average only sluggish economic performance.  
 
To overcome shaky empirical evidence on micro and macroeconomic benefits of education, 
the human capital literature has recently taken a new strategic direction, focusing on 
learning.  
 
 
A new body of literature has put ‘learning achievements’ at the heart of economic research 
on education. In a seminal article Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) emphasised the 
importance of education quality (as measured by cognitive skills acquired) in order to 
evaluate the relationship between education, distribution of individual earnings and 
economic growth.30  
 
                                                 
29 Endogenous growth literature has found a positive relationship between schooling and the growth rate in GDP per 
capita across countries. Barro (1991) found that the 1990 primary and secondary school enrolment rates were positively 
correlated with 1960-1985 growth in real GDP per capita for 98 countries. 
30 This seminal article was followed up in subsequent publications (Hanushek and Woessmann 2011 and 2012, Hanushek 
2013).  
1.3 The cognitive-skills enriched human capital model or the shift to 
‘learning’ 
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From a micro-economic perspective, they provided a review of existing studies of the link 
between cognitive skills and individual earnings in developing countries, mostly in Africa: 
all concluded that higher cognitive skills yield higher private returns. The relationship 
would be even stronger in developing countries, in line with the classical result of 
diminishing returns to education investment as the level of economic development 
increases. Boissiere, Knight and Sabot (1985: 1029) had already showed that in Tanzania 
and Kenya ‘cognitive achievement [was] the main determinant of the structure of earnings’, 
far more than school attendance; differences in cognitive achievements between primary 
and secondary completers accounted for the largest proportion of wage gaps.  
 
The expanded coverage of international student achievements tests also allowed Hanushek 
and Woessman to examine the macroeconomic relationship between learning achievements 
and growth over a long period (1960 – 2000) for fifty countries. They confirmed findings 
from earlier studies (for instance, Hanushek and Kimko 2000): quality, rather than access, 
would be the key element in accounting for the impact of education on economic 
development. ‘One standard deviation increase in student scores on international 
assessment of literacy and mathematics competencies is associated with a 2 percent 
increase in annual growth rates of GDP per capita’ (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008: 32). 
The effect was significant in both developed and developing countries but skill deficits in 
developing countries were larger than generally derived from just school enrolment and 
attainment.  
 
While the methodological flaws of rates of return studies have already been analysed, the 
next section further exposes three major critiques of the human capital literature, from a 
political economy perspective. These critiques address both the older and the more recent 
‘learning enhanced’ version of human capital theory. 
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2. A critical reading of human capital literature and its institutional policy 
prescriptions 
 
 
 
Human capital theory rests on a one-dimensional and utilitarian view of education: the 
value of education is entirely subsumed in individual earnings derived from its acquisition. 
The value of knowledge and skills are merely economic. Human and physical capitals are 
similar: ‘investment in education behaves in a more or less similar manner as investment in 
physical capital’ (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004: 118). Both neoclassical and 
endogenous growth theories are infused with this utilitarian conception of education. For 
Lucas (1988: 31), the ‘accumulation of human capital involves a sacrifice of current utility’ 
in the form of ‘a decrease in current consumption’ or ‘a less desirable mix of consumption 
goods’.  
 
As stressed by Rose (2005: 163) ‘Schultz and his followers do not deny the importance of 
the “cultural purposes of education”’. For Schultz (1961: 5) ‘it is altogether proper that 
people should prize highly the cultural contributions of education’; knowledge of economic 
returns to human capital investments ‘should not be the exclusive basis for public policy 
decisions in making expenditures for education’. His main concern was that the economic 
contributions of education be recognised and explored. Becker (1962) also acknowledged 
the complexity of the satisfaction procured by education: earnings encompass both 
monetary earnings and ‘psychic earnings’; however, the latter need to be translated into a 
‘monetary equivalent’. ‘Social returns’ or ‘social externalities’ are admitted but they are both 
difficult to measure and the aggregate outcome of individual decisions. Endogenous 
growth theory concedes that human capital accumulation is a ‘social activity, involving 
groups of people, that has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital’ (Lucas 
1988: 17). However, social benefits ‘spill over from one person to another’: externalities are 
an aggregation of individual outcomes (ibid: 40).  
 
One could consider the new focus on quality as an important shift towards a more holistic 
understanding of education. However, it still relies on a purely economic conception of 
education as geared towards the needs of economic competition. Education is defined as 
2.1 Utilitarian and atomistic education  
50 
 
the transmission of cognitive skills which go beyond literacy and numeracy to encompass 
problem-solving and teamwork skills (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008: 627-628): 
problem-posing skills are not considered. From this perspective, ‘quality’ is a matter of 
enhancing the efficiency of the investment, the productivity of capital. 
 
By focusing on individual cognitive achievements, the learning-based human capital model 
transforms education into an individual journey where ‘innate abilities’ overshadow social 
factors in shaping educational achievements. Beyond measurement, the model ignores the 
mechanisms by which quality education contributes to the entrenchment of social 
inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa. Recent analyses that exploit Household Budget or 
Demographic and Health surveys have documented the unequal access to upper levels of 
education according to levels of income in sub-Saharan Africa. In Malawi, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe, the completion of senior secondary and university-level education 
is limited to middle- or upper-income households (Al-Samarrai and Bennell 2007). In 
Tanzania, Lewin and Sabates (2012) show that richer groups have benefited more than less 
privileged groups from the primary enrolment expansion in the 2000s: children from 
privileged households improved their enrolment rates and reduced their likelihood of being 
over age faster than those in poorer households. However, these quintile-based studies 
conceal the social or racial differentiated access to quality schools and the role of private 
education. They also do not say much about the politics and structural factors that 
contribute to shaping these unequal patterns.  
 
Recent developments in the ‘new political economy’ might seem to allow mainstream 
economics to transcend the individualistic conception of education embedded in the 
human capital tradition. General equilibrium models, developed from historical empirical 
evidence of Western countries, were designed that mathematically formalised the role of 
elites or class in the transformation of educational systems.31 The complex relationship 
between industrialisation, democratisation and education expansion that characterised 
Western history between the late 18th and the beginning of the 20th centuries has also been 
proposed as a model for developing countries. Yet the underlying analysis of education 
‘politics’ in developing countries remains simplistic and rests on a reductionist vision of 
                                                 
31 See Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), Bertocchi and Spagat (2003), Galor and Moav 
(2005). 
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‘rent-seeking’ elites who prevent any reform. For instance, Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) 
argue that democratisation in the West, granted by the elite under the threat of revolution, 
resulted in major educational reforms which economically benefited the elite. In developing 
countries, however, education expansion decided upon by the elite to profit from its 
economic externalities might nurture their fear of a ‘democratic revolution’ and lead to 
more repressive regimes. The authors fail to ask why the oligarchy in developing countries 
would not be able, as their 19th century European counterparts were, to lead a successful 
political transition to democracy and mass education. ‘Strictly monitored and targeted’ (ibid: 
308) aid by international agencies would constitute the unique prospect to set in motion a 
virtuous democratisation and growth process through human capital accumulation. 
 
This literature could be praised for providing a political economy reading of education 
policies and their related distributive conflicts. Education policies are no longer driven only 
by aggregated individual earnings; they are also a site of political and social struggles. This 
literature also dwells upon findings from other social sciences, mainly history and sociology. 
However, it is difficult to see where their added value really lies beyond the rising 
mathematical sophistication of their models. These attempts to account for ‘politics’ are 
made within a fundamentally unchanged model; they still rely on methodological 
individualism, which ‘precludes the endogeneity of social forces, structures and relations, 
whether these be economic or otherwise, unless derived from aggregation over individuals’ 
(Fine 2000: 252). Nevertheless, this ability of neoclassical economics to absorb elements of 
‘politics’ – understood as the mechanisms underlying the distribution of resources and 
power - raises major challenges for an alternative thinking intended to exist outside this 
framework. 
 
 
 
A second major critique of human capital theory concerns its failure ‘to contextualise the 
relationship between education and the economy’ (Fine and Rose 2001: 161). Specifically, 
Amsden (1997, 2010) convincingly points out the fallacy of the ‘employability’ paradigm 
that explains un- or underemployment in sub-Saharan countries as the result of the inability 
of education systems to provide quality education. Human capital proponents 
conceptualise the relations between education, the labour market and economic growth 
2.2 Human capital theory and the employability paradigm  
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through a Say’s law approach. However, this neoclassical view that the production of 
skilled workers will automatically create its own demand and generate activities to use these 
skills does not correspond to economic realities. ‘Jobs do not necessarily make an 
appearance simply because the supply of qualified job seekers improves (…). The demand 
side must also be improved’ (Amsden 2010: 60). Johnston (2011) similarly argued that for 
the macroeconomic benefits of education to occur, the education policy should be closely 
tied to an active state industrial and trade policy geared towards job creation.  
 
Relentless references to the ‘Asian tigers’ as a model of economic growth driven by high-
skilled human capital have often been anchored in a romanticised vision of their 
development path and an equally myopic view of the role of education and high-skilled 
labour in their ‘miracle’. The Asian developmental trajectory was originally mostly based on 
a technology copying strategy and low skill-based export manufacturing (Amsden 2001).32 
Similarly, Mauritius, which has been internationally praised and singled out among all 
African countries for its quality education system, grounded its economic take-off on low 
skill-based export manufacturing that enabled the country to economically absorb a large 
proportion of its youth population (Livingstone 1989). Even ‘rates of return’ specialists 
who have, in recent years, tried to quantify the earning premium associated with different 
education levels in Tanzania ignore one core tenet of the knowledge-economy narrative - 
the technologically-driven instability of labour market skills requirements. When specifying 
their Mincerian regression, they assume a constant technological function (Söderbom et al. 
2006: 265).33 A recent international IFC study also raises questions with respect to claims of 
a fundamental skill mismatch in sub-Saharan Africa. In low and medium income countries, 
‘lack of skills’ does not feature as an impediment to business; electricity and finance 
constitute the top constraints faced by formal private firms (IFC 2013).34 McKinsey’s 2012 
report Africa at work confirms that finding workers with appropriate skills and work 
experience is not seen by business leaders in Africa as the most prominent obstacle to 
                                                 
32 Besides, when they gained independence, their education stock was higher than in newly independent sub-Saharan 
African countries; the international aid they received, partly to avoid a ‘communist contagion’, was also incommensurate 
with current levels of aid to sub-Saharan Africa. 
33 Even in developed countries the knowledge economy narrative is not grounded on robust evidence. Brown and Lauder 
(2009: 134-135) note that ‘there is considerable ambiguity in both the qualities that are required for knowledge work and 
considerable amount of impression management in judgments that are made about such workers’. In such a context, 
university global league tables play the role of ‘proxy for a series of desirable characteristics that [transnational companies] 
seek’ (ibid: 137). 
34 Based on World Bank’s enterprise surveys covering 46,556 firms in 106 countries. 
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growth (unlike macroeconomic conditions, political stability and access to finance) 
(McKinsey 2012: 7). 
 
In their exploration of skill formation in newly industrialised economies of East Asia - 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore - Ashton et al. (1999) point to several political 
economy factors that conditioned governments’ abilities to successfully translate 
investments in human resources into enhanced levels of education and skills. They 
underlined the importance of a trade and industrial policy, mechanisms that link trade and 
industrial policy to education and training provision, a high centralisation of control over 
education policy and maintaining these linkages through time. For these authors, ‘part of 
the distinctiveness of the Asian newly industrialised economies is not just the level and type 
of investment in human resource development, but their achievement in linking that 
investment to the requirements of the economy at different stages of economic growth’ 
(ibid: 136). 
 
With the encounter between human capital and new institutionalism, however, education is 
not seen as an insulated domain. But a ‘one-size-fits all’ educational and economic 
blueprint is defined by which market-oriented efficient education institutions – based on 
‘choice, competition, decentralisation, autonomy of schools and accountability for 
outcomes’ (Hanushek and Woessmann 2007: 16) - interact with well-functioning market-
friendly economic institutions constituted of ‘established property rights, open labor and 
product markets, participation in international markets’ (ibid: 20).  
 
 
The third major critique that can be formulated against the human capital literature 
concerns its policy prescriptions. In the recent history of the human capital reform agenda, 
two moments need to be distinguished: input-based educational interventions in primary 
education and the institutional reform agenda. 
 
RORE studies were explicitly designed to provide guidance for policy design and to set 
priorities in allocating funds between education sectors. ‘Allocative decisions have to be 
made within education and rates of return have been used as guides to such decisions’ 
2.3 Human capital theory and educational policy prescriptions 
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(Psacharopoulos 1985: 585). Empirical findings about supposedly universal RORE patterns 
led to two key policy recommendations. Primary education had to receive the highest share 
of education investment and in higher education, cost-sharing schemes were required. In 
parallel, regressions of education production functions were to guide resource allocation 
between various educational inputs: classrooms, textbooks, teacher recruitment and 
teacher-training.  
 
Fields (2007) underlined the limitation of ‘Mincer rates of return’ to guide policy decisions. 
ROREs answer a micro-level question: they account for the increase in the individual 
earning of an individual who gets additional schooling. They cannot allow any assessment 
of the social benefits and social costs of investments in education. They cannot inform 
policy decisions on whether to invest additional social resources in education: ‘policy 
suggestions emanating from such research are less than believable’ (ibid: 58). Bennell 
(1996b) also stressed that due to their methodological weaknesses, aggregate RORE studies 
for sub-Saharan Africa could not drive any decision-making on education investment 
priorities. This critique did not imply that major investments in primary education were no 
longer necessary but that they could not be justified by reference to conventional RORE 
analyses.  
 
Traditional input-based policy prescriptions were also subject to vigorous critiques by 
mainstream economics. Hanushek (1995, 2003) summarised the findings of 96 studies on 
the estimated effects of resources on student performance in developing countries. Results 
showed that the role of class size, teachers’ education, teachers’ experience, teachers’ salary, 
expenditure per pupil or facilities appeared inconclusive: little evidence was found of a 
close relation between higher expenditures and student outcomes. Similarly, Pritchett and 
Filmer (1999) showed that education production functions lacked any analytical power to 
explain decisions on allocation of education resources. Education budgets and policies are 
not determined to maximise the education output but through a political process; common 
recommendations to spend more on a certain input cannot meaningfully inform decision-
making.  
 
Against these damaging critiques, renewed policy prescriptions have been formulated that 
mark the productive encounter between human capital and new institutionalism. Within 
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this framework, the source of inefficiencies in education systems is the absence of ‘built-in 
performance incentives’ (Hanushek 1995: 242). Education reforms should therefore aim at 
radically changing the structure of incentives within education systems. Three institutional 
features are supposed to induce significant improvements in students’ learning 
achievements: ‘choice and competition’; ‘decentralization and autonomy of schools’; and 
‘accountability’. In the context of the ‘learning shift’, and given the magnitude of quality 
challenges in developing countries, the need for deep institutional changes has become 
even more pressing (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008). 
 
To support these reforms, political economy is called on in order to better understand the 
strategies of those who resist the prescribed changes. Bureaucrats and trade unionists are 
the main impediments to the instillation of performance incentives and innovation within 
education systems. For Pritchett and Filmer (1999: 224) ‘the enormous inefficiencies in 
education spending’ are due ‘to high spending on teachers inputs’. The low cost-
effectiveness of education expenditures is the direct outcome of ‘government failures’ 
fuelled by incompetence or corruption. Besides, government cannot resist teachers’ ability 
to defend their welfare through powerful unions. Teachers exploit their better knowledge 
of the education production function to maximise their utility to the detriment of students 
and parents’ interests (ibid). According to Hanushek (1995: 242), ‘public employee unions 
that resist the individual differentiation of workers’ reinforce the careless attitude towards 
performance and outcomes that characterise government agencies. Tactics or devices must 
be crafted to mitigate resisting agents’ power.35 The explicit goal assigned to educational 
institutional reforms is therefore to ‘re-engineer’ the state and to ‘discipline’ teachers. 
Efficient public schools need to be run with private sector methods.36 Setting up outcome-
oriented institutions, including performance-based teachers’ pay, should become the main 
goal for education policy-makers (Bruns et al. 2011, World Bank 2010c).  
 
This radical programme of systematic structural changes is, however, only supported by 
flimsy scientific evidence. 
                                                 
35 ‘It is unrealistic to assume that the staff will automatically adopt new policies that increase the risks of unemployment, 
that eliminate some of the implicit benefits in their current employment and that potentially require new techniques and 
more work (…) Either these people must be brought into the process of change or mechanisms must be developed to 
ensure that they do not sabotage any changes’ (Hanushek 1995: 243). 
36 This set of institutional reforms is not confined to developing countries. For instance, Ball (2012: 30) identified two 
core dimensions of what he called the neoliberal ‘curriculum of reforms’: privatisation/parental choice and the 
reconfiguration of the state education system along managerial rules borrowed from the private sector. 
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Two major components of the new institutional education agenda have so far achieved 
ambiguous results. UNESCO (2013: 260-264) insists that there is a lack of conclusive 
evidence on the benefits of performance-pay for teachers. To set up evaluation systems for 
teachers has intractable practical challenges; 37  in some instances, such schemes have 
induced competition between teachers that has adversely affected low achievers; in others 
performance mechanisms have encouraged teachers to teach to the test, thus undermining 
the broader learning goal. Besides, performance-based pay is often promoted as a way to 
tackle teacher absenteeism while the structural causes of this critical phenomenon that 
impedes quality education are hardly investigated. 38  UNESCO (2013: 272-274) also 
challenges the claims of the intrinsic capacity of ‘low cost private schools’ to deliver quality. 
Context-specific conditions that underlie private schools’ actual better achievements are in 
need of scholarly investigation.  
 
More generally, for Fine and Rose (2001: 156-157), ‘human capital theory offers no insights 
on education as such from an analytical view […] at its core, the theory is simply an 
assessment of a stream of costs and benefits, whether borne or accruing to individuals or 
to the economy’. It essentially begins without any understanding of education processes. 
Even within the cognitive skills enriched model, key assumptions have not altered and 
education has remained an ‘unopened black box’ (Fine and Rose 2001). The model does 
not explain the complex pedagogical process that underpins the production functions, the 
mechanisms that translate inputs into outputs (learning achievements). Within this 
framework, education is not a specific domain, it is a-historical and its organisation is not 
seen as the result of specific national economic and political forces: market rules are 
universal and they apply to education as to any other sector in any national context. 
Therefore, there is no need to demonstrate, analytically, the link between prescribed 
institutional reforms and education outcomes. ‘Not many examples of operational, large-
scale attempts at competition [in the education sector] have been evaluated. Nonetheless, 
the benefits of competition are so well documented in other spheres of activity that it is 
                                                 
37 According to UNESCO (2013: 262), ‘assessing teachers for performance related pay relies on sophisticated analysis that 
is difficult to undertake even in more advanced systems’. 
38 Tanzania is badly affected by teacher absenteeism: according to AERC/World Bank (2011) on average, 25% of primary 
teachers are absent on any given day and 25% are in school but not in the classroom. As a result, primary school students 
are taught for just 2 hours a day. Typically, this report does not explore the root causes of the phenomenon nor does it 
call for further research on the matter.  
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quite inconceivable that more competition would not be beneficial for schools’ (Hanushek 
and Woessmann 2008: 73).  
 
Human capital economists fully admit their ‘fundamental ignorance’: ‘we cannot describe 
what makes a good or a bad teacher or a good or a bad school’ (Hanushek 1995: 236). 
‘Uncertainty exists about the best set of policies’ (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008: 659). 
And while they distinguish teachers as the key factor in achieving quality, Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2007: 161) recognise that ‘it is difficult if not impossible to identify aspects of 
teachers that could form the basis for policies and regulations encouraging good teachers in 
the classrooms’. To them this ignorance is not seen as a critical obstacle to progress: ‘we 
should learn to live with (the) fact that we won’t be able to describe the educational process 
very well in the near future’ (Hanushek 1995: 236). This implies ‘finding policies that 
acknowledge and work within this fundamental ignorance’: experimentation and innovation 
should help overcome this lack of understanding (ibid).  
 
This call for more experiments to identify efficient education institutions echoes the rising 
number of randomised controlled trials (RCT) conducted in education.39 Various strategies 
to encourage school attendance or improve learning achievements have been tested: 
providing deworming medicines to children (Kremer and Miguel 2004), conditional and 
unconditional cash-transfers, vouchers, classroom reorganisation, remedial education and 
cameras in classrooms to try to reduce teacher absenteeism (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). 
Pritchett (2013) draws on a series of RCTs to substantiate his claims regarding the intrinsic 
lack of relevance of traditional educational interventions such as higher pay for teachers, 
higher qualification requirements for teachers, the supply of textbooks or reduction in class 
size. 
 
The RCT literature has increasingly influenced mainstream development economics and aid 
agencies. Nevertheless, RCTs have not gone unchallenged: their internal validity, ethical 
dilemmas, supposed ideological neutrality and fallacious utility to inform policy-making 
have all been thoroughly contested. 40  Within an RCT framework, schooling trajectory 
                                                 
39 This type of empirical research has developed in a context of growing scepticism about aid effectiveness: external 
assistance rests on ‘wishy-washy’ evidence of cross-country regressions and case studies rather than ‘hard evidence’ 
(Banerjee 2006), which leads to a major waste of resources and a weak impact on development. Gathering evidence on 
what does and does not work would help decision-makers to design more effective policies. 
40 See, for instance, Cartwright and Hardie (2012); Barrett and Carter (2010); Labrousse (2010), Deaton (2009); Ravaillon 
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would be solely determined by individual choices, for good or ill: ‘all those people who 
drop out somewhere between primary school and college and those who never start school, 
many, perhaps most, are the victims of some misjudgement somewhere: parents who give 
up too soon, teachers who never tried to teach them, the students’ own diffidence’ 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2012: 95). Individual educational success would be critically 
determined by ‘patterns of belief and behavior’ (ibid). The systemic, historically grounded 
nature of education, inserted within a complex set of social, political and economic 
relations, is being denied. The onus of tackling educational failures (access and learning) is 
being shifted to the poor. 
 
Cartwright and Hardie (2012) have demonstrated that ideal (i.e. internally valid) RCTs can 
indeed show whether or not an intervention worked somewhere, in a specific setting and 
population (‘it worked/did not work here’). But because they are not grounded in a robust 
analytical account of causal principles and support factors they cannot forecast whether or 
not the intervention ‘will work there’. For Deaton, randomised evaluations of projects are 
useful to assess their average effect but lead to a ‘narrowness of scope’: the focus of the 
evaluation becomes ‘too narrow to tell us “what works” in development, to design policy 
or to advance scientific knowledge about development processes’ (Deaton 2009: 3). 
Besides, RCTs tend to circumvent political deliberation. As argued by Cartwright and 
Hardie (2012: 161&164), ‘because they allegedly embody an infallible route to the truth’, 
even ideal RCTs ‘attempt to impose structured, rules-based procedures, where success 
depends on a process we call thinking or deliberating’. RCTs tend to provide policy makers 
with a pre-set, ready-made and often ideologically grounded solution to ‘fix’ an education 
crisis. 
 
The next section situates the specific and evolving place of secondary education in donors’ 
education discourse, with a specific focus on the World Bank. It shows how evolutions in 
the global education aid agenda have directly reflected the trajectory of human capital 
literature as discussed above. It also illustrates the continuing ideological tension within the 
international community.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
(2009). 
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3. Secondary education and the global education agenda 
 
 
In the 1960s-1970s, donors’ education interventions largely favoured post-primary 
education: the World Bank particularly, guided by its manpower strategy, promoted the 
diversification or vocationalisation of secondary education and development of higher 
education in sub-Saharan Africa (King 1990, Heyneman 1985). 41 The World Bank’s vision 
of education at that time was not confined to its economic benefit. Its social dimension 
was clearly recognised: ‘the individual economic payoff is often illusory’ but ‘they are 
important social benefits and (…) education is essential to maintain one’s relative position 
in the social order’ (World Bank, 1971: 6).  
 
However, since the late 1980s, the World Bank’s education agenda and interventions have 
been progressively reshaped to reflect the human capital/RORE main finding: primary 
education would be the most profitable investment. The proportion of World Bank 
funding allocated to primary education increased from 22.9 per cent of total education 
lending in 1980-84 to 37.8 per cent in 1995-1999 (Mundy 2002). The rising influence of the 
World Bank, converted to the ‘rates of return’ prescriptions, contributed to shaping a 
global education agenda – Education for All, Millennium Development Goals, Fast Track 
Initiative – almost entirely dedicated to primary education. 42  This primacy of primary 
education was achieved after a battle between the World Bank and UN agencies, 
advocating for a broader definition of ‘basic education’ beyond primary education. This 
competition was underpinned by an ideological antagonism between the World Bank’s 
human capital framework and the UN agencies’ rights-based approach (Bermingham 
2011).43 The priority given to primary education clearly skewed government and donor 
investments away from other education levels, especially secondary education (Johnston 
                                                 
41 In that period, some donors, notably SIDA, UNESCO and UNICEF, supported non formal education and literacy 
programmes in developing countries, particularly in Tanzania. 
42 Rose (2005) provides a detailed account of the construction, between the 1980s and the end of the 1990s, of the World 
Bank’s hegemony in education, which has prompted the ‘triumph of human capital’. Its rising analytical power went hand 
in hand with an increasing financial pre-eminence. 
43 For an exposition of the right-based approach see Tickly and Barrett (2011) or Jones (2007). 
3.1 The World Bank and secondary education: from neglect to the 
promotion of ‘public-private partnership’ for mass secondary education 
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2011, Thin 2006).44 OECD-DAC statistics vividly illustrate this international shift. From 
the end of the 1990s, when donors globally committed to the EFA-MDG compact, 
overseas development assistance (ODA) to secondary education declined sharply over the 
next decade (Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2-1: Shares of education sub-sectors in the total ODA to education, 1998-2011 
Source: the author, based on OECD-DAC aid statistics (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm). Note: 
commitments; all recipients, all donors. ‘Secondary education’ includes vocational training. ‘Basic education’ includes 
primary education, early childhood and non-formal education; ‘post-secondary’ includes ‘higher education (inc. 
scholarships)’ and ‘advanced technical and managerial training’; ‘Unspecified level’ refers to ‘education policy and 
administration’, ‘education facilities and training’, ‘teacher training’ and ‘educational research’. OECD-DAC statistics 
continue to bear the imprint of the historical battle on the definition of ‘basic education’, won by the World Bank and its 
focus on primary education. 
 
Nevertheless, the World Bank, which had been instrumental in forging the international 
primacy of primary education, also played a ground-breaking role in recognising the 
detrimental effect of the exclusive focus on primary education and the need to reinvest in 
post-primary education. In 2003 it established its Secondary Education in Africa (SEIA) 
initiative ‘to assist countries to develop sustainable strategies for expansion and quality 
improvements in secondary education and training’ (World Bank 2008: ix). In 2005, it 
published its New Agenda for Secondary Education that acknowledged the ‘historical neglect’ of 
secondary education and called for ‘mass secondary education’ (World Bank 2005: xi& xii).  
 
                                                 
44  Mamdani (1993) critically analysed the role of the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes and primary 
education focus in the decline of African universities. 
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The World Bank’s renewed interest in secondary education has been firmly grounded 
within the ‘global knowledge economy’ narrative. The need for secondary education 
expansion is justified by the successful expansion of primary education within the EFA-
MDG context. But at the same time, this educational level, at the interface between 
primary education, higher education and the labour market, is also meant to respond to ‘the 
economic challenges presented by globalization, and the dizzying pace of the knowledge-
based economy’ (World Bank 2005: xiii). The path towards mass secondary education 
implies a break with the traditional significance of this education level. Developing 
countries need to arrange a fundamental shift in the content of secondary education in 
order to address the fundamental ‘skill mismatch’ they experience.45 The curriculum needs 
to be reshaped away from an exclusive academic orientation geared towards the 
preparation of a small elite for higher education; it needs to incorporate new competencies 
and skills to enable students to integrate in the labour market. 46  
 
In terms of funding and management, the World Bank’s vision for secondary education 
entails two fundamental dimensions. First, the Bank recognises the fiscal conundrum posed 
by the prospect of mass secondary education.47 It suggests a three-pronged strategy: a 
broad public-private partnership that encompasses families, communities and the private 
sector;48 substantial contributions by aid agencies; and the submission of public secondary 
education to a new public management regime based on ‘incentives and accountability 
mechanisms’. The path towards mass secondary education should propel a fundamental 
reconfiguration of the role of the state, from education provider to mere regulator of 
market-based provision.49   
 
                                                 
45 ‘There is a gap between what is currently being taught in secondary schools and the knowledge and skills required if 
countries, firms, and individuals are to be competitive’. (World Bank 2005: xxi). 
46 The argument here is not to deny any relation between education and the labour market. Rather, the intent is to point 
out the risks of mis-framing the research agenda and policy debate on this theme, under the hegemonic influence of the 
human capital paradigm. This is all the more important than education systems across the world are being profoundly 
reshuffled on the ground of alleged demands of the labour market while, as discussed in previous section, the relationship 
between the economy and education remains, within the human capital framework, a complete black box. 
47 ‘Many developing countries will have serious problems bearing the full financial burden of expanding access and 
improving quality in secondary education.’ (World Bank 2005: xxii). 
48 The World Bank recognises a difference between lower and upper secondary education: ‘governments are expected to 
finance the compulsory phase of secondary education, families and communities should play a more active role in 
financing the post-compulsory phase’ (World Bank 2005: xxii). 
49 ‘Significant changes in the economic and political conditions that once framed government action have cleared the way 
for new forms of interaction between the state, communities, and markets in the provision of secondary education. The 
changes have not made the state’s presence in secondary education less significant. On the contrary, governments are 
increasingly being required to play a leading role in steering, monitoring, and supporting service delivery’ (World Bank 
2005: xxiii). 
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The perfect correspondence between this agenda and the human capital/new 
institutionalism policy prescriptions criticised in Section 2 appears evident. Despite their 
fragile scientific base, the human capital employability paradigm and menu for educational 
reforms have exerted a profound influence on the World Bank’s discourse on secondary 
education. Until quite recently however, within the international community, the World 
Bank has remained quite solitary in its secondary education endeavour.50 As argued by the 
agency, ‘the constituencies and champions for the subsector appear to be weak or non-
existent’ (World Bank 2005: xix). Nevertheless, the years 2010-2012 marked a turning point 
when conditions materialised for an extended international coalition to support post-
primary education in the context of a renewed attention to quality education. The World 
Bank’s 2011 Learning for All Strategy and Education for All Global Monitoring Reports 2012 and 
2013/4 embody, with some divergences, the reversal in the global education agenda.  
 
 
The publication of the World Bank’s 2011 Education Strategy for 2020: Learning for All - 
Investing in people’s knowledge and skills to promote development was an influential moment in the 
recent history of international aid for education. The concern for quality is not new in the 
Bank’s education strategic documents. The Bank started its ‘search for low cost quality’ in 
the late 1970s (King 1990). But the 2011 Strategy represents the exact translation, in a 
programmatic document, of Hanushek and Woessman’s academic work on the relationship 
between cognitive skills and economic growth and their rejection of traditional input-based 
education policies.  
 
Education, reframed under the label ‘learning’, is mainly valued in relation to its impact on 
economic growth. Education systems should aim at providing children and youth with ‘the 
knowledge, skills, or competencies necessary to adapt to a competitive and increasingly 
globalized economy’ (World Bank 2011: 17). The strategy admits that little is known about 
the mechanisms conducive to quality education: ‘the debate on what is an effective learning 
environment and how to achieve it is ongoing’ (World Bank 2011: 29). Nevertheless, a 
programme of systematic institutional changes is proposed to achieve better learning 
                                                 
50 The African Development Bank, the World Bank’s sister, being an exception. 
3.2 The ‘secondary education-quality-skills’ shift and the international 
community’s competing agendas 
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outcomes. Developing countries are advised to instil performance-based incentives for 
teachers, set-up results-based financing mechanisms, strengthen the autonomy of and 
competition among schools, develop information systems to document results and set-up 
cash-transfer or voucher mechanisms. The Strategy also calls for more impact evaluations 
while recognising the difficulty of using randomised controlled trials to deepen the 
understanding of education quality and sector wide education reforms (World Bank 2011: 
40). They may, however, be useful to find the ‘right incentives’ and organisational forms 
that ‘work’. These are systematically pre-identified in relation to the market such as ‘school-
based management, teacher incentives, information for accountability and leveraging the 
private sector’ (World Bank 2011: 41 and 64).  
 
The systematic deployment of this apparatus, geared towards a methodical re-engineering 
of the state, has become the core of the World Bank’s education agenda. Suggested policy 
interventions are less concerned with education or learning processes than with a reshuffle 
of institutions to make them more efficient in transforming available domestic and 
international resources into ‘results’ that simply have to be measured. Following Jones 
(1998: 152), it can be argued that this set of institutional pre-conditions for ‘successful 
educational policy and practice override any views about educational processes the Bank 
might wish to promote’. 
 
The World Bank is not the only institution shaping the global education agenda but 
without doubt it is the most influential. Its ‘learning turn’ has been widely embraced by the 
international community as shown by discussions about a ‘learning goal’ in the context of 
post-2015 negotiations (United Nations 2013). There is today a wide recognition of the 
necessity to address issues of quality. However, beyond this consensus over the diagnosis, 
the 2013/4 Education for All Global Monitoring Report (GMR), dedicated to ‘quality’, vividly 
demonstrates the existence of competing ‘learning’ agendas within the international 
community. Its policy recommendations, centred on teachers, largely depart from the 
World Bank’s new public management agenda applied to quality education. Teachers and 
their unions are not castigated here as rent-seeking agents who block reforms geared 
towards quality and whose incentives hence need to be restructured. A comprehensive 
approach to the teaching profession is proposed, where the ‘teacher question’ is not 
addressed in isolation from issues related to curriculum and assessment systems, where 
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better pay, existence of a career path, suitable pre-service training and professional support, 
as well as appropriate responses to teachers’ misconducts, may critically serve the learning 
agenda (UNESCO 2013: Chapter 6).  
 
In the context of the international learning shift, a consensus has simultaneously emerged 
regarding the necessity of expanding the global education agenda to post-primary education. 
In 2010, the Fast Track Initiative Board decided to broaden the organisation’s mandate to 
cover all six EFA goals (Bermingham 2012: 566)51 and to alter their definition of ‘basic 
education’ to ‘early child development and primary and lower secondary education’.52 The 
2012 EFA Global Monitoring Report, which calls for ‘universal lower secondary education by 
2030’ (UNESCO 2012: I)53, has unambiguously reflected this new strategic orientation. The 
document, entitled Youth and skills also wishes to ‘put education to work’; it is specifically 
concerned with the linkages between education and the labour market. In conflating the 
two themes, the document implicitly posits the primordial role of secondary education in 
the relationship between education and the labour market. It recommends extending the 
coverage of formal junior secondary education, in particular via the abolition of school fees; 
improving the relevance of upper secondary education to labour market needs and 
developing skills training schemes for disadvantaged youth: the new interest in secondary 
education is coupled with renewed considerations for vocational education and training 
(VET).54 
 
The 2012 GMR provides another striking piece of evidence of existing pluralistic 
educational approaches in global spheres. 55  For instance, according to the report, job 
                                                 
51 The EFA goals are: i) expand early childhood education; ii) provide free and compulsory basic education for all; iii) 
promote learning and life skills for young people and adults; iv) increase adult literacy; v) achieve gender parity and gender 
equality and vi) improve the quality of education.  
52 https://www.globalpartnership.org. 
53 ‘Universal lower secondary education by 2030’ (UNESCO 2012: I). 
54 There is no place here to discuss the extensive literature on vocational training in sub-Saharan Africa. In a famous 
article, Foster (1965) pointed to the vocational training ‘fallacy’ in sub-Saharan Africa; the questionable effectiveness of 
formal vocational training programmes has been widely documented (King 2009; Angel‐Urdinola et al. 2010). However, 
McGrath (2012) deplores the general scepticism over VET in the academic literature; he revisits from a theoretical 
perspective the relationship between VET and development and considers ‘VET as a means of human development’. For 
an extensive discussion see various articles in International Journal of Educational Development Volume 32, Issue 5, September 
2012 ‘Skills and Development’.  
55 World Development Reports occupy a similar place in the international development landscape. As an example, the 
WDR 2004 ‘Making services work for poor people’ - a document that has, for many aspects, prefigured the World Bank’s 
2011 Learning for All strategy - recognised education as a multifaceted process and explicitly admitted the role played by 
education in a nation’s social fabric. ‘Quality’ education implies the encouragement of creativity and the successful 
diffusion of values. These divergences may reflect competing thinking within the Bank, with an education department 
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creation is not the developmental priority; young people are trapped in subsistence work 
because of a lack of skills, not a lack of jobs, 56  and if imparted with appropriate 
‘entrepreneurial’ skills, they can use self-employment as a route out of poverty.57 Yet, this 
employability paradigm coexists with a call for a state-driven skill development strategy tied 
to an industrial policy, following the South Korean model. The report also identifies three 
types of ‘skills’: ‘foundation’ (including literacy and numeracy), ‘transferable’ (including 
creativity, leadership, and entrepreneurial capabilities) and ‘technical and vocational’ 
(UNESCO 2012: 14). Although these categories coexist with the World Bank’s own 
typology ‘cognitive/ non-cognitive/technical skills’ (UNESCO 2012: 83), there has been 
no analysis of the concurrence of these two sets. This may well reflect the unresolved 
tensions within the ‘education community’ between behavioural views of education, 
unambiguously adopted by the World Bank,58 and more constructivist approaches. The 
report obviously constitutes a synthesis between various – contradictory - bodies of 
literature.  
 
Finally, to achieve the Education for All agenda, as extended to quality and junior 
secondary education, the 2012 and 2013/4 Global Monitoring Reports’ funding strategy 
diverges from the ‘value for money’ paradigm. ‘Spending more matters’ (UNESCO 2012: 
9): governments and the international community are called upon to provide additional 
funding. Both reports systematically challenge alternative solutions advocated by the new 
institutionalist current, which prioritise more efficient use of available resources: the 
‘considerable risks’ of performance-based aid, under consideration by the World Bank and 
DFID, are highlighted (UNESCO 2012: 154); scepticism is expressed about ‘low cost 
private schools’ (UNESCO 2012: 77; UNESCO 2013: 272-274) and cash transfers; and a 
commitment to public schooling as ‘the best way to reach the poorest’ is asserted 
(UNESCO 2012: 77).   
 
                                                                                                                                               
faithful to an orthodox human capital perspective and other departments, in charge of the WDR, driven by a more 
pluralistic approach. 
56 ‘Creating more jobs will not fix the problem if a sizeable proportion of young people do not have the skills needed to 
fill them’ (UNESCO 2012: 15). 
57 ‘Another route out of subsistence work is self-employment. Many young people in urban centres in the Arab States and 
sub-Saharan Africa see this as a viable option. In 2008, a survey in Egypt revealed that about 73 per cent of young people 
would be happy to become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial skills, however, are lacking among poor urban youth’ 
(UNESCO 2012: 28).  
58 ‘Non cognitive skills’ are assessed through questions that ‘capture traits, behaviours and preferences, and tries to 
distinguish more stable personality traits from more malleable non-cognitive skills’ (UNESCO 2012: 83). 
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The international community does not constitute, in the education sector as in any other 
sector, a monolithic block (Rose 2005, King 1990, 2007). Even within the World Bank, 
different influences compete within a dominant theoretical framework (Jones 1992; 
Psacharopoulos 2006). Despite this diversity, the current aid regime has provoked a 
convergence of discourses and practices; donor specificities have eroded (Mosse 2005). 
Even UNESCO, despite its commitment to a right-based approach, seems to embrace the 
human capital doctrine. In January 2008 the organisation took part in the World Economic 
Forum where it advocated for a greater involvement of the private sector and for Public 
Private Partnerships to achieve EFA (Verger and Novelli 2008). In this context, one may 
argue that the 2012 and 2013/4 EFA Global Monitoring Reports, as hybrid intellectual objects, 
testify to the enduring ideological battle, within the global education policy-making sphere, 
between the human capital model and a more pluralistic line; they constitute attempts to 
contest the World Bank’s hegemonic project in education. 
 
Against these frictions, a consensus has however emerged regarding the need for indicators 
and targets to monitor post-2015 junior secondary education and learning goals. The last 
part of this chapter critically examines past international experiences in managing education 
by numbers. 
 
 
 
Policy use of international educational data is not a recent phenomenon (Torres 1999). 
Since its establishment, UNESCO has produced comparable statistics to help its member 
states plan their national education programmes (Cusso and D’Amico 2005). In the 1960s 
its regional conferences agreed a target of achieving universal primary education by 1980, 
as an instrument to mobilise financial resources (Jansen 2005, King and Rose 2005a). In 
this earlier phase, however, international education statistics were chiefly used to support 
educational policy-making and assessment in relation to nationally defined objectives. Since 
the 1990s, they have increasingly fulfilled a much more normative function and contributed 
to the diffusion of standardised policies (Cusso 2012).  
 
The human capital / new institutional turn, in promoting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ educational 
model and a managerial imperative, has driven a fundamental reformulation of the role of 
3.3 Managing quality secondary education by numbers? 
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the international educational statistical apparatus. In the context of the definition of the 
EFA-MDG agenda at the end of the 1990s, the World Bank designed a model of optimum 
educational expenditures based on international best practices, that prescribes, in particular, 
optimal budgetary shares for the education sector and primary education, most appropriate 
level of teachers’ salaries, recommended percentage of private education and most suitable 
pupil/teacher ratio (Bruns et al. 2003, Cusso and D’Aminco 2005). By replicating this 
model, developing countries would allegedly be able to achieve the MDG education target 
– universal primary education by 2015. This benchmarking logic directly informed the 
design of the Fast Track Initiative and its ‘indicative framework’ (Bermingham 2011; Rose 
2005b) and has remained a core tenet of the Global Partnership for Education: to access 
external funds, countries need to prepare ‘sound and sustainable’ Education Sector 
Development Plans compliant with externally defined and standardised criteria. 59  The 
indicative allocation of GPE funds to various countries is also determined on the basis of 
‘country scores’ derived from a composite index that incorporates countries’ ‘institutional 
performances’, as calculated by the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment score (GPE 2012b).60 
 
Moreover, in recent years, the World Bank has set up its System Assessment and 
Benchmarking for Education Results (SABER), ‘a comprehensive tool for system 
diagnostics to assess the characteristics and effectiveness of education systems (…) against 
global standards, best practices, and performance of comparator countries’ (World Bank 
2010d: 28).61 The Bank acknowledges that analyses based on ‘a case-by-case basis’ have the 
‘advantage of being tailored to the specific needs of each country’ but the drawbacks of 
‘being time-consuming, duplicating work and lacking comparability’ (ibid). ‘Benchmarking’, 
‘global standards’ and ‘best practices’ have become critical engines of the international 
educational policy reform agenda. 
                                                 
59 ‘Benchmarking’ is among the nine guiding principles of the initiative (GPE 2012a: 3).  
60 The CPIA has been developed by the World Bank to determine the amount of IDA resources a country receives. This 
composite indicator allows a ranking of countries according to the quality of their policy and institutional environment as 
assessed by the Bank’s staff against a set of criteria. In their analysis of the ‘uses and abuses of governance indicators’, 
Arndt and Oman (2007) highlight methodological issues raised by the CPIA’s construction, among which the likelihood 
of correlation of errors among the 37 sources from which the composite indicator is constructed and its lack of 
comparability over time. Van Waeyenberge (2009) provides a critical analysis of the tool, both a device to allocate aid and 
a normative benchmarking. She argues that the CPIA ‘seeks to promote further the adoption of the World Bank’s 
traditional (neo-liberal) reform agenda’ and because ‘the selective allocation of aid flows on the basis of the CPIA implies 
the imposition of a set of conditions to be put in place by a country prior to the receipt of the aid flows, the tool 
performs a strong disciplinary role with regard to a recipient country’s policy space (ibid: 806). 
61 http://saber.worldbank.org/index.cfm (accessed 05/04/2014). The tool was recently rebranded as ‘Systems Approach 
for Better Education Results’: benchmarking with a more human face. 
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Over the last two decades, international surveys of students’ learning achievements, such as 
PISA62, have also come to occupy a prominent place in international and national debates 
on education policies. These surveys have mostly concerned developed and emerging 
countries but similar exercises have also been conducted in sub-Saharan Africa - by 
SACMEQ in Southern Africa and PASEC in West Africa.63 A learning indicator has also 
been added to the FTI indicative framework (Bermingham 2012: 566). The ‘cognitive skills 
turn’ has lent a new impetus to the search for global comparability. In 2013, in the context 
of post-2015 negotiations, the OECD launched its ‘PISA for Development’ initiative 
aiming at the full incorporation of developing countries within the global educational 
ranking.64 The G20 initiative has also asked a group of major international organisations – 
the World Bank, the OECD, ILO and UNESCO - to create internationally comparable 
skills indicators with ‘particular reference to low income countries’ (UNESCO 2012: 83).65 
 
Millennium Development Goals indicators and targets have had unintended effects. They 
contributed to a narrow focus on primary education (Colclough 2005) and to the dropping 
of quality and equity issues from the global education agenda (Unterhalter 2013; King and 
Rose 2005a; Jansen 2005). In the case of the FTI ‘indicative framework’, Rose (2005) 
argues that the targets unduly constrained national policy-makers’ room for manoeuvre, 
despite claims of flexibility and adaptability to national specificities. More generally, 
international targets, incorporated in national PRSPs and tied to budget support 
disbursements, may be understood as ‘new, perhaps more oblique forms of conditionality 
for developing countries’ (King and Rose 2005b: 97). In the case of Burkina Faso, Samuel 
(2013) stresses that, once FTI funds were obtained, international policy prescriptions, 
perceived as imposed conditionalities, met with internal resistance and were only partially 
                                                 
62 Programme for International Student Assessment. The development of these surveys occurred against the background 
of the conflict between UNESCO and other agencies (the World Bank, the OCED and the EU), the former resisting 
pressures to reorient its statistics to accommodate alleged demands of the globalised economy. UNESCO ‘never 
published classifications, or indices, explicitly comparing performances of countries, especially in the area of students’ 
learning achievement’ (Cusso 2006: 534). This reluctance partly derived from the organisation’s historical commitment to 
countries’ cultural diversity. UNESCO eventually aligned with other agencies at the end of the 1990s, a sign of its loss of 
leadership (Cusso 2006). 
63 The Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium to Measure Education Quality and Programme d’Analyse des Systèmes 
Educatifs de la CONFEMEN. 
64 http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisafordevelopment/. Another global research initiative – the Learning Metrics Task Force, 
implemented by the Brookings Institution and UNESCO Institute of Statistics with the support of about 30 organisations 
(international aid agencies, NGOs, philanthropic foundations and multinational publishing companies), aims at forging a 
global consensus around ‘what learning is important globally?’ and ‘how it should be measured’ 
(http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/universal-education/learning-metrics-task-force/about). 
65 The intent is to export to developing countries the experience of the EU reference framework of eight competencies 
that combine knowledge, skills, and attitudes. For a critique of this framework see Bruno et al. (2010). 
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implemented. At the same time, the Education Sector Analysis – a detailed system 
diagnosis based on a standardized framework - conducted by international experts to insert 
the Burkinabe education system within the FTI benchmarking logic, produced vague, 
contradictory and opaque numbers. Despite claims of precision, this allowed for fiction, 
rather than evidence, to be installed at the heart of educational policy-making. According to 
an FTI evaluation, monitoring of indicators on financial allocations to education was 
difficult because of ‘incomplete data on both domestic and aid investments in the sector’ 
(Bermingham 2012: 567). Eventually, this technology of quantification, described as if 
‘governed by the rules of science, not politics’ (Samoff and Stromquist 2001: 647), 
contributes to the curtailment of locally driven innovations: ‘African educators are urged to 
(…) eschew radically new ways of thinking’ (Samoff 2007: 498).66 
 
These critiques invite speculation on the possible consequences of subjecting quality and 
secondary education to a similar technology of quantification. Managing quality secondary 
education by numbers may well help galvanise international and national forces around two 
themes that have been neglected for two decades.67 An agreement on a global indicator to 
monitor financial commitments, as suggested by the GMR 2013/4 (UNESCO 2013: 8-9), 
may help crystallise a campaign for national and international resource mobilisation. Yet, in 
an era of budget austerity, the addition of junior secondary education to the agenda may 
also lead to reallocation within the existing envelope.  
 
It should also be noted that the likely choice of monitoring a post-2015 learning goal 
through internationally standardised tests with quantitative targets focused on measurable 
basic skills may have the unintended effect of jeopardising the very possibility of fulfilling 
the goal (Barrett 2011). The quest for a universally valid measure of ‘quality’ denies the 
contingent and evolving character of learning objectives. It disregards the fact that the 
features of quality education are the outcome of locally and historically specific political 
negotiations (Tikly and Barrett 2011, Samoff 2007). The risks attached to the reductionist 
                                                 
66 For more general discussions, not specific to education, on the politics of quantification and the political and social use 
of numbers, see for instance Bruno and Didier (2013), Desrosieres (2008) or Porter (1995). In his analysis of African 
development social and economic statistics, ‘mostly produced for the consumption of the development community’ 
(Jerven 2013: 105), Jerven emphasises the political significance of these numbers, ‘malleable’ outcomes of a negotiation 
process rather than outputs of a technical exercise. For a recent discussion on ‘education policy as numbers’ in developed 
countries see Lingard (2014). 
67 Most authors recognise the important role played by the MDG target in propelling the impressive primary enrolment 
expansion in developing countries since the 2000s. According to UNESCO (2013: 6) ‘better global monitoring of learning 
can push governments to make certain that all children not only go to school but are achieving the basics’. 
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nature of international targets (Maxwell 2003) are high. Indeed, as argued by Jansen (2005: 
378) ‘quality cannot be reduced to single or even composite statistical indices, without 
injuring the concept (quality) itself’. These international surveys constitute benchmarking 
exercises: they allow a ranking of countries in relation to their educational performances. 
To avoid losing the competitiveness race, ‘bad performers’ are induced to reform their 
inefficient educational systems in line with human capital institutional prescriptions (Bruno 
2009, Brown et al. 1997).68 If reduced to an instrument to legitimise the implementation of 
the human capital educational reform agenda, an international target for ‘learning’ may only 
result in the insertion of African education systems within the ‘indefinite discipline of 
competitiveness’ (Bruno 2009).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Over the last three decades human capital theory has dominated economic research on 
education and development; it has also largely contributed to shape - or rather legitimate – 
aid agencies’ educational policy interventions. This chapter illustrated the ability of the 
model to evolve and respond to its internal critiques. Its most recent offshoot – the 
cognitive-skills enriched model with its new emphasis on ‘learning’ - is a valuable departure 
from the focus on access to primary education that prevailed in the 1990s-2000s. 
Nevertheless, this evolution has happened despite essentially unaltered assumptions of 
methodological individualism and primacy of individual choices. It is underlined by a 
utilitarian conception of education geared towards economic competition’s exclusive needs. 
Finally, while the education-economic growth relationship lies at the core of the human 
capital narrative, its literature fails to contextualise this relationship: the overarching 
employability paradigm assumes that African labour markets will obey Say’s law – that the 
supply of skilled labour will create its own demand – in defiance of economic realities.  
 
The cognitive-skills enriched model has, however, given rise to a renewed educational 
agenda that conflates quality, post-primary education and marketable skills. The renewed 
interest in secondary education contributes to the reframing, in a knowledge economy 
idiom, of the education-work nexus that used to be at the heart of the manpower strategy 
                                                 
68 Policy speeches and the media in Europe have evoked a ‘PISA chock’ (Pons, 2012). Yet Pons and Mons (2013) 
demonstrate the absence of any direct link between PISA results and educational policy-making in France. In this country, 
policy-makers have rather used PISA to confirm and legitimise pre-existing policy orientations. 
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in the 1970s. In parallel, the encounter between human capital and new institutionalism has 
led to the formulation of a programme of thorough re-engineering of the educational state. 
From a very thin evidence base, new public management coupled with private provision is 
proposed as the only road to learning achievements. However, recent Education for All 
Global Monitoring Reports demonstrate that this hegemonic human capital project remains 
contested within the international community. Yet, in the context of the negotiations of the 
post-2015 education agenda, a consensus has emerged on the need to identify indicators 
and set international targets to monitor two new global goals of learning and lower 
secondary education. In light of past experiences, and while the ‘value for money’ paradigm 
remains prevalent, the risks are very high that these indicators will become primarily used 
to advance the human capital/institutional reform agenda further in African countries. 
 
Supplanting the limitations of human capital theory and the world education agenda 
derived from it requires a political economy analysis more fundamental than that targeting 
‘rent-seeking’ agents – bureaucrats, teachers and unions – who may resist international 
institutional prescriptions. The next chapter proposes an alternative political economy 
approach to explore the complex factors that have shaped both the design and 
implementation of the ward secondary schools policy in Tanzania. 
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Chapter Three  
 
Political Economy of Education: Theory, Context and Methodology 
 
 
In contrast to the a-historical, reductionist and utilitarian conception of education that 
infuses the global education agenda, this thesis proposes a political economy analysis of  the 
relationship between education and development. Political economy is conceived here as a 
discipline concerned with the interactions between political and economic processes. The 
first section of this chapter defines further the key principles of a political economy of 
education. It also accounts for different approaches to educational research situated in the 
fields of the sociology of education and critical political economy. Paraphrasing Li (2007: 
19), the aim is not to ‘construct a super theory’ but to use the ‘tensions introduced by 
different theoretical traditions because of the distinct questions they pose, and the tools 
they offer’. Section two clarifies the meaning of key concepts - ‘the state’ or ‘the elite’ - in 
the context of this research. Section three provides important contextual information on 
the organisation of Tanzania’s education system. 
 
The research adopted a pluralistic methodological approach, mostly qualitative but 
complemented by a statistical and financial analysis. Annex C provides a specific 
methodological note on aid and budget data used in this research, their sources, underlying 
assumptions and limitations. The fieldwork was conducted in Tanzania between September 
2011 and April 2012. It encompassed three scales of investigation: the policy-making 
sphere at national level (Dar es Salaam and Dodoma) and the implementation domain at 
district (Lushoto town) and school levels. The last section describes the main features of 
the methodology and specific ‘positionality’ challenges faced during the fieldwork. 
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1. Political economy of education: definition and theoretical sources of 
inspiration 
 
 
 
Heterodox political economy assumes that the economic and the political are inseparable; 
this entanglement calls for a mode of inquiry not restricted to the application of the 
apparatus of mainstream economics to politics.69 Political economy analyses are historically 
and empirically grounded; mechanisms of resource allocation and related distributive 
conflicts constitute important objects of study. Accordingly, the political economy 
approach to education adopted by the present research incorporates issues of politics, 
power and contest. It explicitly reinstates education in its function of instrument of social 
reproduction and potential social transformation. 70  The Tanzanian education system is 
envisioned as embedded within the society and the economy, historically produced and 
reproduced at the intersection of  the international and the national, shaped by material and 
ideological factors and a site of  conflict over resource allocations. Its economic significance 
goes beyond providing ‘human capital’ to the labour market: it itself is a site of economic 
activities (for instance, textbook production or school infrastructure construction).  
 
This research draws inspiration from the public sector system of provision (pssop) 
approach developed in Fine (2002, 2009) that provides a general framework for the study 
of a particular public sector in an ‘integral and systemic’ manner.71 Contrary to mainstream 
economics or the welfare-regime approach (Esping Andersen 1990) it recognises that the 
specificities of each public service – education, health, water or housing - are grounded in 
the very nature of each service (Bayliss and Fine 2007: 239). The study of a specific pssop 
requires looking at the ‘structures, agencies, processes, power and conflicts that are 
exercised in material provision itself’ (Fine and Hall 2012: 65). To date this approach has 
mainly been applied to electricity (Bayliss and Fine 2007) and water and housing (Bayliss et 
al. 2013). But in their critique of the World Bank’s human capital agenda, Fine and Rose 
(2001) and Rose (2005) suggested using the pssop approach to analyse education systems in 
                                                 
69 Contrary to the ‘New political economy’ school that subjects politics to methodological individualism and the concept 
of representative agent/median voter (see for instance Acemoglu et al. 2013 and Chapter 2 for a brief critique). 
70 However, the present research does not cover this second aspect; specifically, it does not study possible instances of 
contestation of the ward secondary schools policy by parents/communities/students, civil society organisations or trade 
unions. 
71 The system of provision framework was initially developed to analyse private commodity consumption (Fine and 
Leopold 1993, Fine 2002). 
1.1 Political economy of education: a definition 
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developing countries. However, in the literature, the analytical description of the pssop 
approach remains at a very abstract level; it only ‘poses a general analytical framework with 
considerable leeway about how it should be filled out in both methodological and 
theoretical content’ (Fine 2002: 80).72  
 
The political economy approach to education, as clarified above, provides the research 
project with its overarching theoretical framework. Nevertheless, various analytical 
traditions, presented in the next part, have also been sources of inspiration.  
 
 
Lahire (1999) identified, in the social sciences, three classic ways of understanding the 
social function of schooling.73 A first strand of the literature considers schools primarily as 
sites of transmission of knowledge and focuses research on the nature and form of 
knowledge, teaching and learning relations in schools and classrooms and the pedagogical 
apparatus. For instance, in Great Britain, the ‘New Sociology of Education’, led by 
Bernstein (1975), studies how the educational institution selects, from all the categories of 
knowledge socially available, the knowledge that is legitimate to be taught and shapes the 
specific forms of its transmission to students. Buchmann and Hannum (2001: 88) 
underlined the scarcity of qualitative school-based research in developing countries and 
argued that ‘our knowledge of how school organisation and classroom processes influence 
children’s educational experience in these contexts is limited’. In the case of Tanzania, 
Vavrus (2008) and Barrett (2007) conducted classroom-embedded research on pedagogical 
practices at secondary and primary levels, respectively. Both authors put in perspective the 
                                                 
72 The World Bank has recently adopted a system approach to education. In January 2014, its Director for Education 
delivered the keynote speech at the Education World Forum, entitled ‘When It Comes To Learning, Education Systems 
Matter’ (http://blogs.worldbank.org/education; accessed 28/01/2014). This systemic perspective mainly relies on the 
Systems Approach for Better Education Results initiative (see Chapter 2), which is far from the recognition of the 
historicity and specificities of countries’ education systems. Pritchet (2013) similarly promotes a system approach to 
education. To achieve learning outcomes in mass education systems would require a shift from a ‘spider’ system 
(controlled and centralised) to a ‘starfish’ system (highly decentralised, that promotes changes and innovations). His policy 
recommendations are however clearly anti-state and pro-private (charter schools, school autonomy etc.). One may 
wonder if, in these two instances, the ‘system approach’ may not ultimately turn into a ‘neoliberal ruse’ to bring private 
provision in and legitimate channelling a growing share of public resources (including aid funding) to this part of the 
‘system’. 
73 Bernard Lahire is a French sociologist, professor at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and Bourdieu’s disciple. He has 
however extended and nuanced Bourdieu’s work. His work deals with the production of school failure, working classes’ 
modes of appropriation of the culture of writing, educational success of children from poor families and the political 
construction of the illiteracy ‘problem’.  
1.2 The social function of schooling: overview of theoretical sources of 
inspiration 
75 
 
dichotomy, which dominates discourses about teaching methods in sub-Saharan countries, 
between teacher-centred and pupil-centred approaches: Tanzanian teachers engage in 
mixed pedagogical practices that draw from both models. At the same time, they emphasise 
the essential relation between broader political economic processes – resourcing of schools 
and teachers’ salaries – and pedagogical practices: the resource scarcity experienced by 
Tanzanian schools limits the scope of the ‘pedagogical palette’74 available to teachers.  
 
In a second scholarly current, schooling is primarily conceived as a state instrument to 
discipline future citizens’ bodies and minds. From a Marxist perspective, education has 
been considered as an ‘ideological state apparatus’ alongside the church, the media and 
other cultural apparatus. According to Althusser (1970) 75 ‘children at school also learn the 
“rules” of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the 
division of labour, according to the job he is “destined” for (…) the reproduction of labour 
power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also, at the same time, a 
reproduction of its submission to the rules of the established order’. In a converging 
perspective, Foucault analysed schooling as one of the technologies of state bio-power. For 
him, the subjection of the body into a docile and usable force constitutes an element 
indispensable to capitalist development (Foucault 1976, 1975). From a Foucauldian 
perspective, Bayart notes that schools in colonial sub-Saharan Africa were not only 
instruments to discipline the body of the colonized; they also produced a ‘moral subject (…) 
whose ethical and physical practices were to become constituent of the new public culture’ 
(Bayart 2000: 249). Stoler (1995) similarly describes the disciplinary and normative role of 
education as a constituent part of colonial empires’ domination projects.76  
 
The third interpretation of schooling sees its role as a site of class formation and 
consolidation. Bourdieu’s work symbolises these reproduction theories that relate 
educational inequalities to families’ unequal positions within the relations of economic 
production and the structure of distribution of cultural capital. Schools, curricula and 
pedagogical relations serve the existing asymmetrical power relations in society (Bourdieu 
and Passeron 1970). In his essay on the Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire (1982) concurred: 
                                                 
74 The phrase is borrowed from Barrett (2007), inspired by Bernstein (1975: 56). 
75 On line source: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm. 
76 On the social role of education in American Southern slavery states, see Anderson (1973).  
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schools make dominant knowledge into the only visible and acceptable knowledge. 
According to Giroux (1981) schools are sites of cultural reproduction that serve to 
empower the already empowered in society and to maintain the marginalisation of the 
disempowered. For Marxist political economists too, one of schools’ main functions is to 
‘elaborate, inculcate and reproduce’ the dominant ideology, which ‘is never socially neutral’ 
(Poulantzas 1978: 28). In the United States, Bowles and Gintis (1976) insisted that the 
‘principle of correspondence’ between the social relationships internal to the education 
system and those of the workplace was a key mechanism of social reproduction.  
 
In colonial Africa, western-type education systems played a critical role in the movement 
towards independence. The nascent local elite, who had emerged through their access to 
colonial education, conducted their liberation struggle in the name of values that the 
colonial education system was preaching. In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere was one of only two 
Africans who attended university abroad during colonial time (Buchert 1994). On the other 
hand, as argued in Bayart (2000: 249), teachers, alongside ‘catechists, doctors, nurses, 
administrative personnel or clerks of colonial companies, as salary-earners, were 
instrumental in creating the foundation of the class which is currently dominant in Africa’. 
Lloyd (1966) and Campbell (1974) also underlined the critical role played by education in 
the formation of the new elite and the relation of this group to the traditional elite and to 
the masses. For Bayart (1993), education played a major role in the process of ‘reciprocal 
assimilation of elites’: its power to form an ‘esprit de corps’ contributed to the integration of 
different - emerging and already established - segments of the elite to form the ‘post-
colonial hegemonic block’. He also underlined the rather perfect correspondence between 
the spatial distribution of education institutions, their qualitative hierarchy and social 
stratification. Samoff (1979) analysed the relationship between education and class 
formation in Tanzania: since the beginning of the 20th century, ‘access to education has 
been the proximate determinant of class differentiation in Tanzania’; education constitutes 
‘the major route to power and wealth’ (ibid: 47). Writings on the most recent period, 
however, are scarce. According to Samoff (2007: 494), African education systems today 
remain ‘organised to differentiate and serve best a small elite’. The main difference in the 
post-independence period certainly lies in the growing role of the private sector (Boyle 
1999): new private educational options allow elites to exit a public system damaged by 
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decades of fiscal austerity and to access quality education, which remains unaffordable for 
most of the population. 77  
 
According to Lahire (1999), reproduction theorists have neglected questions regarding the 
specific materiality of schools. When schools are only conceived as sorting mechanisms or 
as sites of discipline, the specific role played in social reproduction by their constituting 
features - pedagogical practices, particular school knowledge or power relations shaped by 
this specific knowledge – is obscured. Lahire’s own research on dissonance and 
consonance between family and school configurations reconciles both dimensions – a 
concern over educational inequalities intertwined with an inquiry into the specific forms of 
school knowledge and modes of socialisation (Lahire 2008). In a similar vein, one can also 
refer to Willis’s (1981) pioneering work that explored how schooling contributes to prepare 
‘working class kids’ to ‘get working class jobs’ in the United Kingdom.  
 
The present research is chiefly interested in macro-social processes associated with 
education and is largely inspired by the two latter analytical traditions. But the research 
approach was mostly inductive, interested in unraveling, from an empirical investigation, 
how Tanzanian elites comprehend the social functions of public schooling and how their 
accumulation strategies relate to it. In the present work, ward secondary schools largely 
remain black boxes as sites of transmission of knowledge. This silence should not be 
interpreted as a statement that nothing happens in these schools; it is merely a direct 
consequence of the interrogations underlying this research. Further research would be 
needed to understand, for instance, how ward secondary schools’ environment (poor 
infrastructures), pedagogical relations, children’s interactions or the nature of the 
knowledge transmitted and its relation to children’s cultural capital contribute to transmit 
to the students a sense of their socially assigned position and how, in response, they deploy 
their own agency.  
 
Another critique of reproduction theorists is that their mechanistic view of social 
reproduction through education dismisses the possibility of breaking the cycle of 
                                                 
77 Di John (2007) uses Hirschman’s exit-voice framework to analyse issues of public education performance in Latin 
America:  the expansion of private education allows the ‘exit’ of upper income groups from public education and the 
fragmented and clientelist political parties impede disadvantaged groups from ‘voicing’ their interest and pressuring 
government to improve the quality of education. 
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reproduction. In contrast, Freire (1982) argued that education could help construct the 
conditions of social transformation. Emancipatory education should not be a simple 
transmission of knowledge. It should rather help people construct themselves as subjects 
able to act in the world to radically alter it. He dwelt upon Gramsci’s (1971) call for a new 
type of education dedicated to the transmission of a particular type of consciousness and 
the formation of intellectuals capable of contesting the prevailing order and working 
towards a new egalitarian social order. Giroux (1989) also defends the possibility that 
radical, critical pedagogy might advance equality, democracy and humanity.  
 
The approach of education as ‘capability’, developed by Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum, also provides an alternative to both utilitarian economics and reproduction 
theorists to think through the relationship between education, inequality and development. 
‘Capabilities’ are defined as a type of freedom that enables one to choose and live a lifestyle 
one wants to live; public decision-makers’ distributive task should aim ‘not simply at the 
allotment of commodities, but at making people able to function in certain human ways’ 
(Nussbaum 1987). The capability approach applied to education in developing countries is 
still in its infancy (Tikly and Barrett 2011), but offers a promising normative way to chart 
out philosophical principles that could drive the design of education policies geared 
towards social justice. To date, the approach seems less useful in trying to understand 
actual education policy-making in a particular country, the historicity of an education 
system or its ideological and political underpinning. The capability approach has been 
developed in reaction to the mainstream economic approach to distributional issues but its 
starting point remains individual freedoms and rights. Sen (1999: xii) acknowledges a ‘deep 
complementarity between individual freedom and social arrangements’ but, as argued by 
Fine (2004: 98), his work is marked by an ‘unresolved tension between the micro-
foundation of his approach, and the broader recognition of social phenomena (…) as 
irreducibly macro’. Sen’s ‘approach is profoundly neutral with respect both to underlying 
social relations and historical specificity’ (ibid). Sen also applies a universal approach to all 
human capabilities: the specificities of systems of service provision (education, health, food 
etc.) and their interaction with ‘corresponding cultures, ideologies and political practices’ 
(ibid: 100) cannot be unravelled within his framework.  
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In view of these critiques, a political economy approach as described above better fits the 
purpose of this research project. Nevertheless, the capability approach appears especially 
appealing in thinking about quality education against its utilitarian comprehension by 
human capitalist proponents as basic skills to compete on the global market.78 Nussbaum 
(2010, 2006) warns against the deleterious effects on democracy of an education system 
narrowly focused on for-profit competencies (basic skills, literacy, numeracy, computer 
science and technology). ‘Education based mainly on profitability in the global market 
magnifies these deficiencies [of democracies: ‘parochialism, haste, sloppiness, selfishness, 
narrowness of the spirit’], producing a greedy obtuseness and a technically trained docility 
that threaten the very life of democracy itself’ (2010: 142). In contrast, she insists on the 
democratic value of humanities. The ‘Socratic abilities’ they encourage – the ability to think 
and argue for oneself - do not make money and are refractory to measurement through 
standardised tests. Nevertheless, they contribute to producing values and skills equally 
indispensable to a flourishing democracy and a thriving economic development. The 
capability approach to ‘quality’ education also crucially emphasises the importance of a 
broad democratic deliberation about the meanings of quality education in a specific society 
(Tikly and Barrett 2011: 11-12).  
 
2. The state and the elite: clarification of key concepts 
 
 
 
According to a political economy influenced by Marx, the state can be defined as a set of 
political institutions that embody and secure the structures of social relations. However, as 
convincingly argued by Poulantzas, the state occupies a position of ‘relative autonomy’ vis-
à-vis class interests that enables it to achieve ‘an unstable equilibrium of compromises 
between the dominant classes and the dominated’ (1978, chapter 4). 79 State education 
policies need to be analysed in conjunction with the role of the state in ensuring the 
support of the masses: ‘the state (…) acts by producing a material substratum for mass 
consensus’ (ibid: 31). This vision is reminiscent of Gramsci’s view that the ‘state capacities 
                                                 
78 Tikly and Barrett (2011: 12) similarly argue that the capability approach ‘can provide a new way of thinking about 
education quality’. 
79 Miliband proposed a divergent analysis of the state, conceived in a functionalist perspective as an instrument to serve 
the capitalist class’ interests (Miliband 1969).  
2.1 The state: elements of theory 
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to act depend upon the balance of class and social forces, and the role of actors, within civil 
society’ (Walsh 2012). The ruling class secures its durable hegemony through both the 
coercion and consent of the working class. It can consolidate its economic control by 
allowing certain demands made by trade unions and political parties: it engages in ‘passive 
revolution’ by going beyond its immediate economic interests and allowing the forms of its 
hegemony to change (Gramsci 1971). 80  Block (1977) argues that under working-class 
pressures, the state apparatus might organise the expansion of educational resources 
available for the working class. But ‘there is every likelihood that the content of the 
education will be geared to the needs of accumulation – the production of a docile work 
force at an appropriate level of skill’ (Block 1977: 22). When discussing the role of the state 
it is also important to make a distinction between state power and the bureaucratic 
apparatus: state managers’ responses to ‘strong popular pressures for an expansion of social 
services’ are guided by their consciousness of their own interests which may not 
correspond exactly with those of ruling classes (ibid: 23-24).  
 
Nevertheless, the coherence of the state as reflective of a single or a strong coalition of 
class interests should not be overstated. 81 In this perspective, Bayart’s political sociology of 
the African state provides a useful analytical counterpoint. Bayart (1993, 1996, 2000) 
contests the thesis of the radical foreign origin of the state in Africa, conceived as the 
product of a mere transplant of the Western bureaucratic state. He insists on the historicity 
of the state formation trajectory, inscribed in the longue durée, shaped at the intersection of 
external and internal dynamics and embedded within the society.82 To account for the 
African state, he stresses the enduring heuristic nature of ‘the strategy of extraversion’ 
paradigm - ‘the creation and capture of a rent generated by dependency and which 
functions as a historical matrix of inequality, political centralization and social struggles’ 
(Bayart 2000: 222). Bayart also conceptualises the African state as built on a network of 
personal loyalties that spreads in every direction, horizontally and vertically, to link various 
informal distributive networks (the ‘rhizome’ metaphor). Analyses need therefore to look at 
                                                 
80 Despite Poulantzas’ critiques of Gramsci, their analyses of the state converged on key aspects. Gramsci rejected class-
reductionism and the comprehension of the state in functionalist terms. He considered the state as a site of class struggle, 
understood power in relational terms and through his notion of ‘integral state’ rejected the view of the state and civil 
society as two distinct terrains. For a comparative exposition of both authors’ analyses, see for instance Walsh (2012).  
81 North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), in their ‘Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History’, stress 
that the state is not a homogeneous, united actor and emphasises the divergence of interests among the dominant elite 
coalition.  
82 In emphasizing the relations between social relations of production and local context, Bayart departs from dependency 
theorists or World Systems scholars (Wallerstein 1974). 
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the ‘very personal and factional nature’ (Bayart 2000: 245) of the state in action. The state’s 
rhizomes form the real location of the contest over power and material resources.83 The 
present study of the Tanzanian state’s secondary education interventions intends to 
illustrate this hybridity of the African state, a terrain where international agencies’ 
interventions intersect with bureaucratic baronies, local notabilities and elites’ straddling 
accumulation strategies.  
 
 
 
In this research, the ward secondary schools policy is mainly analysed through an ‘elite 
lens’. Savage and Williams (2008) argue that, since the 1950s, social sciences have neglected 
the study of elites. They encourage social scientists to ‘remember’ elites and to ‘understand 
the significance of elite formation in present day capitalism’. Reis (2012: 180), in her study 
of Brazilian elites’ perception of poverty, also underlines the large number of ‘case studies 
of how the poor themselves perceive their plight (…) But little has been said about the 
view of those at the top of the social structure’.  
 
Long lasting epistemological debates about the definition of ‘the elite’ remain unsettled 
(DiCaprio 2012: 3).84 For the purpose of this research, following Reis and Moore (2005: 2), 
national elites are defined as ‘the very small number of people who control the key material, 
symbolic and political resources within a country’. The terms ‘elites’, ‘ruling class’ or 
‘dominant class’ are used interchangeably.85 As argued by DiCaprio (2012: 4), ‘elites exist 
not only at the top, but at the top of each level of society’. In Tanzania, at district level, the 
‘local elite’ is mainly made up of district staff, politicians (Members of Parliament and 
district councillors, members of political parties), religious leaders and local entrepreneurs: 
                                                 
83  Bayart’s analyses differ from the work of Chabal and Daloz (1999) who link African states’ instability to the 
impossibility of grafting a Western-type state in Africa due to African states’ neopatrimonial features. For these authors, 
the ‘fragility’ of African states’ is driven by African leaders’ enrichment maximization strategies in face of their alleged 
short-term prospects in power, outside any bureaucratic and economic logics. For Bayart, who underlines, on the 
contrary, the enduring stability of African leaders in power, their straddling strategies between positions of power and 
positions of accumulation are not specific to African politics. Whereas for him ethnicity constitutes a construct of recent 
history, Chabal and Dalloz invoke ‘ancestral norms’ to account for patronage relations between self-interested African 
leaders and the rest of the society.  
84 For a detailed exposition of the evolution of elites’ studies since the Italian School (Pareto 1916 and Mosca 1939), see 
Savage and Williams (2008) and DiCaprio (2012). 
85 Early ‘elites theories’ were initially developed as a response to Marxists’ emphasis on the masses as engines of historical 
changes. In his classical study of class struggles in Tanzania, Shivji (1978) rejected ‘elite theories’ as an inappropriate 
framework to study processes of class formation. Here, the word ‘elites’ should, however, be understood as a descriptive, 
operational device rather than an interpretative, analytical concept. 
2.2 Elite or ruling class? 
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far from being distinct, hermetic groups, they entertain fluid relations, attend the same 
places of socialisation and play a critical role as competing brokers of the central state in 
the allocation of resources to rural areas. Secondary teachers, by their age, salary level or 
subordinated position within the education administration, can be considered as a subaltern 
group especially in comparison with head teachers, obvious members of the district or 
ward elite. Being educated and coming from outside the village, they do, however, hold a 
specific, intermediary position in the district’s social relations. 
 
Despite their small number, elites influence their country’s development trajectory through 
various channels: they frame the public debate, make and execute policies and they 
influence the allocation of resources and authority (DiCaprio 2012: 5). Neo-patrimonial 
views of the African state (Chabal and Dalloz 1999) or neo-institutionalist approaches (van 
de Walle 2001) tend to view decision-makers and more broadly elites as insulated from 
society, engaged in a rational optimisation of their personal interests through ‘rent-seeking’ 
activities. In this approach, the structural constraints that shape elites’ policy and resource 
allocation choices, their historicity and ideological grounding are obscured. By contrast, this 
research aims to unearth the political economy forces that shape and constrain them.  
 
Finally, the current aid regime also influences the delineation of elites’ boundaries. Aid 
relations can indeed be considered as an increasingly transnational domain: for Harrison 
(2010: 108-109), the numerous dialogue and consultative forums, which characterise the 
current aid regime, are sites of ‘sociability’ where ‘African nationals and expatriates of 
various kinds intermingle’ and produce ‘transnational communities of neoliberal practice’. 
Similarly, Gould (2005a: 138), in his analysis of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper processes in 
Tanzania, pinpoints the policy formulation arena as ‘a technocratic domain of transnational 
professionals’. In this research the term ‘transnational elite’ is used to designate this 
constellation of domestic and international actors who share converging interests and 
ideological views. This agglomerate may be joined by representatives of multinational 
corporations. 
 
Ball’s (1990) analysis of the 1988 Education Act in the United Kingdom provides an 
interesting methodological and conceptual model to explore elites’ role in education policy 
formation in Tanzania. Several elements of his sociology of education policy are significant 
83 
 
to the present research. First, he emphasises the importance of struggles between interests 
groups within the policy-making sphere, in which educational bureaucrats enjoy degrees of 
autonomy that may evolve over time. He defines policy formulation as ‘an amalgam, a 
blending of tensions, a managing of nascent contradictions’ (Ball 1990: 43). Besides, 
discourses play a critical role in shaping power relations in this arena and should be subject 
to close scrutiny. He stresses the distinction between policy-making and policy 
implementation: an education policy is shaped, transformed and, possibly, subverted in the 
course of its execution. His methodological approach, characterised as an ‘ethnography of 
elite political culture’ (ibid: 2), was based on multiple interviews conducted with prominent 
actors – politicians, bureaucrats, members of the business elite - who influenced the design 
of the Act and its implementation. 
 
Other agents involved in the education sector – students, parents, communities, teachers’ 
trade union and civil society organisations - are not entirely absent from the analysis. 
Chapter 6 of this thesis partly accounts for communities’ involvement in the 
implementation of the ward secondary schools policy. 86  Nevertheless, throughout the 
dissertation, the elite remain the primary analytical vantage point. This perspective should 
not be interpreted as a denial of the Tanzanian population’s agency in contributing to 
shape public policies. As argued by Reis (2012: 181), ‘to say that elites matter when we 
discuss poverty and inequality is not to ignore that pressures from below are very relevant 
to the issues at hand’. But, she continues, ‘elites are strategic actors that cannot be 
neglected when we inquire into the prospects for poverty reduction and for social 
redistribution’. Specifically, Chapters 4 and 6 demonstrate the interdependent nature of the 
relations between Tanzanian elites and the rest of the society. 87  
 
 
 
                                                 
86 This research is situated in continuity with previous works by Vavrus (2003, 2005) and Stambach (2000, 1996) who 
conducted locally-embedded anthropological research on secondary education in the Kilimanjaro region. Even though 
conducted prior to the ward secondary schools movement, their investigations into the meaning of secondary education 
in a neoliberal time and its role in shaping individual and collective identities strongly resonate with the interests of the 
present research in the role of cultural systems in shaping education policies. 
87  According to Boone, ‘dependency and underdevelopment theorists, like modernisation theorists, tended to view 
postcolonial states and ruling classes as remarkably unconstrained by the societies over which they sought to preside’ 
(Boone 1994: 108). 
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3. The organisation of the Tanzanian education system: elements of context 
 
 
 
In Tanzania, the Executive, through the President and a small group of Ministers, 
dominates the political-administrative landscape. The Executive can be divided into the 
‘senior technocracy’ and the CCM Party.88 The Cabinet and the President occupy a position 
in between, closer to the Party than to the technocracy (Lawson and Rakner 2005). The 
CCM party remains today the ‘single most dominant force of accountability in Tanzania’ 
(ibid: 29). However, even though most government upper-level technocrats are CCM 
cadres, including in the ministries in charge of education, perceptible tensions exist 
between technocrats and politicians (Languille and Dolan 2012).  
 
In the education sector, the state administration is formed of three main ministries.  
- The Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) is responsible for policy 
formulation, coordination, monitoring, setting standards and quality insurance of the 
whole education system. It retains direct management responsibility for higher 
education, technical and vocational education and Teachers Training Colleges.89  
- The Prime Minister’s Office - Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-
RALG) supervises the management of pre-primary, primary and secondary education by 
Local Government Authorities (LGAs). 
- The Ministry for Community Development, Gender and Children (MCDGC) 
coordinates the Folk Development Colleges that provide non-formal and vocational 
training to communities.90  
 
In 2009-10, the government decided to decentralise secondary education. LGAs - districts, 
towns, municipal and city councils -, already in charge of primary education since 1998, 
were now fully responsible for the management and delivery of formal and non-formal 
basic education services. Secondary education resources were no longer channelled to 
                                                 
88 The CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) party was created in 1977, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, as the merger of 
the Tanzania African National Union Tanzania African National Union (TANU, the then ruling party in Tanganyika, in 
power since the independence in 1962) and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), the then ruling party in Zanzibar. 
89 Over the research period, the name and institutional coverage of the ministry in charge of basic education have 
changed several times. For instance, it expanded to include vocational education and training as well as higher education. 
For simplicity, the term ‘Ministry of Education’ is often used in the present dissertation. 
90 This ministry is not covered by this research.  
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schools but to districts. LGAs also became the employers of primary and secondary 
teachers. This decentralisation in education was anchored to the cross-sector 
Decentralisation by Devolution policy (DbyD) and the Local Government Reform 
Programme, initiated in 1998 and heavily supported by donors (Harrison 2008).  
 
Within the district administration, the District Secondary Education Officer (DSEO) is the 
interface between secondary schools and the central administration, represented at regional 
level by the Regional Education Officer. At a lower administrative level, Ward Education 
Coordinators (WEC), the administrative body closest to schools, are responsible for the 
coordination and monitoring of education activities within the Ward. At school level, the 
management (including financial) is under the authority of School Boards. 
 
 
 
Secondary education in Tanzania has two levels: the lower level, Form 1 to Form 4, leading 
to the Certificate of Secondary Education Examination or CSEE) and the upper level, 
Forms 5 and 6, leading to the Advanced Certificate of Secondary Education Examination.91 
In 2011, the organisation of secondary education in Tanzania was based on four categories 
of schools (government, community, non-government and seminaries), which can be sub-
divided between ‘day’ and ‘boarding’ schools and between ‘girls’, ‘boys’ and ‘coeducational’ 
schools (Table 3.1). Public education is organised through ‘government schools’ 
(sometimes labelled ‘old government schools’) and ‘community schools’ (or ward 
secondary schools). In 2011 there were 92 government secondary schools, the same 
number as in 2004. Access to these schools, reserved for the best performing pupils at the 
Primary School Leaving Examination, is regulated by the quota system put in place during 
Ujamaa that attributes a specific number of seats to each region and to girls. No such 
restriction applies to ward secondary schools: every primary school leaver should, in theory, 
find a seat in an O Level community secondary school. Annual school fees for public day 
schools are set at Tsh 20,000/student. 
 
                                                 
91 Primary education officially caters for pupils aged between 7 and 13; lower secondary education for students aged 
between 14 and 17 and upper secondary education for students aged between 18 and 19. 
3.2 The organisation of secondary education in Tanzania  
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Table 3-1: Number of secondary schools by category in 2011 
  Government Community 
Non-
government Seminaries 
 
Total 
A Level 
    
 
Day school 1 0 9 1  
Boarding 2 4 10 2  
Sub-Total 3 4 19 3 29 
A-O levels 
    
 
Day school 30 86 118 31  
Boarding 53 3 97 24  
Sub-Total 83 89 215 55 442 
O level 
    
 
Day school 5 3238 370 28  
Boarding 1 33 234 22  
Sub-Total 6 3241 604 50 3901 
TOTAL 92 3334 838 108 4372 
Source: the author, based on the Registry of government and non-government secondary schools, August 
2011 
 
The private education sector is split between ‘non-government schools’ and ‘seminaries’, 
religious educational institutions. This sector is extremely diversified; it ranges from 
expensive, highly selective, high performing schools to ‘low-cost’ and poorly performing 
institutions that cater for children who failed their primary school leaving exam; its cost-
based organisational features overlap with religious lines. The expansion of public junior 
secondary education in Tanzania has reversed the historical private/public balance in the 
sub-sector: public schools are now the most numerous (UNESCO 2012a). 
 
The social and political meaning of mass, public and low quality secondary education 
cannot be understood without taking into account of the ability of the rich and the middle 
class to access quality private secondary education. Nevertheless, the research is focused on 
the public education system and specifically on one of its components: O Level community 
secondary schools. It touches only marginally upon private provision. There are several 
reasons for this choice. First, the Tanzanian state continues to dominate secondary 
education provision: in 2011, 85 per cent of lower secondary students were enrolled in 
public (government and community) secondary schools (URT 2012a). Second, an 
understanding of this complex segment of the education system would have required an in-
depth investigation beyond the scope of this research. Finally, this research was interested 
in questioning how the ‘private vs. public’ dichotomy is played out at the very heart of the 
public education system. It chose to invert the traditional perspective on this issue. It 
considers ward secondary schools as a specific public-private partnership model that needs 
to be unpacked. Rather than looking at the ruling class’ strategy to consolidate its social 
87 
 
position through private schooling, it investigates channels by which ward secondary 
schools, which children from rich and middle class families do not attend, contribute to the 
accumulation strategies of the ruling class.  
 
 
 
In 2004 approximately twenty agencies were involved in the education sector; in 2011-
2012, there were eleven: DFID, CIDA, SIDA, JICA, USAID, France, the World Bank, the 
African Development Bank and three UN agencies (UNESCO, UNICEF and WFP).92 In 
terms of funding, in FY 2011/12, the World Bank, CIDA and DFID provided about 60 
per cent of external assistance to the sector.93 
 
Between 2001 - following the abolition of primary school fees - and 2006 a wide coalition 
of donors supported the Government of Tanzania’s Primary Education Development 
Programme (PEDP).94 Over the research period, the World Bank was the only agency of 
any significance that resolutely invested in secondary education. 95  Its first intervention 
(SEDP I, 2004 - 2007) was a USD150 million project,96 implemented through a sector 
adjustment approach (Development Policy Loan) with tranche release conditions linked to 
the implementation of secondary education policy reforms. It had three main objectives: (i) 
increase access to lower and upper secondary education; (ii) improve students’ learning 
outcomes; and (iii) improve the management of secondary education through 
decentralisation and capacity building (World Bank 2004).97  
 
The World Bank’s second intervention (SEDP II), approved in 2010 for a duration of five 
years, is a USD150 million project implemented through an Adaptable Program Loan 
(APL). Its core objective is ‘to improve the quality of secondary education, with a focus on 
underserved areas’ (World Bank 2010a: 9) and its main components target traditional 
ingredients of quality: schooling environment (Component 1: ‘upgrading existing schools 
                                                 
92 Only OECD-DAC donors are considered here. In the course of the research period, several agencies left the sector: the 
EC, the Netherlands, GTZ, Norway, Ireland, Belgium and Finland. 
93 Source: the author’s own calculations. See Annex C (the figure does not include the notional share of general budget 
support to education).  
94 The World Bank, the Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, Ireland, Finland, the EU, Norway, France and Belgium. 
95 This aspect is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
96 USD123.6 million IDA credit and USD26.4 million IDA grant. 
97 In order to avoid any confusion, it is important to note that both the government secondary education programme and 
the World Bank project to support it have the same name - ‘SEDP’. They are however two different documents. 
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infrastructures’); teachers (Component 2: ‘improving the equitable provision of teachers 
and quality of teaching’) and textbooks through the transfer of resource to schools 
(Component 3 ‘ensuring adequate financing to secondary schools and improving utilization 
of resources’). A fourth component concerned technical assistance and capacity building.  
 
Since FY 2006/07, general and sector budget support has become the main aid modality in 
the sector.98 A non-earmarked aid modality, General Budget Support (GBS) is directly 
channelled to the Treasury and merged with other domestic revenues (the principle of 
fungibility): its allocation to specific sectors or sub-sectors depends on the national budget 
cycle and negotiations. Sector Budget Support (SBS) constitutes a variation of general 
budget support with a focused sector dialogue on education policies, finances and 
outcomes. The European Commission was the first agency to provide SBS to education 
within its 2006-2008 programme. In 2009, CIDA started its own SBS followed by DFID in 
2011.99  
 
The relationship between education donors and the ministries in charge of education is 
organised through a dialogue structure, set up at the launch of the Education Sector 
Development Plan (ESDP) in 2001. It is based on a series of joint technical working 
groups, an ESDP task-force and an ESDP Committee co-chaired by the Permanent 
Secretaries in the MoEVT and the PMO-RALG. Since 2006, the education aid arena has 
been fully inserted within the GBS framework and education aid relations have in part been 
shaped by the demands of this specific aid modality. The GBS Performance Assessment 
Framework (GBS PAF), the core instrument to manage GBS aid, consists of a list of 
outcome and process indicators, with annual targets that donors and government jointly 
assess in the context of the GBS annual review as a basis for GBS donors’ disbursement 
decisions. Another core instrument – the Public Expenditure Review process (PER) – was 
set up in the early 2000s as a forum for a joint technical dialogue over budget allocations 
and other public finance issues.100 Education donors’ coordination and harmonisation is 
                                                 
98 In FY 2011/12, budget support represented about 70 per cent of total external assistance to education (source: the 
author’s own calculation; figures includes the notional share of GBS to the education sector).  
99 The World Bank, DFID, CIDA, the AfDB, SIDA and JICA are also GBS contributors. 
100 A map of both arenas, education and general budget support, is sketched in Annex B. Civil society organisations have 
been part of these arenas. In education, three main organisations have played a prominent role: TENMET, HakiElimu 
and Twaweza. The present research does not cover the role of CSOs. For a brief political economy assessment, see 
Languille and Dolan (2012); on HakiElimu, see Philips (2011); on Twaweza, see Languille (forthcoming).  
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structured within the Education Development Partners Group (DPG) headed by a Chair 
agency supported by a Deputy-Chair and a Secretariat.101  
 
Table 3-2: Main aid interventions in the education sector (2004 – 2011) 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
PEDP (basket fund +World 
Bank) 
        
Sector Budget Support 
        European Union 
        CIDA 
        DFID 
        
World Bank SEDP 
        SEDP I 
        SEDP II 
        
AfDB Education II 
        World Bank, Higher Education 
Development Plan 
        SIDA&NORAD Higher 
Education & Research 
        
UN agencies 
        Source: the author, based on donors’ programmes documents (dates of commitment, not disbursement). USAID 
programme is not included due to lack of information. 
 
4. Methodological framework 
 
 
 
As a transnational policy, the object of the research – secondary education policy in 
Tanzania - raises methodological issues of scale. As argued by Gould (2004b: 20) ‘aid and 
development cannot be understood unless situated in a trans-scalar canvas of social 
relations, interests and imperatives’. Research that ‘cannot “jump scale” can become the 
hostage of “situated knowledge”, and of partial truths’. The ward secondary schools policy 
has indeed a fundamental trans-scalar nature; it is made of material and ideational flows 
between multiple levels – from Washington or Brussels to Dar es Salaam or Dodoma and 
to districts and villages - and between multiple sites at each level. As a response to this scale 
challenge, empirical investigations were conducted at three levels: national (Tanzania’s 
economic and administrative capitals: Dar es Salaam and Dodoma), Lushoto town and 
                                                 
101 The successive lead agencies were: the Netherlands in 2006, the European Commission in 2007, SIDA in 2008, DFID 
in 2009 and 2010 and CIDA in 2011 and 2012. 
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school levels. The global level was mainly investigated through the study of donors’ 
educational strategies and a critical analysis of the human capital literature (Chapter 2).102  
 
The research focused on the period 2004–2011/12, a timeframe that corresponds to the 
acceleration of secondary expansion and the transition to a new aid regime in the education 
sector. However, the definition of education systems as historical social constructs and the 
recognition of the enduring imprint of the colonial and socialist eras on educational 
structures, content and meanings required to ground this research in a good understanding 
of the historical context. This also applied to the local setting – Lushoto district - where 
implementation aspects of secondary education expansion were investigated.  
 
 
 
At national level, in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, 103 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with members of the elite – domestic and international. The selection of 
informants rested on a combination of two non-probabilistic sampling techniques. 
Through ‘purposive sampling’ interviewees were identified by their position, their 
reputation or their knowledge on the object of research (Kidder et al. 1991). Supplementary 
interviews were selected following a ‘snowball sampling method’, on the basis of names 
suggested by the first set of respondents (Tansey 2007).  
 
Several sites of investigation were targeted: the education administration, planning and 
finance administration, political arena, civil society organisations, aid arena and the 
textbook industry (see Table 3.3). In the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance, 
various departments were identified because of their specific functions in the 
formulation/implementation/funding of the ward secondary schools policy. For each 
group of actors, an interview guide was formulated. The research entailed two one-week 
field trips to Dodoma, where the Parliament and the PMO-RALG are located.  
 
 
                                                 
102 In Dar es Salaam the author was hosted by REPOA, a Tanzanian research centre, which provided her with an office, 
useful letters of introduction and a stimulating working environment. 
4.2 Empirical investigations at national level 
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Table 3-3: Basic information about interviews conducted at national level 
 Institution No of 
inter-
views 
Departments/domains covered 
Government Ministry of Education and 
Vocational Training  
22 - Office of the Commissioner 
- Pre Primary and Primary Education Unit 
- Secondary Education Unit;  
- Higher Education Division; 
- Policy Planning Division (planning, budget, ESMIS, 
construction, ESDP Secretariat) 
- School Inspectorate Division 
- Administration and Human Resources Management Division;  
- Procurement Management Unit 
- EMAC Secretariat 
- Tanzanian Education Authority (TEA) 
- Tanzanian Institute of Education (TIE) 
 Prime Minister’s Office – 
Regional Authorities and Local 
Governments  
6 Education Division 
 Ministry of Finance 9 - Budget  
- Local Government  
- External Finance  
- GBS Secretariat 
- Government Procurement Service Agency (GPSA) 
- EDF National Authorising Officer  
 Other 7 - President Office – Planning Commission 
- President Office – Public Service Management   
- President Office 
- Prime Minister Office 
- Tanzanian Revenue Authority  
- Copyright Society of Tanzania 
- Tanzania High Commission to UK 
Donors DfID, World Bank, CIDA, 
SIDA, EU Delegation, 
UNICEF, Belgian Cooperation, 
AFD, French Embassy 
17 - Education advisers  
- Economists  
- Local government/decentralisation  
Civil Society  - HakiElimu 
- Uwezo 
- Twaweza 
- Legal and Human Right 
Commission (LHRC) 
- SOMA 
- Bakwata (National Muslim 
Council of Tanzania) 
- Tamongsco (Tanzanian 
Association of Owners and 
Managers of Non-
Government Schools and 
Colleges) 
- TCCIA (Tanzania Chamber 
of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture) 
- Journalists, academics 
- Teachers Trade Union (TTU) 
15  
Members of 
Parliament 
and political 
parties 
CCM 
Chadema (opposition) 
NCCR (opposition) 
11  - 8 members of CCM (included 3 Lushoto MPs) 
- 2 members of Chadema  
- 1 member of NCCR  
Textbook 
industry 
Publishers 
  
9 - International (Oxford University Press, Longman Pearson and 
Radar Education, MacMillan Aidan) 
- Regional (Ujuzi Press) 
- Local (Ben&Company, Mture Publishers, Read It, Mkuki Na 
Nyota) 
 Printers 2  
 Booksellers 3  
 Business associations 2 - Publishers Association of Tanzania (PATA) 
- Association of Booksellers of Tanzania 
Total  103  
Source: the author 
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The author also attended, as an observer, the technical seminar of the 2011 Joint Education 
Sector Review, held in Dar es Salaam on 1-3 November 2011.103 It gathered representatives 
from a wide variety of education stakeholders (government, civil society organisations and 
aid agencies) to assess sector performances. This event helped the author identify lines of 
convergence and sites of friction within the ‘educational community’, between donors and 
government and within the government.  
 
According to Goldstein (2002), the difficulty of ‘getting in the door’ is the first issue faced 
by elite interviewers. Yet, in the context of this research, access to informants turned out to 
be relatively easy. From the list of priority interviews initially planned only four did not take 
place, the most prominent of which was former Prime Minister Lowassa, the political 
driver of the ward secondary school policy. He was contacted and seemed agreeable to a 
meeting, but however this never happened. Section 4 further discusses the extent to which 
this relative easy access to informants was related to the author’s specific positionality 
within the research field. 
 
 
 
Fieldwork was conducted over six weeks in Lushoto District, in North-East Tanzania, in 
February-March 2012. It was preceded by a one-week stay in the town of Tanga to conduct 
interviews with the key staff of the regional administration.  
                                                 
103 Education sector reviews are organised in two stages: a workshop at technical level followed by a high-level meeting at 
political level, gathering ministers in charge of education and heads of aid agencies. 
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Figure 3-1 : The location of Lushoto District (Tanga Region) in Tanzania (source: 
the Natural Resource Institute) 
 
The focus on only one district was guided by the methodological choice of privileging 
depth over breadth of information. Lushoto District offered an interesting particularity as 
regards the ward secondary schools policy: there, the secondary education expansion was 
particularly intense. With 72 ward secondary schools, in 2011 Lushoto was the district with 
the highest number of government schools in the entire country.104 
                                                 
104 The same year, Moshi Rural District in Kilimanjaro Region had only 62 government secondary schools (source: 
ESMIS/MoEVT).  In 2012, according to district data, there were 79 secondary schools in Lushoto. 
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Figure 3-2: The 20 districts (with region) with the highest number of government 
secondary schools 
Source: the author, based on URT-MoEVT (2011) 
 
Empirical investigations involved qualitative interviews conducted in Lushoto town, 
location of the district’s headquarters. Like at national level, several elite groups were 
targeted and a mix sampling method was used (see Table 3.4).  
 
Table 3-4: Basic information on interviews conducted in Lushoto district 
Institution No of 
interviews 
Departments 
District Administrative Secretariat  2 - District Administrative Secretary 
- Staff in charge of the district education fund 
District Council administration 11 - Executive Direction 
- Budget and Planning 
- Treasury  
- Secondary Education  
- Primary Education  
- Procurement Unit 
- Internal Audit Unit 
Ward and Village Officials 9 - 1 ward Executive officer 
- 2 ward education coordinators 
- 6 village secretaries 
Preventing and Combating 
Corruption Bureau 
1 - Director of PCCB District Branch 
Politicians 15 (+3) - (3 current MPs, CCM) 
- 1 MP adviser 
- 3 former MPs  
- 4 ward councillors or ‘diwanis’ (including the Council Chairman) 
- 2 CCM members (District Secretary, lay member) 
- 4 Chadema representatives  
- 1 CUF representative 
- 3 village chairmen 
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Source: the author 
 
As at national level, once research credentials had been checked by the appropriate 
authorities, access to informants was relatively easy. From the list of proposed informants, 
only the District Commissioner, District Engineer, Head of the Council’s Finance 
Committee and a couple of key affluent district entrepreneurs could not be interviewed. 
Busy agendas and the political and financial sensibilities of their position may explain this 
lack of responsiveness. The fieldwork also coincided with a period of intensive activity for 
the Secondary Education District Office, the main administrative entry point for this 
research. A wave of newly recruited teachers had just arrived in town, waiting in the 
courtyard of the office to be posted to their new schools; some, displeased by their 
assignment location, assailed the office to try change their posting to another school. At the 
same time, the district was unable to pay new teachers their statutory allowances: the social 
discontent was palatable among the young teachers. The Director of the Secondary 
Education Office, her academic officer and her secretary could not provide much time for 
a researcher. This tense situation made it impossible to obtain district-level education 
statistics and comprehensive data on financial transfers to schools. However, the situation 
provided an opportunity to observe from a privileged standpoint the everyday life of an 
institutional cornerstone of the implementation of the ward secondary schools policy.  
 
In terms of access to the district’s official documents, the administration was very 
responsive. However, the minutes of  district council meetings – legally, public 
documentation – were the only documents to which access was denied despite repeated 
requests. Neither the District Executive Director nor the District Administrative Secretary, 
supportive of  the research in all other aspects, were prepared to take the responsibility of  
Entrepreneurs / financial 
institutions 
10 - 2 booksellers 
- 1 construction company 
- 1 sawmill company 
- 3 diversified companies (books, hardware, construction) 
- 1 staff of the National Microcredit Bank /district branch 
(customer service manager) 
- 2 members of teachers’ SACCOS (cooperative officer and board 
chairman) 
- 1 Dar es Salaam-based large scale entrepreneur, originated from 
Lushoto 
Civil society 7 - Teachers Trade Union’ District Secretary 
- 3 ‘Friends of Education’ (HakiElimu) 
- 1 member of a youth organisation 
- 1 Muslim sheik 
- 1 representative of the Evangelical Lutherian Church of Tanzania 
(ELCT) 
TOTAL 55  
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sharing documents that account for the functioning of  the main formal site of  public 
decision-making in the district. In guaranteeing the opacity of  council meetings, they 
inadvertently indicated to the researcher one major site of  negotiation, conflict and 
deployment of  power in the district.   
 
Out of the 79 secondary schools existing in the district at the time of the research, 28 were 
visited, including 25 ward secondary schools and three private schools: one highly selective 
and top performing Catholic school and two ‘low cost’ and low performing schools (a 
Bakwata school105 and a wazazi school106). Two broad sampling criteria were used to identify 
schools: to visit at least one school in each of the 44 wards and to get a rough balance 
between old (1990-2005) and new (2006-2011) schools.107 Primarily for logistical reasons, 
most visits to schools were conducted unannounced. 108 Face-to-face interviews were 
systematically conducted with headmasters (or with the second master) in all schools visited. 
In six schools, face-to-face interviews with village leaders (Chairman and/or Secretary) or 
ward officials were also organised.  
 
In addition, depending on the circumstances, nine focus groups with teachers, five with 
students and four with parents were organised. As pointed out earlier, this research project 
focused on the elite. Discussions with subaltern groups occupied a peripheral position in 
the data collection strategy. Nevertheless, this access to dominated voices provided a 
precious counterpoint to national and local elites’ main narratives. Focus groups with 
teachers (and students, to a lesser degree) helped in tracing the power structure that 
underpins schools’ management. Focus groups with parents offered a counterpoint ‘from 
below’ to the accounts by local elites of their allegedly generous role in the policy 
implementation. They also helped assess the actual material impact of the policy for the 
rural population. Finally, focus groups with parents and students also revealed the sketch of 
a national imagined community, with dominant and subaltern classes attaching a 
converging cultural significance to secondary education. In two cases, when the school visit 
                                                 
105 Tanzanian Muslim Council. 
106 CCM’s parents wing. 
107 One ward could not be reached due to road conditions. 
108 During a monthly meeting organised by the Secondary Education District Office with all headmasters, the author 
introduced herself and her research assistant and explained the purpose of the research. They were informed of a possible 
visit. 
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was formally planned in advance, parents taking part in the focus group were purposely 
chosen by the headmaster: in these instances, the parents’ contributions were obviously 
chiefly geared towards conveying a positive image of  the school’s management. When 
contrasted with the two ad-hoc parents’ focus groups, these meetings confirmed that 
peasant communities are shaped by power relations and that individual families entertain 
differentiated relationships with the schooling institution. This access to subaltern voices 
was all the more important given that the local elites’ interviews conveyed a very 
homogeneous culturalist narrative that largely blamed ward secondary school failures on 
peasants and students themselves.  
 
 
The researcher is an integral part of the research process and contributes greatly to the 
construction of meaning during the study (Gilbert 2008: 512). Between 2005 and 2008, the 
author worked for the EU Delegation to Tanzania as an education programme manager; 
she designed and managed the first Sector Budget Support Programme for education in 
Tanzania. This programme gave a prominent place to ‘outcomes’ and public finances and 
promoted the design of new tools inscribed in a new public management approach. In 
2007, she was the lead of the Education Development Partners Group, representing other 
education donors in education and general budget support dialogue structures. The year 
2007 coincided with a pivotal moment in education aid relations, shifting from a 
project/basket fund approach to budget support, a transition that led to serious tensions 
between education donors and the Tanzanian education administration. For three years, 
the author was very much enmeshed within the power relations that characterized 
Tanzania’s education aid arena. About half of interviews conducted in the national 
education aid arena were carried out with the author’s former colleagues or interlocutors. 
This author’s specific ‘positionality’ evidently influenced, in various ways, the fieldwork 
dynamics.109 
 
                                                 
109 The notion of ‘positionality’ refers to the idea that the researcher contributes to the construction of knowledge; 
her/his identity or personal characteristics (age, gender, class, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, political views etc.) may 
influence aspects of the study (types of information collected, or the way in which it is interpreted). See Hertz (1997).  
4.4 A multi-sited and multi-level fieldwork: the researcher’s positionality 
challenges  
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First of all, this specific position helped open doors and, more importantly, quickly 
establish a trust-based rapport conducive to open and rich discussions, both with 
government officials and donors’ staff. The author’s inside knowledge of Tanzanian 
administrators’ ethos also equipped her to navigate around what Paige called the ‘forbidden 
narratives’, hidden beneath ‘peculiar silences and areas of tensions – forbidden zones that 
the interviewer had to approach with care’ (Paige 1998: 9).110 In the case of donors, this 
former position as ‘one of them’ greatly aided the author in gaining access to what Gould 
(2004a: 14) called the ‘backstage’ field where donors’ staff express their scepticism about 
official aid narratives and their organisations’ official virtuous goals. Even in the case of 
previously unknown informants, this past experience helped open doors. For instance, the 
External Finance Department in the Ministry of Finance, constantly solicited by myriad 
consultants and researchers, only opened its doors when it received questionnaires that 
demonstrated an insider’s understanding of their work and challenges. A dismissive ‘look at 
the web site, everything is there!’ had been their initial reaction. 
 
This specific position called, right from the inception of the research project, for a careful 
exercise of constant reflexivity. As defined in Hertz (1997: viii), reflexivity is ‘an ongoing 
process that constantly returns to the questions “What do I know?” and “How do I know 
it?” in order to maintain continual questioning as to where the information has been 
created’. During the fieldwork, this implied a permanent questioning of the ways by which 
the former active participation in the research site could influence informants’ answers. 
The ambiguity of the author’s position was made very clear when, during interviews, 
government officials would use a collective ‘you’ to speak of donors, including her among 
them, self-evidently. One informant explicitly said ‘Sonia, you’re a donor’. Despite the author’s 
attempt to clarify her present position as an academic researcher, detached from the donor 
community, she was gently reinstated in her former identity. When asked about the 
performance measurement tools introduced to manage budget support in the education 
sector, one official replied ‘but Sonia, you were at the vanguard of this change’. In that context, 
interpreting the fact that most informants had positive views on this New Public 
Management technology was delicate: were the answers given to please her? In this specific 
case, triangulation of data and tracing discursive patterns outside the circle of previously 
                                                 
110 For instance the contradiction between the ward secondary schools policy and Nyerere’s educational prescriptions or 
the issue of communities’ forced contributions (against the widespread narrative of voluntary participation). 
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known informants proved the solution to the interpretative conundrum: informants with 
whom the author had not interacted in the past conveyed a similar discourse.  
 
This ambiguous position was also evident during interviews with former donor colleagues. 
They would often invite the author’s past self  into the conversation. For instance, while 
discussing the challenges of  performance-based aid, an education aid manager wondered: 
‘Who wants to say that the sector is doing poorly? I don’t necessarily want to say that to my management 
and neither does X [other aid agency’s education adviser] and neither did you when you were here’ 
(emphasis added) (interview 50). Had the author wanted to escape her ambivalent position, 
she was explicitly reminded that any critical charge against aid managers would inevitably 
also be a form of self-criticism. The fieldwork in the aid arena was shaped by a permanent 
self-awareness of the specific ethical responsibility derived from a past inscription within 
the power structures underlying aid relations. Nevertheless, the author’s ‘researcher self’ 
and aid managers/government technocrats inhabit two separate ‘epistemic communities’, 
defined as ‘a set of relationships around shared meanings’ (Mosse 2006: 945). In the face of 
intractable epistemological differences, the risk exists that the present accounts may be 
contested by those, in the aid arena, who may feel betrayed or weakened by a text that 
challenges the authorised system of representations they adhere to.111  
 
These challenges only dominated one part of the fieldwork. This multi-sited, multi-level 
fieldwork actually required the author to draw from a ‘variety of selves’ (Reinhartz 1979), 
not only the former aid manager. For instance, the exploration of  the textbook industry 
allowed her to shift to an outsider position, unknown by her informants, to experience the 
position of  a candid observer in a completely new environment. As argued by Soss (2006: 
137), ‘strangeness has its benefits too. The newly arrived outsider is often able to notice as 
unusual – and hence draw into analysis – the very things that insiders take for granted’. The 
fieldwork in Lushoto also mobilised another ‘alter ego’. There, investigations were 
conducted with a Tanzanian research assistant. Most interviews were conducted in English, 
including interviews with district staff  and in schools. 112  But for parents, local 
entrepreneurs, village leaders, and, to some extents, students, the language of  interviews 
                                                 
111 See Mosse (2006) for an in-depth discussion. Albert Hirschman’s famous evaluation of World Bank projects in the 
1960s (Hirschman 1967) met with similar epistemic challenges. His critical results were dismissed by the World Bank; one 
member of staff noted that Hirschman attempted a ‘marriage between two inherently incompatible points of view – that 
of the decision maker and that of the academician or seeker of truth’ (quoted in Alacevich 2012: 31). 
112 English is the language of instruction at secondary level. 
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was Kiswahili: the research assistant ensured the translation. But, beyond the translating 
support, she played an instrumental role in identifying local ‘big men’ and helping map 
their political-economy networks. She opened the doors of  the few places of socialisation 
that the district capital offered, where the symbiotic relations between politicians, district 
technocrats and businessmen could be observed, in vivo. 
 
Finally, the Western researcher, as an outsider, is often perceived as a powerful person able 
to influence local power relations. In the various sites of the fieldwork, many informants 
saw the author as a witness of their political, business or personal rivals’ alleged 
misdemeanours. During interviews, she was pulled into various conflicts, for instance 
between a head teacher and a ward councillor fighting about a specific tender for school 
desks or between the ruling and opposition parties or between intra-CCM opponents in 
Lushoto. Specifically, allegations of corruption were often raised against individuals. Much 
of the literature directly engaging with the issue of corruption has barely addressed 
questions related to the predicaments associated with empirical investigations of morally 
condemned or illegal behaviours. As argued by Harrison (2006) ‘most discussions of ethics 
in anthropology concern the ethics of conducting research rather than of researching 
unethical behaviour’. As an exception, Stirling (1968) discussed the practical dilemma of 
researching and publishing accounts of illegality including corruption: if the researcher 
decides to remain silent on illegal practices, her account will remain partial; on the other 
hand, writing about them can be difficult in practice. First, the pervasiveness of accusations 
of corruption cannot be taken as evidence of their truth: they ‘may be only loosely related 
to corrupt practice, and may equally reflect existing power’ (Harrison 2006: 10). In addition, 
even if one ascertains the reality of corruption in a specific case, it may be quite impossible 
to publish the information without potentially harming informants. According to Harrison, 
Stirling’s answer to this dilemma – to ‘offer only a discussion in general terms, without case 
analysis’ – might not be entirely satisfactory: it might undermine ‘the pervasiveness of the 
account’ (ibid). As a response, Harrison suggests displacing the focus of the analysis from 
the ‘corruption’ itself to the ‘accounts of corruption’, the way they reflect power and the 
way they relate to ‘the material and social conditions within which they arise’ (ibid.: 24). In 
this dissertation, this prescription is followed and accounts of corruption are situated 
within a broader analysis of power dynamics and of elites’ accumulation strategies in the 
educational sphere. 
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Most interviews conducted at central level were recorded; this was not the case during the 
fieldwork in Lushoto. Most quotations are anonymised, almost systematically for 
Tanzanian informants. Interviews are referred to as ‘Interviews 1, 2, 3 …’ The detailed list 
with names, precise position and date of interview will be made available to the examiners 
on demand. 113 The minimum contextual information necessary for the analytical 
demonstration is provided, with the view to avoiding identification of informants. In cases 
where the name or the precise professional position of the informant is provided, personal 
consent has been formally obtained during the interview or via email at the writing-up 
stage. As a general rule, the terms ‘senior’ or ‘top’ government official are used to designate 
ministers, permanent secretaries and directors; the label ‘government official’ applies to 
other administrative ranks. Similarly, schools visited are attributed an alphabetic letter and 
their name is mentioned only if absolutely necessary for the analytical demonstration and if 
unlikely to cause any harm to research participants.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the theoretical framework of the research: a political economy 
of education that considers education systems as historical constructs, produced and 
reproduced at the intersection of the international and the national, with ideological and 
material dimensions and sites of distributive conflicts and productive economic activities. 
The research draws on the insights from various analytical traditions in social sciences that 
point to three ways of viewing the social function of schooling: transmission of knowledge, 
social reproduction and the discipline of students’ minds and bodies. Finally, the chapter 
stressed the intellectual affinity of this research with the capability approach on two main 
aspects: the promotion of the humanities and the affirmation of the political nature of 
‘quality education’. 
 
                                                 
113 No corrections have been made to interview quotes other than in cases where meaning might be affected by the 
choice of words of an informant who has English as a second language. 
 
4.5 Treatment of data 
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Two core concepts lie at the heart of the research: the ‘state’ and the ‘elite’. In contrast to 
the normative and culturalist approach of neopatrimonialist authors or donors’ good 
governance agenda, the contemporary African state is not conceived here as the outcome 
of a failed graft of a Western-type state onto authentic indigenous societies. It is endowed 
with historicity; it is a site of conflicts and the nest of a vast web of interests, international 
and domestic. This research projects tells the story of the ward secondary schools policy in 
Tanzania through an elite lens. Elites are defined here as the few people who control the 
significant material, symbolic and political resources in a country. They do not form a 
homogeneous group: this research unearths sites of contention within the elite, both 
ideological and material, at national and local levels.  
 
The research adopted a pluralist methodological framework; it is based on the exploitation 
of various types of data: official documents, printed media, education statistics, budget and 
aid data, and qualitative information gathered during fieldwork conducted in Tanzania in 
2011-2012. This encompassed about 180 in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
members of the elite at national level and in Lushoto district, visiting 28 secondary schools 
and holding focus-groups with parents, students and teachers. The next four chapters 
propose a political economy reading of key aspects of Tanzania’s ward secondary schools 
policy informed by the analysis of this large variety of materials. 
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Chapter Four  
 
Elite narratives and the ward secondary schools policy:  
A specific formulation of the access-quality-equity nexus 
 
 
‘Resort camps’, ‘advanced nursery schools’, ‘day care centres for grown-up children’, ‘garbage in, garbage 
out’, ‘in ward secondary schools, the product is nearly zero’: these are some of the phrases used by 
the research informants to describe the ward secondary schools. These respondents, from 
various segments of the national and local elite, expressed harsh judgements on these 
community schools. From a learning point of view, the recent expansion of junior 
secondary education in Tanzania could without doubt qualify as a ‘failure’. Nevertheless, 
according to President Kikwete, ward secondary schools are a success: ‘it has worked.’114 He 
was not the only high-ranking official who approved of this policy choice. According to an 
official in the PMO-RALG ‘this [policy] is one of the best things we have done’ (interview 5). For a 
Member of Parliament (CCM): ‘we had one among the most successful policies, implemented within 
order’ (interview 131). Are the President of Tanzania and these officials in a state of denial? 
One cannot dismiss the possibility that this self-congratulating posture among a wide share 
of the ruling class, ‘frustrated by stubborn social realities and material facts’, has decided to, 
what Scott described as ‘retreat to the realm of appearances and miniatures’ (Scott 1999: 
257). However, Keen stresses ‘the need to be suspicious of the idea of “failure”’ and 
advised researchers to focus on a tangential question: ‘What objectives are being achieved 
amidst apparent failure, chaos and breakdown?’ (Keen 2008: 216). In that sense, rather than 
assessing success or failure, one may ask, in a long tradition of political economy, whose 
interests have been served by observed outcomes. 
This chapter presents insights to understand why this specific policy was adopted at this 
specific time and why alternative choices – like a gradual expansion or the prior provision 
of skilled teachers, ‘historically plausible alternative courses of action present in the policy 
debate’ (Jackson 2006: xi) - were rejected by the rulers. It avoids the temptation to look for 
evidence of the ‘real’ intention behind the policy choice and to search for individual 
                                                 
114 Speech delivered at the University of Dar es Salaam 50th Anniversary Ceremony (20 October 2011). 
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motives of policy makers: motives that, even if they exist, are by definition ‘unobservable 
beliefs inside of heads’ (Jackson 2006: ix). Instead, the chapter traces discursive patterns 
that contributed to the legitimation of the policy and to making it possible. Respondents’ 
narratives are used to explore elites’ interpretation of the traditional access – quality – 
equity conundrum and to unveil the various functions that elites ascribe to their country’s 
education system. The chapter largely draws on the notion of ‘public rhetorical 
commonplaces’ defined by Jackson as discursive resources ‘that can be utilized so as to 
render a given policy acceptable’ (Jackson 2006: ix). Their availability is ‘an indispensable 
part of the process of public policy-making’ (ibid). We will see that to implement the 
decision to construct one secondary school in each ward, the State had to deploy its 
coercive power against segments of the elite (this chapter) and the wider population 
(Chapter 6). However, as noted by Jackson (2006: 242), ‘social arrangements are almost 
never stable enough to do without an on-going process of legitimation that helps to 
produce and reproduce those arrangements by rendering them socially and politically 
plausible’.  The thesis argues that without the mobilization of these ‘public rhetorical 
commonplaces’, the reconfiguration of the post-independence educational settlement that 
the ward secondary schools policy has entailed would not have been possible.  
 
The Tanzanian state is not a homogeneous entity: the ward schools policy is the outcome 
of intra-ruling class conflicts, especially between politicians and technocrats. This 
disjuncture of interests reflects conflicting visions of modernity (Section 1). Nevertheless, 
in 2011-2012, elites deployed a homogeneous discourse to legitimate this education policy 
with controversial outcomes. The analysis of interviews conducted with members of the 
elite, at national and district levels, and the study of press articles and official documents, 
revealed three main public rhetorical commonplaces, knitted together to legitimise the 
policy decision:  a policy that answers a ‘social demand’ (Section 2); an inescapable policy to 
manage the youth (Section 3); and a policy meant to secure Tanzania a place within the 
global knowledge economy (Section 4).  
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1. The ward secondary schools policy and elites’ conflicting visions of modernity  
 
 
The ward secondary schools policy choice was politically driven, at the highest level of the 
Executive. Despite the community-driven official story, all insiders’ accounts of the 
decision-making process underlined the critical role played by a prominent political figure, 
Edward Lowassa, Prime Minister between 2006 and 2010 and President Kikwete’s long-
time close political ally. The label ‘Lowassa schools’, coined by the press and used by some 
respondents, attests to a barely contested paternity. This was confirmed by a senior official 
in the CCM Secretary: ‘Then came the 4th President, Kikwete. He put much on education. The Prime 
Minister decided that we should establish ward secondary schools to accommodate primary leavers from that 
ward’ (interview 85). This account points to a harmonious, collaborative division of roles 
between a President, who sets a general strategic orientation on education, and a Prime 
Minister who plays a decisive role in shaping the policy and drives its implementation. 
 
Electoral objectives were undoubtedly not foreign to Lowassa’s decision. As argued in the 
introduction assessing individual motives largely remains out of the researcher’s remit. 
Nevertheless, it would be unwise not to relate this decision to Lowassa’s well-known 
presidential ambitions.115 This process cannot be analysed in abstraction from his personal 
efforts, on his way to the political summit, to assert his credentials as a statesman 
responsive to people’s needs. Despite the catastrophic Form 4 examination results, 
Lowassa continues to boast of his secondary education achievements to boost his political 
profile. Similarly, his supporters proclaim their champion’s political superiority by drawing 
on the ward secondary school story.116  
 
Moreover, President Kikwete certainly required his own education initiative to overshadow 
President Mkapa’s educational legacy. The name of his predecessor remains firmly attached 
                                                 
115 In January 2014, Lowassa, after his implication in a corruption scandal, was back to a leading position within the party 
and was ‘determined to win the CCM presidential nomination’ for the 2015 elections (Africa Confidential, 24/01/2014, 
Vol. 55 - N°2). 
116 For instance, ‘Lowassa who is remembered for his influence in Ward Schools program’ In2EastAfrica, 17August 2012; 
‘Records have it that it was Lowassa’s zeal and commitment to construct secondary schools in every ward’ Vox Media, 4 
July 2011. 
1.1 Edward Lowassa’s electoral strategy rooted in a long-standing intra-
ruling class conflict 
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to the internationally praised PEDP and the abolition of primary school fees. The ward 
secondary schools can be understood not only as a technical but also as a political sequel to 
PEDP. For Kikwete, investing in the education field might have been a political necessity 
to assert his power and boost his chances to gain a second term. This was paradoxically 
confirmed by the member of the CCM Secretary mentioned above, whose position 
logically depends on Kikwete (CCM’s president): he asserted against all evidence that 
‘President Mkapa did not do much on education; he tried his best with PEDP’ (interview 85). 
Lowassa’s and Kikwete’s individual electoral strategies point to the critical importance of 
educational initiatives in building a politician’s stature, at least as imagined by the elite.117 
 
If Lowassa’s personal electoral strategy cannot be denied, it was also rooted in a long-
lasting intra-ruling class conflict. Indeed, despite its enduring nature, the historical 
education settlement exposed in Chapter 1 did not remain unchallenged. Many officials, 
when questioned about the evident contradiction between Nyerere’s educational options 
and the ward secondary schools policy, dismissed this inconsistency as spurious. However, 
these claims of absolute fidelity obscured the intense contestation that Nyerere’s 
educational options were subject to, both during his time in power and after his resignation 
as President in 1985. Samoff (1979b) showed, in particular, how the petty bourgeoisie in 
the Kilimanjaro region developed strategies to reinforce their social and political position 
inherited from the colonial period: they funded their own local private secondary schools in 
contradiction to the national education agenda. Coulson (1982) pointed to wealthy parents’ 
individual strategies to ensure that their children, who did not perform well or failed the 
Standard 7 examination, would still be admitted to selective public secondary schools or 
secure a seat in a fee-based private school. The government itself implemented its own 
policy on private education flexibly to accommodate the ‘social demand’ (Lassibille et al. 
2000). The vocationalisation of the curriculum, at least as it was implemented through 
manual activities or cultivation of the shamba (school field), was resented by parents and 
seen as a continuity of the colonial education system that denied academic education to 
Africans (Buchert 1994; Okoko 1987).  
 
                                                 
117 To assess the actual influence of politicians’ educational credentials on their chances of being elected would require 
another research project. However, Chapter 6 briefly challenges the idea of an automatic relation between politicians’ 
political survival and their involvement in education. 
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Nyerere himself was very much aware of the pressure exerted by some segments of the 
ruling class to expand secondary education. ‘I know that virtually all the pressure for 
educational expansion comes in the form of demand for more secondary schools (…). I’m 
saying that it is the job of the Party and the Government and in particular the Ministry of 
Education to resist this pressure’ (Nyerere 1984: 153). In 1988, he vocally denounced 
public officials’ support of the expansion of public and private secondary schooling as 
subverting the Party’s programme:  
‘Many of these new Private Schools are the results of public collections supported by – 
or even initiated by – Party leaders and prominent figures! (…) No one has suggested 
that it is part of our Party’s Programme! (…) It would be a greater service to the people 
of Tanzania, to the children of Tanzania, and to education in Tanzania, if public 
collections were made and used for the upgrading of our primary schools. Our leaders 
should look again at their responsibilities to the mass of our people’. (Nyerere 1988: 184)  
 
The post-independence educational settlement was also subject to stern international 
criticism. A famous 1990 World Bank comparative study of educational achievements in 
Kenya and Tanzania (Knight and Sabot 1990) disparaged Nyerere’s Education for Self-Reliance 
policy and especially the restrictions put on private secondary schools. Despite its 
methodological flaws and its denial of the actual financial constraints experienced by 
Tanzania’s education system (Samoff 1992), 118  the 1990 document still influences aid 
agencies’ economists today in Dar es Salaam. One of them referred to this ‘amazing study 
by Knight and Sabot’ and implicitly characterised the Education for Self Reliance as an anti-
egalitarian and obscurantist policy: he used the motto ‘don’t educate anybody’ to qualify the 
former ‘Tanzanian way’ in education.119  
 
The 1995 Education and Training Policy offers an illustration of the ideological convergence 
between donors and an elite segment against the education configuration inherited from 
Ujamaa. This policy document, largely drafted under external influences, incorporated a 
fundamental attack against a core element of the historical settlement on secondary 
education: it planned the end of the quota system set up during Ujamaa (URT 1995: 21). 
                                                 
118 Samoff specifically pointed out the crucial difference in the two countries’ economic bases. In Kenya ‘the economic 
base permits a substantially larger investment in education, both public and private’ and ‘the differences in the availability 
of secondary education observable in 1980 were more a function of Kenya’s relative affluence than of Tanzania’s 
socialism’ (Samoff 1992: 88). 
119 Foreign economist, aid agency (interview 51). 
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Since the private sector was now allowed to thrive, the quota system, portrayed as 
intrinsically unfair and inefficient, lost its relevance. The notion of ‘merit’, understood in 
relation to collective and historically constructed inequalities, was replaced by ‘merit’ 
viewed through an individualistic lens, in relation to ‘natural’ aptitudes, independent of 
social origin and that society needed to nurture: the government’s role was to support the 
‘deserving ones’. These criticisms of the quota system were still referred to by some of the 
research informants.120  
 
Lowassa did not invent the ward secondary schools policy: the 1995 Education and Training 
Policy identified the construction of one secondary school in each ward as a key educational 
orientation for the country (URT 1995: 102). The CCM Election Manifesto in 2000 and 2005 
also reaffirmed the strategy. 121  However, in his inaugural speech to Parliament on 30 
December 2005, the newly elected President Kikwete did not mention the ward secondary 
schools at all. Instead he prescribed the creation of ‘Pan-Territorial Secondary Schools that 
will deliberately mix talented students from all corners of the country’ with the view of 
strengthening national unity: 122  this programmatic vision had more resonance with the 
Ujamaa meritocratic model of government secondary schools than with a model of 
community-driven mass secondary education. The persistent coexistence of these two 
options provides an evident sign of friction within the state: the question of the type of 
secondary education that the country required or could afford has been a long-lasting site 
of contestation for Tanzanian elites.  
 
Drawing the political and social map of elite coalitions in Tanzania proved an elusive quest 
for the researcher. As argued in Gray (2012), the Tanzanian ruling class has been 
characterised by its fragmentation and the boundaries of political coalitions alter according 
to the contested issue at stake. One enduring splinter line could nevertheless be clearly 
identified: the ward secondary schools policy exemplifies the disjuncture of interests 
between politicians and technocrats, which could be traced both at central and district 
                                                 
120 Including Margaret Sitta, former Secretary General of the Teachers Trade Union (TTU), former Ministry of Education 
during the expansion of ward secondary schools and current Chair of the Parliament Standing Committee for Social 
Affairs. 
121 CCM (2000 and 2005). 
122 http://www.parliament.go.tz/docs/pspeech_en.pdf (Last accessed on 15/02/2014).  
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levels.123 The opposition between the two groups exhibits a divergent appreciation of the 
appropriate route to modernity. 
 
 
 
Initially, the formal SEDP 2004-2009 document was the result of a process-oriented 
collaboration between bureaucrats and donors’ representatives. The SEDP was the last off-
spring of a decade-long education planning process that started in the mid-1990s (see 
Chapter 1). The final SEDP document was passed through various government-donors 
technical committees and based on numerous studies commissioned by donors. It foresaw 
an expansion grounded on targets in terms of access and learning achievements (URT 2004: 
vii). The programme also had meticulously programmed an accelerated production of 
qualified teachers. These targets were derived from a modeling exercise that factored 
enrolment projections, required teaching force and available financial resources (World 
Bank 2004: 7).  
 
Nevertheless, from the inception of the planning process, a tension was perceptible 
between an aspiration to universal secondary education – a socially desirable target - and a 
more gradual expansion commensurate with the availability of public resources – a 
financially realistic target. The SEDP document achieved an evidently shaky compromise 
between two scenarios that reflected the divergent positions of the World Bank and the 
government on the necessary rythm of expansion (Figure 4.1). 
 
                                                 
123 This opposition is a long lasting feature of Tanzanian power configurations. It is rooted in the historical opposition 
between the intellectuals – the bureaucrats – and the, generally, less educated politicians. See for instance Ivaska (2005). 
1.2 Ward secondary schools and the ‘rule of the experts’  
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Figure 4-1: Evolution of O Level GER, actual vs projected, 2003 – 2011 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b) and World Bank (2004) 
 
In his foreword to the SEDP I, Joseph Mungai, then Minister of Education, announced: 
‘This is a visionary plan with projections of up to 2010 when we should achieve 50 per cent 
primary-secondary transition rate that may translate into having over 500,000 pupils joining 
Form One in secondary schools annually which would be about five times the current rate’ 
(URT 2004: i). Proclaimed by a member of the Cabinet, these targets can be considered as 
endorsed by the entire government, including the Prime Minister and the President, and 
imbued with a high level of political legitimacy. Consistent with this politically asserted 
goal, the core text of the document dwelled on the ‘high growth scenario’ to present the 
different components of the programme: from a formal point of view, preeminence was 
given to the government’s preference for a steady pace of expansion. However, despite 
being relegated to the rank of annex, the World Bank favoured option – a ‘medium growth 
scenario’ that took account of available resources and macro-economic prospects - was 
chosen as the basis of the actual implementation for the first years: only ‘favourable 
performance [would] mandate change into the high growth scenario’ (World Bank 2004: 
20). 
 
This built-in ambiguity reflects more than the power struggle at play in the negotiation of 
an aid intervention between the World Bank and a recipient country. The ward secondary 
schools story also reveals the proximity between Tanzanian and international bureaucrats : 
they share a similar faith in the intrinsic efficiency of technical rationality. Most government 
officials involved in the design of SEDP and interviewed during this research fully 
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endorsed the technocratic planning approach that underpinned the design of SEDP. They 
confirmed, with visible professional pride, the technical soundness of the initial plan and 
the gradual nature of the projected growth: the expansion was ‘programmed, it was well 
programmed (…) targets had been prepared’ (official, MoEVT, interview 10). Most of them 
would legitimate, a posteriori, the ward secondary schools policy, dwelling upon the three 
rhetorical commonplaces mentioned in the introduction, enmeshed in various 
combinations. However, in the interstices of this dominant legitimation discourse there 
surfaced, often through discursive contortions, regrets that the actual expansion deviated 
from its carefully planned, gradual trajectory. Specifically, the immediate outcomes of the 
ward secondary schools policy – poor learning performances, scarcity of teachers, derelict 
infrastructures - could have been avoided had politicians not irrationally overruled the 
technocrats’ enlightened plans:  
We as the ministry, we wanted to expand secondary education according to plans. As technocrats, we 
plan how things should go. But the political envoys said “No, no, no. We need to run, to jump”...so 
actually we can say, our plan was not followed by the party. We are suffering what we are suffering now 
because we didn’t go according to plan. (official, MoEVT, interview 10) 
The following statement epitomises the conflict-ridden relations between the political and 
bureaucratic spheres: 
That’s the difference between developed and underdeveloped countries. In developed countries technocrats 
are steering the wheel of development. In under-developed, political people are leading, they are the ones 
who decide and you will follow. You, technocrat, you will follow. It is the other way round. (…) Now, if 
you want to live here, you live here. If you don’t want to live here, go find your place to live. Here, 
politicians are leading the way and we shall expand secondary education. And you technocrats will have 
to do what we say. You will have to expand, you say no money, no this, no this. Go and expand.’ 
(official, MoEVT, interview 6) 
At district level, where the material implications of the policy choice have been the most 
challenging for the bureaucratic apparatus, technocrats’ bitterness vis-à-vis politicians was 
equally perceptible underneath the usual official legitimation narrative, a resentment shared 
by headmasters and teachers. 
 
In this vision, the core root of under-development lies in political leaders’ stubborn 
rejection of what Mitchell (2002) called the ‘rule of the experts’, the genealogy of which can 
be traced back to the European Enlightenment and its ‘mantra of efficiency’ (Alexander 
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2008). Bureaucrats view themselves as custodians of a specific modernisation philosophy 
geared towards the general interest, in conflict to politicians’ cynical populism and self-
serving policy choices.   
 
 
Lowassa’s individual agency was decisive in driving the ward secondary schools policy 
forward. Nevertheless, it was endorsed by the rest (or at least a large share) of the political 
class. The following statement by an official of the CCM Secretary highlights the subtle 
relations between the top Executive and the Party, in the decision making process. 
Immediately after having recognised Lowassa’s significant role in the ward secondary 
school, the informant continued:  
The idea itself originated from the party caucus, before being tabled before the government. It was 
initiated within the party. We have the official party meetings: the NEC [National Executive 
Committee]. The party caucus is an informal gathering of CCM party leaders, eminent leaders where 
they discuss basic issues. Political figures were behind the decision. The Prime Minister himself, Lowassa 
who was also a member of the NEC, was the one championing the idea of ward secondary schools but 
it’s not the decision of one person, it’s a collective idea and the government took it. (interview 85) 
 
Margaret Sitta, former Minister of Education, also stressed the government solidarity and 
collective endorsement of the policy:  
Most of decisions need to go before the Cabinet. Nothing can be done without the decision of the 
Cabinet. So it was not Lowassa’s decision. Of course he was the Prime Minister and as the Head of 
Government’s business, he took the responsibility of its implementation but you can’t say that it was 
Lowassa’s decision.  
The fact that, despite all the evidence to the contrary, Sitta downplayed Lowassa’s 
individual role is interesting in itself. This denial reveals something about the tensions 
within the party and about the common ideological substratum that contributes to the 
coalescence of competing CCM factions. During the ward secondary school process, her 
ministry was blatantly side-lined by the Prime Minister’s Office. She is also the wife of the 
Parliament’s former Speaker who has been leading a fierce intra-CCM battle against 
1.3 The educational ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the coalescence of 
Tanzania’s political class 
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Lowassa and his faction.124 Interviewed in April 2012, in a context of emerging social 
contestation over the ward secondary schools, Margaret Sitta could have questioned, even 
indirectly, Lowassa’ s ward schools decision as a tactic to undermine his credibility, putting 
the blame for catastrophic Form Four results on him. Insisting on the Cabinet’s collective 
agency certainly allowed her to reassert her own influence over the decision-making 
process. Nevertheless, what transpires from the rest of the interview was a full 
endorsement of the policy and of its ideological underpinnings. ‘If you ask me about the ward 
secondary schools, I will tell you that I’m very very proud of them, they were a big relief. (...) We knew well 
that during the transition, certain cohorts will suffer. But it’s a transition period. After a number of years, 
things will improve’. Ward schools were not a failure, but a necessary stage in development. In 
that context, her denial of Lowassa’s role can be reassessed as a political attack meant to 
deny him getting full credit for a successful policy.125  
 
Margaret Sitta’s lexical corpus – especially the idea of a necessary sacrifice of some cohorts 
- can be seen in interviews with many other CCM politicians. Her endorsement was 
therefore not (only) a contingent answer crafted for a Western researcher’s ears. It reflects 
on the contrary the entrenchment, among Tanzanian politicians, of a specific 
developmental ideology, of what Scott referred to as ‘high modernism’ (Scott 1999: 345), 
grounded in the belief that development cannot occur without a ‘great leap forward’. This 
was a development path that would entail some sacrifices in the short run. 126 As explicitly 
stated by an MP (CCM) ‘Now we’ve got difficulties but in 30 years to come it will be different, we’ll 
have the biggest learned community in East Africa …Yes, the beginners will be crucified for those who come 
later’ (interview 131). The high casualty toll of the policy is completely assumed as a 
necessary, unavoidable price of development: ‘OK we start with a failure but it’s impossible to 
reach the top right from the beginning it’s not possible, it’s illogical. We did expect that we could have a lot 
of failures but as a ruling party we were ready for these challenges: we know that, later on, we’ll come to a 
better position’ (interview 85). The question of who was to pay the price of the policy was, 
                                                 
124 See for instance ‘CCM circles the wagon’ Africa Confidential 54(12), 07/06/2012. 
125 A similar sign of an intra-CCM rivalry could be detected during the Parliamentary discussion of the FY2011/12 budget 
when MP Lowassa and his successor Prime Minister Pinda battled over who would get credit for the ward schools 
‘success’. They argued about the ability of the current government, in contrast to Lowassa’s previous government, to take 
‘bold decisions’ to boost the country’s development. See for instance: The Guardian 1 July 2011. 
126 This developmental ideology reveals the enduring influence of early development theorists like Rosenstein-Rodan, 
Rostow, Nurske, Singer and Hirschman who did not believe in incremental development and advocated for a ‘big push’ 
to overcome the initial inertia.  
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obviously, not a matter for discussion and the fact that these same sacrificed cohorts would 
go on to be the next generation of teachers was dismissed as irrelevant.  
 
Mirroring bureaucrats’ denunciation of politicians’ irrationality, the ‘great leap forward’ 
development philosophy is explicitly articulated in contrast to gradualism, bureaucrats’ 
modus operandi. ‘I resolved that it could not be business as usual nor should we leave it to the normal 
evolutionary path of growth. That was not desirable for our country’ (President Kikwete).127 In their 
rejection of gradualism, politicians also assert their position against the international 
community, whose proximity to Tanzanian bureaucrats’ ethos is hence implicitly posited. 
Margaret Sitta, recalling a meeting with the Head of the World Bank, while she was 
Minister of Education, explained:  
I remember I attended a meeting where the World Bank asked me: “Why do you construct so many 
schools without the available teachers, you risk undermining quality?” But I asked them, “Which comes 
first, access or quality?” To me, access should come first. Because I’m convinced that, even without a 
laboratory, a kid who stays four years in a school will not be the same. It’s better than to just get to the 
street.  
Their hostility towards bureaucrats’ technocratic rationality and quest for a ‘general 
equilibrium’ does not entail a disavowal of their traditional tools. The three following 
statements show how statistics, scientific research and economic laws are mobilised by 
three generations of politicians and CCM cadres to ascertain the rationality of ‘the great 
leap forward’: 
With regards to secondary school education, the situation in Africa was the same. Of the 503,054,515 
secondary school students in the world, South East Asia had 160,278,253, Latin America and the 
Caribbean had 57,108,671 and North America and Western Europe together had 62,686,626 
students. Sub-Sahara Africa had 30,576,317 students only and Ethiopia had 4,505,507, South 
Africa 4,186,882, Kenya 925,341, Uganda 619,519, and Tanzania 524,325 (…) It is these 
statistics that informed our decision on the need for unprecedented interventions to expand secondary and 
higher education in terms of building more schools and colleges, increasing enrolment of students. 
(President Kikwete)128 
 
                                                 
127 Speech delivered at the University of Dar es Salaam 50th Anniversary Ceremony, 20th October, 2011. 
128 Ibid. 
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The decision was based on collective research, people did research. The idea came out from research, it 
was based on research. (Senior official, CCM Secretary, interview 85) 
 
In economics we have two theories of growth: the balanced theory of growth and the unbalanced theory of 
growth. I consider that the unbalanced growth is more productive to development…Without the law of 
large numbers we would not make any progress. In the course of time, we’ll improve the number of 
teachers, the availability of books. The success will come. We don’t regret. (Former MP, former 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, interview 135)129 
 
To accelerate the path of development, politicians needed to tame the bureaucratic 
apparatus. The implementation of the ward secondary schools policy involved a quasi-
military mobilisation of the government bureaucratic apparatus under Lowassa’s 
authoritarian supervision. The latter would regularly summon staff of the Ministry of 
Education and Regional and District Commissioners in Dar es Salaam and hold them to 
account over the progress of the implementation in their respective administrative areas. A 
former Regional Commissioner, in post at the time of the policy, explained:  
I was called one day on the phone: ‘‘Your region has only 32 per cent of entrance at secondary, why?’’ 
Then I was called to a meeting in Dar es Salaam with the DC, DED, District chairman...in a 
conference room like this one. The PM told the RCs and DCs: you have 30 minutes to find a solution 
to allow all primary leavers to be admitted in secondary schools and 3 months to implement it. So we 
came with a programme. We went to the people and they did a good job. From 32 per cent in February 
I reached 96 per cent admission rate in April. (interview 131) 
 
Another insider informant concurred: 
There was a lot of political push from top, the Prime Minister. We had a lot of meetings at the Prime 
Minister's office chaired by the Prime Minister, with attendance of the Minister for Education, the 
Minister for Local Government. The regional commissioners, all the top brass. Regional commissioners, 
top officials at the regional level and top officials at the district level. They were all called to come and 
explain directly to the Prime Minister what they were doing and what their plans to expand were (…) 
                                                 
129  In this quote the reference to Albert O. Hirschman’s ‘unbalanced growth theory’ is explicit. Against other 
development theorists who promoted ‘balanced growth’ (Rosenstein-Rodan or Nurkse), Hirschman argued that 
unbalancing the economy was the best strategy to achieve economic growth. Specifically, state investments in what he 
called ‘Social Overhead Capital’ (basic services including education, health, infrastructures or public utilities) would result 
in excess capacities that, despite possible initial unprofitability, would subsequently stimulate investments in ‘Directly 
Productive Activities’ (Hirschman 1958).  
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they had to stand there and they had to explain and then, they were asked questions. If they were not 
well-prepared, they had to go out and get themselves prepared and come again another day. It was very 
serious. (Senior official, MoEVT, interview 10) 
 
Every echelon of the CCM apparatus was put to work: ‘Through the party chain of command, up 
to the ten-house cells level (palozi nyumba kumi) we managed to bring the idea to every ten house, to get the 
message through and make people act’ (official, CCM Secretary, interview 134). Far from the 
official story of a bottom-up process, driven by communities’ self-help initiatives, it was 
very much a top-down process. Every official embarked on the mobilisation enterprise, if 
not by conviction, certainly in fear of losing his/her post in case of unreached targets: ‘no 
RC would make a mistake’ (interview 131). A representative of an NGO underlined the 
coercive dimension of the policy implementation: ‘It was done at great force, it was almost 
Chinese-like or Soviet-like orders; you must do it whether you like it or not.  And so, it was … done in a 
very rough, very, very rough way’ (interview 67). 
 
This voluntarist, ‘big push’, mode of policy-making was not new in Tanzania. For instance 
the villagisation process under Ujamaa followed a similar pattern: it started as a voluntary 
scheme but in face of thin actual outcomes top leaders resorted to coercion to achieve 
results (Hyden 1980). Similarly, Samoff (1979a: 45) pointed to the habit of Tanzanian rulers 
to launch ‘widely publicized “operations” (…) often with scant reference to previous 
experience, with little substantial analysis, and with a tendency to be heavy-handed’.  
 
Nevertheless, the coercion exerted by the state over the bureaucratic apparatus should not 
be considered as the usual mode of relations between the party and technocrats. An 
informant, well advanced in his professional career when the policy was decided upon, 
noted: ‘I was not used to that and I'm sure, even for some of those top guys, they were not used to that. It 
was unusual, it was unusual’ (senior official, MoEVT, interview 10). In normal circumstances, 
the bureaucratic apparatus enjoys a rather large autonomy vis-à-vis the party: because of the 
lack of capacities within the party, there is ‘a very big leeway and a very big discretion by a 
bureaucracy to run government’ (MP, CCM, interview 149). The ward schools story confirms 
earlier analyses of the party–government relationship: according to Lawson and Racker 
(2005: 9), the CCM may interfere with the government’s policy formulation and 
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implementation duties ‘when it identifies a risk of the government making political 
mistakes’. 
 
The fact that the CCM Election Manifesto for 2010-2015 (CCM 2010) has included as a 
priority for the education sector the ‘construction of one A Level school in each 
division’,130 a clear continuity of the ward secondary schools policy, demonstrates that the 
tension between great leap forward and rule of the experts is still alive: the intra-CCM 
struggle, underpinned by diverging modernization philosophies, remains unsettled. 131 
Despite these frictions within elites, in 2011-2012, they also deployed a homogeneous 
discourse to legitimate the ward secondary schools policy. The next three sections explore 
the three public rhetorical commonplaces that they mobilised to tell their ward secondary 
schools story.  
 
2. The ‘social demand’ for secondary education and elites’ egalitarian 
aspirations 
 
 
‘Social demand, social demand, social demand’ (academic, interview 72): one of the dominant 
narratives provided to explain the expansion policy relates to Tanzanian leaders’ 
responsiveness to people’s ‘demand’ in the context of mass primary education. In 2006, the 
first cohort of PEDP students was about to complete their primary schooling and the two 
words ‘social demand’ were heard again and again in all interviews, across all elite categories. 
‘The demand is tremendous; the demand for secondary education is from the people. Now it's so intense. In 
the past, the demand was for primary education. But now the demand has shifted. Everybody wants their 
kid to go to secondary education’ (senior official, MoEVT, interview 10). This policy ‘was a 
natural response to what are the demands of the communities’ (official, MoEVT, interview 7).  
 
                                                 
130 The division is the administrative unit between the ward and the district. 
131 The young generation of politicians, across parties, seems more prone to embrace the ‘rule of the experts’ than to 
adhere to the big push narrative. For instance, one young CCM member castigated CCM elders’ development philosophy, 
underlining its irrational inadequacy: ‘They’ve got an idealistic approach. We need a realistic approach. If you decide to build a school and 
you don’t have teachers, you don’t have books... what do you expect? You don’t have to politicise everything. Education is a technical issue’ 
(CCM member, interview 146). 
2.1 Ward secondary schools: a government response to a ‘social demand’ 
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The ‘social demand’ argument was also present at the time of the decision: it cannot be 
considered, at least exclusively, a discursive currency mobilised by elites in order to 
legitimise a posteriori the policy and its appalling learning outcomes. In 2001, Joseph Mungai, 
then Minister of Education, noted: ‘The GER for lower secondary education increased from 5.0 in 
1995 to 7.0 in 2000. These levels remain low in terms of social demand’. 132  Official planning 
documents conveyed a similar message. Early plans for secondary expansion were rather 
silent, in their statement of intentions, on any possible egalitarian purpose attached to 
secondary education: the two other narratives – youth employment and economic 
modernisation – prevailed.133 However, in 2004, three years after the abolition of school 
fees for primary schools, the notion of social demand was clearly visible in official 
discourses. In his foreword to the SEDP 2004-2009, Mungai stressed: ‘Without the expansion 
in access stipulated in SEDP, the transition from primary to public secondary schools would drop 
dramatically. This would clearly be unacceptable, not only to the Government, but also to the parents’ 
(URT 2004: i).  
 
Similarly, donors have largely mobilised the ‘social demand’ rhetoric. The foreseeable 
‘social pressure’ caused by primary education leavers and the necessity for the government 
to provide a response was acknowledged by the World Bank in its SEDP programming 
document: ‘The current limited provision of secondary education is economically unwise 
and socially unsustainable’ (World Bank 2004: 5). A similar argument had already been used 
by the agency to justify the official opening up of education to private providers in the mid-
1980s: ‘excess demand pressures had built up to intolerable levels (…) Excess demand was 
indeed a major factor motivating the government’s decision in the early 1980s to remove 
the barriers to private sector growth’ (Lasibille et al. 2000: 5). For the World Bank, ‘rates of 
return’ are at the root of the ‘social demand’, interpreted as the aggregate sum of individual 
demands for education: ‘social demand for education is driven by labour market wage 
premiums for higher levels of educational attainment’ (World Bank 2010: 80). Their SEDP 
project was explicitly justified on the ground of greater private returns to secondary 
education relative to investments in primary or tertiary schooling. For World Bank staff in 
the Dar es Salaam office, ‘rates of return’ constitute the common sense explanation of the 
                                                 
132 Text of the speech accessible at http://www.ibe.unesco.org/International/ICE/ministers/Tanzania.pdf. 
133 See for instance URT (1995) or URT (1999a). 
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government’s expansion decision: ‘Today with the huge number of primary leavers, a higher wage 
premium is associated to higher education’ (interview 58).  
 
The discursive mobilisation of the ‘social demand’ argument, a public rhetorical 
commonplace for donors and the elite, points to a specific perception of the role of the 
state as a benevolent ‘servant of the people’ ensuring the conditions for equalization of 
social conditions.134 Government, donors and various elite segments may differ on the 
instruments or the pace to achieve this egalitarian quest but a permanent shared vision of 
the state’s main duty remains: to provide social services for the people. 
 
The effectiveness of this ‘social demand’ eluded the empirical investigation; its modalities 
of materialisation, its supposedly bottom-up channels of expression were not substantiated 
by research interviewees; this ‘social demand’ took on the attribute of a self-evident social 
fact. Chapter 2 challenged the ‘rates of return’ narrative and its ability to account for 
countries’ specific education trajectory. The pre-eminence, among the Tanzanian elite, of 
this idea of a ‘social demand’ for secondary education should rather be analysed in 
conjunction with the profound contradiction between an enduring egalitarian ethos among 
the Tanzanian ruling class and the elitist nature of secondary education in the post-
independence educational settlement.  
 
 
 
Despite calls for a classless state, secondary education was constructed, under Ujamaa, as a 
key site of class formation. A direct link was set up between secondary education and 
access to white-collar jobs: entry qualifications for specific training schemes (like those for 
agricultural extension workers, teachers and many types of technicians) were upgraded to 
Form Four (Coulson 1982: 203). English, commonly perceived as an indispensable 
resource to access influence, power and wealth, was maintained as the language of 
instruction for post-basic education levels, building up the distinctive social function of 
secondary education.135 Contrary to  Nyerere’s intent, secondary schools continued to be 
                                                 
134 This is not specific to Tanzania nor to developing countries: in the case of the United States, republican ‘egalitarian 
virtues’ propelled the ‘high school movement’ in the beginning of the 20th century (Goldin 2001). 
135 Swahili, the national language, is the language of instruction at primary level. 
2.2 The enduring currency of Ujamaa egalitarian ideology 
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referred to as ‘Bwana Kubwa’ or ‘big man’ schools and primary school leavers who could 
not enter secondary education continued to be labelled as ‘failed’ (Nyerere 1974).  
 
In 2011-2012, elite discourses abounded with allusions to the power of education as an 
instrument to climb the social ladder and to reach positions of authority. ‘No one, no family, 
no community can prosper without investing in education’ (former MP, CCM, interview 135). ‘How 
you get to power, it’s education’ (academic, interview 73). The decisive role played by Nyerere in 
forging a nation united on an educational substratum also constituted a permanent 
reference. Few interviewees challenged the belief in the unlimited power of education. 
Only one respondent acknowledged that: ‘Some families, parents overinvest on education. (…) The 
danger is that people can become very frustrated and disappointed if they think that education is everything. 
It’s a misplaced thought about what education can achieve’ (senior official, interview 38).  
 
Despite its indisputable elitist nature, in 2012 the Ujamaa secondary education model was 
still perceived by those who had benefited from it as a tool to serve an egalitarian 
development strategy. Many respondents of this research expressed their gratitude towards 
a system that had made their own social advancement possible. ‘[Nyerere] thought of rural 
people, he thought of poor people. Some people like us couldn’t pay school fees. My father was very poor. But 
we were educated to university education’ (official, MoEVT, interview 6). Another informant even 
refuted the word ‘elite’ to qualify government secondary education: ‘I don’t believe that 
secondary education was for the elite. I don’t. Not during Nyerere’s time … Even at that time, education 
was for all’ (official, MoEVT, interview 1). Here the word ‘elite’ is implicitly associated with 
wealth-based schooling as opposed to the meritocratic feature of government secondary 
education that officially allowed every child to attend secondary school, irrespectively of 
his/her social extraction, and to climb the social ladder. An official of the Tanzanian 
Chamber for Agriculture, Industry and Trade confirmed the critical role of free secondary 
education in the post-independence formation of the bureaucratic middle-class: ‘I benefitted 
from the system of free secondary school. And believe me, if we had to pay school fees, I wouldn’t have gone 
to secondary school because we were a large family and my big brothers were the ones who were at school. So 
if I had also to pay, my parents would never have taken me to school, to secondary school’ (interview 74). 
This egalitarian ethos was embraced, at least rhetorically, at the highest levels of the 
Executive. For President Kikwete, ‘Most of us here, of my generation, would never have gone to school 
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and reached this far in life had it not been for the far-sightedness and good social policies of our Founding 
Father’.136 
 
While universal primary education has almost been achieved, the site of valuation of 
education as a promise of a better future has drifted towards secondary education. ‘A parent 
who has got a child who has finished secondary education…there’s nothing to grieve. You’re starting to feel 
good (…) Hope, hope in the family, will be built around secondary education’ (academic, interview 72). 
Secondary education has been elevated to the status of ‘social equaliser’, a ‘social good’ to be 
delivered by the state (MP, CCM, interview 149). Economic success is also intrinsically 
associated with secondary education: ‘If you look at Chaggas who are succeeding, these are people 
who have Form Four’ (interview 72).137 This comprehension of secondary education as the 
first step out of a survival stage implicitly disqualifies primary education as a guarantor of 
prosperity.  
 
More than an aggregated sum of discrete individual interests, the ‘social demand’ narrative 
reflects the interdependent nature of the relations between the ruling class and the rest of 
the society, already pointed out in Section 1. Indeed, implicit behind the ‘social demand’ 
rhetoric is the perception of an essential bond between political survival for those in power 
and their delivery of education. Because ‘education is in people’s mind’, the government’s own 
existence is considered at stake; ‘the government depends on the support of the people. We should 
respond to people’s demand’ (interview 85). The ‘social demand’ for ward secondary schools in 
Tanzania vividly illustrates Boone’s contention that ‘state power [is] rooted in rural 
societies’ (Boone 1994: 109).  
 
A second dominant narrative mobilised to justify the ward secondary schools policy has 
been centred on the youth. 138  A bulge of idle and disenfranchised primary education 
leavers was about to threaten the society’s peace and harmony; their capture within a state 
                                                 
136 Inaugural speech to Parliament, Dodoma, 30 December 2005. 
137 Chaggas are a tribe from the Kilimanjaro region that have historically, since the colonial period, benefitted from better 
education services. 
138 According to the United Nations, ‘the term “youth” refers to all those between the ages of 15 and 24’ (UN 2012: 4), an 
age bracket that corresponds to secondary education in Tanzania. Beyond this statistical categorisation, the youth age 
boundaries should be considered as much more extensive and blurred. For instance in Tanzania, a country-specific 
definition, frequently used by stakeholders and policy makers, extends the youth upper age limit to 35 years (URT 2006: 
9). More generally, the concept of youth needs to be seen as a social construct that corresponds to a particular political 
and economic subaltern position (Bayart’s ‘cadets sociaux’) or a socio-cultural identity. For an analysis of intergenerational 
relations in contemporary Tanzania through an exploration of hip-hop culture and a discussion of the concept of ‘new 
generation’ as a resource in politics of identity, see Stroeken (2008). 
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institution would ensure their domestication, the discipline of their mind and body and the 
taming of their violent or deviant behaviours.139 
 
3. Ward secondary schools, a device for youth domestication 
 
 
 
In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring and London riots, international aid agencies 
flooded the world with reports on the ‘youth issue’, echoed by news headlines. The 2013 
World Development Report drew attention to the ‘621 million youth neither working nor 
studying’ (World Bank 2012a: 4), pointing out that ‘in extreme cases a lack of job 
opportunities can contribute to violence or social unrest’ (ibid: 6). The risk that ‘hordes’ of 
jobless educated young people may pose to the political order and prospects for economic 
growth has unleashed international anxieties, in a renewed interpretation of Louis 
Chevalier’s classical ‘working classes, dangerous classes’. The ‘Youth’ appeared to catalyse 
contemporary disquiet about world socio-economic dynamics, with sub-Saharan Africa as a 
focus of all fears.140 
 
In 2011-2012, in Tanzania, the two phrases ‘the youth roaming the streets’ and the ‘youth 
ticking bomb’ were permanent references in interviews, newspapers, official speeches and 
Parliamentary debates. The idea of a ‘raw youth’, 141  ‘half-cooked’ and half educated, 
featured prominently in discourses. Metaphors of fire or explosion were widespread:  
A petrol tank will be very safe until somebody comes with a match…if you want to know how 
volatile I am then bring a matchbox. Otherwise, if you don’t bring any flame, I’d be here.  History 
is like that. (…) People are finishing school in thousands, they are in the rural areas; they are in 
towns; that is the petrol itself’. (Official, MoEVT, interview 6)  
The direct link between the PEDP and the decision rapidly to expand secondary education 
was underlined by most officials. But several policy options could have been envisaged to 
cater for the expected rise in primary education leavers - and are indeed present in the 
public debate: the gradual construction of new schools, an expansion focused on existing 
schools with additional boarding facilities or the prior-training of teachers. In most 
                                                 
139 The reference to Foucault is transparent (see Chapter 3). 
140 Sub-Saharan Africa has the fastest growing population, the highest share of 15-24 years old in the world, and records a 
5 per cent annual urban growth rate, twice as high as in Latin America and Asia  (UN-Habitat 2009). 
141 Expression borrowed from Burton (2006). 
3.1 The youth threat to the social order of elders 
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interviews, officials – even bureaucrats who acknowledged their scepticism about or 
disagreement with Lowassa’s choice – resorted to two related lexical fields to legitimise the 
policy and, implicitly, disqualify alternative policies: the policy was a matter of emergency 
and the government had no choice.142 ‘Maybe there was no decision. Maybe they had no choice … 
They didn’t have the choice’ (academic, interview 72). ‘[The ward secondary schools decision)] was also 
the result of a crisis of the education system (…). The crisis was apparent in January 2006. (…) In real 
sense it solved the problem of enrolment’ (MP, Chadema, interview 83). 
 
In the face of this ‘primary school leavers crisis’, ‘youth in the streets’ was actually the only 
alternative envisioned by most officials, against which the government decision was being 
retrospectively assessed. The word ‘street’ appeared again and again in interviews; a sort of 
catchphrase that seemed to embody elites’ deepest fear. ‘Youth don’t do anything. Some sell 
vegetables, they’re just at home. I’m concerned. They’re wasting seven plus four years at school and now 
they’re back home doing nothing, wandering in the street’ (politician, CUF, Lushoto, interview 144). 
The government had to build a dyke to contain the youth tidal wave that threatened to 
unleash itself on the peaceful Tanzanian order. Any other alternative was dismissed as 
illogical or not feasible: ‘Some people said that the government took the wrong decision. But I disagree. 
There were only two options: A/ to build schools and then to train teachers; B/ to train teachers and then 
build schools. The second option was obviously not possible’ (MP, CCM, Social Affairs Committee, 
interview 80).  
 
The very formulation of the ward schools policy – to build one secondary school in each 
ward, very much different from a call for ‘secondary education for all’, implicitly posits an 
intrinsic relationship between education and population management. A formulation that 
puts the emphasis on the location of schools, within communities, tangles up welfarist 
considerations – the state bringing basic social services to the people – together with 
concerns over youth mobility. In a context of widespread social anxiety over the youth 
invading city streets, the design of an education policy in spatial – rather than learning – 
terms cannot be interpreted as a coincidence: ward secondary schools would assist in fixing 
the ‘raw youth’ in rural areas and prevent their migration to cities. As put by a former 
Member of Parliament: ‘It allows to concentrate kids in one area rather than letting them smoking 
                                                 
142 The ‘no alternative’ and ‘emergency’ rhetoric is a classical feature of policy-making legitimation processes (Ball 2012). 
In his analysis of the relations between the bureaucracy and the peasants under Ujamaa, Hyden (1980: 107) noted: ‘the 
party government officials had to induce a political atmosphere which justified extraordinary action’. 
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marijuana’ (interview 145). This policy formulation should be contrasted with the old 
government secondary schools, mainly located in urban centres. Their attendance would 
oblige students to quit the village and the farm to enter the urban world; ‘migration’ was 
part and parcel of the secondary schooling experience.  
 
The ‘social order’ discourse has had a specific gender coordinate. Family planning 
considerations were indeed systematically mobilised to justify the policy. A high-ranking 
official in the PMO-RALG noted: ‘We’ve got a high birth rate in Tanzania due largely to early 
pregnancies. With secondary education, you diminish the number of young mothers and fathers. When 
they’ve finished secondary school (Form 4), they’re young adults, they can marry’ (senior official, PMO-
RALG, interview 28). This official position was echoed over and over by research 
respondents. Interviews reflected social anxieties about girls’ sexuality and linked the ward 
secondary school policy to an ambition of controlling it.143 One possible alternative policy – 
building fewer but bigger schools to benefit from economies of scale – was consistently 
dismissed on the ground of protecting girls, in a local echo to the following statement by 
Prime Minister Pinda’s wife in Rorya District, after a fund-raising event for the 
rehabilitation of a girl's dormitory: ‘The completion of the hostel will be of a great benefit not for these 
children only but for the parents and the nation at large. We are going to protect the girls from unwanted 
pregnancies and early marriages as well as sexually transmitted diseases.’144 
 
The general anxiety over the exuberant and threatening ‘youth body’- the violent male body 
and the sexualised female body – was coupled with a general discourse that blamed the 
youth for their fate. This discursive trend was particularly noticeable among headmasters 
and teachers in Lushoto District. Most of them blamed their students’ disappointing exam 
results on the deficient school environment and lack of teachers. However, a large 
proportion would, at the same time, castigate the students themselves: ‘learners themselves are 
a challenge; they’ve got poor habits’ (teacher, school P). Headmasters and teachers bemoaned 
students’ lack of discipline (‘some students are rude and undisciplined’ – Headmaster School F); 
their laziness (‘students themselves don’t realise that they have to fight for their future’ - Headmistress, 
school J); their backwardness (‘students don’t know the meaning, the importance of education’ - 
second master, school Y) or intellectual limitations (‘students’ awareness is a challenge: they don’t 
                                                 
143 ‘Most of them get pregnant; they got few shilling, lots of distractions for young girls’ (former MP, Chadema, interview 139).  
144 Tanzania Daily News, 6 August 2012. 
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think’ - Headmaster, school P). The use of corporal punishment confirmed that the 
domestication of the youth body is located at the heart of the society’s educational 
preoccupations. 145  It is interesting to note that the government’s current challenge of 
producing and allocating enough (young) teachers to teach in ward secondary schools 
amounts precisely to organising a reversal in youth migration, from the cities to rural areas 
where the urbanite, educated youth are reluctant to live. In a striking parallel with teachers’ 
discourses towards their students, Lushoto District officials complained about the attitudes 
of these ‘raw’ teachers newly posted in the district who ‘complain so much, like children’146 
or ‘cry, shout, abuse, rebuke’.147 
 
Current data on demographic and urbanisation trends have provided a fertile soil for 
growing social anxieties over the ‘idle youth’. Tanzania has one of the highest birth rates in 
the world; 65 per cent of the Tanzanian population is under age 24 and Tanzanians aged 
between 15 and 24 represent 17 per cent of the country’s population. The demographic 
growth is coupled with a rapid urbanisation process. Similarly, girls’ actual educational 
challenges and more generally women’s subaltern social status correspond to a material 
reality. 148 Nevertheless, the genealogy of this narrative is far more complex that these bare 
statistics.   
 
 
The resonance between Tanzanian and international current anxieties over the youth, 
already pointed out, has been underpinned by a lexical convergence: while the World Bank 
measures ‘rates of idleness among 15-24 years old’ (World Bank 2012a: 6), Tanzanian elites 
worry over the ‘idle youth’. Aid agencies firmly condemn corporal punishment but their 
                                                 
145  A 2008 report showed that corporal punishment in Tanzania was perceived as acceptable: 82 per cent of all 
interviewees said that it is admittable for a teacher to whip a student who misbehaves in class (CAMFED 2008). 
According to one teacher in Lushoto (school F), the demand for discipline would come from parents themselves: ‘Parents 
ask to give students punishment, to cane them or ask them to fetch water’. In another school, one parent would complain about 
corporal punishment. 
146 District official, interview 108. 
147 District official, interview 124. 
148 The percentage of people living in urban areas in Tanzania is likely to grow from 24 per cent in 2005 to 38 per cent in 
2030, a progression more than twice the growth rate of the population as a whole. By 2030, more than 25 million 
Tanzanians will be living in urban areas with Dar es Salaam among the ten fastest growing African cities between 2010 
and 2020 (UN Habitat 2010: 54). 23 per cent of women age 15-19 are pregnant or already have children. Young women 
with no education are more than 8 times as likely to have begun childbearing than women with secondary or higher 
education (52 per cent versus 6 per cent) (URT 2010a: 8). If gender parity in access to primary education has been 
achieved, gender disparities grow at secondary and higher education levels and are also substantial in performances (URT 
2011b). 
3.2 Schooling and the youth threat: external and historical resonances 
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educational discourses and interventions do reflect a desire to domesticate the youth body. 
Rose (2005) argued that the World Bank’s education agenda, under the Post-Washington 
Consensus and its strategic focus on women’s empowerment, was firmly embedded within 
a patriarchal, essentialist perspective on girls and women. DFID’s 2005 Girls’ Education 
Strategy, while recognising girls’ education as a right, contains a similar assignment of girls to 
their traditional reproductive role, of the family and of the nation: ‘educating girls helps to 
make communities and societies healthier, wealthier and safer, and can also help to reduce 
child deaths, improve maternal health and tackle the spread of HIV and AIDS’ (DFID 
2005: 1). In Tanzania, the last National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (Mkukuta II),149 
expression of a consensus between donors and government, is explicit on the ultimate goal 
of girls’ education: ‘Increased access to secondary education, especially for girls is expected 
to be one of the most effective measures to address issues of population dynamics, 
including [a] reduction in fertility rate’ (URT 2010c: 64).  
 
The apparent novelty of the nexus ‘idle youth / urbanisation / crime’, contemporary to a 
‘primary school leavers crisis’ driven by specific demographics and the success of a specific 
educational programme (PEDP) and nourished by the international discourse, conceals its 
long genealogy that can be traced back to colonial and post-independence administrative 
discourses and practices. 150 While in the mid-1950s, the colonial administration was already 
distressed by the ‘primary school leavers’ crisis’ (Burton 2006), in 1967 Nyerere evoked the 
‘so-called problem of primary school leavers’ that Education for Self Reliance was meant to 
address (URT 1967a). Burton (2005) shows how the colonial administration, the 
Europeans and Asians, lived in a constant fear of being submerged by ‘raw’ youth escaping 
rural areas. These colonial anxieties were couched in an identical language: references to the 
‘idle’ youth ‘roaming the streets’ and metaphors of ‘stream’, ‘tide’, ‘wave’ or even fire and 
explosion abounded in colonial administrative records and press.151   
 
                                                 
149 ‘MKUKUTA’ is the Kiswahili acronym of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty. Mkukuta I 
covered the period 2005-2010; Mkukuta II the period 2010-2015. 
150 The timing of this (re)emergence of the youth theme is based on the author’s own comparative assessment of the 
public debate in 2005-2008 and in 2011-2012. It does not mean that in the first period the theme was not present, 
however, eclipsed by other subjects, it occupied a peripheral position. The study of successive Poverty Reduction Strategy 
documents in 2000, 2005 and 2010 confirmed the discursive shift. 
151 ‘We may be regarded as sitting on top of a volcano which may erupt at any moment’ (M.J.B. Molohan, assistant district 
officer, quoted in Burton 2005: 100). See also, Burton (2005: 166). 
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‘Independence from colonial rule did not resolve debates and questions about the status of 
young people’ (Burgess 2005: xviii). Nyerere’s discourse and politics revealed a distinctive 
ambivalence towards the youth. He constantly insisted on the pivotal role of the youth in 
the development process but this spearheading role was reserved to a particular category of 
youth, hard-working and committed to rural development. In contrast, young 
underemployed in the cities, urban ‘idlers’, were castigated as internal enemies. Their 
idleness was equated with betrayal of the socialist work ethics. In the Arusha Declaration, 
‘laziness, drunkenness and idleness’ were cast as serious sins ‘to be ashamed of’; ‘to loiter in 
towns or villages without doing work’ was depicted as unacceptable exploitive behaviour 
(URT 1967b).152  
 
Nyerere’s discourse on women exhibited similar ambiguities. His unabated commitment to 
universal primary education came with an equal commitment towards girls’ education: ‘In 
Africa if every child does not go to school those to be left out will be mostly the girls’ 
(Nyerere 1997: 211). The quota system to enter government secondary schools was used to 
address gender educational disparities. However, the Arusha Declaration drew a distinction 
between the frivolous and lazy urban (educated) woman and the industrious woman in the 
village: ‘Women who live in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania. But 
the men who live in villages (and some of the women in towns) are on leave for half of 
their life... The energies of the millions of men in the villages and thousands of women in 
the towns (…) are at present wasted in gossip, dancing and drinking’ (URT 1967b). Under 
Ujamaa, schoolgirls were similarly constructed as licentious beings, ‘portrayed as [an] 
unapologetically pleasure-seeking group that refused to observe public decorum and 
gendered or generational hierarchies of authority’ (Ivaska 2007: 227). This construction 
found a perfect echo in 2012 parliamentary debates when the Committee for Social Affairs 
rebuffed the Ministry of Education’s proposal to end pregnant girls’ expulsion from 
schools: this proposed change to the 1995 Education and Training Policy would encourage 
girls’ promiscuous behaviour.153 Schoolgirls’ sexualised bodies remain both a site of fixation 
of social anxieties and a contested domain within the ruling class.154 
                                                 
152 Paragraph based on historical accounts by Brennan (2010), Burgess (2010), Brennan (2006), Ivaska (2005), and Burgess 
(2005). 
153 MP, Chadema, member of the Social Affairs Committee (interview 84). 
154 Contemporary obsession with family planning and sexuality resonates strongly with the ‘motherhood’ ideology that 
pervaded British public discourses on poverty in the beginning of the 20th century. The blame for infant mortality was put 
on maternal ignorance and negligence and schooling was integral part of a campaign to transform working class women 
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Finally, the dimension of space management embedded in the ward school policy also 
strongly resonates with ambiguities of colonial and post-colonial administrative practices. 
The concerns of the state about African peasants’ mobility and their migration to towns 
were perennial throughout the colonial period. In attempts to control Africans’ mobility, 
the colonial administration devised coercive measures (pass laws, resident permit, heavy 
taxation of informal economy and repatriation schemes) but also considered compulsory 
education and the extension of the school system (Burton 2005).155 Similarly, under Ujamaa, 
the main argument to justify the villagisation process was centred on the provision of social 
services (Coulson 1982: 256-57). But controlling patterns of space occupation through the 
construction of (primary) schools and health dispensaries or the localisation of new 
settlements around existing social services like schools were certainly at the heart of this 
major social engineering project. 156 These historical examples mainly deal with primary 
schooling, nevertheless they attest to a profound continuity of the appeal of education 
policy as a population management device to the Tanzanian State. 
 
The next section explores the third rhetorical commonplace mobilised to legitimate the 
ward secondary schools. It is also centred on the youth, but understood as agents of 
modernisation whose skills will unlock the door of the global knowledge economy to 
Tanzania.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
(Davin 1997). They also echo colonial states’ ‘domesticating impulse’ (Cooper and Stoler 1997b: 17) riveted to the body of 
the colonised (Stoler 1995). 
155 Former District Officer A.H. Pike recorded the colonial administration decision in 1942 to erect ‘a ring of schools near 
the township boundary’ ‘in order to deter children from entering the township by affording them education facilities near 
their homes’ (quoted in Burton 2005: 97). Similarly, Mbilinyi (1985: 95) underlined the functional relation established by 
the colonial power between education policy and population stabilisation: ‘a policy of universal primary education was 
adopted for towns in order to absorb unemployed town youth and keep them off the streets’. 
156 According to Hyden (1980: 130), the ‘compulsory villagization in Tanzania between 1973 and 1976 is the largest 
resettlement effort in the history of Africa (…) a gigantic effort involving the movement of probably as many as five 
million rural Tanzanians’. See also Scott (1999: 224-261) for an analysis of Tanzanian villagisation between welfare ‘logics 
of improvement’ and simplification of settlement patterns for political control and agricultural production purposes. 
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4. Secondary education and elites’ imagined globalisation 
 
 
In the case of the UK, Ball argued that New Labour education reforms were driven by a 
‘necessarian logic…which relates education very directly to the demands and inevitabilities 
of globalisation’ (Ball 1999: 8). Tanzania has not been spared by ‘planetspeak discourses’: 157 
the modernisation philosophy that underpinned developmental strategies and education 
policies, under the colonial rule and the socialist regime, has been reworked in a 
‘globalisation’ and ‘knowledge economy’ idiom. 
 
In interviews, references to ‘globalisation’ would arise, again and again, with unfailing 
regularity. The decision to expand secondary education has been directly fuelled by a 
certain interpretation, dominant within the Tanzanian elite, of the very meaning of this 
phenomenon for Tanzania: ‘Due to this demand of personnel and the change of the world society, 
globalisation, we had to focus on how to compete, to integrate to the world. That demand drove us to that 
decision [the ward schools policy]’ (senior official, CCM Secretary, interview 85). Elite 
anxiety at being left outside the contemporary modernisation movement transpired from 
most interviews. ‘No matter what, we can’t stay behind’ (senior official, MoEVT, interview 4). 
Education is seen as a major instrument in avoiding Tanzania being consigned to the 
fringes of the global world: ‘a nation of uneducated nationals cannot participate effectively in the 
present world, economically and politically’ (former MP, CCM, interview 135). The education 
system has to mould a population able to cope with this highly unstable, ever-changing, 
technology-driven globalisation: ‘we want them to cope with the changing technologies … the students 
should cope with the world changing technologies or whatever taking place in the world’ (official, MoEVT, 
interview 5). 158  
 
                                                 
157 The term is borrowed from Ball (2012) and refers to a ‘way of reasoning that seems to have no structural roots, no 
social locations and no origin’. 
158 The association between secondary schooling and modernity is not reserved to the elite. In her study of secondary 
schooling in Kilimanjaro, Stambach (2000) points to a similar perception, among Northern Tanzania’s population, of 
secondary schooling as a site of emergence of modern identities. She describes how schooling constitutes a site of 
collective reworking of the very meaning of tradition and modernity, through the dialectic opposition of schooling and 
everyday-life organisation, based on age-hierarchy and patrilineality, and its narrative of tradition identified with 
backwardness. 
4.1 Ward secondary schools: equipping the youth with skills for the 
knowledge economy? 
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The ‘globalisation-education’ narrative has been framed alongside three inescapable 
imperatives: science, English and skills.  
 
Lack of scientific knowledge would jeopardise Tanzania’s chance to enter the global 
economy and benefit from it: ‘I’d wish we had enough scientists to pick up the world of innovation’ 
(senior official, MoEVT, interview 4). If Tanzania is to become a middle-income country 
by 2025, ‘competitive, knowledgeable, scientific and technologically anchored among the 
community of nations’, the goals set by Vision 2025, science needs to lie at the core of its 
developmental strategy: ‘Basic sciences and mathematics must be accorded signal 
importance in keeping with the demands of the modern technological age. Science and 
technology education and awareness of its applications for promoting and enhancing 
productivity should permeate the whole society through continuous learning and publicity 
campaigns’ (URT 2000: 20-21). The national scientific endeavour is relayed by high-ranking 
officials in the education sector: Jumanne Kawambwa, Minister of Education and 
Vocational Training, closed his statement to the Education Sector Performance Report 
2010/2011 with a call for ‘quality improvement in education, especially in Sciences, 
Mathematics, ICT, Languages, Skills Development and e-Learning’ (URT 2011c: xvi). The 
cause of science is being embraced by all segments of the elite, from top politicians to 
government bureaucrats, civil society members and the private sector: the Tanzania 
National Business Council’s 2009 paper entitled ‘Human Capital Development – Focusing on 
Science and Technology’ bemoaned the lack of national awareness about the role of science and 
technology as ‘an essential tool for national development’. It called for a holistic 
transformation of the education system to enhance the teaching of learning of science and 
technology.159 In that context secondary education is considered a crucial key to unlock the 
door of contemporary modernisation to Tanzania. ‘In an era of science, technology and 
information science, secondary education develops and reinforces the capacity for continuous learning and 
updating to match requirements of globalization’ (Gray S. Mgonja, former Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Finance). 160  
 
Information and communication being an integral part of the knowledge economy model, 
the yearning of Tanzanian elites for globalisation has crystallised into a quest for English 
                                                 
159 Document accessed at http://www.tnbc.go.tz/Download-document/index.php. 
160  Letter to the World Bank Country Director for Tanzania and Uganda, Request for an IDA credit for the 
implementation of SEDP, 5 April 2004 (World Bank 2004). 
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mastery. English is viewed as ‘the medium of dialogue as well as intellectual and 
commercial transaction’ (Joseph Mungai, former Ministry of Education and Culture, URT 
2004: ii). In recent years, English medium primary schools have mushroomed, mostly in 
urban centres, and testify to the elite appetite for English. 
 
Figure 4-2: Evolution of enrolment in the non-government primary schools in 
Tanzania, 2006-2011 
 
Source: URT (2011b and 2012a). Note: ‘the contribution of the private sector in Primary Education is 
mostly directed towards establishing English medium schools.’ 
 
Confirming Brock-Utne’s analysis (2010, 2009), Tanzanian proponents of English 
interviewed during this research, pointed out the lexical limitations of Kiswahili as a 
scientific language; they challenged its value and relevance in a time of global economic 
competition: 
I personally remain a proponent of English, which should remain the medium of instruction. Especially 
in terms of global perspectives. Kiswahili is not big enough yet: if you teach maths or physics or 
microbiology in Kiswahili, we cheat ourselves. Let’s wait so that Kiswahili grows, enlarge its vocabulary 
in sciences and technology... In the current phase, we still need English to globalise ourselves. (Religious 
leader, interview 71)  
 
The ‘English vs Kiswahili’ debate has largely been framed in terms of competition with 
Kenya, in the context of the East Africa Community. The perceived threat of a labour 
market overwhelmed by well educated, English-proficient Kenyans is widespread among 
the bureaucratic elite. It also permeates the business community: ‘Once the East African 
regional labour market opens, Kenyans will flow into Tanzania to take Tanzanian jobs’ (CEO, printing 
company, interview 97). In this competition, Kenyans’ alleged mastery of English and the 
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quality of their education system are viewed as critical parts of Kenya’s comparative 
advantages. This entrenched perception influenced the negotiations of the East Africa 
Community Treaty: Tanzania has obtained a restrictive clause on the free movement of 
labour.161  
 
Finally, economic development would be blocked by a fundamental skills mismatch, rooted 
in an irrelevant and inefficient education system. Right from the inception of the SEDP, 
the critical link between secondary education and the labour market was posited: ‘the 
supply of educated and trainable labour force’ was the first multiplier effect of secondary 
education identified by the SEDP document (URT 2004: v). But the youth–
unemployment–education nexus gained a new centrality between 2005 and 2012. As in 
international spheres (see Chapter 2), with the ward secondary schools policy, youth 
employment has come to the forefront of Tanzanian public debates and authorities’ 
concerns. In a same movement, self-employment in the informal sector is being glorified as 
the venue for youth success and national economic development: ‘If we are to succeed as a 
country, our youth have to embrace self-employment (…) The youth need to realise that 
the success of modern societies all over the world has been built on the informal sector’.162 
All segments of the elite promote self-employment as the silver bullet to tackle youth 
unemployment. For Tanzanian elites, the desirable youth are entrepreneurial and 
innovative; they aggressively chase opportunities: ‘Tanzanians have to learn to be entrepreneurs, 
and be ready to see and use opportunities for self-development that economic reforms provide’ (President 
Kikwete).163  
 
As for the ‘idle youth’ narrative, the ‘knowledge economy’ public rhetoric commonplace 
has been forged at the intersection of international discourses and the country’s historical 
legacy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
161 The opening of the Tanzanian market to East African ‘professionals and technicians and associate professionals’ has 
been phased between 2010 and 2015 (www.eac.int/commonmarket/movement-of-labour.html, accessed 10/02/2014). 
162 http://www.citizen.co.tz/editorial-analysis/19-ediorial-comments/26816-by-faith-young-people-can-be-just-like-
ngowi.html. 
163 Inaugural speech to Parliament, Dodoma, 30 December 2005. 
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Chapter 1 pointed out the ‘learning crisis’ experienced by Tanzania since 2010, triggered by 
Form Four examination results. In this context, the word ‘quality’ has come to occupy a 
central position in donor-government policy dialogue. During the 2000s, chiefly focused on 
access to primary education, concerns over quality were not absent from policy documents 
but the learning achievement theme could not be debated. Like a taboo, the word quality 
was implicitly prohibited in the sector dialogue. The HakiElimu saga provided a vivid 
example of the government’s high sensibility to the quality challenge: in 2005, the local 
NGO’s reports and media campaigns that highlighted PEDP’s failures to induce learning 
improvements incurred the wrath of the Minister of Education. 164  By 2011-2012, the 
government’s approach towards quality had dramatically evolved: today ‘everybody is 
saying the word “quality”’.165 All interviewees – donors, civil society representatives and 
academics – acknowledged the government’s attitudinal change. As Rajani, former 
HakiElimu Executive Director, explained ‘Nobody in government is now…claiming that the quality 
is good… And the whole question now has changed.’  
 
The negotiations of the World Bank’s SEDP II (2010-2015) constituted a major driver of 
the quality turn. The SEDP I was severely criticised by the Bank’s Independent Evaluation 
Group: it was rated as ‘moderately unsatisfactory’, quite a negative judgement in the IEG’s 
terms. Specifically, the disastrous impact of the uncontrolled and under-funded expansion 
on quality learning was assessed as putting a ‘significant’ risk on ‘development outcomes’ 
(World Bank 2010b: 33). The design of the Bank’s SEDP II clearly reflected this major 
internal criticism: ‘quality’ was put at the heart of the programme. 
 
In parallel, DFID revised its Tanzania country strategy to ‘reflect the need to focus on 
improving the quality of education’ (DFID 2012: 14). This strategic orientation was the 
direct consequence of recommendations by the UK’s Independent Commission for Aid 
                                                 
164 HakiElimu was co-founded in 2001 by Tanzanian activists to promote the right to education, with SIDA, CIDA and 
DFID among its main donors. Following the NGO’s reports on PEDP under-achievements the organisation was banned 
from conducting activities in schools. This event provoked deep tensions between the government and donors. Rakesh 
Rajani, co-founder and Executive Director of the organisation resigned and then set up a new organization, Twaweza, 
which carries out the Uwezo studies. For an account of the HakiElimu-government conflict see Philips (2011). 
165 Education aid manager, development agency, Tanzania. 
4.2 Quality secondary education for the knowledge economy: between 
international discourses and Nyerere’s legacy  
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Impact (ICAI) that conducted an evaluation of DFID’s education interventions in Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Tanzania between 2005 and 2010; the report stressed the ‘lack of attention to 
learning outcomes and to the trade-off between increasing access and ensuring quality’ 
(ICAI 2012:1). 
 
Beyond a broad converging concern of Tanzanian elites and donors over poor learning 
performances, a consensus has also built up on the very definition of ‘quality’. The saliency 
of skills, sciences and English in elite discourses over secondary education has indeed 
mirrored donors’ education discourse and interventions.  
 
For instance, the World Bank’s SEDP II displays a strong science emphasis, with a focus 
on laboratories, science textbooks and teaching practices in maths, sciences and languages. 
The project monitoring framework reflects this focus: the list of outcome indicators is 
overwhelmingly biased towards these three areas (World Bank 2010).166 As acknowledged 
by a member of World Bank staff, the focus on science was the outcome of ‘a long debate, 
first within the World Bank team and then with the government’ (interview 58). The design of the 
World Bank’s support entailed the negotiation, between the agency and the government, of 
‘minimum requirements’ to transform ward secondary schools into ‘functional schools’. 
The government’s initial proposal included various elements like libraries, administration 
blocks and hostels. The minimum physical infrastructures finally agreed include ‘(i) 
classrooms, (ii) science laboratories, (iii) latrines, (iv) water supply, and (v) electricity supply 
(World Bank 2010a: 45). Both sides recognised that the choice was powerfully influenced 
by the World Bank - ‘it was their own preference’ (official, MoEVT, interview 5). But both also 
acknowledged that the government was easily convinced, Tanzanian decision-makers 
sharing converging scientific ideals: ‘the Permanent Secretary with whom we discussed is a scientist 
and an academic, he appreciated the idea’ (World Bank, interview 58). At the 2011 Education 
Sector Review, the same Permanent Secretary strongly reaffirmed government’s 
commitment to science education, in line with the Five-Year-Development Plan and Vision 
2025. Processes of domestication of donors’ discourses and conditionalities are being 
facilitated by a cognate ideology that equates modernity with science.  
 
                                                 
166 In parallel the World Bank Science and Technology Higher Education Program 2008-2013 (US$200 million) supports the 
Government of Tanzania’s efforts to deliver more and better-qualified graduates in specific degree programmes of high 
priority including sciences and education.  
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Reflecting global trends (Chapter 2), Tanzania-based aid agencies also largely draw on the 
skills mismatch narrative. For the World Bank, Tanzanian growth prospects have been 
jeopardised by the deterioration in education quality that induces a skill shortage. Even if 
they complete secondary schools, young job seekers are not equipped with the right skills 
to fill the jobs available (World Bank 2009). Many aid managers expressed their concern 
over unsatisfied market needs for qualified employees. They also relayed the narrative of an 
unbeatable Kenyan competition: 
One of the main constraints of Tanzania I would say is the very low level of skill across society (…) in 
the public sector but also (…) the private sector. I think that’s a main concern… when you speak to 
entrepreneurs, that’s probably their number one concern. It’s, they say, it’s very difficult to find qualified 
personnel (…) when you come across somebody with above average competence then it’s a Kenyan. 
(Foreign economist, interview 56) 
 
Finally, donors have demonstrated a growing interest in vocational training. In his opening 
statement to the 2011 Education Sector Review, the Canadian High Commissioner to 
Tanzania, representing the Education Development Partners Group, underlined the 
challenge of ‘providing these young people with marketable skills’ and the ‘increased recognition of the 
importance of expanding post-secondary education, particularly Technical and Vocational Education and 
Training’.167 CIDA has also decided to support the Direction of Technical and Vocational 
Training within the MoEVT in conducting a tracer study to better understand the dynamics 
of self-employment and informal sectors.168 
 
This converging understanding of quality education as science/English/skills cannot be 
interpreted as the mere outcome of an externally driven, imposed global agenda. In this 
instance too, Nyerere’s educational legacy forms a constitutive ingredient of the discursive 
construct. In 2012, the Planning Commission explained its current initiative to draft a 
national skill development strategy as an attempt to revive the logics underlying manpower 
surveys during Ujamaa.169 Similarly, the introduction of a competence-based curriculum was 
interpreted as Nyerere’s direct legacy. 170  The self-reliance rhetoric is summoned but 
                                                 
167 H.E. Robert J. Orr, High Commissioner for Canada, Joint Education Sector Review - Technical Working Sessions, 
November 1-3, 2011 ‘Opening Statement by Education Development Partners’ Group’ (http://ed-dpg.or.tz/JESR-2011, 
accessed 10/02/2014). 
168 Information publicly shared during the 2011 Education Sector Review. 
169 Interview 40, senior official, Planning Commission. 
170 A curriculum developer in the Tanzanian Institute for Education wondered: ‘What is the origin of competence-based 
education in Tanzania? Was it imported from other countries or did it have deep indigenous roots here? When I went to visit back the 
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construed through an individualistic lens. Self-reliance is no longer a collective endeavour, 
it is no longer the responsibility of the entire society and the role of the government is to 
create an enabling environment for the respectable and industrious youth, to equip them 
with the entrepreneurial skills that would enable them start a micro-enterprise – a 
‘machinga business’ - and transform tiny income generating activities into light 
manufacturing firms employing large groups of people (interview 72). 
 
Nyerere’s own contradictions offered a fertile ground for the naturalisation of the 
knowledge economy discourse in the Tanzanian soil. Nyerere’s personal ambiguities over 
English – he was a fierce advocate of Swahili as the key ingredient of nation building but 
also translated Shakespeare into Swahili – contributed to shape elites’ enduring belief in 
English as a construction site of the modern African self. 171  Nyerere’s educational 
philosophy also wove together two discordant conceptions of education. On one hand, he 
forcefully promoted an emancipatory education geared towards individual and collective 
transformation - an education that would liberate human beings from their enslavement to 
the productive world.172 On the other hand, both his philosophy and development practices 
firmly tied education to economic production.173 The vocationalisation of the secondary 
education curriculum testified to his firm belief in the need to reconfigure the education-
labour nexus in relation to actual conditions of production in Tanzania. His manpower 
policy also set up a strict relationship between the secondary education certificate and entry 
to the formal labour market. Blurring the boundaries between education and work was a 
core tenet of his educational thinking: ‘What we are aiming at is converting our schools into 
economics communities as well as educational communities’ (URT 1967a: 91).  
 
Contemporary discourses around the ward secondary schools testify that the 
general/vocational education nexus remains a highly contested domain in society at large, 
among educationists and within the ruling class.174 For Nyerere, this unresolved tension 
between technical and academic education constituted a major setback to the country’s 
                                                                                                                                               
Arusha Declaration and Education for Self Reliance, I found the whole thing there: developing critical thinking among the people, developing 
Science and Technology, combining work and the education’. 
171 This idea was developed by Simon Gikandi at the conference ‘The Other English: Some African Reflections’, British 
Library, 28/02/2011. 
172 ‘I want to be quite sure that our educational institutions are not going to end up as factories turning out marketable 
commodities’ (Nyerere 1974: 126). 
173 This contradiction has already been pointed out in Mbilinyi (2006). 
174 A senior government official underlined the political sensitivity of the subject among policy-makers: ‘On the debate 
between skills and academic knowledge, the government is reluctant to take a strong position’ (interview 38). 
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development: ‘Our failure to emphasize science teaching, of all kinds and at all levels, and 
especially our indifference to technical and vocational training is the greatest failure of our 
educational system’ (Nyerere 1988: 179). At the end of his life, Nyerere endorsed the full 
correspondence between Education for Self-Reliance and the employability rhetoric: ‘Their 
education must prepare them [the young people] to be Self-Reliant and self-employed if 
they cannot secure (…) paid employment. Perhaps in the language of today, we should say 
that education should help the young to develop a spirit of private enterprise’ (Nyerere 
1998: 164).  
 
 
In uncovering the ideological backbone of the globalisation narrative, the argument is not 
to deny the challenges faced by Tanzanian students in maths, sciences and English. It is not 
to refute Tanzanian elites’ modernisation aspirations and their desire to see their country 
occupy a position at the heart of the global economy. But authorities’ and donors’ policy 
focus on sciences, English and skills, discursively tied to knowledge-economy inevitabilities, 
is problematic in many instances.  
 
First, the knowledge economy narrative has been supported by shallow empirical evidence. 
Available statistics strongly support the widespread concern over declining performances in 
maths, sciences and English mastery even if equally poor results were achieved in art (i.e., 
non-science) subjects like Kiswahili or history (Figure 4.3).  
 
4.3 The knowledge economy narrative: obscuring mechanisms of social 
reproduction 
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Figure 4-3: Pass rates at the CSEE per subject 2008 - 2011 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a). Note: the relatively high pass rates for Physics 
and Chemistry should be interpreted with caution given that Form 3 students have to opt for art or 
science subjects. The pass rate for these subjects concerns only a portion of students. 
 
But the available data on the Tanzanian labour market are not very helpful in making sense 
of labour market dynamics. More specifically, from these data it is impossible to derive a 
strong relation between labour trends and levels of education, let alone skill endowment 
levels. Successive Integrated Labour Force Surveys (ILFS) consistently reported a counter-
intuitive relationship between employment and level of education: the urban 
unemployment rate was higher among people with secondary education or above and the 
phenomenon has increased with time.175 In any case, as argued by Cramer (2009: 1) data on 
labour markets in sub-Saharan Africa should be treated with the highest circumspection: 
‘there is barely any reliable evidence on youth unemployment for any developing country’.  
 
Besides, existing surveys do not identify ‘skills’ as a major brake on business development: 
the 2006 IFC Enterprise Survey for Tanzania ranked ‘inadequately educated workforce’ in 7th 
position out of 15 business environment obstacles. It was cited by only 1.4 per cent of 
firms as their top obstacle, far from electricity, the major obstacle for 74 per cent of the 
firms, and access to finance (9.8 per cent of the respondents).176 Likewise, a 2011 survey 
commissioned by Tanzanian businesses identified ‘skilled labour’ only as the 13th priority, 
out of 17, for a state ‘enabling’ policy to improve the investment climate (BEST – AC 
                                                 
175 The last ILFS, conducted prior to the ward secondary schools movement cannot account for potential unemployment 
among the first cohorts of ward schools Form 4 leavers. In 2006, unemployment was highest among the youth (15-25 
years old): their unemployment rate was 14.9 per cent against 10.4 per cent for adults (URT 2007a: 57). A labour survey 
conducted in 1965 found a similar pattern (Burton 2006: 386). This was recorded in a context of reportedly good quality 
secondary education. 
176 http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/CustomQuery/tanzania (accessed 31/03/2014). 
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2011: 4). Tanzanians’ perceptions of the labour market also lead to the questioning of the 
skill mismatch claims (Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4-4: Perceived main reasons of unemployment 
 
 
Source: URT (2007)  
 
More imagined than evidence-based, claims over the irresistible demands of globalisation 
on the education system contribute to vitiate the education debate in Tanzania by 
delineating its legitimate boundaries. These claims support the entrenchment of a narrow 
utilitarian vision of education, hardly questioned. One respondent stood alone in his 
defense of a broad, humanist definition of education: ‘What about the poets, the art, the cinema? 
We need diversity. We need all competences besides maths and physics and science, social sciences, art. We 
need to bring diversity in our society. A focus on maths and science is of course easier to justify’ (senior 
official, interview 38). Quality education is becoming subsumed into (measured) learning 
achievements in maths and sciences; attempts at challenging the bounded definition of 
‘quality education’ are silenced and discredited on the ground of globalisation requirements. 
This process of ‘mis-framing’ (Fraser 2008) the meaning of quality a priori excludes 
potential alternative voices that might challenge elites’ consensus around for-profit quality 
education and question its alleged self-evident, common sense nature. The hegemonic 
discourse of international and domestic elites on the globalisation imperatives contributes 
to depoliticize the eminently political question of quality education.  
 
The globalisation narrative also contributes to legitimate policies that reinforce unequal 
dynamics within the education system. For instance, most students transit from primary 
schools, where Swahili is the language of instruction, to ward secondary schools with a very 
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poor proficiency in English; there they rarely encounter proficient English teachers. At the 
same time, English medium (pre) primary schools cater disproportionality for the needs of 
a tiny share of enrolled children (Figure 4.5).  
 
Figure 4-5: Evolution of enrolment in government and non-government primary 
schools 2006-2011 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a). 3.5% of primary schools are English medium; the 
government only runs eight English Medium Primary school (URT 2011b). Note that available data does not 
allow differentiation between urban and rural schools that would certainly lead to a more contrasted situation. 
 
Through their access to English-medium private (pre) primary schools, wealthy parents 
build their children’s education premium from the (pre)primary level. The language 
privilege is also relevant to maths and science subjects as long as the language required to 
access these disciplines is only mastered by a minority of the young generation. English as a 
language of instruction constitutes an instrument of consolidation of privileged position. 
 
A large body of literature has demonstrated the benefits of learning in the mother tongue 
or at least in the socially dominant language.177 Nevertheless, Tanzanian authorities and 
donors frame the debate and shape their policies over the language of instruction in terms 
of scarcity of competent English teachers and lack of teaching and learning materials. The 
possibility of switching to Swahili as the language of instruction throughout the education 
system is not explicitly envisioned. In 2012, while recognising the political sensibility of the 
subject among Tanzanian elite, DFID’s education adviser invoked the globalisation 
imperative to dismiss the possibility of a radical policy shift in the language of instruction: 
‘there’s competition within the East African community and the free market flows’. The globalisation 
                                                 
177 For Tanzania, see Brock-Utne (2009, 2010). 
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rhetoric contributes to further entrenching a major source of inequality within the 
Tanzanian education system. At the same time, consciously or not, it facilitates the 
protection of UK and US interests in the global domination of the English language. 
 
The attribution criteria of the Higher Education Students’ Loans offer an example of a 
science-focused education policy that deepened social inequalities within the education 
system. 178  Beyond the issue of favouritism and mismanagement, 179  a more important 
element is how the structure of the incentives it promotes consolidates the position of 
privileged children. In line with the national priority given to sciences, students in health, 
sciences and education (sciences and mathematics) are eligible for a 100 per cent loan, 
without means-testing; but given that community secondary schools are characterized by a 
severe lack of science teachers and laboratories, most of the students who can continue 
sciences at higher level logically come from privileged schools, well-resourced in science 
teachers and equipment. In brief, ‘you make rich kids learn sciences’ (MP, Chadema, interview 
83). In the present conditions of the public education system, the simultaneous emphasis 
on science and English facilitates the reproduction of elites’ social position.  
 
Finally, examining the occupational future envisioned by the elite for the mass of the youth, 
Oketch seems to have a valid point in arguing that the ‘renewed interest in the dichotomy 
of vocational education versus general education’ amounts to a ‘political pronouncement’ 
rather than a desire to improve access to education at all levels (Oketch 2007:1). In 2012, 
Prime Minister Pinda explicitly encouraged male youth to take on ‘boda boda’ (moto taxi) 
jobs, stressing their contribution to rural economic development. 180  Tanzanian labour 
statistics corroborate the pre-eminence of the informal sector as a major recipient of new 
entrants into the labour force (URT 2007a). But, as argued by Rizzo (2011), in his study of 
informal transport workers in Dar es Salaam, the informal sector does not provide a 
temporary occupational status that leads to formal wage labour. People engaged in this 
labour market segment tend to remain trapped within its realm and the rosy self-
                                                 
178 As part of implementation of the 1999 National Higher Education Policy, the Higher Education Students’ Loans 
Board was established in 2004 and commenced its operations in July 2005. The Board issues loans to students pursuing 
Advanced/Higher Diplomas and degree studies at accredited higher education institutions. It is also in charge of 
collecting repayment of all loans issued to students, so as to make the scheme sustainable.  
179 Anecdotal evidence supports the idea of an unfair distribution of loans that would benefit children of the well-
connected (noted by several respondents). For the issue of funds embezzlement see for instance The Citizen 26/01/2012 
‘Punish officials behind theft of students’ cash’. 
180 The Citizen 23/3/2012 
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employment narrative conceals precarious working conditions stemming from unregulated 
relations of employment and earnings at bare subsistence level.181 
 
Yet, within elite dominant discourse, the youth unemployment problem becomes framed as 
a problem of the youth themselves. Their joblessness is rooted in their own attitudes and 
personal traits: ‘rather than thinking about their careers, they have their minds set on immediately getting 
nice cars, buying nice houses, eating and drinking. The students complain and fall into doing drugs, selling 
drugs, riots, alcohol, and clubbing’ (Prime Minister Pinda). 182 Like parasites, they expect 
everything from the state: ‘Over the years, Tanzanian youth have complained that the government has 
done little to create jobs for college leavers. This attitude has consigned many to idleness and social ills such 
as drug abuse when they could be breaking new ground in productive activities’ (ibid). Elites firmly 
embrace the idea of youth ‘voluntary’ unemployment:  
Many of our professionals have to look for work in the private sector on their own, or have to employ 
themselves. Some of them, as I speak, are walking up and down the streets of our urban areas looking 
for employment, even though they have marketable or usable knowledge and skills. For instance, it is 
not uncommon to find university graduates in agriculture, animal husbandry and fisheries looking for 
employment in urban areas, hoping to work in an air-conditioned office. (President Kikwete)183 
 
This statement by President Kikwete echoes views that abounded in colonial 
administration reports (Burton 2006: 370) and under Ujamaa (Ivaska 2005: 101). Despite 
the paucity of conclusive labour statistics and a very impressionistic understanding of 
labour market dynamics, the employability narrative remains firmly entrenched, both 
among donors and Tanzanian elites. The continuous redeployment, in elite discourse, of a 
rhetoric that locates the onus of youth unemployment upon youth themselves obscures the 
state’s structural inability to conjure up the contradiction between school expansion and 
the scarcity of skilled jobs. The discursive plaiting of the rhetorics of employability, self-
reliance and criminalisation of the youth overshadows what is really at stake behind the 
valuation of vocational training: the legitimation, in a context reconfigured by mass general 
                                                 
181  More generally, Bateman and Chang (2012) challenged the model of economic development grounded in the 
proliferation of tiny informal micro-enterprises. One strand of the development literature (de Soto 1989, Moyo 2009) 
depicts the informal sector as a powerful springboard for individual and national economic success. It has contributed to 
shaping donors’ interventions focused on entrepreneurial skills and micro-credit. But this model has largely failed to 
deliver on its promises; it has induced, in developing countries, a distorted productive structure operating inefficiently.  It 
was also at odds with the successful economic trajectories of East Asian tigers (Amsden 2001, 2007, Chang 2006). 
182 13 August 2012, http://goodnewsmission.net/?p=3569. 
183 Inaugural speech to Parliament on 30 December 2005. The World Bank rejects the argument of a ‘queuing’ effect to 
explain Tanzanian youth employment (World Bank 2009). 
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secondary education, of the ‘reproduction of the division between manual and intellectual 
labour’ which is ‘at the very heart of the production process and in society as a whole’ 
(Poulantzas 1978: 60).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Because education policy choices are deeply rooted in national ideology, in the country’s 
political economy trajectory and its economic basis, a systematic exploration of elite 
narratives, their genealogy and their entanglement with global discourses, provides a fecund 
method to understand educational policy-making.  
 
The ruling class does not stand as a monolithic, harmonious block. The ward secondary 
schools policy, driven by one prominent political figure with well-known political 
ambitions, was also rooted in long lasting intra-ruling class struggles. Specifically, it revealed 
the enduring disjuncture of interests between bureaucrats and politicians, underpinned by 
diverging visions of modernity. Bureaucrats, in clear proximity with donors, have faith in a 
technocratic rationality that promotes development gradualism. Despite neoliberal 
pressures to which they in part surrendered in 1985, politicians remain faithful to the 
development ideology in which they were groomed: following early development theorists, 
they believe that only a bold big push can propel development. Nevertheless, most have 
adopted the knowledge economy idiom. Nyerere’s contradictory legacy has favoured this 
plurality of ideological references that coexist both within institutions and in individuals. 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that government authorities, when deciding upon the 
appropriate combination of access, quality and equity, are not driven by a revealed 
aggregation of individual rates of return. Education, understood as transmission of 
knowledge, has certainly not formed the main driving force of elites’ decision over the 
ward secondary schools policy. Concerns over youth domestication chiefly prevailed: 
schooling has implicitly been understood as a device to tame the youth and control 
population flows. The profound resonance with the colonial power’s policy and rhetoric 
and with contemporary international discourses reveals the structural problem faced by the 
modern capitalist state over the social integration of the youth. In a context of essential 
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scarcity of jobs, ‘a school system that kept students locked in an extended state of youth’ 
(Stambach 2000: 143) provides a temporary solution to the ‘youth containment imperative’.   
 
The boundaries of the ‘quality’ debate have been strongly determined by what the elite – 
domestic and international – perceives as the globalisation imperative: labour markets’ 
imagined craving for skills, science and English. While the globalisation imperative entails a 
closure of the educational debate, it also reflects the fundamental ineptitude of the ruling 
class to chart out a labour-intensive developmental path for Tanzania, and sub-Saharan 
Africa in general. As Amsden noted, the employability ‘fallacy’ or ‘job dementia’ has 
flourished ‘out of ignorance of what industries could be created in the global South’ 
(Amsden 2012: 114). In such a context, the ‘blaming the youth’ rhetoric, that echoes the 
‘criminalisation of the poor’ in 19th century Victorian England (Stedman-Jones 2007), 
coalesces with the globalisation imperative to conceal mechanisms of social reproduction at 
play within the education system. 
 
According to Scott (1999: 345) the great majority of ‘high modernist planners’ were 
‘strongly committed to a more egalitarian society, to meeting the basic needs of their 
citizens (especially the working class) and to making the amenities of a modern society 
available to all’. An egalitarian ethos still largely pervades both the administrative apparatus 
and state power in Tanzania. Nevertheless, the next two chapters will show that the 
modalities of funding and implementation of the ward secondary schools policy vitiate the 
egalitarian credentials claimed by the decision-makers.  
145 
 
Chapter Five  
 
In search of the secondary education budget 
 
 
This chapter contrasts the stated desire of elites for quality secondary education for all with 
their material effort to fulfil this desire. The post-independence educational settlement 
mentioned in previous chapters had a financial dimension. The Education for Self-Reliance 
focus on primary and adult education was reflected in budgetary terms: between 1966/67 
and 1980/81, the share of primary and adult education in recurrent expenditures increased 
by 13 percentage points and in development expenditures, by 37 percentage points. Over 
the same period, the share of secondary education in recurrent expenditures fell by 20 
percentage points and in development expenditures, by 19 percentage points (Buchert 1994: 
106). Despite international criticism and internal contestation, Nyerere consistently justified 
the deliberate choice of a distorted educational pyramid on the grounds that Tanzania, as a 
poor country, could not afford to expand secondary education (Chapter 1). Could 
Tanzania’s economic base in 2006, when the government decided to embrace the path 
towards mass public secondary education, financially accommodate the break with the 
historical educational organisation and its budgetary manifestation: a low secondary 
education budget?  
 
The budget is the expression of a political system; it reflects elites’ choices and preferences. 
It is also the outcome of conflicts between segments of the elite: ‘The crucial aspect of 
budgeting is whose preferences are to prevail in disputes about which activities are to be 
carried on and to what degree, in the light of limited resources’ (Wildavsky 1992: 595). 
Public expenditures constitute a means by which the state builds up its legitimacy and 
secures (or fails to secure) popular consent. The analysis of expenditures offers an 
interesting lens through which to examine power relations among the elite and the 
interdependence between the ruling class, which presides over budget design, and the rest 
of the society. To what extent did the break with the Tanzanian post-independence 
educational settlement, driven by the highest level of the Executive, provoke a realignment 
of elites’ budget preferences? 
 
146 
 
Assessing the distributional impact of public spending has long been a core endeavour of 
welfare economics. With the rise of Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies, concerns 
over the inequity in government allocation of resources for social services gained traction 
in development economics (Bourguignon et al. 2002). In Tanzania, the most recent benefit 
incidence analysis of public education expenditures underlined their unequal distribution, 
although the inequities are lower than the sub-Saharan African average. 184  Students 
belonging to the poorest families - 27 per cent of the school-age population and 0 per cent 
of those who reach higher education - only benefit from 13 per cent of public education 
resources (UNESCO 2012a: 231&232).185 However, this study does not say much about 
the politics underlying these distributional patterns, or about the magnitude of disputes 
attached to them, including within the dominant class. Have elites’ egalitarian claims to 
legitimate the ward secondary schools been realised through the budget? Have other 
imperatives prevailed over welfare considerations? What conflicts have underpinned the 
balancing of competing preferences? This chapter intends to illuminate these questions. 
 
Tanzania is heavily aid-dependent. In FY 2011/12, the total amount of external assistance 
(loans, grants and budget support) represented about 30 per cent of total revenues (URT 
2011d).186 In education, aid represented 18.6 per cent of the sector budget.187 During the 
years 2000-2009 Tanzania has also become one of the biggest recipients of budget support 
in sub-Saharan Africa: 188  with this aid modality, external assistance is being directly 
channeled to the National Treasury to implement the country’s national strategy for 
poverty reduction and growth (Koeberle et al. 2006). In this context, budget systems and 
public finance management reforms have occupied a growing centrality in donors’ 
interventions and dialogue with the Tanzanian government (de Renzio 2006, Lawson et al. 
2005). This chapter does not intend to provide a comprehensive political economy analysis 
of aid relations in education. Here the analytical lens is much narrower; the chapter’s aim is 
                                                 
184 Based on data from the 2007 Household Budget Survey (conducted prior to the ward secondary schools expansion) and 
FY 2008/09 budget data. 
185 These unequal patterns of public spending have been relatively stable over time: in 1993/94, according to an earlier 
benefit incidence analysis, the poorest quintile only benefited from 14% of public expenditures for the whole education 
system against 37% for the richest quintile. The poorest quintile did not benefit at all from public spending at tertiary 
level. The distribution at primary level was equal: 19% of public spending benefited the poorest quintile and 18% the 
richest quintile (Castro et al 1999). 
186 In 2008, Tanzania ranked 7th out of the top 20 ODA recipients worldwide, in volume (UNDP 2011: 157). In 2011, the 
country’s net official ODA represented 10.3 per cent of its GNI; the average for low income countries was 9.1 per cent, 
and 4 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa (World Development Indicators 2013). 
187 The author’s calculation, see Annex C. 
188 In 2010, worldwide, Tanzania was the top recipient of budget support in volume and the second in terms of share in 
public expenditures, behind Rwanda (Swedlund 2013: 362, based on OECD and IMF data). 
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to shed light on the channels through which aid agencies contributed or attempted to shape 
the patterns of secondary education expenditures. Following Whitfield and Fraser (2008: 2), 
the chapter is also interested in the ways in which domestic elites manage ‘to pursue their 
own policy preferences, resisting donor priorities while still taking the money’. 
 
Unlike the field of revenue mobilisation (Moore 2013, Di John 2011), the political 
economy of budget allocation in sub-Saharan Africa has remained largely unexplored 
outside a flourishing literature of a technocratic nature. Most existing works that deal with 
the politics of public expenditures (Killick 2005 on Ghana, Rakner et al. 2004 on Malawi, 
Hodges and Tibana 2004 on Mozambique) 189 provide insightful analyses of the interplay 
between dominant actors involved in the budget process. However, they tend to assess 
budgeting procedures and practices against donors’ normative good governance 
prescriptions. Their description of the budget as a ‘façade’ (Killick 2005) or a ‘theatre that 
masks the real distribution and spending’ (Rakner et al. 2004: 4) corresponds to a 
Tanzanian reality, especially at district level, where central level distributional choices are 
renegotiated by local elites (see Chapter 6). Nevertheless, this characterisation also eclipses 
the fact that the voted budget embodies some structural and historical distributional 
choices that do have a bearing on the actual physiognomy of the public education system. 
Besides, conflicts that budget negotiations give rise to cannot easily be dismissed as mere 
ludicrous stage performances. As an exception, Mmari et al. (2005) 190  do not treat 
Tanzanian budget decision-makers’ ‘incentives’ as the result of a rational calculation of 
their individual interests but rather unravel the complex power structure that underpins 
them. This chapter adopts a similar non-normative approach of elites’ education budget 
preferences. 
 
The chapter is supported by an analysis of education budget and aid data between 2004 and 
2012. Annex C provides a methodological note detailing data sources, the assumptions and 
their limitations. Given ‘the variety of compromises with accuracy’ (Samoff 1991: 675) that 
these underlying assumptions entail, the readers should not be misled by the ‘façade of 
precision’ (Samoff 1991) of the budget figures provided here; they are invited to rather 
focus on the general trends in public spending that they sketch out. The first section 
                                                 
189 All studies funded by DFID. 
190 Also funded by DFID. 
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presents basic information about the education budget, its sources of revenue, main blocks 
of expenditures and preparation process.191 The second section examines the dynamics of 
external assistance in the face of the rapid expansion of junior secondary education. The 
third focuses on domestic elites’ education budgetary preferences and investigates their 
actual financial commitment toward ward secondary schools. Finally, the last section 
considers the secondary education budget as a site of confrontation between domestic 
elites and donors; it questions the extent to which Tanzanian authorities have managed to 
exert a sovereign control over their education budget.  
 
1. Setting the budget scene: actors and process 
 
 
 
Beyond key ministries in charge of education, numerous institutions conduct education 
activities.192 For simplification purposes, the analysis in this chapter focuses on three main 
actors: the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT, budget vote 46), the 
Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG, 
budget vote 56) and local government authorities (LGAs, regional votes 70 to 95). These 
three budget holders account for approximately 90 per cent of education expenditures with 
about 60 per cent of the total education budget spent by regions/LGAs (UNESCO 2012a: 
119). 
 
 
 
Domestic revenues and external finance constitute the two main sources of revenue of the 
education budget. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to the education sector can 
be divided into four categories:193  
- On-budget projects and loans are integrated in budget books as ‘development-foreign’ 
expenditures but do not, or only partially, follow national systems and procedures.  
- Off-budget projects are managed entirely outside national systems and procedures.  
                                                 
191 For an extensive presentation of the budget process in Tanzania, see for instance HakiElimu and Policy Forum (2008). 
192 Typically, ministries in charge of health or agriculture have their own training institutes and their budgets are integrated 
within the budget of their mother ministry. 
193 See Chapter 3 (part 3.3) for a mapping of donors’ interventions in education. In 2010, 92% of ODA to Tanzania was 
computed on budget (OECD 2012). 
1.1 Main budget holders 
1.2 Main revenues and expenditures 
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- General budget support (GBS) funds only accrue to the education budget on a notional 
basis. GBS allocation depends on the national budget cycle and negotiations.  
- Sector budget support (SBS) constitutes a variation of general budget support with a 
sector dialogue focused on education policies, finances and outcomes.  
   
Two main categories of education expenditures fall outside the education ministries’ 
control: teachers’ payroll and education grants to districts and schools. The teachers’ 
payroll annual ceiling – and therefore the number of new teachers that can be recruited 
each year – is jointly determined by the Ministry of Finance and the President’s Office – 
Public Service Management (PO-PSM). Teachers’ personal emoluments are budgeted 
under local governments’ budgetary votes. 
 
Figure 5-1: Mapping the education budget 
 
External assistance to education
EDUCATION BUDGET
Domestic 
revenues
General  and Sector
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SEDP/PEDP development 
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Recurrent:
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(Directorate for sector 
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foreign):
Primary and Secondary: 
centrally-run components of 
SEDP/PEDP development 
programmes 
Recurrent:
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secondary)
- School meals
- Capitation grants 
(primary/secondary schools)
Development (domestic& 
foreign):
PEDP and SEDP development 
EXPENDITURES BUDGET HOLDERS RESSOURCES
 
Source: the author 
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The system of secondary education grants to districts and schools forms a complex web of 
flows of funds (Figure 5.2). Different streams are budgeted under local governments’ 
budgetary votes:  
- Other charges (OC) to finance activities of district secondary education offices; 
- Examination expenses;  
- Capitation grants to cover the supply of textbooks and other teaching and learning 
materials, infrastructure maintenance, furniture and school administration. In theory, 
secondary schools should receive Tsh 25,000 per enrolled student. This amount was 
initially calculated in US dollars (in the context of the SEDP I) and has never been 
adjusted to account for inflation;194  
- School meals grants (for secondary boarding schools, Tsh 1.500 / per student per 
schooling day);  
- Education development grants to finance school infrastructures. 
 
In general, the issue of grants to districts and schools encompasses three interrelated 
questions, with both technical and political dimensions:  
- The computation of the total envelope that represents the national budgetary effort to 
finance schools’ running and infrastructures expenses; 
- The formula or criteria to be applied to this global envelope to distribute grants 
between districts and schools to ensure an allocation of funds according to needs; 
- The actual flows of funds between the different administrative levels from the Treasury 
to school level.195 
 
This chapter is mostly concerned with national level budgetary negotiations and 
government-donors dialogue around public finance management (Circle 1 in Figure 5.2). 
The politics of the district budget (Circle 2), budget realities at school level (Circle 3) and 
‘community contributions’ (Circle 4) are studied more closely in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                 
194 Capitation grant mechanism was initially piloted in the primary schools of 16 districts under the World Bank’s Human 
Resources Development Program, then institutionalised as a government mechanism under the World Bank’s PEDP (for 
primary level) and later the SEDP I (for lower secondary schools): initially, funds flowed directly from the Ministry of 
Education to schools. Since the 2009 decentralisation decision, funds now flow to secondary schools via districts, as for 
primary schools. 
195 This third aspect is typically the object of Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS). For a technical presentation of 
this instrument, see Gauthier (2006). This tool has mainly been used in the context of donors’ broader anti-corruption 
agenda, to identify sources of ‘leakages’ in the flow of funds.  
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Figure 5-2: Mapping intergovernmental transfers in secondary education 
Students Universities
SLB 1 Donors
NECTA MoEVT PMO-RALG MoF TASAF
TIE
NACTE
PE        Leave       OC      Exam     CG         SM (BS)     LGDG
Employers 
via MoF VETA
Individuals TEA 2
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District
LGDG (educ) + 20% own 
revenues
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4
LGDG (educ) + 20% own 
revenues
Parents LGDG (educ)
labour, in 
kind, cash Village
3
SB/SCC
Temporary 
Teachers
Desk
Food 
cont.
Exam fees
Other 
cont.
Fees 
Teachers 
sal&allow
Textbook Other TLM
Adm/Maint 
costs
Construction (class, lab, 
admin block, hostels...)
Recurrent expenditures Dev expenditure
government secondary schools
Adm/Maint.: administrative and maintenance costs SB: school boards 
BS: boarding schools SCC: school construction commitee
CG: capitation grant SLB: Students' Loans Board
Cont.: contributions SM: school meals (only for boarding schools)
LGDG: Local government development grant TASAF: Tanzania Social Action Fund
NACTE: National Council for Technical Education TEA: Tanzania Education Authority
NECTA: National Examination Council of Tanzania TIE: Tanzania Institute of Education
OC: other charges TLM: teaching and learning materials
PE: personal emoluments VETA: Vocational Education and Trainign Authority  
Source: the author, an earlier version was included in Languille and Dolan (2012) 
 
 
 
Education ministries’ and local governments’ budgets are the outcome of close 
negotiations with the Ministry of Finance, which is responsible for the oversight of the 
budget preparation and execution. Every year, it issues budget guidelines, provides sector 
ministries and districts with budget ceilings, gives them instructions to ring-fence some 
budget items or to exclude some expenditures; it also scrutinises their budget proposals 
before tabling the national budget to Parliament for its approval in July. Parliamentary 
discussions over education finances are held in two Parliamentary Standing Committees - 
the Social Affairs Committee (for the MoEVT) and the Local Government Authorities 
Accounts Committee (for education grants).196 
                                                 
196  Tanzanian civil society organisations have invested in the domain of education public spending. Specifically, 
HakiElimu was heavily involved in the education public expenditure review process between 2001 and 2006. Following 
1.3 The budget cycle 
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2. External assistance and the fiscal space for quality secondary education for all  
 
 
At the global level, as shown in Chapter 2, within the MDGs framework, ODA to 
education displayed a long-lasting bias towards primary education. Tanzania did not escape 
this international pattern. From FY 2004/05 to FY 2009/10, donors’ main sector of 
investment remained primary education. Over this period, the primary level absorbed 
between 49 per cent and 77 per cent of total education ODA (Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5-1: Share of education sub-sectors in the total ODA to education in 
Tanzania 2004-2012 
 
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Primary 77.2 65.2 66.0 49.0 61.0 65.2 43.5 36.6 
Secondary 18.7 26.2 12.4 30.1 8.1 5.8 28.8 24.2 
Higher Education 
and Research 4.1 8.6 21.6 20.9 30.9 29.0 27.7 39.2 
Source: the author (see Annex C) 
 
During the planning negotiations of the Education Sector Development Programme (in 
the years 1995-2001) the Tanzanian Government advocated for a broad definition of ‘basic 
education’ as encompassing primary and junior secondary education. The battle between 
the World Bank and the UN agencies over the appropriate definition of ‘basic education’ 
(Chapter 2) was reflected in Tanzania. Technocrats in the MoEVT were aware of the tight 
interdependence between enrolment dynamics at primary and secondary levels and wanted 
to secure financial support for an extended ‘basic education’. But the international 
definition of that time prevailed. A former senior official in the MoEVT wondered:  
Do we have the same concept, we at the government and our donor partners? When we were advocating 
for basic education, did we understand the same way? When we were trying to define basic education 
from pre-primary to secondary and including adult and non-formal education (…) to what extent DPs 
bought this? It’s the starting point for the budget process. Unfortunately, on the other side of the coin, 
DPs take another definition. Even in planning policy we don’t come from the same route.’ (Interview 
4) 
                                                                                                                                               
Mmari et al. (2005), this research considers that CSOs’ actual influence on budget allocations has remained marginal; 
NGOs’ interventions are outside the analysis of this chapter. 
2.1 Donors’ lasting bias towards primary education in the budget support 
era 
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Even when the PEDP basket fund was phased out in FY 2006/07, donors’ commitment 
towards primary education did not fade: in FY 2009/10, the share of primary education 
within external assistance was as high as in FY 2005/06, last year of PEDP basket fund (65 
per cent).  
 
After the closure of PEDP basket fund, the patterns of external assistance in education 
experienced two major alterations. First, a change occurred in the distribution of the 
financial effort between the state and donors, the burden clearly shifting to the domestic 
component of the budget. Donors’ share of the education budget recorded a sharp decline 
in FY 2006/07 and then oscillated between 15 per cent and 20 per cent of the total 
education budget (in FY 2004/05, it had reached 57 per cent) (Figure 5.2). Second, FY 
2006/07 marked the inclusion of the education sector within the budget support 
framework (Figure 5.3).  
 
Table 5-2: Share of external finance in total education budget 
% 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Education aid as 
total of education 
budget 
56.8 33.9 16.5 19.9 20.1 17.3 14.7 18.6 
Source: the author. Note: notional share of budget support to education included; aid data based on donors’ disbursement 
reports (execution); budget data based on URT (2011b and 2012a) (estimates); see Annex C.  
 
Figure 5-3: Aid modalities in the education sector, evolution 2004/05 - 2011/12 (% 
total education ODA) 
 
 
Source: the author (see Annex C) 
 
In 2006, the Government of Tanzania and its ‘development partners’ signed the Joint 
Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), which formalised their mutual commitment to the 
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Paris Declaration principles for aid effectiveness (URT 2006: 5). The JAST singled out 
general budget support as the government’s preferred aid modality (ibid: 16). In education, 
several donors that used to finance the PEDP basket fund now designated general budget 
support as their main instrument to support the education sector (CIDA, DFID, SIDA, 
Netherlands, Finland and Norway). The European Union also supplemented its general 
budget support programme with an education sector budget support package. 
 
Donors’ shift to budget support in education was closely associated with a commitment to 
a sector-wide approach. The new aid regime was supposed to encourage a greater focus on 
inter-linkages between education sub-sectors and a holistic understanding of education 
finances and sector budgetary trade-offs.197 However, with budget support, ‘it is up to the 
government to manage the money according to their national laws and regulations, and it is 
spent according to the prioritizing made in the national budget’. 198  In this sense, the 
external assistance skewed towards primary education after the end of PEDP also derived 
from the government’s budget choices. As a senior official in the MoEVT said: with 
general budget support, ‘it depends on yourselves how you make your priority... So, if you want that 
money to go to secondary education, you can make your own decision to go to secondary education’ 
(interview 10). 
 
Nevertheless, donors’ preferences and modes of intervention contributed to the sustained 
budgetary bias towards primary education. The two core instruments of budget support – 
the GBS PAF and sector policy dialogue – interacted to reinforce this primary education 
focus. In 2005-2006 the GBS PAF translated a formal commitment to a sector wide 
approach to education (one indicator per major sub-sector). But in 2007 and 2008, peak 
years of the secondary expansion, the GBS PAF reflected donors’ continued overarching 
preference for primary education. Only in 2009, was secondary education unambiguously 
treated on an equal footing with primary education. Moreover, the fact that, until the 2009 
PAF, the indicator for secondary education remained ‘transition rate to Form One’ – 
identified in a context when Tanzania had a very low transition rate in comparison with 
comparable sub-Saharan countries - demonstrated donors’ lack of reactivity in the face of 
the radical transformation experienced by secondary education (Table 5.3 below).  
                                                 
197 See for instance EC (2007).  
198  Development Partners Group in Tanzania’s web site (http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/external/aid-modalities/budget-
support.html, accessed 11/10/2013). 
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Table 5-3: Education performance indicators in the successive GBS performance 
assessment frameworks, 2005 – 2011 
 
PAF 2005 
(for GBS 
review 
2006) 
PAF 2006 
(for GBS 
review 
2007) 
PAF 2007 
(for GBS 
review 
2008) 
PAF 2008 
(for GBS 
review 
2007) 
PAF 2009 (for 
GBS review 
2010) 
PAF 2010 (for 
GBS review 
2011) 
PAF 2011 (for GBS 
review 2012) 
Net 
primary 
school 
enrolment 
Net 
primary 
school 
enrolment 
Net 
primary 
school 
enrolment 
Net 
primary 
school 
enrolment 
Percentage of 
cohort 
completing 
Standard VII 
Percentage of 
cohort 
completing 
Standard VII 
Standard VII exam pass 
rate                                
A. National average for 
the previous year, 
disaggregated by gender 
(MoEVT)                                
B. Proportion of districts 
in which less than 40 % 
of Standard VII pupils 
passed the PSLE in the 
previous year (MoEVT) 
Transition 
rate from 
Standard 
VII to 
Form I 
Transition 
rate from 
Standard 
VII to 
Form I 
Transition 
rate from 
Standard 
VII to 
Form I 
Transition 
rate from 
Standard 
VII to 
Form I 
Percentage of 
cohort 
completing O 
Level 
Secondary 
Education 
(Form IV) 
Percentage of 
cohort 
completing O 
Level Secondary 
Education 
(Form IV) 
Form IV examination 
pass rates (Division I-III) 
national average for the 
previous year, 
disaggregated by gender 
(MoEVT) 
Gross 
Tertiary 
Education 
enrolment 
Gross 
Higher 
Education 
enrolment 
Gross 
Higher 
Education 
enrolment 
Gross 
Higher 
Education 
enrolment 
Percentage of 
cohort 
completing A 
Level 
Secondary 
Education 
(Form VI) 
Percentage of 
cohort 
completing A 
Level Secondary 
Education 
(Form VI) 
Total enrolment in 
Degree Programmes (% 
females) 
    Qualified 
Teacher/
Pupil 
Ratio in 
Primary 
Schools 
Qualified 
Teacher/ 
Pupil 
Ratio in 
Primary 
Schools 
Transition 
Rate from 
Standard VII 
to Form I 
Gender 
Disaggregated 
Transition Rate 
from Standard 
VII to Form I 
Gender 
Disaggregated 
  
       Gross 
enrolment 
(Total 
Enrolment) in 
Higher 
Education 
Gross enrolment 
(Total 
Enrolment) in 
Higher 
Education 
  
       Qualified 
Teacher/Pupil 
Ratio in 
Primary 
Schools 
Qualified 
Teacher/Pupil 
Ratio in Primary 
Schools 
  
       Qualified 
Teacher/Pupil 
Ratio in 
Secondary 
Schools 
Qualified 
Teacher/Pupil 
Ratio in 
Secondary 
Schools 
  
Source: the author, based on DPG web site http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/index.php?id=57 (accessed 27/09/2013) 
 
Until 2008-2009, the education sector did not have a formal sector performance framework. 
However, the EU education sector budget support tied its disbursements to a list of 
quantified outcome indicators. The programme was formally committed to support ‘basic 
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education’ conceived in broad terms, following the Tanzanian definition (pre-primary, 
primary, secondary, teachers’ education, adult and non-formal education).199 However, its 
list of indicators revealed a bias towards the main challenges faced by primary education 
(Table 5.4).   
 
Table 5-4: Performance indicators for the release of variable tranche of the EC 
sector budget support programme 
 
Reduction of cross-districts disparities in the net 
enrolment ratio in primary education 
Gross enrolment rate in secondary education (Form I to 
Form IV and Form V to Form VI) 
Pupil/grade A or diploma teacher in primary education Gross enrolment ratio of girls in Form V and VI 
Reduction of cross-district disparities in pupils/teacher 
ratio in primary education 
Percent of students passing the Form IV examination 
(CSEE) 
Pupil/textbook in primary schools Public expenditure on education as a percentage of total 
public expenditure 
Percent of girls passing the Primary School Leaving Exam % of LGAs awarded clean audits by the National Audit 
Office 
Source: URT and EC (2007: 10) 
 
The second instrument of budget support – policy dialogue at sector and macro levels – 
was, in practice, equally distorted in favour of primary education. A former senior official 
in the Ministry of Education recalled donors’ minimal concern for secondary education:  
When we were talking of secondary education, at that time you would look at DPs’ [development 
partners] face, they would not take it seriously. Only the World Bank would. Others would not come 
heavily in meetings or with funding… In sector dialogue, they would not get interested in secondary 
education, their face would dry, their interest would decrease… In planning, budget process, GBS 
discussions, you can bring issues but they did not support secondary at all… DPs said they were not 
sure that it was a priority. We were saying “there’s a huge demand” and they would say “we’re not 
sure of that”. (Interview 4) 
 
The ward secondary schools policy was a direct consequence of the PEDP, which was 
widely supported by donors. The abolition of primary school fees in 2000 was the outcome 
of strong external influences, echoed internally by civil society organisations (Gould 2005). 
Part of the Government disagreed with the policy on the grounds of its doubtful financial 
sustainability (Mmari et al 2005). The personal relationship between the World Bank’s 
Country Director and President Mkapa played a critical role in the negotiations (Weeks et 
al. 2002). Nevertheless, the possibility of aid agencies financially bearing the consequences 
                                                 
199 URT and EC (2007).  
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of their own programme and contributing additional funds to support the expansion of 
secondary education was never envisioned. 200  The pace of secondary expansion did, 
however, raise concerns among education aid managers but only to the extent that they 
advocated for a return to the phased expansion as projected in the Ministry of Education-
World Bank programme.  
 
Recognising the highly political nature of a policy directly driven by the Prime Minister, the 
Education Development Partners Group tried to convince Heads of Cooperation and 
agencies to forge a high level collective position on the ward secondary schools issue. But 
in a time of strict observance of the JAST, Heads of Cooperation deferred to the formal 
structures to conduct such high level political dialogue, the Joint Coordinating Group 
(Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Cooperation) and the Development Cooperation 
Forum (the Government’s Chief Secretary and selected Ambassadors). 201  These two 
forums were, however, technocratic structures. As such Heads of Cooperation implicitly 
admitted that the Prime Minister – political driver of the policy – remained out of the reach 
of a possible collective initiative from aid agencies’ top officials. It also demonstrated that 
quality education for all was not seen as an issue that justified the risk of a political 
confrontation with Tanzania’s top leaders: the structural contradiction between the 
pretence of influencing public policies and aid agencies’ inherent reluctance to enter the 
political arena was clear.  
 
 
During this first sequence of the research timeframe, the World Bank was the only 
significant agency that resolutely invested in secondary education.202 
 
 
 
                                                 
200 In its 2005 New Agenda for Secondary Education, the World Bank emphasised the ‘common perception that the pressure 
created by secondary enrollment is a problem that can be deferred to the future’ (World Bank 2005: 127). 
201 Mostly based on the author’s participation in the events. 
202 Between 1998 and 2007, the African Development Bank’s ‘Education II Project’ targeted secondary education and 
funded the construction of laboratories, supply of mathematics and science textbooks and training of science teachers. 
2.2 The World Bank’s SEDP I (2004 – 2007): introducing the SEDP 
capitation grant in a time of uncontrolled expansion 
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Table 5-5: Share of different aid interventions in total ODA to secondary education 
(per cent) 
 
 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
SEDP 
WB 
66.4 72.2 0.0 58.1 0.0 0.0 77.7 40.7 
ADB 9.7 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
GBS/SBS  23.9 24.9 100.0 41.9 100.0 100.0 22.3 59.3 
Source: the author, based on disbursement reports, see Annex C 
 
The World Bank’s educational assistance in Tanzania perfectly mirrored the agency’s 
shifting strategic orientations as described in Chapter 2. After its decisive push in favour of 
the abolition of primary school fees and substantial financial support for the PEDP,203 the 
Bank’s focus moved to secondary education, and later, higher education,204 while other 
donors largely remained focused on primary education.  
 
The project conditions for tranche releases reflected the Bank’s concerns over funding 
mechanisms or more broadly resource allocation (including teachers) for secondary 
education. 
 
 
Table 5-6: World Bank SEDP I - tranche release conditions and project objectives 
 
 
Project Objective Effectiveness Second Tranche Third Tranche 
Increase 
proportion of 
relevant 
age group 
completing 
secondary 
- Issue circulars governing 
management of capitation, 
development and 
scholarship grants in 
schools 
-Reduce tuition fees for 
Government day schools 
from 
Tsh 40,000 to Tsh 20,000 
 
Improve learning 
outcomes, 
especially for girls 
- Allow private sector 
publishers 
to compete for textbook 
provision and end of 
government monopoly 
-Allocate appropriate 
budgetary resources for 
FY2004-2005 to ensure 
adequate staffing and grants  
-Adopt package of 
incentives 
to attract teachers to 
underserved areas 
-Amend the mechanisms for 
approval of educational books 
-Adopt and implement a 
program of continuous 
development of professional 
skills for teachers and 
administrators 
-Allocate appropriate 
budgetary resources for 
FY2005-2006 to ensure 
adequate staffing and 
grants  
-Amend regulations for 
national curriculum and 
examinations 
                                                 
203 The World Bank’s PEDP programme (2001 – 2005) was financed by a USD150 million loan and a USD50 million 
grant. The Bank remained outside the PEDP basket fund financed by other PEDP donors. 
204 In May 2008, the World Bank approved a USD 100 million loan to support the Science & Technology Higher 
Education Programme in Tanzania. 
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Project Objective Effectiveness Second Tranche Third Tranche 
Enable public 
administration to 
manage secondary 
education 
more effectively 
-Issue circulars determining 
criteria for posting teachers 
to schools 
 -Issue regulations 
determining 
functions and 
responsibilities 
of central, regional, local 
and 
school authorities 
Source: adapted from World Bank (2010b: 18). Conditions related to financial issues are highlighted in bold. 
 
The World Bank intervention entailed a structural reform of the lower secondary education 
funding mode. Starting in 2005, in line with the World Bank’s conditionalities, the 
government reduced tuition fees for government secondary schools from Tsh 40,000 to 
Tsh 20,000. In order to compensate for schools’ financial losses, a capitation grant 
mechanism was set up: the central state would transfer to schools Tsh 25,000 /per enrolled 
student to cover non-teacher running costs. The government would also provide 
development grants for the construction of new classrooms and infrastructure 
rehabilitation. It also agreed to expand the scholarship programme for students from 
poorer households. These measures were coupled with its formal commitment to ‘allocate 
appropriate budgetary resources (…) to ensure adequate staffing and grants’ (World Bank 
2010b: 18). 
 
The World Bank programme had a noticeable impact on the secondary education budget, 
which recorded a 166 per cent increase between FY 2003/04 and FY 2004/05. In its 
disbursement years (FY 2004/05, FY 2005/06 and FY 2007/08), the World Bank’s 
support represented a substantial share of the secondary education total budget. As the 
World Bank wrote: ‘the initial Bank support was important in giving the start-up of SEDP 
a strong lift’ (World Bank 2010b: 21). 
 
Table 5-7: Share of World Bank SEDP I in total secondary education budget (per 
cent) 
 
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2010/11 2011/12 
38.6 41.0 0.0 21.9 0.0 33.5 9.0 
Source: the author, see Annex C  
 
Nevertheless, a key assumption that underlined the SEDP I financial framework – that 
other donors would join the Bank – did not materialise. 205  The effect of this was 
                                                 
205 ‘It is anticipated that other donors will add to the proposed financing of 150 million US dollars through the PRBS and 
specific sector support in other years’ (World Bank 2004:11). 
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compounded by the fact that one of the major risks initially identified by the programme - 
‘that the government will be unable to deliver on promises to allocate more funds to 
education in general, and secondary education in particular in view of competing priorities’ 
(World Bank 2004: i) – did occur. The ward secondary schools policy profoundly 
undermined the financial backbone of the World Bank’s strategy for secondary education 
in Tanzania. The Tsh 25,000 capitation grant could not be sustained in a context of rapid 
expansion. The level of secondary education capitation grant declined from Tsh 20,000 per 
student in 2005 to Tsh 10,000 in FY 2008/09 (UNESCO 2012a: 17). Equally, the Ministry 
of Finance was unable to fulfil its commitment in terms of staffing (World Bank 2004:11).  
 
This led to major frictions between the World Bank and the government. The Bank tried 
unsuccessfully to convince the government to slow down the expansion in order to ensure 
its financial sustainability.206 The third tranche was disbursed with a major delay (in August 
2007 instead of the planned September 2006), only after a partial waiver by the Bank’s 
Board. Frictions arose within the World Bank itself, with some members of staff opposing 
the partial waiver of the capitation grant conditionality on the grounds that the 
government’s decision to step outside the World Bank’s carefully projected expansion plan 
was a breach of commitment.207 Yet, despite external pressures, Prime Minister Lowassa’s 
government did not alter its policy choice and managed to keep aid flowing, even if delayed. 
 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted a strategic shift among donors in 2009-2010 towards secondary 
education/vocational training and quality education. To what extent has this influenced the 
level of their funding and their instruments? 208  In FY 2010/11 and 2011/12, external 
assistance to education displayed a more balanced intra-sectoral allocation (Figure 5.4). 
                                                 
206 ‘Bank supervision missions cautioned the Government about the fiscal dangers of too rapid expansion beyond the 
medium growth scenario of the SEDP Program Document and its impact on quality’ World Bank (2010b: 19). 
207 ‘Some in the Bank argued that the condition on the adequate size of the capitation grant should not have been waived, 
because it was the result of allowing enrolments to expand beyond the agreed medium term scenario’ (World Bank 2010: 
33). 
208 The author could not find reliable budgetary data on vocational education and training. The financial analysis is 
restricted to formal secondary education. During the fieldwork, DFID was preparing a new project to specifically address 
quality education; however, this ‘Education Quality Improvement Programme in Tanzania (2012/2017)’ is not covered by 
this research. 
2.3 Donors and the learning crisis (FY 2010/11 and FY 2011/12): enhanced 
financial effort and the incommensurable fiscal challenge  
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This rebalancing was due both to the World Bank SEDP II (2010-2015) and to budget 
support aid components. 
 
Figure 5-4: Allocation of total education external assistance between sub-sectors in 
Tanzania 2004/05 - 2011/12 
 
 
Source: the author, see Annex C 
 
Donors have also altered their macro and sector instruments to accommodate both the 
growing interest in secondary education and the anxiety generated by students’ poor 
performances. Until 2009, in addition to the focus on primary education mentioned earlier, 
successive GBS PAFs clearly reflected input-oriented education priorities and an emphasis 
on enrolment (see Table 5.3). The 2009 PAF simultaneously marked the upgrading of 
secondary education and the insertion of ‘quality’ within the GBS framework. Moreover, 
since 2008/09, at sector level, a complementary performance assessment framework has 
been in place, the ‘rating framework for the education sector assessment’. This tool – a list 
of outcome and process indicators with quantified targets - has had effective sector wide 
application and, in 2011, with the growing concern over quality, donors increased the 
weight given to outcomes indicators.209 
 
Yet, within this context of instrument adjustments, donors’ actual funding fell short of the 
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group’s call for an ‘enormous fiscal and managerial 
effort […] to reverse these trends’ (World Bank 2010b: 33). According to the IEG, 
                                                 
209 On the limitations of this management by numbers see Languille (forthcoming). 
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‘Finding the financial resources to complete the job of building quality into the expanded 
system is an enormous challenge to be resolved by the government and development 
partners’ (ibid: 36). In terms of amount, the total aid to the sub-sector did record a sharp 
increase between FY 2009/10 and FY 2011/12. Yet, in constant terms, the level reached in 
FY 2011/12 was only slightly superior to that recorded at the beginning of the research 
period. The allocation pattern also demonstrates the high level of unpredictability of this 
external assistance due to the World Bank’s various disbursements, an established 
detrimental aspect of a project approach (Figure 5.5).210  
 
Figure 5-5: External assistance to secondary education in Tanzania 
 
 
Source: the author (see Annex C) 
 
In the case of the World Bank’s SEDP II, the biggest share of the programme has been 
dedicated to the upgrading of existing infrastructures (see Table 5.8). However, this 
funding only affects 264 schools, i.e., a mere 8 per cent of all community secondary schools 
in 2011. Only two schools per district will have the chance to be upgraded to ‘fully 
functional schools’, a drop within an ocean of ‘dummy schools’.211 
 
 
                                                 
210 On the lack of predictability of projects and the expected greater predictability associated to budget support see 
Tavakoli and Smith (2013) or Hedger et al. (2010). 
211 The label is from an official in the Ministry of Education. 
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Table 5-8: The World Bank SEDP II components – IDA financing and 
government’s counterpart funding (commitment) 
 
Project components World Bank (IDA) Government of Tanzania Share of 
government 
Upgrading existing schools 
infrastructure 
US$78.3 million US$192.2 million 71% 
Adequate financing to secondary 
schools (capitation grant) 
US$37.8 million US$127.1 million 77% 
Equitable provision of teachers and 
the quality of teaching 
US$27.1 million 0 0 
Capacity building and technical 
assistance 
US$6.8 million 0 0 
Source: the author, based on World Bank (2010a) 
 
Donors’ actual commitment to meeting the financial challenge becomes even more 
questionable in light of the evolution of external assistance allocated per enrolled student in 
public secondary schools. The last two fiscal years have recorded a slight recovery in the 
amount spent by student but this spending unit envelope represented only about 10% of 
the FY2004/05 amount (Figure 5.6). 212  
 
Figure 5-6: Aid spending per student enrolled in public secondary schools 
 
 
Source: the author (see Annex C) 
 
It is, however, important to emphasise, once again, that GBS/SBS allocation patterns 
remain chiefly determined by the national budget negotiation process. As such, they 
therefore reflect domestic elites’ budget preferences; these are investigated in the next 
section. Section Four will then show how donors, rather than providing more funding, 
                                                 
212 For a senior official in the PMO-RALG: ‘the World Bank money is just a peanut’ (interview 27). 
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have tried to alter these domestic budget preferences and push for ‘more quality 
expenditures’. 
 
3. Secondary education and domestic elites’ budget preferences 
 
 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, Tanzanian education as a whole has benefited from the 
increase in government expenditures fuelled by good macroeconomic performances, 
improved revenue collection and sustained external aid revenues.213  In constant prices, 
between 2002/03 and 2011/12 the total volume of public spending on education increased 
by 186 per cent (Figure 5.7). Within the national budget, the education sector constitutes 
the primary spending unit, before infrastructure and health: in 2011/12, education 
absorbed 16.9 per cent of the total budget. 
 
Figure 5-7: Education budget 2002/03 - 2011/12 (mill. Tsh, constant prices, base 
2001) 
 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a)  
 
However, the actual budgetary effort towards education needs to be examined in 
perspective. Between 2002/03 and 2010/11, education expenditure grew at a much slower 
pace than the total government budget (Figure 5.8).  
                                                 
213 Between 2005 and 2011, the average annual growth rate was 6.9 per cent. Domestic revenues increased from 9.2 per 
cent of GDP in 1998/99 to 17.5 per cent in 2011/12 (UNESCO 2012a).  
3.1 Inter-sector budget allocation: educational ‘consumption’ vs productive 
sectors 
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Figure 5-8: Government and education budget as share of GDP 
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Source: the author based on URT (2011b and 2012a) 
 
Besides, after a peak in 2008/09, the annual budgetary effort towards education steadily 
declined: in 2011/12, the education share of the total budget was lower than in 2002/03 
(Figure 5.9).  
 
Figure 5-9: Education budget as a share of the total government budget 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a) 
 
A senior official in the Ministry of Finance exposed the rationale of the relative under-
prioritisation of education:  
What we are trying to do is to try to get the quick wins which can bring in resources. You know that 
education is consumption (…) if you don’t have infrastructure, the agricultural sector is not ticking, 
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you cannot get resources we can require to make education tick also, or to give it to education so that 
then, we consume. It’s like health, also, is consumption. But you have, as a nation, to have the quick 
ways in some sectors which will be the backbone of providing the services. If you make your 
infrastructure work properly and be in good condition, then you’ll see you’ll make money.’ 
(Interview 31) 
Senior officials in the education administration (the MoEVT or the PMO-RALG) shared 
similar views on education quality as a consequence of rural development or infrastructure 
investment – i.e. a shift away from the human capital paradigm.  
 
These tensions over the balance between education (or, more broadly, social sectors) and 
productive sectors are not new: between 1999 and 2003, in the context of implementing 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy, the government managed to assert its overriding budget 
preference for ‘economic services’ and ‘production’ while fulfilling donors’ conditionality 
requesting an increase in per capita allocations to priority sectors (Mmari et al. 2005: 41-45). 
More recently, the 2011 Five-Year Development Plan 2010-2015 has represented an attempt by 
a faction of the ruling power to regain control over national development (Languille and 
Dolan 2012). It emphasises an infrastructure-led development agenda rather than the social 
services/good governance priorities that shaped Mkukuta I and II under donors’ 
influence.214  The human capital paradigm provides a strong backbone to the Five Year 
Development Plan, which critically emphasises quality education and skills enhancement and 
therefore reflects the secondary/quality discursive turn pointed out in Chapter 3. But its 
financial framework only accounts for investments in higher education infrastructure: 
strategic interventions in primary and secondary education have simply not been costed 
while approximately Tsh 580 billion is projected for higher education (URT 2011e: 124-
129). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
214 Five year development plans used to guide the government’s economic choices during the socialist period and were 
stopped in the mid-1990s (Wynne 2005). Hickey (2012) for Uganda and deRenzio and Hanlon (2007) for Mozambique 
highlight a similar disenchantment with a poverty focused economic strategy and a similar initiative to craft an alternative 
developmental model geared towards structural transformation.  
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In this general context of relative prioritisation of education in the budget, different sub-
sectors have received a differentiated treatment (Figure 5.10).   
 
Figure 5-10: Share of sub-sector allocations in the education budget (in %) 2002/03 
- 2011/12 
 
Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a)  
 
Specifically, secondary education financing underwent a steady decline, from a peak of 18.2 
per cent of the education budget in 2004/05 to its lowest level of 6.2 per cent in 2009/10. 
The evolution of ‘unit costs’ illustrates, even more forcefully, the low budgetary priority 
given to secondary education during the expansion phase. The post-independence 
budgetary trade-off between primary/literacy and secondary had not only a low share of 
the education budget for secondary education, but a second facet: a high unit cost for 
secondary education. For Nyerere, this was the price of ‘quality education’. Even after the 
introduction of cost-sharing measures in 1985, secondary education unit costs remained 
relatively high. In 1990, Tanzania had the second highest (after Uganda) ratio of secondary 
to primary unit costs, of 62 countries with GNP per capita below USD 5,000 (Lewin 1996: 
370). Between 2002 and 2009, this unit cost recorded a dramatic decline: enrolment in 
public secondary schools (O and A levels) increased by 590 per cent but the secondary 
education spending unit decreased by about 70 per cent (Figure 5.11).  
 
3.2 Intra-sector budget allocation sector: secondary education, the 
neglected child 
168 
 
Figure 5-11: Spending per student in primary and secondary education (2002/03 - 
2011/12) 
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Source: the author, based on enrolment and budget data from on URT (2011b and 2012a)  
NB: Budget in constant prices, base year 2001. Due to data availability, by convention, the ‘primary 
education spending unit’ was computed using the enrolment in public primary public schools and the 
budget for ‘primary, non-formal, other education institutions and supporting services’. Budget figures 
include on-budget aid funding. 
 
With 9.3% of its education budget allocated to secondary education in 2010/11, Tanzania’s 
public spending on this level was among the lowest in relation to similarly situated sub-
Saharan African countries.215 
 
This intra-sector budgetary allocation is not the full picture of the actual funding for 
secondary education. In practice, at local level, budget allocations were renegotiated and 
between 2006 and 2010, districts diverted resources initially earmarked for the primary level 
to secondary education; they also allocated other non-earmarked resources to this sub-
sector (Chapter 6).216 Nevertheless, these national budgetary trade-offs reflect the budgetary 
priorities of elites for the education sector.  
 
Four main factors can be highlighted to explain this allocative pattern that disfavoured 
secondary education. As shown in Chapter 4, the ward secondary schools policy was 
actually driven by Prime Minister Lowassa and his Office, in opposition to a side-lined 
Ministry of Education. This specific sharing of responsibility may have partially contributed 
to the inertia of the secondary education budget during the initial phase of expansion as the 
                                                 
215 World Bank (2010a) for comparative data. 
216 2006 corresponds to the year of the government’s decree on ward schools; 2010 to the effective implementation of 
decentralisation of secondary education.  
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leadership of the Ministry of Education may have overlooked the budgetary requirements 
of a policy that they disowned. 217  Moreover, with this highly political process that 
circumvented the technocratic apparatus, the budget lost its centrality as the financial arm 
of the bureaucracy; it became irrelevant. ‘The strategic planning process was turned on its head; it 
was basically left redundant’ (economist, aid agency, interview 57). The expansion, as we will 
see in next chapter, was largely funded outside the budget: ‘the real economic effort was much 
higher, only that part was not budgeted’ (ibid). Therkildsen (2000: 66) argues that in Tanzania 
‘policy decisions are often taken as if no hard constraints for reform initiatives exist’. The 
budget inertia in the face of the ward secondary schools policy shift illustrates the enduring 
relevance of this characterisation.  
 
The limits of strategic budgeting in Tanzania represent another factor that has driven the 
low budgetary effort for secondary education. In theory, the country has abandoned 
incremental budgeting: performance-based budgeting was introduced in 1998 and in the 
early 2000s the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) began to be used 
(Naschold and Fozzard 2002; Wynne 2005). 218  Today, the allocation of resources to 
ministries is supposed to be closely tied to their three-year strategic plan and annual action 
plans. Each ministry’s objectives result from the ministry’s ‘vision’ which is itself the 
ministerial representation of the needs of the country as expressed in various and 
overlapping strategic development frameworks (Vision 2025, Mkukuta and the Five-Year 
Development Plan). This strategic planning and budgeting framework is replicated at all 
administrative levels, from districts to schools.219 This pyramidal structure could, in theory, 
offer an effective framework to realise a strategic priority shift (for instance towards 
secondary education or quality education) in budgetary terms. However, budget-making 
realities in Tanzania largely diverge from this ‘textbook’ objectives-based approach. 
 
First of all, the national MTEF is not an instrument that allocates financial envelopes to 
different sectors based on a costed development scenario. Each ministry has its own 
MTEF, which is simply the incremental projection of the current fiscal year ceiling over the 
                                                 
217 This remains however a hypothesis, even if highly plausible. Evidence to support it was difficult to gather. 
218 For a general exposition on MTEFs see Holmes and Evans (2003: 5). According to the World Bank, in Tanzania: ‘The 
MTEF links the budget process to MKUKUTA and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and is aligned to the sector’s 
performance budgeting (…)  In this regard, the sector strategy is focused on priority projects and activities and reflects 
funding constraints’ (World Bank 2011: 77). 
219 Interviews with headmasters and district officials.  
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two outer years. Equally, the education sector budget is not the result of a multi-year costed 
plan computed from macro-economic and demographic assumptions, enrolment 
projections by sub-sector and targets for teacher-pupil ratio or book-pupil ratio. The 
MoEVT and the PMO-RALG prepare, in isolation, their own budget estimates, which are 
the results of the compilation of costed activity plans developed by each unit or department. 
The starting point of the budget preparation is not a strategic allocation among key 
priorities or key departments but the amount of fuel spent on different field visits or the 
amount of allowances induced by planned workshops. Far from being strategic, the 
budgeting process remains a bottom-up incremental exercise: the ministry’s leadership 
(Permanent Secretary and Directors) only gets involved at the very end of the process for 
final decisions.220 Within such a framework, it is difficult to envisage a drastic budgetary 
reorientation to keep pace with a strategic policy reorientation towards a sub-sector (for 
example, secondary education) or a department (for example, the inspectorate), which, 
historically, have been financially neglected. In that sense, as in Ghana (Killick 2005), the 
Tanzanian budget process entails a ritualistic dimension.221   
 
Student loans constitute the third factor behind the low budget for secondary education; 
they have indeed crowded out basic education resources. Budgetary trends reflect domestic 
elites’ overwhelming preference for higher education: this sub-sector recorded a steady 
resource increase between FY 2005/06 and FY 2011/12, both in absolute terms and as a 
share of the education budget.222 If one excludes two years, this education level recorded a 
regular upward trend, from 16.7 per cent of the education budget in 2004/05 to 27.2 per 
cent in 2011/12 (Figure 5.10). 
 
Understanding the social, political and economic meaning of higher education today in 
Tanzania would require an in-depth investigation beyond the scope of this research. 
Chapter 4 already pointed out how the student loans allocation criteria contribute to the 
reinforcement of unequal dynamics within the education system. In addition, because of a 
                                                 
220 The eighth step out of a ten step cycle: ‘In March-April, the MTEF is submitted to the Ministerial budget committee 
(Permanent Secretary and Directors) to allow management to own the budget’ (interview 2, official, MoEVT). 
221 Early assessments of Tanzania’s MTEF were quite positive. Le Houerou and Taliercio (2002) considered that the 
country had one of the best developed MTEFs in Africa. The World Bank’s official view of the instrument that it 
championed remains very positive today: ‘The MTEF has achieved credibility with Cabinet, line ministries, and other 
stakeholders. The MTEF is also seen as a key instrument in ensuring effectiveness in the use of public resources. In this 
regard, the MTEF has fostered a strong link with the PER process’ (World Bank 2011: 78). 
222 ‘Tanzania’s higher education allocation [in FY 2008/09] is the fifth highest of forty-one countries for which data were 
available and among the highest of all African low-income countries’ (UNESCO 2012a: 127). 
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the historical very low recovery rate, the system has almost been turned into a grant 
system.223 Also, because a large share of each loan is transferred directly to institutions to 
cover tuition fees, the scheme has de facto meant a publicly subsidised marketization of 
higher education. 224  These dynamics, which mechanically benefited mainly the most 
privileged students and private education entrepreneurs, coincided with the rapid 
expansion of secondary education enrolment, which lacked any commensurate budgetary 
effort.  
 
Numerous complaints have also been formulated about the fact that this funding 
mechanism benefits the children of the rich and well connected. An official in MoEVT 
pointed out: ‘that’s true it drains resources and starves other departments. It is so needed, so critical but 
now even the rich get it…that’s why there are all these outcries’ (official, MoEVT, interview 19). The 
government has taken some measures to try to increase the recovery rate and most 
informants in the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance and Parliament consider 
the scheme as financially not sustainable. 225 Nevertheless, even after 2010, in a context 
where quality secondary education has become a subject of major social concern, student 
loans remained the education budget’s top priority.  
 
The last factor contributing to the low secondary education budget is that resources for 
ward secondary schools have remained a second-order budget priority. The capitation grant 
global envelope was never ring-fenced by the Cabinet and the Ministry of Finance. Since its 
inception, the starting point for computing the envelope has never been the theoretical 
‘unit cost’ (Tsh 25,000 per student): as argued by the Ministry of Finance, ‘this funding 
target is subject to the Government’s resource constraints’ (URT 2007b: 24). The process 
leading to the determination of the envelope available for education grants remains the 
outcome of informal negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and the Cabinet, 
through an ad hoc prioritisation process, in the absence of any formal guidance criteria 
                                                 
223  In November 2011, the recovery rate since the inception of the scheme was 13 per cent (Deputy Minister of 
Education and Vocational Training in The Daily News 09/11/2011 ‘From the Parliament - Loans board yet to recover 
695bn/’). 
224 Between 2004 and 2010, the number of enrolled students increased by 280 per cent (URT 2011b). In FY 2008/09, 
about 36 per cent of overall disbursements were for students in private institutions (UNESCO 2012a: 135).  
225 ‘The Government set up a Presidential Commission to analyze the current loan scheme and develop recommendations 
aimed at improving the scheme’ (World Bank 2012d: 2).  
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(Boex 2009).226 In FY2010/11, for instance, at inter-sectoral level, expenses prompted by 
the energy crisis crowded out other expenditures.227  
 
Among education expenditures, two categories are considered as absolutely crucial due to 
their political sensitivity: examination expenses and school meals in boarding schools. 
Failure to organise national examinations, highly symbolic moments in the nation’s yearly 
calendar, carries a political risk that national leaders are not ready to take.228  National 
leaders also fear the destabilising effect of secondary student riots or strikes triggered by 
their food, events that regularly occur and receive wide media coverage. For a senior 
official in the Ministry of Finance ‘meals are very crucial. (...) So if you don’t take care of that it will 
be terrible’ (interview 31). These expenditures take definite precedence. For another official 
in the Ministry of Finance, ‘you can’t postpone school meals but you can postpone capitation grant. 
Available funds can suffice to operate schools’ (ibid). Concerns over social order supersede the 
government’s stated commitments to quality education. And in the case of boarding school 
meals, the price of this primacy is very high in terms of breaching egalitarian goals: food in 
boarding schools only affects a handful of students (about 800 in 2012), against about 1.5 
million in ward secondary schools. 
 
 
The social commotion caused by the massive examination failures and the specific 
construction of ‘quality’ as ‘science, English and skills’ (Chapter 4) have had a direct impact 
on the education budget. Indeed, at the end of the research period the share of secondary 
education in the education budget recorded a sharp increase from 9.4 per cent in 2010/11 
to 20.4 per cent FY2011/12. A Ministry of Education member who was directly involved 
in the budget preparation confirmed: ‘from FY 2010/11, the ministerial budget committee 
(Management, Permanent Secretary and Directors) has decided to move to secondary education’ (interview 
2). 
                                                 
226 At inter-sector level, according to a GBS PAF performance indicator, each financial year at least 25 per cent of the 
total national budget (excluding national debt) should be allocated to LGAs. In FY 2011/12 and three previous years, the 
target was met. However, there is not any formal key of repartition between sectors (Boex 2009). 
227 Interviews with senior officials in the Ministry of Finance and the PMO-RALG.  
228  An official in the Ministry of Finance highlighted this priority of examination expenses (in the case of budget 
execution not budget preparation): ‘During the 1st quarter we only released funds for examination (...) If during 3rd quarter 
you receive funds you’ll allocate for other activities’ (interview 33). 
3.4 FY2010/11 and FY 2011/12: a budget more responsive to quality and 
secondary education 
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Figure 5-12: Education sub-sector budgetary allocations 2002/03 - 2011/12 
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Source: the author, based on enrolment and budget data from URT (2011b and 2012a) 
 
At the level of the Ministry of Education, two departments particularly critical in delivering 
quality – the Teachers Education Department and the Inspectorate – also recorded a 
substantial increase in the absolute amount of their envelope, even though they continued 
to absorb a minute share of the budget. A senior official in the MoEVT, involved in the 
budget preparation, confirmed the new budget priority granted for these two domains 
(interview 7). 
 
Table 5-9: Trends of Budgetary Funding of Teacher Education and Inspectorate 
(Millions Tsh, current) 
 
 
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Teacher Education - MoEVT 25,250 47,053 28,895 35,892 47,172 
Inspectorate - MoEVT 5,900 12,096 11,969 17,806 17,748 
Source: URT (2012b: 104) 
 
In FY 2010/11, the MoEVT and the PMO-RALG jointly decided to earmark funds from 
CIDA’s sector budget support to help selected districts build laboratories and teachers’ 
houses in hard to reach areas.229 This budget prioritisation geared towards quality-related 
inputs occurred without any formal or informal prescription from CIDA230; it testified to 
the education administration’s evident commitment to financially address the quality crisis.  
 
                                                 
229 Interview 23 (official, PMO-RALG). 
230 Interview with CIDA’s education aid manager. 
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In this process of reconfiguration of education budget priorities towards quality secondary 
education, the Ministry of Finance’s endorsement has been critical. For the researcher, the 
opacity of the budget negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and the education 
administration (the MoEVT and the PMO-RALG) has proved difficult to see through. The 
degree of autonomy of the education bureaucracy remains difficult to gauge. Contradictory 
accounts of closed-door processes, however, converged to emphasise the preeminent role 
of the Ministry of Finance and its internalisation of the secondary education/vocational 
training/quality priority.231 Annual Speeches by the Minister of Finance to the National 
Assembly to present budget estimates for the following fiscal year encapsulate the 
Cabinet’s budgetary preferences. In recent years, they have paid prominent attention to the 
quality/science/skills nexus in education. For instance, in FY 2012/13, the focus was on 
the vocational/science component of ‘quality’.232 For FY 2013/14, the Minister of Finance 
singled out a unique ‘underlying challenge’ for the education sector: ‘to improve learning 
and teaching environment at all levels’. Without the Ministry of Finance’s approval, based 
on a shared understanding of what the education priorities are and what quality education 
means, the Ministry of Education would have faced difficulties in promoting a 
reorientation of its budget. 
 
It remains difficult to assess the influence of donors’ performance-based management 
instruments (GBS and sector PAFs) on intra-government budget negotiations. One might 
nevertheless argue that this management by numbers has played at least a mediated role on 
budget allocation. It has certainly influenced the process of internalisation of the quality 
agenda within the government, and specifically within the Ministry of Finance. To 
disentangle and weight the relative influence of internal and external factors in this process 
proves a challenging task. Given its magnitude, the Ministry of Finance could not remain 
impermeable to the domestic public uproar caused by the learning crisis. At the same time, 
its intimate relation with donors made it a primary locus for the diffusion of donors’ 
learning preoccupations; negotiations geared towards the insertion of ‘quality’ indicators 
within the GBS PAF, ‘a very powerful instrument’ according to a senior official in the Ministry 
of Finance (interview 37), have certainly played a part in the reconfiguration of the 
Ministry’s budget priorities.  
                                                 
231 Tilley (2009) already insisted on the dominance of the Ministry of Finance in the budget preparation. 
232 Speech by the Minister for Finance Introducing to the National Assembly, the Estimates of Government Revenue and Expenditure for the 
Fiscal Year 2012/2013; p.47. 
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Nevertheless, if budget decision-makers, under the Ministry of Finance’s leadership, have 
translated the strategic secondary/quality shift in material terms, these budgetary alterations 
occurred at the margins of the budget. In addition, domestic elites’ overarching budget 
preference for higher education consolidated throughout the research period. They 
rearticulated their budget priorities in favour of secondary education at the expenses of 
primary education: after a relatively steady growth in the primary education budgetary 
envelope between FY 2003/04 and FY 2009/10, this sub-sector recorded a sharp decline 
of approximately 20 per cent over the last two fiscal years covered by this research (in 
constant terms, see Figure 5.12). 
 
 
Elites’ preferences as highlighted above have given rise to frictions between various elite 
groups. First of all, these budget patterns have been the result of conflicts between the 
government and members of Parliament. During the preparation of the FY 2011/12 
budget, the Ministry of Education tried to contain the inflationary trend of the student 
loans scheme: the Parliamentary Committee for Social Welfare rejected its attempt. The 
Ministry of Education was forced to top up the student loans envelope amount projected 
in its initial budget estimates.233 
 
This battle over the budget for student loans provides a new example (see Chapter 4) of 
diverging interests, within the state, between politicians and technocrats. For 
representatives of the Ministry of Education, the inflationary envelope for student loans 
puts at stake the very survival of the ministry. Indeed, for FY 2012-13, the MoEVT’s 
remaining financial envelope after deduction of the student loans was only 16 per cent of 
the total Ministry budget. The success of the Social Welfare Committee in imposing its 
budgetary preference on the Ministry of Education exemplifies Parliament’s rising power 
within the political-administrative landscape since the 2010 general  elections, away from its 
traditional function of ‘rubber stamping’ government decisions pointed out in earlier 
studies (Mmari et al. 2005).  
 
                                                 
233 Report of the Parliamentary Social Affairs Committee, FY 2011/12 budget discussions (URT 2011f: 3-4). 
3.5 The secondary education budget as a site of intra-ruling class conflicts 
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These frictions between the MoEVT and Members of Parliament also help reveal a major 
reason behind elite budget preferences for student loans. Indeed, the Report of the Social 
Welfare Committee implicitly highlighted one key driver of MPs’ budgetary choices. Under 
the sub-title ‘Peace and Harmony in Colleges Country-wide’ MPs expressed their deep concerns 
over universities nurturing the political contestation of their power: ‘Honourable Speaker, the 
committee is not happy with the situation prevailing in some of the Higher Learning Institutions. The 
government should conduct a research to find the sources of riots and conflicts in government higher learning 
institutions…there is a feeling that conflict and riots of government Higher Learning Institutions are caused 
by political fanatics and the convincing powers of political party leaders.’234 MPs see higher education 
institutions as sites of potential destabilisation of the social and political order.235 
 
The intra-sector budget allocation in education also constitutes a site of frictions between 
the CCM and the government. The ruling party apparatus appeared more sensitive than the 
government to the popular discontent caused by the massive failure in Form Four 
examinations. According to the party line, secondary education should become the 
education budget’s overarching priority as a way to lessen the political risk fuelled by the 
popular outcry. ‘Parents and the opposition are crying about secondary education, the failures and bad 
results; they’re not crying on primary or higher education. They complain on mass failure of secondary 
schools. As a government it’s a big challenge. The government depends on the support of the people. We 
should respond to people’s demand. It’s the number one priority for us’ (senior official, CCM Secretary, 
interview 85). But at the same time, the party’s involvement in the budget formulation 
process takes a highly mediated form. ‘We’re advising and negotiating to see how the ministry can try 
to capitalise its budget. We think that the ministry should give first priority to secondary education and 
we’re moving. But the budget is the government thing. The minister is appointed by the president, all 
ministers are appointed by the President and are from CCM: there’s direct engagement of the party through 
the ministers and deputy-ministers. Directors are also President’s appointees’ (ibid). The budget 
remains the technocrats’ property and the party’s ability to shape patterns of budget 
allocations appears largely circumscribed. However, this self-account of CCM’s position as 
                                                 
234 URT (2011f: 7-8). 
235 Besides this social order dimension, other factors may explain elites’ protection of the higher education budgetary 
envelope: to secure access to a very scarce resource for a segment of the elite who cannot afford the cost of Western 
universities - the emerging ‘middle class’ whose conditions of reproduction are not yet consolidated; the fragmentation of 
the elite which prevents a consensus around an alternative funding policy option; an efficient lobbying of ‘edu-
entrepreneurs’ who have set up lucrative private universities; the converging ideological adherence to the ‘financialisation’ 
of higher education among donors (the World Bank) and segments of the elite. The political economy of the Students’ 
Loans Board is, as yet, unresearched. For an analysis of the marketization of higher education in sub-Saharan Africa see 
Mamdani (2007). 
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regards government’s education budget choices reveals a dynamic power sharing between 
the government and the party, already pointed out in Chapter 4 (Section 1.3). The party 
acknowledges the government’s pre-eminence in conducting public affairs and the budget 
process. Yet, it can also choose to reassert its primacy in certain circumstances when it 
considers that government choices jeopardise the national political stability, and ultimately 
the survival of the party.  
 
A last example illustrates the power dynamics among domestic elites and testifies to the 
ambiguity of their commitment to quality and post-primary education. One main source of 
finance for vocational training comes from the Skills Development Levy, a 6 per cent tax 
on payroll; 2 per cent of which goes directly to the Vocational Education and Training 
Authority (VETA).236 The remaining 4 per cent levy has been subject to competing claims: 
from Members of Parliament to increase the funding of vocational training; from the 
Ministry of Finance to increase the resources of the Students’ Loans Board; and from the 
Tanzanian Education Authority to augment its current subsidy, largely below the legal 
requirement.237 In FY 2012/13, the Ministry of Finance decided to officially allocate the 4 
per cent to the Students’ Loans Board. However, employers have also long complained 
about the levy itself, considering it as a burden that inhibits Tanzania’s economic 
competitiveness in regional and global markets. In 2013, the Association of Tanzania 
Employers drafted a Position Paper in which they ‘urged the government to reduce the Skills 
and Development Levy’.238 Their lobbying was successful: in FY 2013/14, the Ministry of 
Finance decided to decrease the levy from 6 to 5 per cent.239 In the same budget, the 
Ministry of Finance introduced a new 14.5 per cent excise duty on all mobile phone 
services (previously applicable to airtime only), 2.5 per cent of which was to be used to 
finance education. Tanzania has recorded a high penetration rate of mobile phones and an 
exponential growth in mobile banking and payments.240 In such a context, the simultaneous 
                                                 
236 VETA is a parastatal under the MoEVT’s authority. The levy was introduced through the Vocational Education and 
Training Act (1994) (http://www.mof.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&id=42&Itemid=57).  
237 TEA was set up in 2001 to manage the Education Fund, a parallel funding mechanism, mainly subsidised by the 
government through the MoEVT budgetary vote. According to the law, the government’s subsidy to TEA should not 
exceed 2 per cent of the government budget after deduction of debts. Since its inception, TEA has received between 0.1 
and 0.5 per cent of this budget (interview with Mrs Lulabuka – TEA Director General).   
238 ‘Abolish skills development levy, employers urge govt’, The Citizen, 11/04/2013. 
239 Speech by the Minister for Finance Introducing to the National Assembly the Estimates of Government Revenue and Expenditure for 
Fiscal Year 2013/2014, p.51. 
240 Depending on the source, the penetration rate in 2011 varied between 47 per cent and 60 per cent. See for instance, 
http://www.tanzaniainvest.com/telecoms/interviews/771-interview-with-prof-nkoma-director-general-of-the-tanzania-
communications-regulatory-authority. 
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changes in the tax regime in relation to the financing of education represent a shift of 
burden from a small segment of the ruling class – the business elite in the formal sector241 – 
to the mass of the population. This budget decision, which deepens the regressive nature of 
public education finances, also confirmed the analysis by Mmari et al. (2005: 29) that 
singled out business associations as ‘the non-state actor with the most influence on the 
budget process’.  
 
4. Donors’ ‘value for money’ quest in education: contesting Tanzania’s 
sovereignty 
 
So far in this chapter, donors’ and domestic elites’ education budget preferences have 
mainly been examined separately. This analytical separation in part had a heuristic function. 
It also aimed to shed light on the autonomy of internal dynamics. This last section 
considers the budget as a site of interactions and conflicts between the two groups. In the 
budget support era, the budget arena has indeed become a ‘transnational domain’ (Harrison 
2010, Gould 2005a). According to Harrison (2004: 77), within the new aid paradigm (what 
he called the ‘post-conditionality regime’), ‘it becomes far less insightful to make 
distinctions between external and internal interests’.  
 
This section is situated in line with the literature that has studied the nature of national 
sovereignty in the context of the new aid paradigm and its claims to promote ‘national 
ownership’ (Swedlun 2013, Hickey 2013, Dijkstra 2013, de Renzio and Hanlon 2007). 
Following Whitfield (2009), it questions the extent to which, within the new aid paradigm, 
Tanzania’s government can exert its sovereign control over its development policy. This 
section focuses on two specific sites of the secondary education budget – the teachers’ 
wage bill and the capitation grant - in the context of the converging concern of donors and 
the government on secondary education quality; its conclusions over donors-government 
power configurations are more nuanced than existing studies (Swedlun 2013, Whitfield and 
Fraser 2008), which tend to overestimate Tanzanian authorities’ subservience to donors’ 
demands.  
 
                                                 
241 In reality, it is difficult to locate the actual incidence of the skills levy: on employers (lower profits), workers (lower 
wages) or customers (higher prices). 
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As in the case of the SEDP I, the question of resources for schools - the Tsh 25,000 
capitation grant – was at the centre of the Bank’s SEDP II design. A major dimension of 
the programme’s protracted negotiations dealt with the government’s financial 
commitment to it (World Bank 2010a: 15). A disbursement condition was included to 
ensure that the government would fulfil its share of the agreement and budget adequate 
funding to cover the Tsh 25,000 per student (World Bank 2010d: 14). 
 
During implementation, in FY 2010/11, ‘the capitation grant’ turned into a major site of 
contention between the World Bank and the government. As a World Bank economist 
explained, ‘we have the same issues [as under the SEDP I] of adequate resources per students at the core 
of some of the agreements, and also they are at the core of the tensions that are emerging’ (interview 57). 
Yet, during the 2011 Education Sector Review, the World Bank’s education adviser 
outspokenly told the audience: ‘the secondary capitation grant is a success story; the Tsh 25,000 per 
student has been reached’. Indeed, the analysis of Treasury releases to Lushoto District for FY 
2010/11 confirmed that the level of capitation grant sent to districts (for further transfer to 
schools) was approximately Tsh 25,000 per student.242 But this success was only achieved 
after extreme tensions between the government and the World Bank.  
 
As in the case of SEDP I, the government did not include an envelope sufficient to reach 
the agreed level for the secondary capitation grant in its FY 2010/11 budget. An official in 
the Ministry of Finance explained: ‘with the issue of counterpart funding, there was a very hot debate 
that the World Bank might consider stopping the programme due to the shortfall in the performance of the 
project’ (interview 36). In order to force the government to endow the capitation grant with 
its appropriate budget share, the World Bank manoeuvred to insert the issue within the 
GBS framework. At their initiative, a ‘temporary process action’ (TPA)243 was included in 
the GBS PAF that requested the ‘delivery of annual capitation grants of Tshs 25,000 per 
                                                 
242  Author’s own calculation based on Treasury releases to LGAs in FY 2010/11 (accessible at 
http://www.mof.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=608%3Amg&catid=55%3Aother-
chargesoc&Itemid=224). 
243 Key policy actions, temporary measures, identified at sector level as fundamental obstacles to sector improvements 
and that cannot be solved through ‘sector dialogue’ and needs for instance the active involvement of the Ministry of 
Finance. 
4.1 The capitation grant saga: the quality secondary education episode 
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student to all government secondary schools to facilitate purchase of textbooks and other 
learning materials by June 2011’.244  
 
This event illustrates the World Bank’s specific position within the education aid arena. 
Rivalries between the World Bank and other donors in education had already been 
mentioned in 2002/03 by Weeks et al. (2002). During early discussions over possible 
external support to the government’s secondary education plan (in the years 2002-2004), 
the World Bank’s modus operandi and non-cooperative behaviour contributed to 
discouraging prospective agencies from engaging in the sub-sector.245 Between 2004 and 
2007, the World Bank and its Country Director played an influential role in driving donor 
efforts towards better coordination, harmonisation and alignment. However, within the 
Bank itself, sector staff’s incentives have remained primarily shaped by organisational rules 
and accountability lines set in Washington. Their position has been very ambivalent 
regarding the joint sector dialogue structures. Key members of the education development 
partners group complained about the World Bank’s operational mode, perceived as free-
rider behaviour and disregard for local dynamics: ‘The World Bank continues to act the same, to 
do its parallel things on its own. Nothing to do with persons but it’s structural. But it’s very irritating and 
frustrating’ (interview 48). For instance, contrary to the alignment principle, the World 
Bank’s SEDP II was endorsed by its Board before the government’s own document was 
even finalised. A member of the World Bank staff acknowledged their ambiguous 
commitment to the dialogue structures that they circumvented on efficiency grounds: ‘we 
tend to allow the usual process to unfold. But there are times when we consciously bypass the process… 
There was no other way of doing it but to bypass the process. Mainly because it is so process-oriented…And 
it is just too cumbersome’ (interview 50).  
 
However, in the case of the secondary education capitation grant, informed by their 
setbacks under the SEDP I, the World Bank education staff felt that their power, within a 
project, would be insufficient to override the government’s entrenched budget preferences. 
They decided to resort to the alleged leverage power of GBS to fulfil their programme 
requirements; that meant, however, that they had to follow the rules of the GBS game and 
engage in negotiations in multiple sites. The World Bank’s education aid managers had to 
                                                 
244 Source: 2011 GBS PAF that can be downloaded on the DPG web site (http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/index.php?id=991, 
last accessed 243/04/2014). 
245 Interview 67 with a local NGO representative. 
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build a strategic alliance with other influential education donors (CIDA and DFID) and 
convince them to endorse the initiative. These two donors, as Lead and Deputy-Lead of 
education donors, represented the group in macro level discussions over the GBS PAF 
revision. ‘We pushed for it. No, it was, it was very, it was a very…in a way, [a] very participatory 
process, actually. The development partners chose it… but the Bank was the biggest proponent of including 
that because it would help us if the government met the capitation grant requirements for this year. Then 
they would have met also the Bank requirement’ (interview 58). This stuttering statement by a 
World Bank staff member shows how the World Bank’s internal interest had to be 
reframed into a collective endeavour to make its way into the GBS arena. Initially, the 
Ministry of Finance was very hesitant. Even within aid agencies, the proposal met with 
deep reserve especially among economists involved in GBS management, including the 
World Bank’s chief economist.246 The inclusion of the ‘capitation grant’ within the GBS 
PAF was actually the outcome of a successful alliance between education aid managers and 
the PMO-RALG.  
 
The frictions were finally resolved through programme management tricks and the 
distortion of the World Bank’s own commitment. To achieve the Tsh 25,000, the World 
Bank had to top up its initial commitment by roughly Tsh 12 billion. These funds were 
initially meant to finance activities budgeted for FY 2010/11 but not yet implemented and 
carried forward to the next financial year. The sustainability of the scheme in following 
years remains highly questionable.247 Besides, this secondary capitation grant ‘success story’ 
had been realised at the expenses of primary education: in FY 2010/11, Tsh 80 billion was 
budgeted for the primary education capitation grant but only Tsh 23 billion released.248 For 
this very reason, an education aid manager, whose individual agency was critical in ensuring 
the inclusion of the capitation grant in the GBS PAF, questioned a posteriori the rationale 
of the whole endeavour: ‘In retrospect, I see it as a mistake. First of all, because it was already in the 
World Bank’s agreement so it was likely to happen anyway. But secondly, because it then skewed the use of 
resources in the sector … the budget for primary capitation was only released at 29 per cent which was the 
lowest for years’ (interview 62).  
                                                 
246 An economist from another major agency, a prominent GBS provider, noted: ‘it was a big mistake. I think it’s bad because 
it’s a budget…I think it’s bad to push sector budget allocations because if you do that for every sector, you end up in the total which is above 
100 per cent.  And I think it’s simply, it’s completely the wrong thing to do’ (interview 56). 
247 A senior official in the Ministry of Finance noted: ‘if now we don’t continue getting the loan for financing that Ths 25,000, it will 
go down, you see?  This is the game of the day…when the funding is not there, it will go down’ (interview 31). 
248 Interview 23, official, PMO-RALG. 
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Donors’ fixation on the ‘capitation grant’ is not a novelty in the Tanzanian education aid 
arena. Since the inception of the primary capitation grant with the PEDP in 2001, this has 
constituted one of the key structuring features of the sector dialogue. The two PETS 
conducted in 2002 (under the World Bank’s leadership) and 2008 (under first the EC and 
then DFID leadership), two politically loaded processes, demonstrate donors’ enduring 
concern about resources allocated to schools.249 However, the last episode in the capitation 
grant saga marked a displacement or reformulation of the capitation grant narrative. In the 
first phase, the ‘capitation grant’ problem was mostly framed in terms of transparency of 
flow of funds (the issue of ‘leakages’), in full consistency with the good governance/public 
finance management agenda, and in terms of equity of resource distribution between 
districts. Only primary education was under donor scrutiny. With the SEDP II, ‘quality 
secondary education’ (‘textbooks and other learning materials’) became the dominant 
narrative, albeit embroiled with the ‘corruption’ and ‘equity’ themes. Previous 
preoccupations have not been erased; the capitation grant saga is formed of concatenated 
layers of meanings that reflect the trajectory and dynamic nature of the global (education) 
aid agenda.  
 
This episode also illustrates that, within the aid arena, confrontational lines straddle the 
boundaries of government and aid agencies: in this instance, a coalition formed between a 
segment of the government – the education administration – and education aid managers 
whose converging interests – more funding for quality secondary education – prevailed, at 
least temporarily, over the opposing coalition formed by the Ministry of Finance and aid 
agencies’ economists. These events perfectly illuminate Harrison’s view of sovereignty in 
the ‘post-conditionality regime’, a ‘frontier (…) formed by the interaction of forces therein, 
rather than by the delimitation between one space and another’ (Harrison 2004: 25-26). 
 
Finally, donors deployed power mechanisms to force the Ministry of Finance to formally 
fulfil their conditionality on funding for ward secondary schools but contributed to 
undermining their own broader education goal: quality basic education for all. In this 
                                                 
249 The first PETS, in 2002, led to controversial findings and recommendations. The study was never endorsed by the 
government (Sundet 2007). During the Education Sector Review High Level Meeting in 2007, ‘conducting a PETS’ was 
one of the four demands that Heads of aid agencies directly addressed to the Prime Minister. It was also a non-negotiable 
condition for the disbursement of the FY 2007/08 tranche of the EU sector budget programme. This second PETS 
covered also secondary education, but only because of government’s firm insistence. 
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episode, as under the SEDP I, the government achieved what Plank (1993: 418), in the case 
of Mozambique, termed a ‘complex and perilous balancing act’, safeguarding the continued 
flow of aid while simultaneously securing its own overarching budget priorities.  
 
 
 
Most government officials interviewed considered teachers’ low morale a key obstacle to 
achieving quality education and teachers’ salaries a core ingredient of their motivation. The 
learning crisis has led to new recruitment of teachers, with a marked increase in secondary 
level teaching staff between 2010 and 2012 (Table 5.10).  
 
Table 5-10: Number of teaching staff, basic education, 2008-2012 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Growth 
rate over 
the period 
( per cent) 
Primary Education 154,895 157,185 165,856 175,449 180,987 16.8 
Secondary Education 32,835 33,954 40,517 52,146 65,086 98.2 
Teachers' Colleges 1,060 1,678 1,745 1,833 2,044 92.8 
Source: URT (2012b: 108) 
 
This recruitment had a direct impact on the official qualified teacher-pupil ratio, which has 
improved in the most recent years, notably at secondary level. 
 
Table 5-11: Qualified Teacher-Pupil Ratio for Basic Education (2008-2012) 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Primary Education 1:64 1:60 1:54 1:49 1:47 
Secondary Education 1:37 1:43 1:40 1:34 1:29 
Teachers' Colleges 1:21 1:22 1:22 1:23 1:22 
Source: URT (2012b: 108) 
 
At secondary level, the changes in staffing levels drove a 27 per cent increase in the 
teaching wage bill (basic salaries) between FY 2008/09 and FY 2011/12 (in constant 
prices).  
 
4.2 The contentious politics of the teacher wage bill  
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Table 5-12: Teachers’ wage bill (basic salary) in primary and secondary education 
(constant prices) 
 
  FY2008/09 FY2010/11 FY2011/12 
Secondary teachers 126,560,465,191 112,611,789,467 160,869,491,654 
Primary Teachers N.A. 409,016,505,576 480,210,344,030 
Total teachers' wage bill N.A. 521,628,295,043 641,079,835,684 
Share of secondary 
teachers ( per cent) N.A. 21.6 25.1 
Source: the author (see Annex C). FY2008/09: actual expenditures; FY 2010/11: approved estimates; FY 
2011/12: estimates 
 
Also, in 2011-2012, when threatened with a teachers’ strike, the government decided to 
settle a long standing dispute with the Tanzania Teachers’ Union (TTU) over teachers’ 
salary and non-salary arrears: in FY 2011/12, a Tsh 44 billion sum was paid to primary and 
secondary school teachers.  
 
Despite these positive trends, teachers at the beginning of their career earn about half as 
much as health workers (Tsh 249,600 for teachers, Tsh 477,200 for health workers), 
although differences are less pronounced at the end of careers.250 Industrial action has 
regularly met with coercive responses from the government.251 In 2010, following  a strike 
notice by TTU, President Kikwete delivered a menacing speech to teachers while high-
ranking representatives of the army and the police stood ostentatiously behind him. 
Similarly, in 2012, in the context of salary negotiations, the government responded to a 
teachers’ strike with intimidation, sending a ‘strong warning to teachers’; the action, 
overwhelmingly supported by the teaching force, was challenged in Court and declared 
illegal.252  
 
These domestic politics of the teachers’ wage bill cannot be envisaged outside donors’ 
ambiguous positions about Tanzania’s civil service wage bill. In the budget support era, just 
as during the structural adjustment period, the Tanzanian government’s policy choices are 
being fundamentally constrained by the need to comply with the IMF’s fiscal 
                                                 
250 Source: Civil servants’ salary scales for 2010-2012. Salary scales are renegotiated every two to three years between civil 
servants’ trade unions and the government.  
251 Since the birth of the TTU in the 1990s, the ruling power has deployed traditional containment techniques to inhibit 
its potential destabilising power: undermining their leaders’ credibility; intimidating teachers or capturing their leaders 
within the system (invitation to workshops with allowances or nomination of their President – Margaret Sitta – as 
Minister of Education in 2005). 
252 For an account of the strike see for instance: ‘Tanzania: Teachers’ Strike De-stabilizes the Nation’ 01/08/2012 
(http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/08/01/tanzania-teachers-strike-de-stabilizes-the-nation/ accessed 25/09/2013).  
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prescriptions.253 For instance, in May 2011 the IMF’s Board of Directors ‘encouraged the 
authorities to press ahead with essential fiscal consolidation and structural reforms to 
sustain pro-poor growth and employment over the medium term’. 254  Their specific 
recommendation on the wage bill sounded more like asking the government to square the 
circle: ‘the growth in the wage bill must be stabilized while providing space for recruitments 
in social sectors’ (IMF 2011: 16).  
 
The contradiction in donor expectations was highlighted both by informants in the 
Ministry of Finance and by donors’ aid managers. An economist in a major aid agency 
forcefully stressed the inconsistency of donors’ demands:  
The government tells us “You have been pushing me for two years so that I hire more teachers, where I 
find the money to pay for them?” You see, this is crazy. This is crazy. It’s schizophrenia. (…) We 
cannot say we want them to do more development. You cannot push them like you have to teach 
better … better quality teachers means better pay. More teachers means more pay. So you have to 
increase the rate payment (…) We want them to do more teachers and more health care but then if they 
increase the budget and they increase the recurrent and they take non-concessional loan, you will go like 
no, you cannot do this.’ (Interview 55)  
 
While imposing tight fiscal discipline, donors have framed the question of the relation 
between the teachers’ wage bill and quality education in terms of incentives to teachers in 
‘hard to reach’ or ‘underserved’ areas. Despite a formal procedure to allocate teachers 
based on need, Tanzania’s education system is characterised by a highly uneven 
geographical distribution of teachers.255 This diagnostic has been shared by both parties. 
Yet donors’ policy prescription to address this key obstacle to quality education has 
constituted a long lasting site of frictions between the government and donors, specifically 
the World Bank. The issue of ‘teacher deployment and utilization’ was a key feature of the 
World Bank’s SEDP I, subject to disbursement conditionalities (World Bank 2004: 18-19). 
With its SEDP II the World Bank has decided to finance (i) a one-off settling-in allowance 
                                                 
253 This over-dependence on IMF conditionalities was already mentioned for Tanzania in Weeks et al. (2002: 147).  In her 
general assessment of the new aid paradigm, Dijkstra (2013: 14) also underlined ‘the fact that the IMF is still the primary 
entrance condition (which) maintains the pivotal role of this institution in determining economic policies’.  
254  IMF Executive Board Concludes 2011 Article IV Consultation with the United Republic of Tanzania, Public 
Information Notice (PIN) No. 11/53, May 9, 2011 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2011/pn1153.htm 
accessed 14/10/2013). 
255 At primary and secondary levels, ‘60 percent of teachers [are] allocated according to criteria other than the level of 
enrolment’ (UNESCO 2012a: 46). 
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for teachers taking up posts in hard to reach schools; and (ii) the provision of teacher 
housing in hard to reach schools (World Bank 2010a: 51). 256 RCT-based evaluations were 
planned to test the impact of financial incentives to teachers in ‘hard-to-reach’ areas (and of 
capitation grants).  
 
The government put on a united front against the World Bank’s demands, which it 
considers potentially highly disruptive. For the government - i.e., the Ministry of Education, 
the Ministry of Finance and the PMO-RALG - the issue of teachers’ incentives cannot be 
dealt with at sector level: it needs to be addressed within the broader civil service 
framework under the responsibility of the President Office’s Public Service Management. 
The World Bank’s RCT-research programme also had to be redesigned and its ambition 
down-sized. Government officials, while willing to submit their education policies to 
evaluations, disagreed with one core feature of RCTs: the use of ‘control groups’ that 
would contradict the principle of equal treatment guaranteed by the state.257 
 
The government’s cautious treatment of the incentives issue entangles macro-economic 
preoccupations – the fear of a contagion spreading to the rest of the civil service thus 
leading to an explosive wage bill, egalitarian considerations and concerns over social order. 
A senior official in the Ministry of Finance pointed to the extreme political sensibility of 
the question: ‘It’s a macro issue. If you miscalculate you can bring a big disaster on the wage bill. To 
define ‘hard to serve’ areas is challenging. It has been brought to cabinet for discussion. PO-PSM is 
working on the definition and the strategy whereby what types of incentives and to whom but the World 
Bank is pushing very hard’ (interview 37). In this instance, donors’ prescriptions collided with 
the government’s overriding priority: to guarantee the conditions of social peace under 
tight macro-economic constraints. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
256 Ironically enough in the 1990s, under the Civil Service Reform Programme, the World Bank pushed for the integration 
of occupation-specific allowances into the basic salary to simplify the civil service pay structure. 
257 Ultimately, after months of negotiations, the World Bank was allowed to conduct an impact evaluation to test the 
effects of communication/transparency measures tied to the disbursement of the capitation grant. 
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For Tanzanian authorities, budget making constitutes a critical site of exercise of national 
sovereign power. The centrality of budgetary concerns in donors’ interventions during the 
budget support era has met procrastinating and obstructive strategies by the government, 
both at macro and sector levels. At the macro level, the Public Expenditure Review process, 
the official forum for donors-government dialogue over budget issues, collapsed. A World 
Bank economist explained the historical trajectory: ‘There was a period in 1998 to 2003, which 
was basically the golden years of the PER process in Tanzania. Then, 2004, 2005, 2006 …it became 
very process-oriented and very empty of content. And then from 2007 to today [October 2011], it basically 
stopped working in any significant way […] So, there was no real forum where to discuss these things 
[education budgetary trade-offs]’. 258  In the education sector, donors’ repeated requests to 
revitalise the joint technical working group dedicated to budget issues (RACEF, Resource 
Allocation Cost Efficiency Financing) faced the education administration’s lack of diligence. 
An aid manager explained: ‘RACEF was defunct at your time [2006-2008]. It has been reactivated; 
it’s in place but not very active content wise. What we need it’s a Public Expenditure Review in the 
education sector every year’ (interview 48).  
 
The government has continuously managed to confine donors outside – or at the fringes of 
- the budget process that remained a highly opaque domain for most economists and 
education aid managers. An education aid manager, heavily involved in sector discussions 
over budget dynamics, noted: ‘It’s still, for me, difficult to understand the budget process and the 
relationship with the Ministry of Finance’ (interview 62). And a World Bank economist, involved 
in the PER process, acknowledged a similar ignorance: ‘we’ve never really understood how it [the 
prioritisation process during execution] works in the practical day to day routine way’.  
 
In contrast to donors’ tendency to envisage the budget as a technocratic instrument, the 
government’s repeated rejections of donors’ recurrent claims for a direct role in the budget 
design constituted a powerful reaffirmation of the political significance of the budget. 
                                                 
258 Yet, the World Bank’s official view diverges from this account: ‘The PER is partly achieving its intended objectives in 
that it plays a critical role in enhancing efficiency and accountability in the use of budgetary resources. The PER has 
instilled transparency in the budget process and is acting as an arm’s length watchdog for any malpractice by spending 
units.’ (World Bank 2011: 77). 
4.3 The ‘budget impasse’ and the reassertion of donors’ control over aid 
relations 
188 
 
Commenting on donors’ insistence on receiving draft budget guidelines with the view to 
influencing budget allocations, a senior official in the Ministry of Finance clearly expressed 
the government rationale:  
DPs sometimes don’t understand. We do have meetings with them, we’re discussing budget when we 
have the Joint GBS review. Their comments are taken on board, including in Budget Guidelines. 
DPs’ role in any country is to support; they can advise but the government can reject their 
recommendations. The decision-making power is within the government. DPs want to be part of the 
decision-making. It’s not possible. People don’t understand where they stand. They can’t decide for us, 
Tanzania is a sovereign state. (Interview 37) 
 
With budget support, Tanzanian education donors have certainly won a ‘seat at the policy 
dialogue table’, as argued by Swedlun (2013), but they have remained in the anteroom of 
budget discussions. Faced with this ‘budget impasse’, donors are tempted to revert to a 
greater control over aid relations. 
 
The World Bank’s mode of intervention for the SEDP II – an Adaptable Programme Loan 
(APL) that mixes policy conditionalities and project management mode - was chosen to 
allow the agency to regain control over aid relations and education finances. According to 
their Independent Evaluation Group, the SEDP I aid modality – a development policy 
loan, the Bank’s version of budget support – was a key factor in the Bank’s inability to 
influence the pace of expansion and the scope of the government’s fiscal effort to support 
it (World Bank 2010b: 32). A World Bank economist deciphered the shifting vision that 
contributed to shaping the SEDP II: ‘[Under the SEDP I] it was budget support (…) you have 
much less control (…) we thought the government couldn’t do anything wrong and anything they agreed 
would actually happen (…) we have basically decided not to do any budget support in education anymore 
and the next project is an investment project on which you have much more control on them’ (interview 
57). The SEDP II can be interpreted as a project to restore technocrats’ control over 
education policies and finances, to again subject the education system to a sound 
technocratic rationality, as the only path towards quality education. The SEDP II illustrates 
the contradictions of donors’ rhetorical commitment to ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’; 
these concepts disintegrated in the face of a government that decided to implement its 
own(ed) policy that contradicted the World Bank’s desired option. The Tanzania 
government was challenging the tacit rules of the ‘mutual complicity’ (Mosse 2005) or 
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‘ventriloquism‘ (Van de Walle 2005) game; more coercive aid modalities had to be 
reinstated. As argued in Fraser and Whitfield (2008: 4), donors’ commitment to ‘ownership’ 
does not necessarily imply ‘any commitment to increasing the ability of African polities to 
pursue policies of their own design’: the willingness of donors to ‘increase recipient control 
over the aid process is often conditional upon the prior demonstration of political 
commitment to donor preferences’.  
 
This trend – the tightening of donors’ grip over aid relations – has not been confined to 
the World Bank. DFID’s 2012 shift from an exclusive reliance on GBS to support 
education to diversified modes of intervention - sector budget support and projects259 - 
reflects a general trend towards a reassertion of aid agencies’ control. The rationale of this 
step backward to a pre-Paris Declaration epoch is being questioned by education aid 
managers from other aid agencies and government officials in education and finance 
ministries. The capitation grant saga has also shed light on the limitations of this restoration 
of control. Project approach, general budget support, the interplay between the two, all 
consistently failed to persuade domestic elites to rearrange their order of budgetary 
precedence in favour of quality basic education for all.  
 
In the face of the budget support stalemates, donors have also been engineering a new 
approach to aid and school funding. This evolution, intending to translate in Tanzania the 
human capital/new institutional agenda described in Chapter 2, is exemplified by the 
World Bank’s SEDP II. This programme should indeed be understood as the first phase in 
a ten year plan geared toward performance-based school financing.260 Two objectives for 
the World Bank’s SEDP II second phase (2013-2017) – the design and implementation of 
a student achievement measurement instrument and the improvement of administrative 
and pedagogical practices through incentives (World Bank 2010a: 10, table 1) - cannot be 
read in isolation from the Bank’s general insistence on tying teachers’ salaries to students’ 
learning achievements.261 The first phase of the SEDP II only constitutes a preparatory 
period aimed at creating the appropriate conditions to allow competition for resources to 
                                                 
259  Sector budget support: Education Development Grant - £30million (2012 – 2015); project: Education Quality 
Improvement Programme in Tanzania – (2012/2017). 
260 ‘The World Bank will provide financial support to SEDP through an overlapping three phase 10-year APL’ (World 
Bank 2010a: 8). 
261 World Bank (2010c).  
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thrive among public schools. A World Bank staff member unambiguously made explicit the 
World Bank’s long-term strategic objective: 
[The] World Bank is more interested in learning achievements than in infrastructures or inputs. But we 
can’t start to focus on performance-based school financing if schools don’t have the resources. We need 
first to make sure that the gap is narrowed between the most endowed and less resourced before they can 
compete (…) I’ve great hope in this scheme [performance-based school funding]. If one wants to go back 
into the history of the thinking, we have to trace it back to the 2004 World Development Report on 
public service delivery and accounting: to provide reward for performance service delivery…The challenge 
in Tanzania is first to level up the playing field a bit before implementing it. (Interview 58) 
 
The World Bank is not alone in its push towards performance-based school funding in 
Tanzania. The UK’s Independent Commission for Aid Impact encouraged DFID to work 
‘with ministries of education to introduce a results focus into national funding for districts 
and schools’.262 In 2013-2014, the NGO Twaweza, supported by the World Bank, SIDA 
and DFID, piloted a scheme to financially reward public schools and teachers 
performances as measured by the Uwezo tests.263After a visit to Tanzania in 2012, Nancy 
Birdsall, Director of the influential Global Development Centre, recommended that the 
Tanzanian government and donors develop a ‘secondary school learning Aid Program’ that 
would tie aid payments for secondary schools to students’ examination results (Birdsall et al. 
2012). 
 
Importing outcome based school funding to Tanzania will not be a frictionless process. For 
instance, the Ministry of Finance does not consider cash-on-delivery a wise move.264 The 
World Bank also acknowledged that its intention to promote school-based funding is being 
resisted by the government. A World Bank staff member explained: ‘They [the government] 
were very resistant to it [performance-based school financing]. They don’t buy in. But I think if we 
gradually promote it and introduce it they’ll finish to buy in. We might also take their senior people in 
countries where such scheme works to convince them but it will be in Asia’ (interview 58). Apart from 
the World Bank, donors are not unconditionally backing the approach. If SIDA and DFID 
appear enthusiastic supporters, others have expressed more skepticism. Today, the 
outcome of these attempts remains undetermined. However, if this trend takes shape it 
                                                 
262 ICAI (2012: 1). 
263 For a critical analysis see Languille (forthcoming). 
264 Senior official, Ministry of Finance (interview 37). 
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would allow the transnational elite to completely evade the structural question of the fiscal 
space for quality basic education for all. Within such a framework indeed, the onus is being 
shifted from the state and international agencies to individuals (schools or teachers); quality 
education is no longer a matter of resources; it is posited as an individual responsibility that 
can be achieved through the reordering of individual teacher behaviour or school 
management structures.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has untangled internal and external political economy factors that, beneath the 
technicalities of the budget, have moulded a negligible budget for ward secondary schools. 
Trapped within a global education agenda geared towards universal primary education, 
donors did not share the government’s sense of urgency in the face of primary education 
enrolment success. They largely abandoned their own creation and did not mobilise 
substantial resources to accompany the secondary education expansion. Their recent 
funding response to the learning crisis fell short of the enormous fiscal challenge. The 
enduring ‘value for money’ perspective prevailed over considerations about the expansion 
of the fiscal space for quality secondary education for all: ‘more quality expenditure rather 
than more funding’ could sum up their fiscal treatment of the learning crisis. 
 
Domestic elites’ egalitarian claims to legitimate ward secondary schools did not provoke 
any substantial realignment of their budget preferences. The budget for quality secondary 
education appears to be a casualty of a conflict-ridden process geared towards the 
reconciliation of various over-determining forces: elite attempts to explore a counter-
hegemonic developmental model while responding to pressing international fiscal 
prescriptions; the need to create the conditions of the socio-political order or their inability 
to find an alternative model to finance higher education. Specifically, the political order 
imperative was exposed as an important parameter in budget decisions over student loans, 
teachers’ wage bill and the resources to be transferred to schools. The politics of education 
budgeting confirm the prevailing understanding among elites of education as a device for 
youth management. But they appear to assess differently the political risk embodied by 
various segments of the youth. The ward secondary schools policy to contain the poor 
youth in rural areas has received very little support from the national budget; on the other 
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hand, students are perceived as posing a greater threat to the political status quo that 
deserves massive and continued budgetary injections. 
 
The previous chapter underlined the recent discursive agreement, among the transnational 
elite, on the need for quality secondary education to answer the demands of the knowledge 
economy. This rhetorical consensus took a financial form but one at the margins of the 
education budget that did not encroach upon domestic elites’ over-arching budget 
preferences. Donors’ recent attempts to reconfigure the education budget towards quality 
secondary education have collided with structural factors that they tend to ignore – the 
country’s position in the global economy, elites’ imperative for political order and donors’ 
own contradictory demands for tight fiscal discipline. Fraser and Whitfield (2008: 2) found 
little evidence to suggest that in Tanzania the government has ‘substantially challenged the 
donor-dominance that has defined [its] aid relations over the last decade’. On the contrary, 
this chapter has shown that the budget has formed domestic elites’ favourite locus to assert 
their sovereign power: within the broad framework of asymmetrical power relations, 
domestic elites have persistently deployed mechanisms to successfully curtail the 
‘hegemonic potential of international aid’ (Mosse 2005). In the face of this resistance, 
donors are tempted to once again alter their modes of intervention. But new aid modalities 
under consideration - performance-based teacher salaries and school funding – completely 
evade the structural question of the fiscal space for quality basic education for all and 
obscure the responsibility of  domestic and international elites in funding it. 
 
The next chapter pursues the investigation at the local level and shows that private 
resources have mainly made up for this absence of national public fiscal space for ward 
secondary schools. 
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Chapter Six  
 
Who owns the ward secondary schools? 
 The politics of implementation in Lushoto District 
 
 
Nyerere thought that the financial package would not cater for the expansion of secondary 
education. According to him, we could not finance secondary education. But there are other ways. 
He was thinking within the budget frame. His assumption was that everything should be 
financed by the government. But this programme is based on the idea that people can contribute. 
(Politician, Lushoto, interview 135) 
 
According to this prominent political figure in Lushoto District, by reaching untapped 
resources (community wealth) the country could expand its fiscal space and finance the 
expansion of basic social services. Chapter 4 revealed the intrinsic tensions, in secondary 
education expansion, between a technical rationality, politically desired social outcomes and 
the urgent need to manage the youth. Chapter 5 highlighted the negligible financial effort 
of elites to support the ward secondary schools policy. This chapter explores the built-in 
contradiction between the stated welfare intentions behind this policy and the actual 
enforcement of a principle of individual responsibility. 
 
How did the ward secondary schools policy, designed at central level and driven by the top 
executive, but not backed by any substantial budgetary resources, become negotiated at 
local level between bureaucrats, politicians and the population? This chapter focuses on the 
implementation of the policy in Lushoto district, in North-East Tanzania. In 2011, with 72 
ward secondary schools, this district had the highest number of government secondary 
schools in the entire country. The profile of secondary education expansion in Lushoto 
mirrored the national trajectory: a slow progression between the end of the 1980s to the 
beginning of the 2000s, then a marked acceleration between 2004 and 2010, with three 
peak years in 2007-2009. The first secondary school in Lushoto District, Kifungilo, 
registered in 1981, was private, built by the Catholic Church. But the expansion, even prior 
to 2004, has largely been driven by public schools (Figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6-1: Number of secondary schools built in Lushoto each year (date of 
registration) 1980-2010 
 
 Source: the author, based on URT (2011b)  
 
In 2012, 25 out of a total of 44 wards in the district had more than one government 
secondary school, four wards recording four: ‘one secondary school in each village’ has 
become an often-heard policy slogan. This research did not undertake any comparative 
studies in other districts: identifying Lushoto’s specific features that may explain this 
outstanding ‘performance’ remains a speculative task. This chapter has a more 
circumscribed objective: to study the ward secondary schools policy in practice. To use 
Harrison’s (2008: 171) words in his analysis of the implementation of the Local 
Government Reform Programme in Lushoto, this chapter enables us to focus on the ways 
in which the ward schools policy ‘relates to social relations beyond the realm of donors and 
high state officials’. In their study of the Poverty Reduction Strategy in Tanzania Gould and 
Ojanen (2003: 52) similarly insisted on the necessity of critically examining the ‘politics of 
policy implementation’. This chapter provides a portrait of social relations at local level; it 
unveils the power struggles unleashed by the implementation of the policy at various levels 
of the local arena – communities and schools, villages, wards and district headquarters.265 
 
The ward secondary schools policy has been underpinned by a specific discourse on the 
relations between the central state and the local: the first section unpacks its constitutive 
components and sheds light on their genealogy. Section Two presents the budgetary 
                                                 
265 The word ‘communities’ conveys an idea of homogeneity and harmony. In reality, the rural population is subject to 
social differentiation, cleavages and power struggles. This term was nevertheless widely used by Tanzanian dominant 
groups to refer to peasants and parents. Despite its normative limitations, the term ‘community’ is used here.  
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constraints that restrict the ability of the district and of ward secondary schools to deliver 
on their public service responsibilities. Section Three studies the pivotal role of notables in 
mobilising communities and gaining their consent to the policy. Finally, Section Four 
shows how ward secondary schools have turned into a major political battlefield for local 
elites. 
 
1. Community schools, the central state and the ‘local’: securing people’s 
ownership to fight poverty 
 
Right from its inception, which can be traced back to the 1995 Education and Training Policy, 
Tanzanian policy-makers envisioned the ward secondary schools policy from a locally-
driven developmental perspective: ‘urban, district, town, municipal, city councils and 
authorities, communities, NGO, individuals and public institutions shall be encouraged and 
given incentives to establish, own, manage and administer at least one secondary school in 
each ward (Kata) in their areas of jurisdiction’ (URT 1995: 102). In 2006, the ward 
secondary schools policy enunciated by Prime Minister Lowassa similarly called for a 
specific ‘social contract’ between the central state and the population: communities had to 
start the construction of schools then the state (government and districts) would cater for 
the roofing, cover the biggest share of running costs through the capitation grant and 
allocate an adequate number of teachers. 
 
This locally driven model of expansion is deeply rooted in the history of the country but it 
also reflects the profound internalisation, within the state, of global discourses about the 
‘local’ since the structural adjustment programmes period. 
 
‘Self-help’ ideology has tainted development policies in Tanzania since colonial times;266 it 
was a prominent feature of Ujamaa development strategy (Kitching 1989, Samoff 1989). 
Specifically in the education sector, Kilimanjaro Region provided the rest of the country 
with a successful model of educational advancement driven by local initiatives and funding 
schemes (Samoff 1979b). The economic structure of this region, where a nascent capitalist 
class had emerged during the colonial period, provided the local petty bourgeoisie with the 
                                                 
266 This is not specific to Tanzania. Cowen and Shenton (1995) trace the origin of community participation and self-help 
discourse and practices to the late colonial period when ‘voluntary’ community contributions were supposed to cover the 
cost of welfare and health services. 
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material base necessary to construct and run secondary schools: resources were collected 
through a levy on coffee production. It also enabled them to assert their bargaining power 
vis-à-vis a central state eager to curtail their educational, economic and political privileges. 
In 1984, Kilimanjaro Region represented 5.6 per cent of the population but was home to 
26 per cent of all secondary schools in the country, 11 per cent of government and 42 per 
cent of private secondary schools (Samoff 1989: 7). An MP in Lushoto explained how he 
drew on this historical experience to convince his constituents to build secondary schools: 
‘We had to encourage them, to educate them, to make them understand the need for secondary education, to 
explain to them why some regions like Kilimanjaro are developed, well advanced because they have very well 
educated people’ (interview 131).267 
 
The community-driven model of secondary education expansion has also been nourished 
by the understanding among elites of Kenya’s comparative economic success as tied to 
specific education choices (see Chapter 4). The post-independence expansion of secondary 
education in Kenya was largely driven by the Harambee schools movement: locally-funded 
secondary schools. The literature has challenged the romanticised assessment of the virtues 
of the Harambee model. For instance, Mwiria (1990) showed how, because of the scarce 
resources of most community schools, the Harambee movement has led to an increasingly 
polarized system, with secondary schools differentiated by the quality of the education they 
deliver. Nevertheless, for part of the Tanzanian elite, the Harambee movement constitutes 
an evident source of inspiration or legitimation of the ward secondary schools:  
Take the example of our neighbour, Kenya. Just early after independence, they allowed these Harambee 
schools to be constructed. At the beginning they did not fulfil the conditions of a school. But they started. 
As long as they started it, they were allowed to go. Now, in the course of time, they accomplished the 
unfinished infrastructures. And the schools functioned, started to function well. And then, now, if you 
compare the number of secondary schools in Kenya to that in Tanzania, you will find that more students 
are going to secondary schools in Kenya than in Tanzania although we've got a bigger population than 
Kenya. (Senior official, MoEVT, interview 10) 
 
                                                 
267 In the late colonial period, peasants in Lushoto who were against an irrigation scheme imposed by the colonial 
administration went to Kilimanjaro to consult with leaders of the Kilimanjaro Citizens’ Union, an organisation focused on 
issues of land allocation and local expenditures for schools. Back in Lushoto they set up the Usambara Citizens’ Union 
and even chose a Chagga, Petro Njau (KCU’s president) as their President: ‘Usambara did not have any leaders who were 
well educated as Petro Njau’ (Feierman 1990: 174 and 211). 
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These two narratives – the educational successes of the Chagga people and Kenya – have 
been structurally tied to historically-built economic structures but they have played, within 
the Tanzanian elite, the role of powerful myths that contribute to the framing of public 
policies. 
 
The enduring presence of ‘self-help’ ingredients within Tanzanian development policies 
does not imply that self-help projects have been time and space invariant. Over the decades, 
the meaning of the concept has been subject to alterations, reflecting evolving relations 
between the state, society and local brokers. Jennings (2007) underlined, for instance, the 
shift from an initial framing of the ‘self-help’ concept, in the early years of independence, in 
terms of participation in the nation-building project to the post-Arusha Declaration period 
when ‘compulsory’ participation served state control and management priorities. Similarly, 
the concrete institutional arrangements organising relations between the central level and 
the ‘local’ have evolved over time, since colonial ‘indirect rule’ through Native 
Authorities. 268  During Ujamaa, local governments progressively lost their democratic, 
participatory nature to ‘increasingly [become] an agency of central government’ (Samoff 
1989: 2): elected district councils were eliminated in favour of the state regional 
administration.269 The history of the cooperative movement in Tanzania, epitomised by the 
fate of the Ruvuma Development Association,270 also illustrates the precarious position of 
the central state vis-à-vis the ‘local’ and the structural tension between the centre’s needs 
for local intermediaries to mobilise rural masses and its desire to establish control over 
potential competing powers (Samoff 1989).  
 
These historical ingredients of the locally driven model of secondary education expansion 
have, however, been entwined with elements of the ‘pro-poor’ global discourse. With the 
introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes in the mid-1980s, the call by Tanzanian 
authorities for community contributions strongly echoed the International Financial 
Institutions’ promotion of cost-sharing measures to support the expansion of the 
education sector. Since the end of the 1990s, the rhetoric has been reworked in a post-
Washington consensus idiom largely appropriated by Tanzanian elites. In 1999, Tanzania’s 
overarching development strategy, Vision 2025, argued that ‘state welfare responsibilities 
                                                 
268 See Max (1991) for an exposition of the various stages of centralisation and decentralisation experienced by the 
country.  
269 Similarly, for Mamdani (1996: 177) ‘The Tanzania decentralization of the mid-1970s was in effect a centralization’. 
270 For an account of the story of the Ruvuma Development Association see Coulson (1982) or Jennings (2007). 
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are more focused on cost-effective ways of enhancing access to and the quality of social 
services’. One of the main development goals was: ‘To permit a greater role for local actors 
to own and drive the process of their development. Local people know their problems best 
and are better placed to judge what they need, what is possible to achieve and how it can 
effectively be achieved’ (URT 1999b). In 2000, Tanzania’s National Strategy for Poverty 
Reduction similarly insisted on the involvement of communities and local governments in 
social services provision within a cost-sharing framework (Palloti 2008). In 2003 the World 
Development Report posited community participation, user fees, decentralisation and school 
autonomy as key elements in the development of local ‘ownership’ and strengthening of 
public ‘accountability’ to achieve efficient social services delivery (World Bank 2003). In 
2004, the SEDP perfectly illustrated the fruitful encounter between Tanzanian elites’ 
historical conception of the role of the masses in participating in development and donors’ 
endeavours to ‘make services work for poor people’ through the empowerment of 
imagined communities. The SEDP I was designed to alleviate the main financial constraint 
preventing the poor from accessing secondary education, the Tsh 40,000 school fees, 
introduced in the mid-1980s following the Structural Adjustment Programme. According 
to the World Bank, ‘this level of cost sharing [was] prohibitive for many households, given 
the low household income level of Tanzania’ (World Bank 2004a: 5).271 In theory, the 
SEDP was meant to shift the financial burden from the people to the state and the 
international community. This objective was materialised through the official reduction of 
school fees to Tsh 20,000, schools being compensated by the capitation grant.  
 
At the same time both the World Bank and the government agreed that the expansion of 
secondary education should be the result of a joint effort between communities, local 
governments and the central state. In his foreword to the SEDP document, Joseph Mungai, 
then Minister of Education, reaffirmed the core tenet of the programme: ‘[The SEDP] is 
predicated on a community-based developmental approach intended to elicit greater 
participation from below’ (URT 2004: ii). The World Bank’s SEDP project document 
noted: ‘Community secondary schools are the means by which communities express an 
effective demand for secondary education’ (World Bank 2004a: 4). Communities needed to 
                                                 
271 The World Bank SEDP project documents completely ignore the Bank’s historical role in pushing for the introduction 
of cost-sharing measures in the 1980s as if this anti-poor policy was the sole responsibility of an anti-poor domestic 
leadership. 
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demonstrate that they deserved education; they needed to ‘earn their way out of poverty’.272 
The World Bank costing framework for its SEDP I factored in communities’ contributions, 
projected at 25 per cent of the total construction costs (URT 2004), increasing to 30 per 
cent under the SEDP II (URT 2010b: 92).273 For the government and the World Bank the 
model has had two main facets: rolling back the state through a shift of ownership - ‘People 
are living nearby that school. And they see that school as their school’ (official, PMO-RALG, 
interview 25)274  - and a material component of cost-reduction: ‘In that way, we are minimising 
the cost for construction’ (ibid).  
 
The SEDP also reflected the centrality of decentralisation in donors’ pro-poor service 
delivery agenda as well as Tanzanian elites’ adherence to this model of public service 
discharge on local governments.275 As early as 1995, decentralisation of education officially 
constituted the first objective of the Education and Training Policy (URT 1995). The 
‘devolution of authority and responsibilities to lower levels’ to ‘increase efficiency and 
responsiveness in the operation of secondary education’ was a core component of the 
SEDP strategies (URT 2004: 2). The World Bank SEDP I included two disbursement 
conditions aimed at strengthening the decentralisation framework (World Bank 2010b: 18). 
This strategy of decentralisation in education was part of a broader process launched at the 
end of the 1990s within the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), widely 
supported by donors under the World Bank’s leadership. As evidenced by its official 
objectives - to encourage ‘public participation, transparency and accountability’ and to 
improve ‘service delivery’ – the reform constituted an unmistakable Tanzanian offshoot of 
the Post-Washington Consensus ‘good governance’ agenda.276  
 
                                                 
272  Words borrowed from the World Bank’s former President, Williamson (2004). According to Rose (2005: 173) 
‘principles of individual responsibilities for meeting social needs’ continued to underpin the World Bank’s education 
agenda during the post-Washington consensus phase. 
273 The earlier expansion of primary education was underpinned by a similar cost-sharing scheme: under the PEDP, 
primary school fees were abolished but ‘community inputs’ to construction and ‘voluntary community contributions’ to 
quality improvement expenses were explicit features of the plan (URT 2001: 10). 
274 The 2004 World Development Report framed the local ownership challenge in similar terms: ‘villagers refer to “the 
government’s” school, not “our” school’ (World Bank 2003: 112). 
275 For the 2004 World Development Report ‘decentralization can be a powerful tool for moving decision making closer to 
those affected by it’ (World Bank 2003: 29). 
276 See http://www.pmoralg.go.tz/about_us/history.php. The Local Government Reform Programme was part of a 
comprehensive reform package comprising the Public Finance Management Reform, the Public Sector Reform, the Legal 
Sector Reform, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan and the Business Environment Support in 
Tanzania. In 2012, the LGRP was still on-going under the label ‘Decentralisation by Devolution’ (or DbyD) along with its 
sister reforms. Harrison (2008) and Palloti (2008) provide critical analyses of the LGRP reform. 
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An abundant literature has discussed the concept of ‘self-help’, in time rearticulated in 
terms of ‘community-led’ or ‘participatory’ development.277 In her analysis of the World 
Bank education agenda, Rose (2005: 173) argues that this community involvement, in the 
context of the search for alternative resources to finance education expansion, has 
provoked a ‘marketization’ of community participation.278 The reformulation of the ‘self-
help’ ideology prompted by economic liberalisation was also contested within the 
Tanzanian state, as testified to by Nyerere’s own position. He fully endorsed the idea of 
communities contributing to education expansion through their labour but rejected the 
idea of their monetisation:  
‘Constantly asking parents to buy for this or pay for that is self-defeating; sooner or later 
they will stop sending their children to school because they cannot provide what is 
asked for. Silver and gold they have none: what they do have is their labour. That they 
can often provide: labour to build a new classroom, or a teacher’s house, or to paint 
walls or repair a roof’ (Nyerere 1988: 183).  
He simultaneously stressed the fallacy of communities’ labour contribution when the state 
could not provide quality education basic inputs. ‘When talking about secondary school 
expansion, we are quick to say that the people will put up the buildings by their own 
efforts. But the buildings are less important… The important things in education are the 
teachers, the books, and for science the laboratories’ (Nyerere 1984: 154). The World Bank 
itself has recently thoroughly questioned its own normative views on the virtues of 
localised development. Based on a review of empirical research, the Bank has reached 
conclusions that essentially contradict the assumptions behind its SEDP I and II 
programmes in Tanzania (World Bank 2012b).  
 
The remainder of this chapter explores the practical significance of this specific public-
private partnership model, as implemented in an actual setting, Lushoto District. 
 
 
                                                 
277 For instance, Booth (2011) challenged assumptions of the global good governance agenda that bottom-up pressures 
from services users, voters or civil society organisations may lead to improved public good provision. 
278 For a general discussion on education decentralisation and community financing, see Bray and Lillis (1989) and Bray 
(1996).  
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2. Communities and the district: straitened financial surrogates of the central 
state 
 
 
Before effective decentralisation of secondary education in FY 2009/10, districts were not 
supposed to channel resources to secondary education, a sector out of their formal remit. 
During the SEDP I, rather than a transfer of responsibilities and resources to directly 
elected local governments, ‘decentralisation’ was interpreted in terms of ‘school autonomy’ 
through the empowerment of school boards. Financial transfers would flow directly from 
the Ministry of Education to secondary schools.  
 
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Lowassa’s 2006 decree on ward secondary schools made 
legitimate, if not strictly legal, the use of district resources to support the expansion. In 
Lushoto, a former MP admitted the financial involvement of the district in supporting 
secondary education expansion prior to decentralisation: ‘During the meetings of the council 
budgetary committee I asked the district to contribute and to support communities’ initiatives by providing 
iron sheets and to reallocate money to that effect. We bought indeed iron sheets and it constituted another 
booster. We were allowed to do some savings here and there and also through the improvement of the revenue 
collection’ (interview 135). No evidence was collected to confirm or reject the hypothesis of 
PEDP funds redirected to finance secondary education. But human resources were 
diverted: the district administration transferred primary teachers to secondary schools to 
alleviate the abysmal shortage of secondary teachers.280  
 
With decentralisation in FY2009/10, districts’ financial framework for secondary education 
has gained clarity but remains heavily dependent upon central state transfers. In terms of 
recurrent expenditures, the National Treasury channels to the district specific grants to 
cover various expenditures: activities of the District Secondary Education Office through 
‘other charges’ (O.C. proper), schools’ running costs (capitation grant), school meals, 
examination and leave travel.  
                                                 
279 See Annex C for additional information on the district budget and documentation. 
280 Interview 111 (retired senior district official). 
2.1 Public funding of ward secondary schools: the impossible district 
budget balancing act279 
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Table 6-1: Lushoto Secondary Education Budget, Recurrent Expenditures, in 
Thousand Tsh (FY2008/09 – FY2011/12) 
  Spending 
unit 
2008/09 2009/10 Share of 
total 
(%) 
2010/11 Share of 
total 
(%) 
2011/12 Share of 
total 
(%) 
O.C. proper DSEO 20,300  43,350  10 41,498  7.3 139,011  15.1 
Capitation 
grant 
(domestic) 
Schools 0 306,700  74 321,050 56.2 351,172  38.1 
Capitation 
grant (foreign 
- WB) 
Schools           104,885  11.4 
Examination 
expenses 
DSEO 0 0 0 100,747  17.6 202,462  21.9 
Meal Boarding 
schools 
0 61,200  15 63,252  11.1 76,950  8.3 
Leave travel Teachers 1,800  1,800  0 45,150  7.9 48,392  5.2 
Total Other 
Charges  
 22,100  413,050  100 571,697  100 922,872  100 
Source: for FY 2008/09 Ministry of Finance; for subsequent years: district MTEFs (estimates) 
 
As at national level, at the end of the research period, the district budget reflected the 
growing importance of secondary education: in FY 2011/12 the sub-sector absorbed 26 
per cent of the district total non-salary recurrent expenditures against 20 per cent in FY 
2010/11. 
 
As the direct employer of secondary school teachers, the district also receives fiscal 
transfers to cover teachers’ personal emoluments (PE). In FY 2010/11 teachers’ total 
payslip represented about 58 per cent of the district PE envelope with secondary teachers 
representing a growing share: from 11.4 per cent in FY2009/10 to 22.4 per cent in FY 
2011/12.  
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Table 6-2: Lushoto District Budget, Education Personal Emoluments (FY2008/09 – 
2011/12), in Million Tsh 
 
  2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Secondary education PE 68 1,131 2,011 3,995 
Primary Education PE 6,432 8,782 9,889 13,859 
Total education PE 6,501 9,913 11,900 17,854 
Share of secondary PE in total 
education PE (%) 1,1 11,4 16,9 22,4 
Source: for FY 2008/09 Ministry of Finance; for subsequent years: district MTEFs (LDC 2010 and 2011a) 
 
Primary education has been allocated the largest share of recurrent education expenditures, 
but in terms of development expenditures, secondary education has taken precedence. As 
shown in Table 6.3, the district used two main sources to finance its secondary education 
investments: a share of its Capital Development Grant (CDG), a non-earmarked transfer 
from the central level and a share of its Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) envelope, a 
World Bank funded programme dedicated to local development projects. 
 
Table 6-3: Lushoto District Secondary Education Budget, Development 
Expenditures 
Source Item Amount (Tsh) Item Amount (Tsh)
LGCDG To facilitate completion of 5 classrooms 13 000 000 To facilitate completion of 8 classrooms 24 000 000
To facilitate completion of 1  administration blocks 4 000 000 To facilitate completion of 5 administration blocks 60 000 000
To facilitate the construction of 4 classrooms 20 000 000 To facilitate the construction of 6 classrooms 72 000 000
To facilitate the construction of 5 administration blocks 90 000 000 To facilitate the construction of 2 administration blocks 64 000 000
To construct 13 laboratories 523 315 988 To facilitate the construction of 2 laboratories 80 000 000
To facilitate the construction of 4 teachers' houses 60 000 000 To facilitate the construction of 6 teachers' houses 120 000 000
To facilitate construction of 2 hostels 80 000 000 To facilitate completion of 13 teachers' houses 123 500 000
To facilitate the completion of 1 hostels 4 000 000
TASAF
Construction of 2 classrooms; school furnitures for 15 
schools, completion of a laboratory, instalaltion of gas 
plumbing system in one school 130 324 450
ADB To facilitate the construction of 5 teachers' houses 150 000 000
FY 2010/11 FY 2011/12
 
Source: LDC (2011a and 2010); for TASAF: LDC (2011b) 
 
The ability of the district to fulfil its financial responsibilities towards its secondary schools 
has been largely hampered by the realities of the country’s public finance management 
practices. As at national level (Chapter 5), district budget-making realities have largely 
diverged from a ‘textbook’ performance-based budgeting. Several interwoven elements 
linked to national public finances have contributed to undermine the strategic nature of the 
district MTEF.  
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First, districts receive their budget guidelines very late in the budget preparation cycle. As 
an illustration, as of early March 2012, Lushoto planning officers had no information about 
their ceilings for the FY 2012/13 budget that needed to be approved by the District 
Council in March before being tabled to the Ministry of Finance in April-May. The current 
fiscal year ceiling, plus a 5 per cent increment, is the default starting point for budget 
preparation. Second, the unpredictability of donor funding hampers district budget 
preparation. For instance, Lushoto’s MTEF for FY 2010/11 did not integrate the 
component of the SEDP capitation grant funded by the World Bank. Because of delays in 
finalising the World Bank project documents, the district budget was completed before any 
financial commitment was confirmed: the MTEF projected a figure of Tsh 320 million 
(about Tsh 13,000 per student), against an actual disbursement of Tsh 608 million during 
FY 2010/11 (about Tsh 25,000 per student). Third, the inter-sectoral allocation of CDG 
funds, in theory entirely discretionary, is also largely being dictated by national priorities, 
defined at Cabinet level: for instance, for FY 2011/12, agriculture (‘Kwilimo Kwanza’), 
identified as the national priority, had to be reflected in the district budget despite divergent 
priorities at local level: national authorities ‘have their own national priorities. For instance, in the 
district we have huge transport problems. But we did not get any fund for the road. Their priority was 
Kilimo Kwanza and they instructed us to direct all resources to Kilimo Kwanza. We adhered to the 
instruction’. 281  At sector level, the secondary education component of the MTEF also 
translates national sector priorities: in FY 2010/11, laboratories and in FY 2011/12, 
teachers’ houses.  
 
After a budget design largely framed by competing demands from the central level, budget 
implementation is also restricted by central level financial constraints. District budgets 
largely depend on resources transferred from the central level. In Lushoto, in FY2011/12, 
the district’s own resources represented about 4 per cent of district revenues against 96 per 
cent from intergovernmental transfers. In this context, the Treasury’s cash management 
system constitutes a critical challenge to a smooth and predictable execution of the district 
budget. For instance, in FY2010/11 in Lushoto only 65 per cent of the LGCDG budgeted 
amount was actually received.282 Two planned investments in secondary education could 
                                                 
281 Interview with district staff, Budget and Planning Department. 
282 Source: comparison between district MTEFs and MoF web site data: releases to district. 
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not be executed.283 In FY 2009/10 the district received only 50 per cent of the budgeted 
amount for the secondary education capitation grant.284  
 
The capitation grant received in the schools visited for this research never reached Tsh 
25,000 per student. It is likely that the discrepancy partially derives from this cash 
constraint: district officials, lacking the cash to pay pressing outstanding debts or for 
unplanned/emergency activities, may use available education funds for non-education 
activities while waiting for the next disbursement from the Treasury.285 Cash constraints 
may also fuel social tensions between teachers and their employer. For instance, in 
February 2012, at the time of the fieldwork, a cash-strapped district administration was 
unable to pay newly recruited teachers the daily allowances they were entitled to: instructed 
by the central level to pay immediately, the District Treasury and the District Secondary 
Education Officer struggled to identify a budgetary trick to meet the central level 
injunction and avoid open conflict with the new teachers.286  
 
 
To the question ‘who financed the ward secondary schools?’ a former District Education 
Officer responded without any hesitation: ‘villagers’. It is beyond the scope of this research 
to provide an accurate estimation of communities’ contributions to the construction of 
secondary school infrastructures.287 Nevertheless, based on the triangulation of all accounts, 
the financial burden of the expansion appeared to fall disproportionately upon 
communities. According to the former DEO, ‘it was a very big project; it needed a lot of money 
(…) In Lushoto, communities provided more than half of the amount. Then the district, and finally the 
government’. In all schools visited, the story was identical: schools were mainly constructed 
by the communities with little support from the district and/or the government. Villagers 
prepared the ground, provided bricks, stones, timber and labour. Villagers were also asked 
to contribute cash: depending on the location, the contribution could reach Tsh 6,000 or 
                                                 
283 LDC (2011b). 
284 Source: Ministry of Finance web site for the releases; District MTEFs for the budgeted amount. 
285 The hypothesis of embezzlement of funds, the dominant narrative in donors-government circles, cannot however be 
ruled out.   
286 The situation was made even more challenging that PMO-RALG and the MoEVT sent contradictory instructions: one 
instructed the payment of 7 day allowances, the other 14 days.  
287 See however Annex C for a rough estimation. 
2.2 Community contributions in practice: the private costs of ward 
secondary schools and their precarious balance sheets  
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Tsh 8,000 per household. Once the first basic infrastructure was in place – four classrooms 
was the minimum requirement to get official registration authorization – villagers 
continued to contribute to building staff quarters, laboratories and additional classrooms. 
 
Villagers have not only financed a big share of capital costs, they have also contributing to 
running costs. In all schools visited, parental contributions were the school budget’s main 
source of revenue of, official school fees being only a small part of their total contribution. 
The complete list of contributions varied from school to school around a common core. 
Parents had to pay, for each enrolled child: school fees, a security fee, an academic 
contribution, an identity card contribution, a security contribution and a ‘school label’ 
contribution. All these were set in accordance with a formal directive of the Ministry of 
Education. But schools also charged other types of contributions: building fees, emergency 
fees, school bag fees, teaching contributions or a desk and chairs contribution.288 Table 6.4 
below displays a typical list of contributions requested from parents in a secondary school 
located in Soni Ward. In that school, students were also asked to attend school with a 
bucket to fetch water, and a spade for gardening activities. In all schools uniform is 
mandatory and parents are required to provide for it. They have also to pay fees for 
district/zonal and national examinations.289  
Table 6-4: Fees and contributions in a ward secondary school (Soni Ward), 2012 
Item Amount (in 
Tsh) 
School fees 20,000 
Caution money 5,000 
ID card 5,000 
Desk contribution 15,000 
Academic contribution 10,000 
Guard contribution 7,000 
School emblem 2,000 
Food contribution 65,000 
One ream of A4 paper N.A.* 
Total 129,000 
Minimum amount to be paid on enrolment day 80,000 
  Source: based on the official instruction letter sent to parents before the beginning of school year  
  *based on interview with a mother, the price is about Tsh 12,000  
                                                 
288 Depending on schools, this could be paid in cash or by buying the desk directly from a local carpenter.  
289 Form Two students: Tsh 5,000 for district mock exam and Tsh 10,000 for the national exam; Form Four students: Tsh 
15,000 for district/zonal exam and Tsh 35,000 for national exam (national directive). 
207 
 
According to the Household Budget Survey 2007, the mean per capita household monthly 
income in rural areas amounted to Tsh 28,000 (or Tsh 335,000 a year) (URT 2009b). If one 
takes the figure above as a reference, once examination costs are added, in theory, the 
parents of a Form Four student in this school had to allocate close to 50 per cent of their 
annual income to their child’s secondary schooling.  
 
In addition, parents also contributed towards the salaries of ‘Form Six Leavers’ teachers. 
All the schools visited had Form Six Leavers in their teaching force. They were recruited 
either for the duration of the school year or for certain topics to prepare for the exams. 
They were generally paid between Tsh 100,000 and Tsh 120,000 a month.290 Officially, 
these teachers do not exist: they do not appear in national statistics and the state (central 
government or district) has no obligation towards them in terms of training, career, 
supervision and salary: the cost of these teachers was silently passed onto parents.291 
 
The collection of these contributions has constituted a critical challenge for school 
management. ‘These contributions are very cumbersome for parents; it’s very difficult for them. Parents 
fail to pay’: this remark by the Headmaster in School P reflected the situation in all schools 
visited. Headmasters hardly ever reached their budget revenue target. In School V, in 2011, 
they collected Tsh 200,000 against a Tsh 1.5 million budget. In School Y, on 9 March 2012, 
date of the visit, most Form One students still had not paid their fees, two months after the 
start of the school year. As a result, parents were indebted to schools and exam certificates 
turned into ‘credit collateral’: ‘When they come with money, they pay for previous years (…) Then we 
have to retain their certificate until they pay the totality of their debt. We don’t have any other choice. Last 
year, only three took their certificate out of forty-two’ (Headmaster, School AB).  
 
This financial fragility of schools has been rooted in Lushoto’s economic structure. As 
summed up by the Second Master in School E: ‘Our school depends on parent contributions and 
parents depend on crop[s]. But there’s nothing to sell’. A densely populated district, Lushoto has 
                                                 
290 In some schools, a different scale applied to maths and science teachers (Tsh 15,000 per topic). In comparison, a 
permanent teacher earns, at the beginning of his/her career Tsh 249,600 per month (Source: Civil servants’ salary scales, 
provided by Teachers Trade Union).   
291 The most recent household budget survey (URT 2009b) did not show any increase in families’ expenditures on 
secondary education (UNESCO 2012a) but the survey was conducted in 2006 prior to the national campaign of 
secondary expansion. The 2009 PETS recognised that private contributions constituted a significant source of revenue for 
community secondary schools (Claussen and Assad 2010: 13). At international level, based on data from 7 countries, 
UNESCO (2013: 136) estimates that ‘the share of education expenditure borne by households ranges … from 30% to 
58% in secondary education’.  
208 
 
long suffered from land shortages (Sender and Smith 1978, Feierman 1974 and 1990). In 
this mountainous area, the fertile land in the valley is mainly owned by a privileged few.292 
Even in places with cash crops, yields have been decreasing. Interviews with headmasters 
and parents also revealed the disconnect between the school budgetary timeframe and the 
seasonal nature of parents’ revenues, which are dependent on harvests. In Mlola ward, for 
instance, most parents depend on two harvest seasons: beans in May/June and maize in 
January/February. Most school fees and other contributions are due at the beginning of the 
school year in January. Specifically, examination fees have to be paid before the end of 
February for Form Four students and April for Form Two students. If parents do not pay 
they are penalised by way of a fine (from Tsh 50,000 up to Tsh 90,000 per month). In 
focus groups and interviews with village leaders, accounts abounded of peasants forced to 
sell their assets (for instance, cattle) to pay school fees. A parent in School AA confirmed 
that their ability to contribute to school fees was essentially undermined by their precarious 
socio-economic situation:  
Lot of us are farmers; we plant beans, maize or cabbage. We need to wait for the harvest and to sell on 
the market. And prices have decreased. We use that money, we use it for food but it’s a tough situation. 
You can plant cabbage or onions but before the harvest they die through disease and you can’t get any 
money. It’s not that we don’t want to pay, it’s just tough. You can plan to earn a certain amount during 
the year but then difficulties occurred and the plan fails. 
 
Resources sent to schools by the state (central government and district) did not mitigate 
this financial fragility. In terms of development expenditures, state support was assessed as 
‘very little’ not only by headmasters and village officers but also district officials. Under the 
SEDP I, between 2004 and 2009, the central government only provided financing to build 
35 classrooms;293 under the SEDP II (2010-2015), as in other districts, only two schools 
would benefit from the development grant.  
 
In terms of recurrent expenditures, in most schools visited, the level of capitation grant 
received by schools was reported to be far below the Tsh 25,000 official norm.294 The 
                                                 
292 Including former President Benjamin Mkapa, owner of a big farm in Mlalo, a constituency held by MP Ngwiilzi, one 
of his close friends. 
293 Interview with former district official (interview 111).  
294 The most cited figure: between Tsh 9,000 and Tsh 10,000 per student. According to the 2009 public expenditure 
tracking survey (PETS), nationwide, capitation grants were lower than expected, and varied considerably between schools. 
In FY 2007/08, the average capitation grant per student was estimated at Tsh 17,136 (Claussen and Assad 2010). 
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marginal role of the capitation grant in schools’ daily financial management became evident 
when compared to the total amount of fees and other contributions paid by parents. One 
headmaster confirmed the auxiliary nature of the capitation grant, conceived as an ad-hoc 
bonus: ‘I make my budget based on parents’ contributions. If I receive the capitation grant I use it’ 
(School T). Besides, disbursements have been unpredictable both in terms of timing and 
amounts. One headmaster noted: ‘We’re very rarely informed: we go to the bank and we check our 
account balance… On the bank statement it is written ‘capitation grant. Sometimes we get the money at the 
beginning of the quarter, sometimes at the end, depending of the flow of money’ (School I). Furthermore, 
headmasters are limited in the use of these resources: they receive strict instructions on 
how to use the funds and they are not allowed to wait for a second disbursement to 
cumulate resources.295 And because capitation grant revenues are subject to greater scrutiny 
by governmental authorities (under donor pressure), parents’ contributions are considered 
as a more flexible and reliable resource by cash-constrained school managers. Given the 
rigidity of the capitation grant, some headmasters preferred to ignore this source of 
revenue: ‘There’s a limitation, the division on how to use them. It makes it difficult because, it’s a small 
amount. We fail to buy and we prefer not to use it.’296  In national policy-making spheres, the 
capitation grant has long engendered passionate debates between sector ministries, the 
Ministry of Finance and donors, a centrality that stands in obvious contradiction to its 
relatively marginal place ‘at street level’.  
 
Communities certainly did not get a fair return for their contributions. As in the rest of the 
country (see Chapter 1), community secondary schools have been characterised by very 
poor quality infrastructure, teachers and students pointing to the ‘school environment’ as a 
major impediment to good learning. Schools opened with one or two permanent teachers 
and despite the new waves of recruitment in 2010 and 2011, the student-teacher ratio in 
Lushoto’s government schools was 66:1 in 2011, against a national ratio of 34:1.297 And as 
in the rest of the country, teacher shortage was particularly acute in maths and science: in 
2011, there were only 82 science teachers in Lushoto, 20 per cent of the permanent 
teaching force. The massive national failure in Form Four examinations did not spare 
                                                 
295 50 per cent of the grant has to be allocated to textbooks (with priority to science and maths).  
296 In some quarters, small schools can receive between Tsh 100,000 to Tsh 140,000 that they are supposed to spend 
immediately. 
297 The students-teacher ratio was calculated through a simple division: number of students divided by number of 
teachers. It is a crude computation: the ratio should be calculated taking into account the availability of teachers 
depending for each discipline. 
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Lushoto’s ward secondary schools. Table 6.5 below, which presents the results of four 
schools visited, illustrates the scope of the learning failure in the district. All headmasters 
underlined the deterioration in performance since 2007.298 
 
Table 6-5: 2011 Form Four examination results in four schools in Lushoto District 
  Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Division 4 Failed 
School Z 0 0 0 15 26 
School F 0 1 1 35 39 
School AA 0 1 4 22 30 
School Q 0 0 1 21 30 
 Source: data reported by headmasters 
 
Finally, a sense of frustration and sadness emerged from parents’ focus groups. Two 
entwined themes were regularly raised: a loss of hope, for them and their children, and the 
unfairness of the ward secondary schools deal. They paid but felt they did not get anything 
in exchange. Parents contributed because they had imagined a brighter future for them and 
their children but this hope has now vanished. 
 
The next section shows how local notables have played a pivotal role in mobilising 
communities and sheds light on the various mechanisms they deployed to gain their 
consent.299  
 
3. Local elites and the mobilisation of communities: coercion, educating the 
masses and patronage 
 
 
Communities have never initiated the establishment of any community school. A Member 
of Parliament, a village leader, a ward councillor, a district official or a coalition between 
them always led the process. The expansion started in Lushoto before the implementation 
of the SEDP in 2004 and the enactment of the ‘ward schools decree’ in 2006. In the first 
                                                 
298  As pointed out by many informants, bad performances in secondary schools also have their roots in primary 
education. A proper investigation of the decline in exam performances in Lushoto should entail a study of primary 
schooling dynamics.  
299 The reference is here implicit to Gramsci’s definition of ‘hegemony’ as ‘the “spontaneous” consent given by the great 
masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group’ (Gramsci 
1971: 12).  
3.1 1980-2004, the early days of secondary education expansion in Lushoto  
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phase of expansion, the model for public secondary expansion in Lushoto was somehow 
reminiscent of the ‘Kilimanjaro model’ of private schools as described in Samoff (1987, 
1989). Prominent local leaders initiated the process and mobilised local communities. For 
instance, in Lushoto constituency, Balozi Mshangama had a pivotal influence.300  While 
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, he was one of the founders of 
Shambalai Secondary School along with other influential local figures: located in the town 
of Lushoto and registered in 1988, it was the first public government secondary school in 
the district. In Mlalo constituency, the expansion was largely driven by Charles Kagonji, 
former Head of Government’s Information Services. When he became CCM Member of 
Parliament in 1990, there was no public secondary school in the constituency and he began 
a mobilisation process. The first community school in Mlalo constituency opened in 1995 
in Longwi. In Bumbuli, William Shelukindo, who worked for about 20 years as a 
permanent secretary in different ministries, and was elected as a MP in 1995 when the 
constituency was first created, initiated an educational ‘self-help’ project: in 1996 the first 
secondary school in the constituency opened in Soni.  
 
Table 6-6: Members of Parliament in Lushoto constituencies, in every 
Parliamentary term since the beginning of the multiparty-system 
Constituency 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 
Bumbuli 
William Shelukindo 
(CCM) 
William 
Shelukindo(CCM) 
William 
Shelukindo(CCM) 
January Makamba 
(CCM) 
Lushoto Henry Shekifu(CCM) Henry Shekifu (CCM) 
Balozi Mshangama 
(CCM) 
Henry Shekifu 
(CCM) 
Mlalo 
Charles Kagonji 
(CCM) 
Hassan Ngwilizi 
(CCM) 
Hassan Ngwilizi 
(CCM) 
Hassan Ngwilizi 
(CCM) 
Source: the author 
 
Beyond a decisive initiating power, the action of these politicians was multidimensional. 
They interacted with state authorities about the use of land or buildings, the registration 
process and the allocation of teachers. For instance, in the case of Soni Secondary School, 
Shelukindo asked the government to allocate the buildings of a construction camp that 
used to belong to a German company. He also convinced some teachers originally from 
Bumbuli to return to teach in their home district. He negotiated their transfer with the 
Ministry of Education on the condition that he and other notables would personally bear 
the official transport costs incurred. Notables also promoted innovative funding schemes. 
                                                 
300 ‘Balozi’ is the Swahili word for ‘ambassador’: Mshangama is a former Ambassador in Brussels. This title was widely 
used by informants.  
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In Bumbuli, an area of tea plantations, Yusuf Makamba, an influential CCM figure, 
convinced two wards to join forces and set up the Tamota–Funta Development Fund (or 
TAFDEF), funded through a Tsh 200 levy collected on every kilo of tea leaves sold to the 
tea factory. 301  The construction of Tamota Secondary School, registered in 1997, was 
financed through this scheme. 
 
Yet, one fundamental feature distinguished Lushoto community schools from the 
Kilimanjaro model: they were registered as public/government schools. After completion 
of the infrastructure, the area simply did not have the financial capacity to bear the costs of 
running them as private schools. For instance, in the case of Tamota Secondary School, the 
initial idea - to set up a wazazi private school302 - was abandoned in favour of a government 
school as the community could not afford the teachers’ salaries. Yusuf Makamba had to 
negotiate with the Minister of Education for a licence to establish a public school.  
 
The private sector, through religious institutions, also played a role in the early expansion 
of secondary schooling. Historically, during colonial times, in the Usambara region, 
Catholics and Lutherans restricted their education activities to the primary level.303 The 
Catholic Diocese of Tanga oversaw the opening of Kifungilo Girls’ Secondary School in 
1981, followed by Saint Mary’s Mazinde Juu in 1991 and Kongei Secondary School in 1997. 
In parallel, Protestants and Muslims developed their own educational institutions. The 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania (ELCT) opened Lwandai Secondary School in 
1990 and Muslims established a secondary school in Mlalo in 1995.304 The opening of 
private secondary schools entailed negotiations with the state administration. Even after the 
1995 Education and Training Policy that called for the growing involvement of the private 
sector, the 1978 Education Act remained in force: it set strict conditions on the official 
registration of private schools that required the involvement of the two highest ranking 
officials in the education administration, the Minister and the Commissioner of 
Education.305 In establishing their three schools in Lushoto District, the Catholics benefited 
                                                 
301 A long time serving CCM-cadre and President Kikwete’s close ally, Yusuf Makamba occupied the strategic post of Dar 
es Salaam Regional Commissioner before being appointed CCM Secretary General in 2006. He resigned in 2011. 
302 CCM’s parents wing. 
303 The first Lutheran mission was set up in Mtae in 1893. See Feierman (1990: 139, 143, 235) for an exposition of the 
relation between religion and education in colonial Lushoto. 
304 In recent years, religious institutions have expanded their education activities: in 2001, Catholics established a seminary 
in Bangala; Lutherans and Muslims opened seminaries in Soni in 2010. 
305 URT (1978, articles 14&15). 
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from the support of Lushoto-born Joseph Mmando, a senior official in the Ministry of 
Education, who played a facilitating role between the authorities and the Catholic Church.  
 
The early expansion of public secondary education in Lushoto clearly coincided with the 
process of what Kelsall calls ‘districtization’, which accompanied the economic 
liberalisation and rise in multiparty politics in Tanzania (Kelsall 2004, 2000).306 With the 
first democratic parliamentary elections in 1995, Tanzania experienced the beginning of a 
re-localisation of national politics: national elites became increasingly entangled in struggles 
for resources and political offices at local level. National elites, who for decades lived 
detached from rural areas, came back to their villages of origin in search of local legitimacy 
as a route to national power. They had to ascertain their local roots and swear allegiance to 
the ‘local’, at least symbolically. The provision of education – especially secondary 
education - became, in Lushoto as throughout the country– their favoured area of 
involvement.  
 
Notables’ personal drive persisted in the second phase of the expansion that started in 
2006 but in this phase they deployed their political agency within a new coercive 
framework shaped by the top executive’s compelling demands.  
 
 
 
In September 2007, while touring Tunduru District in Southern Tanzania and disappointed 
by the lack of ward secondary schools in the area, Prime Minister Lowassa threatened 
inhabitants and officials: ‘People have been charged and jailed because of these schools’. 307  As 
underlined in Chapter 4, the ‘success’ of the ward schools policy lay partly in the ability of 
the top executive to assert its power over the bureaucracy. Prime Minister Lowassa set 
targets for the entire state apparatus; state representatives at local level (region, district, 
ward and village) were tasked to mobilise peasants to achieve their targets. In turn, state 
representatives, at local level, resorted to coercion to enrol the masses in the ward schools 
movement. In this process of resource mobilisation, district commissioners, councillors, 
members of Parliament, district executive directors, ward and village executives, as 
                                                 
306 Apart from Shambalai Secondary School, registered in 1988, the first wave of secondary schools occurred between 
1995 and 2004, the two first parliamentary terms under the multiparty system. 
307 The African 08/09/2007 ‘Tunduru education alarms Lowassa’. 
3.2 The notables and the exercise of the state coercive power 
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pressurised brokers of the top executive’s demands, all had a lot to lose: their very position 
within the state apparatus.  
 
Villagers unwilling to pay were forced to contribute through the uambozi practice: the 
forced requisition of household assets (cattle, furniture, etc.). One parent in School Z 
described this practice:  
At the beginning, when we decided to build a school and other activities, villagers sat down and discussed 
together. They reached the decision to set up this by-law: if someone fails to do their part or fails to 
attend the meeting, the village chairman and village executive officer choose some people among the 
participants and ask them to go and pick a goat or whatever… People are given deadlines: to recover 
their property they have to bring the money. If they can’t pay cash they have to make bricks for instance. 
 
The practice is grounded in the national legal framework: once authorised by the district 
council, villages or wards are entitled to pass local regulations enforceable within their 
jurisdiction through a local court of village executives. Any breach of regulations means 
that the offender can be charged with a criminal offence, fined or even imprisoned. Village 
and ward officers recognised the instrumental role of these by-laws in compelling villagers 
to contribute to the construction of ward schools. ‘If we don’t have a by-law to apply it’s difficult 
to get support from the community to build…It’s a catalyst to pressurise our development in our community’ 
(former Ward Education Coordinator). Lowassa’s decision on ward schools made this legal 
form of coercion possible and the extraction of peasants’ surplus took place on a larger 
scale than previously: prior to 2006, ‘every member of Parliament, every district commissioner or 
regional commissioner would try on its own (…) Mobilising resources was very difficult especially because at 
that time there was no decree from the government’ (MP, Lushoto, interview 131).  
 
From the interviews emerged a reality of local social relations that profoundly deviates 
from the ‘voluntary, self-help’ narrative: villagers avoided the demands put on them by the 
state and coercion was necessary to draw reluctant peasants into the state’s realm. ‘Our main 
challenge is the participation of the community to the construction (bricks, labour etc.)… Most of them 
don’t like it and say “the government should play their part”. They can do it but only if they are forced. The 
ones who refused to attend the meetings are taken to the ward executive officer for penalties; their properties 
are taken to be sold and to fund the works.’ (Ward official, interview 122). Machiavellian ruse 
supplemented state coercion. One retired district official explained: ‘In some wards, they were 
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not willing to contribute. So we would send their children very far, allocate them to distant secondary schools 
so that it would become very costly for them. The next year they would tell us “we need to build our own 
school”’ (interview 111).  
 
Students themselves have been enrolled as agents of the state. Once schools officially 
opened, students’ own labour force has been exploited to complete the infrastructures: ‘To 
minimise the cost of building we asked students to dig the trenches, to carry sand… We employed a local 
fundi but students worked on it’ (Headmaster, School W). 308  Students also constitute 
headmasters’ privileged device to overcome parents’ avoidance of the fee burden. In the 
majority of schools visited, the school administration expelled students who did not pay 
their fees, in effect turning them into tax collectors: ‘Parents must be squeezed to pay. If you don’t 
send their kids back home to ask fees they’re not paying willingly’ (Headmaster, School I). This 
coercive strategy contradicts both the official instruction from the Ministry of Education 
and core pedagogical goals: students can be excluded for anywhere between one or two 
weeks to two months before being allowed to resume their schooling. In this instance, 
concerns over resource mobilisation blatantly prevail over any educational consideration. 
Yet, this strategy also reflects the precarious position of headmasters, as front-liners in the 
implementation of severely under resourced state policies.  
 
 
The verb ‘to educate’ was heard repeatedly in interviews. However, it was not used to 
qualify activities happening within classrooms or to define the functions of schooling. It 
was pronounced in reference to a key function of local political leaders (members of 
Parliament, ward councillors/diwani, village chairmen, party representatives) and local 
bureaucrats (from district and ward officials to village secretaries):309 ‘to educate the poor, 
to educate the peasants, to educate the parents’. In this context, the concept of 
‘intellectuals’ as defined by Gramsci ably captures the role played by local notables in the 
implementation of the ward schools policy: to engage in organisational, directive and 
                                                 
308 The Ministry official directive on the issue derives from the Education for Self-Reliance promotion of manual activities in 
the curriculum: ‘It’s a duty to participate in the construction but it must be planned and integrated in the school timetable. 
The school timetable should be 141 days/year. So it should not disturb the normal routine of the school (it should be in 
evenings or week-ends)’ (official, MoEVT, interview 22). 
309 Village secretaries are appointed by PMO-RALG; they are state officials. Ngware and Haule (1992) underlined the 
historical close association between village institutions and party structures. 
3.3 ‘Contributors of ideas’: Notables as Gramscian intellectuals 
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educative activities (Gramsci 1971).310 In such a perspective, ‘intellectuals are not defined 
by the quality and content of their discourse (…); they are defined by their place within the 
ensemble of social relations’ (Feierman 1990: 18). In this sense, Lucas Shemdowa’s self-
definition as a ‘peasant’ should not be misleading: 311  as Malindi’s ward councillor and 
Chairman of Lushoto Council, he was an influential intellectual in the district. Similarly, 
ward councillors and village chairmen with minimal education became part of the 
‘intellectuals’ category, their proximity to peasants allowing them to play a pivotal role in 
their mobilisation.  
 
‘Intellectuals’ cannot be considered as a homogeneous and cohesive category but in 
mobilising communities, at least during the phase of rapid expansion, the different factions 
coalesced to relay the centrally designed project on the ground. They all contributed to the 
advancement of popular consent to the central state’s demands. Even representatives of 
opposition parties engaged decisively in mobilisation activities: ‘We tried to convince people to 
contribute as any other party. Whenever there was a meeting, we encouraged villagers to contribute’ (CUF 
representative, Lushoto). Local leaders’ core teaching to the masses revealed a profound 
appropriation of the cost-sharing ideology:  
The policy of the government is: “they have to show effort and whoever is ready gets support”. Otherwise 
you create dormant brains; it’s spoon feeding. The government policy says we need cooperation between 
the communities and the government. It’s not only about needs, you have to show efforts. It’s related to 
privatisation and the development policy that has changed: now communities have to show their efforts. 
(Ward Education Coordinator, interview 122) 
 
As members of the elite, these ‘intellectuals’ strongly share the belief, described in Chapter 
4, in education as the main engine of development. However, their social self-positioning 
as walimu (teachers) of the peasants is firmly grounded in a collective perception of peasants 
as ‘backward’ and resistant to education. The phrase ‘they don’t value education’ was 
systematically enunciated by all strata of the local elite, down to teachers and village 
secretaries, as if a self-evident correlative to the ‘we need to educate them’. For instance the 
young MP January Makamba evoked his own cultural challenge:  
                                                 
310 This analytical framework is directly borrowed from Feierman (1990) who used Gramsci’s definition of intellectuals to 
study the political struggle of a group of peasants in Lushoto in the late colonial period, a localised movement that finally 
merged with the nationalist party. 
311 ‘Professionally, I’m a geologist but my occupation is farming: I’m a peasant’. 
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Our people still don’t value education as other cultures do. A parent would be absolutely content to let 
his or her daughter who passed Standard 7 just stay home and get married. Very content. And actually, 
sometimes, they deliberately ask them not to pass. So it’s difficult when you’re in this situation. As an 
outsider... An outsider has to push.312 
 
Local leaders do recognise communities’ impoverished socio-economic status. But, in a 
second discursive movement, they immediately posit a direct correspondence between 
cultural and financial valuation of education: ‘People don’t know the importance of education: they 
don’t pay’. 313  The culturalist lens cast on the peasants’ relation to education allows the 
framing of the issue of education finances in terms of the poor themselves. Their low 
educational status directly derives from their essential ‘backwardness’ and ‘laziness’. In the 
following statement, Mshangama described his tactic to persuade reluctant villagers to build 
a secondary school: 
I asked them three questions, it was my lecture to them: 
1/ For whom are we putting up classrooms? They answered: “For our children”. 
2/ If we refuse to put up a new classroom for any reason who will lose? The DC? The Councillor? The 
MP? They answered: “Our children”. 
3/ In that case, have you acted sensibly to refuse to put up classrooms? Are you fools, are you stupid?  
 
Yet this narrative collided with parental accounts of their willingness to pay, nourished by 
their desire for education. Belief in the power of education is not a specific attribute of the 
elite. In Lushoto, a social demand for education had already been voiced during colonial 
times (Feierman 1990: 140-143; 190-191). Focus groups with parents confirmed that the 
valuation of education in contemporary Tanzania cuts across social classes. For poor 
farmers, education is the promise of a better future for their children, the key engine that 
can trigger change in otherwise immutable peasant conditions. In Lushoto, a densely 
inhabited district, education has replaced land as the crucial asset to bequeath to one’s 
children: ‘The inheritance is not a farm anymore. Now you give your son or daughter education’ (parent, 
School AA).314 This hope is obviously passed on to children. Students interviewed wanted 
                                                 
312 It is one example among many but it demonstrates the trans-generational nature of this social-positioning as ‘educator 
of the masses’. Unterhalter et al. (2012) identified a similar ‘blaming the poor’ discourse throughout Kenya’s education 
system.  
313 Ward Executive Officer, interview 116. 
314 Stambach’s (2000: 20) research in Kilimanjaro revealed a ‘socially prominent view that lineage lands and schools 
symbolically interrelate’. Kelsall (2004) similarly underlined the relation, in Arumeru District, between population growth, 
land shortage and private investments in education. 
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to become engineers, doctors, teachers, chemists, nurses, pharmacists, pilots and 
accountants. This hope in an educational path to a brighter future instigated parents’ 
adherence to the government’s expansion policy: ‘Somehow I agreed with the decision of the 
government because before kids were not very educated because there were so few schools. So for the sake of 
the kids, I agreed at the beginning’ (mother, interview 151).  
 
Data from the 2006 Integrated Labour Force Survey confirmed the national scope of this social 
desire for education. To the question ‘If given a choice, what would you like to do?’ an 
overwhelming proportion of respondents replied: ‘going to school full time’ (Figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6-2: People’s preferred activities 
 
Source: URT (2007a) 
 
It is difficult to assess the respective weights of consent and coercion in the 
implementation of such a process: depending on the village and the nature of the relation 
between the population and state representatives in the locality, the mix of coercion and 
consent differed. However, this policy certainly bears less resemblance to the Kilimanjaro 
model than to historical centrally driven policies such as Ujamaa villagisation: like that 
historical scheme, it has been implemented in a very heavy-handed, top-down manner.  
 
 
 
 
Local elites have pressured communities to provide the financial base of the expansion. 
Nevertheless, the resource mobilisation process also comprised an element of reciprocity: 
3.4 The notables and the iron sheet: an educational patronage 
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notables did not restrict their contribution to ‘ideas’; they also provided material resources. 
A district CCM cadre pointed out: ‘If you meet people and ask them to build schools you have to 
contribute’ (interview 134). Feierman (1990: 49) explained how in pre-colonial Shambaai,315 
Kilindi kings based their accumulation strategy on the extraction of the peasant economy 
through the payment of tributes. In exchange, rulers dispensed banana groves and, above 
all, ‘rain medicines’, the golden key to food security.316 For the Ujamaa period, Hyden (1980: 
18-19) evoked the ‘economy of affection’ prevalent in Tanzanian rural areas that forced 
bureaucrats and politicians to develop various forms of patronage to gain the support of 
‘uncaptured’ peasants.317  The conditions of implementation of the ward schools policy 
demonstrate that the ‘beneficent notable’ remains an essential structural figure in social 
relations in contemporary Lushoto.318  
 
‘Iron sheets’ were notables’ most prominent material contribution to community secondary 
schools. In interviews, ‘roofing’ and ‘iron sheets’ were the item most cited in describing 
their support for the establishment of schools.319 It proved impossible to estimate, even 
roughly, the financial value of these personal gifts to the community or to relate it to the 
giver’s personal wealth.320  Notables’ munificence may even be completely cost-free for 
them, bags of cement or iron sheets representing entrepreneurs’ kick-backs in privileged 
tender awards. 321  In the social valuation of notables’ leadership, parents and village 
executives seemed to value the intellectual function – organising, directing, educating – 
higher. However, those leaders who did not contribute at all in material form generated 
resentment and incomprehension.322  
 
                                                 
315 Current Lushoto territory. 
316 Kilindi kings drew their power from their ability to control the rain. 
317 For a critical reading of Hyden’s notion of ‘economy of affection’ and its ambiguities see Geschiere (1984).  
318 Bayart (1993) uses the concept of ‘evergetism’, borrowed from the French historian Paul Veyne, to describe the 
patron-client relations in sub-Saharan Africa. Power, money and prestige constitute the three core ingredients of this 
‘private liberality for public benefit’ (Veyne 1990: 10). 
319 In other districts, a similar practice of donations of iron sheets prevailed. See for instance ‘Tanzania: Serengeti Council 
Chairman Donates 120 Iron Sheets’ Tanzania Daily News 26/2/2012.  
320 As an indication, in 2011, a Member of Parliament earned Tsh 7.3 million per month (a basic salary of about Tsh 2 
million plus various allowances. The construction of one school requires about 200 iron sheets, each costing between Tsh 
22,000 and Tsh 25,000.  
321 ‘Councillors don’t have money but they are close to businessmen; they attribute them some bids. For instance, they 
would tell “we need 1 ton of cement. But please give me one or two bags for free’ (informant, Lushoto district). 
322 For the early post-independence period, Feierman (1990: 195-196) noted ‘ [wealthy peasants] were criticized only if 
they did not use the profits to help meet the needs of less fortunate relatives (…) Even when prosperous men were stingy 
and were resented, their commercial farming was never criticized as inappropriate. Only their unwillingness to help was 
resented’.  
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The significance of this educational patronage does not lie in its monetary value: notables 
have to contribute to assert their status in the community but their largesse does not have 
to be proportional to their wealth. In this perspective, iron sheets are loaded with a 
profound symbolic meaning. Since their introduction by the colonial power, they have 
represented a material symbol of progress, modernity and high social status in African rural 
areas.323 Interestingly, the Ministry of Education’s formal requirement for iron sheets of a 
specific size – 28 gauge – derives directly from a regulation in force during colonial times. 
By dispensing iron sheets to help spread education - immaterial symbol of modernity - 
notables position themselves twice as intermediaries of modernity.324  
 
To finance their ‘iron sheets’ largesse, notables drew from their personal wealth, especially 
in the primary phase of the expansion. In the early days of the process of re-localisation of 
national politics, MPs were discovering the nature and obligations of their function. 
Shelukindo noted: ‘I didn’t know; as a MP you’re the shipper, the position is so demanding: demanding 
on your time and demanding on your resources’. Originally, local notables residing in Dar es Salaam 
or in other urban centres (like Tanga) were also considered a major source of funding. For 
instance, the Mkuzu Club, in the Kinondoni area of Dar es Salaam, used to gather 
prominent people from Lushoto, including petty businessmen from Kariakoo:325 they were 
the main financial sponsors behind the establishment of Shambalai Secondary School in 
1988. Similar schemes have continued to be operational: for instance, Mgwashi and Mlalo 
wards benefit from well-organised groups of ‘expatriates’ in Dar es Salaam and villagers in 
Kalumelo have been supported by a committee in Tanga. 
 
In recent years, an adulterated form of patronage – publicly funded – has developed with 
the establishment in 2009 of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF): a nation-wide 
mechanism that channels budgetary resources to each parliamentary constituency to 
                                                 
323 Corrugated iron was developed and patented in Great Britain around 1830 and then exported to the colonies of the 
Empire. In the case of Nigeria, Falola (1999: 246) note that, following  the abolition of slavery at the end of the 1880s, 
‘Such things as corrugated iron sheets, bicycles, wrist watches, a variety of imported cloths replaced slaves as status 
symbols and money was needed to purchase them’. 
324 This symbolic significance of iron sheets is not specific to Tanzania. In Machete Season: the Killers in Rwanda Speak, 
Hatzfeld tells the exile of genocidal Hutus to neighbouring DRC. Before running away, and despite the desperate urgency 
of their situation, they took time to take down the roofing of their houses: corrugated iron sheets were the only material 
objects they brought to Congolese Kivu with them (Hatzfeld 2005).  
325 Kariakoo, in Dar es Salaam, is the biggest market place of the country. Mshangama and Mmando were both members 
of the ‘club’. 
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finance small-scale development projects. 326  In Lushoto, ward secondary schools have 
constituted a privileged field of investment for these funds. These are public financial 
resources subject to standard programming and disbursement procedures but the MP 
heads the CDF committee that allocates the funds to various projects and the gain has 
without doubt been a personal one.  
 
Finally, to bring material support to the community, notables, especially MPs, have also 
exploited their position of extraversion: in this case too, they do not tap into their personal 
wealth but rather their personal connections outside the district. Shekifu raised funds from 
the Telecommunication Regulatory Board and cement companies.327 Shelukindo obtained 
support from important parastatals (the National Social Security Fund, the Tanzanian Port 
Authority and the National Provident Fund).328 Notables’ extraversion strategy also crosses 
national boundaries to reach foreign sponsors. School AB has benefited from the support 
of Austrian benefactors, including a Catholic diocese: they were mobilised by Sister Marjelis, 
headmistress of the neighbouring primary school and resident of the nearby Kifungilo 
Catholic convent, through a personal fund-raising initiative. In another instance, 
Mshangama advised villagers to name their newly built school ‘Prince Claus’, after Queen 
Beatrice of Netherlands’ German husband. During the colonial time, his father used to 
manage a sisal estate in Tanga and the future Prince Claus attended a missionary school in 
Lushoto. The Dutch Ambassador came to the school inauguration and brought gifts from 
the Queen. Stamped with a colonial seal, this rural ward school has in one action been 
connected to contemporary globalised Europe: German and Dutch tourists come and give 
presents to the school. These foreign material contributions have been symbolic. But by 
bringing to the community a highly valued resource – access to the outside world – the 
notable built up his local reputation as an agent of modernity.  
 
Three entangled motives underpin notables’ patronage practices. One is a sense of duty, a 
willingness to give back to the community, felt especially by those who benefited from a 
higher education and occupied influential posts within the state apparatus. Shelukindo’s 
                                                 
326 In her study of the mechanism, Tsubura (2012: 1) describes the CDF as ‘a tool that MPs can use to respond to the 
development needs of their constituencies, cultivate their relationships with the electorate, and enhance their chances of 
re-election’. 
327 Shekifu has been a member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Communication and Transport which 
implies at least an institutional proximity with TCRB or cement companies. 
328 Shelukindo used to be Chairman of the Board of the National Provident Fund.  
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testimony illustrates this commitment nourished by a profound trust in the developmental 
virtues of education:  
I’ve been out of that area for a long time. That was the first time I had time to understand my 
community where I was born. So I realised that development can be spread through education. (…) 
And I was at this point of my life when my own children were going to schools and university and so on 
but … the others ... my relatives … they are just … working hard but achieving nothing. (…) I came 
to assist my community here. I have a responsibility. I was lucky that I was educated and I got a job 
with the government and went to the highest level of permanent secretary. Now, it’s high time … I assist 
my community … It was my personal conviction that I had a role. 
 
A second major motive is personal interest, the desire to be re-elected. Political survival 
depends on reciprocating communities’ contributions. As Shekifu put it: ‘We need to get the 
people’s votes’. Nevertheless, their largesse, mobilisation efforts and educational credentials at 
local level are not a guarantee of political endurance. Especially in the case of MPs, the 
intra-CCM nomination process is highly competitive and subject to ‘veranda politics’ in 
Dar es Salaam. 329  For instance, in Bumbuli, Shelukindo, caught up in the intra-CCM 
national struggle related to a large-scale corruption case, was ousted by the young January 
Makamba, parachuted into a constituency he won without having to contest; he also 
replaced Shelunkindo as Chair of the strategic Parliamentary Standing Committee for 
Energy and Minerals.330 In 2010, in Lushoto constituency, Mshangama, despite his widely 
recognised personal engagement in favour of local development, could not resist Shekifu’s 
personal financial base and high-level connections that enabled him to build up a wider 
electoral clientele.331 Finally, in Mlalo, Ngwilizi, a close friend of former President Benjamin 
Mkapa who was personally involved in Ngwilizi’s campaign, was preferred to Kagonji who 
then defected to the opposition party, Chadema.  
 
                                                 
329 The ‘veranda’ metaphor is drawn from Terray (1986). Since 2010, the selection process of CCM candidates for MPs 
and Councillors seats has been decentralised/democratised but the national leadership has kept a say on the results 
(senior official, CCM Secretary, interview 85). 
330 January Makamba, son of Yusuf Makamba, was adviser/speech writer to President Kikwete. In 2012 he was appointed 
Deputy-Minister for Science and Technology. His would-be Chadema opponent during the 2010 electoral competition 
for the Bumbuli seat, withdrew from the political race at the very last minute: since then she has held important positions 
within the bureaucratic apparatus. January Makamba, inexperienced in local campaigning, thus conveniently won his seat 
without any political fight (based on interviews with several informants in Lushoto and Dar es Salaam). 
331 Henry Shekifu is close to Lowassa and President Kikwete (in 2005 and 2010 he was Kikwete’s campaign manager in 
Tanga, Kilimanjaro and Arusha). He used to work as a manager of parastatals and is now engaged in business: he is one 
of the main distributors of mineral water in Tanga Region.  
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Ultimately, patronage is a ‘way for the notables to express their sense of superiority’ (Veyne 
1990). Nowhere is it more palpable than in Mshangama’s self-appraisal of his contribution 
to the expansion. ‘In almost every ward, they wanted to name schools after my name’ and two schools 
were, indeed, named after him and his wife: his personal flag flies in Lushoto rural areas. 
His discourse reveals a quasi-feudal sense of ownership. According to him ‘the ownership 
must be seen to belong to the community’, a telling passive voice that barely conceals the actual 
nature of the ownership. In his discourse, communities’ schools become ‘my schools’ that are 
‘the reward of a MP to his people’. Ignoring communities’ disproportionate financial and labour 
contributions, he gave himself full credit for these schools’ existence of. In a similar - if less 
eloquent - manner, most notables interviewed insisted on leaders’ preeminent efforts, 
implicitly positing themselves as the true owners of the schools: Shekifu claims, ‘It’s not easy 
to educate the masses. But we’ve got 28 schools and it’s thanks to the leaders’ efforts, the government’s effort’.  
 
4. Ward secondary schools: a new political battlefield for local elites 
 
Chapter Four argued that the ward schools policy has been, at its core and starting with its 
terminology, a space management policy. In Lushoto, the ward schools policy, locally 
translated into a ‘village schools policy’, has also been predominantly shaped by ‘spatial 
politics’.332 
 
 
The ward schools policy in Lushoto has given rise to a fierce competition between villages. 
Surprisingly, in a highly populated district characterised by a long-lasting land shortage, the 
implementation of the policy did not generate major land disputes. Some conflicts did arise 
but in general, access to land was not a critical impediment to the expansion. In most cases, 
                                                 
332 ‘The State engenders social relations in space’ (Lefebvre 2009:225). In their reading of Lefebvre’s work, Brenner and 
Selden (2009) highlighted two meanings of ‘the politics of space’: it refers both to space as a contested site and to state 
‘spatial management’ or ‘spatial policy’. For these authors, ‘territory is always being produced and reproduced by the 
actions of the state and through political struggles over the latter; yet at the same time, in the modern world, territory also 
conditions state operations and on-going efforts to contest them’(ibid: 367). Snyder (2008) argues that spatial politics was 
also a key feature of the PEDP implementation.  
4.1 Politicians’ battles for territory control: village competition and the 
‘ghost secondary schools’   
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a portion of the land of existing primary schools was granted to the future secondary 
school.333 
 
However, the choice of the precise school location certainly led to multiple conflicts. A 
dominant story can be determined from the 25 community schools visited. In the early 
stage of the process, several wards and then villages teamed up to build an initial school. 
The location was chosen to serve all the contributing villages equally – for instance, at the 
centre of the ward or the centre of villages; or in relation to public transport facilities; 
sometimes the location was, indeed, constrained by the availability of land. Once the initial 
school was built, sometimes even before its completion, inter-village conflicts arose, fuelled 
by the perception in one village that the original deal was unfair.  
 
The case of Shume is typical. In March 2012, this ward had six community secondary 
schools: ‘There were some conflicts between the villages. One thought it worked harder than the other 
village. So each village decided to have its own school’ (Councillor, interview 133). In Bumbuli 
constituency, TAFDEF, set-up by Tamota and Funta wards, was dissolved before the 
completion of the first planned school. Initially, both wards had agreed that they would 
build Tamota School before building a school in Funta. However, during the building 
process, Funta’s inhabitants decided that they should start their own school. But the 
resources drawn from the tea levy were not enough to support two schools; farmers would 
have to contribute Tsh 15,000 more. In this context, the joint scheme lost its appeal for the 
people in Tamota, a zone of tea plantations unlike Funta: the tea levy was seen as an unfair 
burden and lost its legitimacy, already undermined by the TAFDEF Secretary’s 
mismanagement of funds. 
 
This inter-village tension has been fuelled by politicians’ political struggles and quests for 
prestige. When conflicts occurred between villages over the location of a school, 
Mshangama systematically advised the construction of separate schools, in each village. For 
instance, in Kwai Ward, when inhabitants were negotiating the construction of their first 
secondary school: ‘Villages in north of Kwai (Kireti, Kwai) wanted the school at Kwe Makame. 
Villages in the south (Mkuzi, Migambo, Milongwi), wanted the school in Mkuzi. I told them “Let’s put 
                                                 
333 A legacy of the colonial period when missions were heavily involved in primary education, allocating a large piece of 
land to primary schools. 
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two secondary schools”. Now there are four secondary schools there’. Far from a sui generis or ‘natural’ 
competition, this rivalry between villages was largely driven by political leaders’ ambitions: 
‘The DbyD [decentralisation] process is very political. Certain wards have two schools. So when a politician 
wants to become a ward councillor, he will emphasise the construction of another school to satisfy certain 
villages’ (district official, interview 109).  
 
Some objective arguments, put forward by officials to justify the multiplication of schools, 
cannot be dismissed easily. In many locations in the district - a hilly, mountainous area - the 
topography makes a walk to a distant school a difficult journey for students. The high 
population density coupled with a high number of primary schools (256 in 2012) has also 
led to a high number of Standard 7 leavers. Nevertheless, in many schools visited the key 
challenge was actually the lack of students. In many instances, a new school was built in the 
vicinity of an existing secondary school and shared the same catchment area. In several 
schools, headmasters complained that ‘students are too few’. For instance, School P, very close 
to School O, was registered in 2007 to take 120 students every year: today, it should enrol 
no less than 400 students. But with a total of only 120 students actually enrolled in March 
2012, they experienced a ‘shortage of students’ and only four of the eight classrooms were 
occupied. This was not an isolated case as confirmed by a district official: ‘At this moment we 
do have some schools where there is no student at all (…). Their catchment area does not fulfil the need for 
a school but they have already prepared the place and already started the construction’ (interview 124). 
Contradicting the dominant narrative about an irrepressible demographic pressure, the 
Chairman of the Council predicted a future landscape of ‘ghost secondary schools’: ‘In a 
short period of time, I guess that some of the schools won’t have any students because of family planning, 
HIV death rate or the migration to urban centres’. 
 
District bureaucrats have attempted to prevent a local interpretation of the national policy 
– one secondary school in each village – that obviously contradicts their own interests. 
Indeed, numerous schools spread over the district territory caused intractable management 
challenges for the District Secondary Education Office. ‘Schools are too many’ to be properly 
supervised.334 But local politicians have manoeuvred to obtain ministerial authorisation to 
open ‘their’ sub-standard or unfinished school or to enrol under-performing Standard 7 
                                                 
334  Interview 124. Even the national top executive expressed concerns about the scope of expansion in Lushoto. 
According to Mshangama, President Kikwete, addressing an education audience in New York, made a reference to 
Shume ward and its six community secondary schools: ‘we have to stop them because the response was too positive’. 
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leavers in ‘their’ school. These local arrangements with central state regulations illustrate 
the precarious position of district bureaucrats. On one hand, they cannot alienate 
politicians as they depend on them in order to be able to fulfil their duties: for instance to 
be informed of school-level realities or to mobilise communities. On the other hand, their 
decisions can easily be overruled by local politicians who enjoy a personal and direct 
relationship with top decision-makers in Dar es Salaam. Submerged by the politics of 
fiefdoms, district bureaucrats have proved unable to contain the wave of new schools. 
 
 
An unmistakable site of contestation for access to central resources, the district budget has 
crystallised the conflicting interests of politicians and bureaucrats and cemented their 
ambiguous position as intermediaries of the state in the local arena. 
 
In theory, the development part of the district budget is designed through an ascending 
programming process, from villages to ward and district, officially aimed at ‘enhanc[ing] 
community participation/ownership in development processes’: the Opportunities and 
Obstacles to Development process. 335  In fact, the prioritisation of investments, across 
villages and sectors, falls under the responsibility of the district Department of Budget and 
Planning.336  The draft budget is partially driven by local needs, as documented by the 
statistical apparatus: ‘We have to propose where to build. We consider the number of students, the 
number of buildings, the number of population, the number of Standard 7 leavers and how old a school is’ 
(district senior official, interview 124). The district MTEF document, in its narrative part, 
insists on a necessary focus on ‘disadvantaged areas and marginalised areas’ (LDC 2010: 29). 
A district staff member further identified them through formal criteria: the ‘very remote areas 
where there are few transportation facilities, the areas hit by hunger and areas that lack basic social services 
(water, education, health services)’ (district official, interview 109). In this perspective, the MTEF 
clearly reveals the essence of a planning/budgeting exercise for civil servants: to allocate 
scarce resources to the most pressing needs.  
 
                                                 
335 PMO-RALG web site: http://www.pmoralg.go.tz/menu-data/programmes/O-OD/.  
336 In his own analysis of the budget process in Lushoto, Harrison (2008: 179) similarly remarked that village and ward 
demands were subject to an ‘opaque reworking carried out at the District level by the Planning Department’ 
4.2 The district budget between technocratic rationality and spatial politics 
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Yet, voted on by the district council, an elected body, the district budget is ultimately a 
political artefact that reflects power struggles between politicians (MPs and councillors) and 
between politicians and district bureaucrats. The MTEF document itself recognised ‘political 
interferences in education issues’ as one of the main planning and budgeting challenges (LDC 
2010: 19). Based on interviews, the major cleavages that shake the local political arena 
during budget negotiations can be sketched out.337 
 
In their programming, district officials integrate the political constraints and take account 
of the political organisation of the district: for example, the existence of three parliamentary 
constituencies. ‘We have to distribute evenly’ (senior district official, interview 124). This 
attention to the political parameters does not prevent intense arguments with politicians. 
The identification of the geographical location of district investments is especially subject 
to heated negotiations. 338  In the following statement, a district bureaucrat describes 
bureaucrats’ and politicians’ conflicting perspectives, divergent languages and the nature of 
their negotiations:  
Those politicians what they need is to maintain their votes. The projects they defend might not be a need. 
That’s when we come to miscommunication and political interferences. Political figures want a project to 
be in his or her ward. But it might not be the district priority or a needy ward. It might already have 
good infrastructures. For them a 40 million project is a way to win votes. That’s the challenge. But we 
use several meetings and the statutory committees. Then we discuss in baraza [Council] meetings and 
we harmonise among political figures. We convince them that their projects are not a national priority or 
a district priority. But if they convince us about the need of their project, that’s a real need of the village, 
we can also agree with them. They do discuss politics; we speak of facts, guidelines and priorities… it’s 
sometimes hard… A politician is not a technical person; he does not care about “vulnerable areas.” 
(Interview 109) 
 
Bureaucrats position themselves as the guardians of a technical rationality jeopardised by 
politicians’ strategies: ‘My role, as a planner, is to harmonize politics. We need to educate them. We 
can’t agree with everything a diwani or MP wants because they’ve got their personal political interests’ 
(senior district official, interview 126). Here again the opposition between the educated 
                                                 
337 To decipher the nitty-gritty of budget negotiations and assess the actual power balances between the different actors 
would ideally require the study of minutes of council meetings. The author was unable to gain access to them.  
338 For the allocation of capitation grant ‘there’s no argument’ (MP, interview 148). Harrison (2008: 181) similarly noted 
that technocrats in the District Planning and Finance Departments were regularly pressured by ward councilors. 
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expert and the politician can be seen. According to a Member of Parliament, the control of 
knowledge grants district bureaucrats an ascending influence over ward councillors who, 
less educated, struggle to make their political authority, grounded in democratic election, 
prevail over the technocratic legitimacy: ‘It’s a very delicate balance. Because on one hand, we have 
the councillors who are supposed to oversee the council. They are “the bosses”. But the level, the asymmetry 
of exposure and knowledge and expertise between the councillors and the DED and all these council 
experts - the planning officer, the education officer…- it’s massive. So they know how to manipulate data, 
documents or reports’ (MP, interview 148).339 
 
 
As argued by Feierman (1990: 21), ‘traditional intellectuals’ see themselves as partially 
autonomous. Tanzanian secondary school headmasters have indeed long occupied a 
specific position among the district elite. Prior to the decentralisation, they used to receive 
instructions directly from the central level and would run ‘their’ school within a loose 
accountability framework: ‘Headmasters were there as an institution, nobody could ask questions… 
No one was here to make any follow up’ (senior district official, interview 124). Their high social 
status stemmed from their position straddling the local space and the modern outside 
world, embodied in the administrative capital: they would regularly travel to Dar es Salaam 
and the Ministry of Education to negotiate their school’s affairs.  
 
For the teaching profession in Lushoto (teachers, headmasters, TTU District Secretary), the 
decentralisation process has had a positive impact, especially for the management of 
teachers’ career and salary issues.340 Teachers complained about bureaucratic hurdles faced 
at district level, largely due to the understaffing of the District Secondary Education Office. 
Yet, for the majority, becoming a district employee has made their life easier. However, by 
redistributing the centres of decision, decentralisation has reordered the pathways to 
favours within the state. Teachers and headmasters lamented the perceived shift from a 
                                                 
339 In this chapter, the District Commissioner’s role has not been touched upon. This omission reflects the data collected. 
Informants rarely evoked DC’s interventions or her educational patronage. One explanation can be linked to a flaw in the 
researcher’s questionnaire that did not include direct questions on this specific figure. The DC also kept her door closed 
to the researcher. In any case, the DC is, in the district, a powerful and feared political character. According to one 
informant ‘Makamba, Shekifu, Ngwilizi, the DC, the directors and other rich men like Bosnia control the decision-making 
process in the district’ but ‘the DC is the most powerful’ (interview 141). 
340 For TTU district Secretary, ‘teachers thank the decision; for them it’s a revolution’. 
4.3 The Headmaster and the Notable in decentralisation times: a power 
reconfiguration 
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predictable, rule-based management by a neutral, Weberian central state to a district 
management more prone to parochialism, tribalism and personal favouritism. The 
following statement by a long-time secondary education headmaster was symptomatic:  
Somebody can hate someone and start a rumour on this person to damage his/her reputation saying that 
he/she does not fit the position (we use the Swahili term ‘majungu’: back biting or gossiping). At 
MoEVT, they were very careful: in case of problem, they would send a delegation for a thorough 
investigation. It’s more biased than in the past ... For instance, last year, one head master was 
transferred because of the pressure of the council but we don’t know on which grounds. They misuse the 
power they have gained through decentralisation.341  
 
Specifically, the posting of teachers to schools within the district – a key responsibility 
devolved to the district – nourished teachers’ resentment vis-à-vis a process they 
considered as biased. And indeed, when newly recruited teachers reported for their initial 
posting in mid-February 2012, the District Secondary Education Office and its vicinities 
metamorphosed into a busy auction place. Fresh recruits would openly bargain with the 
DSEO or the DED, threatening to quit if posted to ‘unfriendly places’. Headmasters would 
vaunt the particular assets of their schools to attract the rare and precious young teachers. 
In the shadow, well-connected parents of new teachers would call district officials to obtain 
a favourable posting for their progeny, close to town.342  
 
Favouritism certainly did not make its appearance only with decentralisation. In the past 
those headmasters who enjoyed privileged access to key officials within the Ministry of 
Education would obtain favours, for instance in terms of allocation of teachers, career 
advancement or simply a swift solution of their administrative issues. Decentralisation has 
certainly reorganised the mechanisms of preferential treatment and has shifted the burden 
of the informal obligation of responding to teachers’ pleas from central civil servants to 
district staff. Ministerial corridors used to constantly buzz with the noise of swarms of 
teachers and headmasters in search of small favours. In the Ministry of Education, at the 
                                                 
341 Other teachers would openly denounce what they perceive as a tribalist management ‘To be helped you’re supposed to 
be known. They ignore us. But if you talk Kisamba, everything is solved quickly’ (teacher, School C). 
342 As put by a bitter teacher: in the district, ‘They’re uneven in allocating teachers to schools. Some have family links and they can be 
allocated near towns. Before, with the system of appointment, names were displayed by MoEVT. It was more difficult to ask for favour’ 
(teacher, School H). An informant, CCM cadre, acknowledged his personal initiative – a phone call to a specific District 
Executive Director - to obtain a good posting for her daughter, a newly recruited teacher. 
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time of the research, decentralisation was partly viewed as a loss of power vis-à-vis PMO-
RALG but all officials expressed great relief at being freed of teachers’ demands. 
 
In a Gramscian perspective traditional intellectuals ‘have some freedom of manoeuvre in 
allying with one power bloc or the other, although they usually compromise with the 
dominant social group’ (Feierman 1990: 21). The decentralisation of secondary education 
has engendered a process of power reconfiguration between headmasters and other local 
power holders (ward councillors and staff, village secretaries and chairmen). The nature of 
their relations varied from one school visited to another, from fruitful cooperation to 
friction, covert animosity or even open conflict that required the intervention of district 
auditors and ministry inspectors. The following statement by the headmaster in School AA 
exemplified collaborative partnerships: ‘We’re together with the Village Chairman, the Village 
Executive Secretary, the Ward Executive Officer, the Diwani. We ask them to come here to parents’ 
meetings; we ask them their support to get desk and building contributions… we agree many issues together’. 
In some cases, headmasters would unquestioningly admit village leaders’ absolute power 
(‘The village leaders lead everything; they have the power’- Headmaster, School J) or surrender by 
fear and swear allegiance (‘Some village leaders are powerful and want to control even the headmaster. 
Some headmasters are under threat... Some headmasters fear; some obey directly: they have to be close to the 
powerful leaders’ - politician, interview 145).  
 
‘Commotions’ and ‘collisions’ – informants’ words – between headmasters and local leaders are 
firmly rooted in the traditional opposition between the educated and the non-educated. In 
reversing the relation between education level and authority, the decentralisation process 
has devalued headmasters’ social position: ‘You feel big when you report to the ministry. When 
you’re in a ward secondary school, you report to the ward development committee. The chairman (the 
councillor) and the Ward Education Coordinator might be standard 7 or a form 4 leaver. As a secondary 
school teacher you might be a two degree holder and used to be dealing with higher authorities’ (senior 
district official, interview 124). Headmasters tend to read their relations to local leaders in 
terms of technical expertise rather than power struggle. However, at the core of tensions 
lies a battle over ward schools’ ownership (‘these local leaders assume it’s their school and it should 
be run according to their will’; Headmaster, School Q) that covers a struggle for the control of 
their resources. Prior to decentralisation, funds would flow directly from the Ministry of 
Education to the school via the regional sub-Treasury. Since fiscal year 2009-10, 
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headmasters have continued to control the use of their school’ capitation grant but have 
lost their influence over development funds, directly managed by the district or channelled 
to the ward and sometimes to the village bank accounts. Headmasters have bartered their 
previous decision-making power for a mere advisory role: ‘I’m invited to Ward Development 
Committee meetings, we always attend. The Headmaster is a permanent member. We advise them... The 
Ward Development Committee are the ones who decide’ (Headmaster, School T). 
 
In this battle for influence, headmasters have kept control over one instrument essential to 
asserting their power within the local arena: they are the secretaries of their school board, 
the school decision-making body. The board approves the school budget and all school 
expenditures need to be supported by a board decision. They also deal with disciplinary 
issues but the budget remains their core responsibility. The conditions of selection of 
members are set out in a Ministry of Education directive and, theoretically, board 
membership has to be formally authorised by the regional and district authorities. In 
practice, headmasters choose board members with almost complete autonomy, and tend to 
select individuals close to them. School boards are an affair of ‘big men’, not of 
commoners: retired district officers and teachers, political figures, religious leaders and 
businessmen. Village representatives are often omitted from these exclusive clubs: ‘The 
budget is their responsibility: so we’re not invited at all meetings. We’ve never been invited to the meeting 
deciding about the budget. It has never happened’ (Village Secretary and Chairman, School R). 
Membership grants access to material resources – sitting allowances – and prestige: the fact 
that former MPs are members of several school boards confirms that this membership is 
constituent of a high social status and provides a position to secure local influence.343 This 
control of board membership also allows headmasters to prevent an inclusive mode of 
management that would give teachers a voice in schools’ affairs: teachers are supposed to 
collectively choose their representative to the board; in the vast majority of schools visited, 
the choice was the headmaster’ privilege.344 
 
The selection of board members also offers headmasters an opportunity to reassert their 
autonomy vis-à-vis the central state and their bargaining power vis-à-vis local authorities. A 
                                                 
343 Sitting allowances amount to Tsh 30,000 per meeting. Mshangama is a board member in Shambalai Secondary School, 
Kagonji in Mtumbi, Lukozi and Manolo Secondary Schools. 
344 The level of teachers’ involvement in the management of school affairs varied from one school to the other, the model 
of the omnipotent headmaster remaining, nevertheless, dominant. Students are not represented on the board. 
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2012 circular by the Ministry of Education forbade ward councillors (and their staff) from 
being voting board members. Central authorities issued this instruction to strengthen the 
accountability framework, as explained by a senior regional official in Tanga:  
Councillors were fighting to be members, across the country … If the councillor … becomes also a 
member of the school board while he’s supposed to monitor the schools, can he be the 
political/government eye in this particular ward … If there’s embezzlement of funds in that school and 
if the councillor is also a member of the board, who will be the eye to ask question?’ (Interview 104) 
Yet, in several schools visited, while aware of the circular, headmasters continued to justify 
the presence of district or ward officials on their board.  
 
Parents have been de facto systematically excluded from school board membership.345 For 
most officials, their presence did not even make any sense - ‘board members represent the 
parents’ (district senior official, interview 124). 346  In practice, decisions over a new 
contribution or fee increase would be arbitrarily taken by the school board and parents only 
subsequently informed during parents’ meetings: a model closer to oligarchy than 
participatory democracy, to a company board than community self-management. 
Headmasters and district officials reported low attendances at these parents’ meetings, 
putting the blame on parents: ‘Villagers sometimes claim they know nothing but it’s due to their 
characters: parents would never come to parents’ meeting, they prefer to work, they don’t care about the use 
of funds, when they’re called they don’t come and they say they’re not informed’ (senior district official, 
interview 124). In the case of development village meetings, even in locations where 
popular consent has prevailed over coercion, the decision-making process is firmly in the 
hands of village and ward officers who control the meeting agendas. The room for 
dissident views appears quite narrow: ‘In meetings you can’t show your reluctance’ (district official, 
interview 122). As argued in Samoff (1989), Shivji and Peter (2000) and HIS (2011), 
villagers’ actual involvement in decision-making has remained very limited.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The SEDP was originally conceived by the World Bank as a welfare programme to alleviate 
communities’ financial burdens. But in direct line with the Post-Washington consensus and 
its promotion of a ‘neoliberalism with a human face’ (Rose 2005), this pro-poor educational 
                                                 
345 An education criterion – to be at least Form Four leaver – may prevent them from being formally chosen. 
346 In a handful of schools, parents’ meetings, while mandatory, were not even organised. 
233 
 
policy was also based on two core premises: user charges generate users’ ownership and 
control, leading to an efficient management of basic social services; and local government 
autonomy enables a national redistributive policy to be more responsive to local needs. 
This hybrid discourse, which resonated with Tanzania’s historical self-help development 
ideology, was largely appropriated by Tanzanian elites and profoundly shaped the ward 
secondary schools policy. Even if donors and the Tanzanian Executive disagreed on the 
pace of the expansion, they largely agreed on its locally driven model of implementation.  
 
The way this public private partnership was actually implemented in Lushoto shows the 
faults in the original ‘voluntary contribution -> ownership -> control -> accountability’ 
narrative. Discursively, symbolically and in decision-making, the communities who built the 
ward secondary schools and continue to provide a large share of their running costs 
certainly do not own them.347 At the same time, the ability of the district, financial surrogate 
of the central state in the local arena, to fulfil its responsibilities regarding its public 
secondary schools has been curtailed by the contradictory demands and public finance 
management practices of the central state. The decentralisation process can be interpreted 
as a central state device to pass on to local governments the burden of coping with the 
intractable financial implications of its education policy choices. 
 
In 2012, in Lushoto District, ward secondary schools were certainly owned by an unstable 
and conflict-ridden triad, composed of district bureaucrats, politicians and other notables. 
These local elites played a pivotal role in the mobilisation of communities. As brokers of 
the central state, they resorted to the state’s coercive power to force communities to 
contribute. But local elites also deployed an ideological apparatus and patronage practices 
to gain the population’s consent to the policy and its cost-sharing features. At the same 
time, spatial politics has been the main engine of the expansion: ward secondary schools 
became a major political field contested by politicians who used the construction of new 
schools as a route to prestige and power. Their opportunistic translation of the central state 
policy into a ‘village school policy’ led, however, to a hyper-fragmentation of the local 
policy space with district administrations struggling to secure a certain degree of territorial 
financial solidarity beyond village boundaries. The next chapter shows how, as well as being 
                                                 
347 This does not imply that ‘communities’ are passive before the powerful. The final chapter will briefly touch upon 
people’s everyday strategies of resistance to or avoidance of state’s demands. Nevertheless, these strategies do not equate 
to challenging the power structure.  
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a political battlefield and a site of social mobilisation, the ward secondary schools have also 
constituted an engine for elite capital accumulation. 
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Chapter Seven  
 
Tanzania’s textbook sector: Aid agencies, multinational 
companies, and the national political settlement 
 
 
Following an influential study by the World Bank in the 1970s (Heyneman et al. 1978), a 
worldwide consensus emerged within the educational community, which considered 
textbooks as a key vehicle to achieve quality education. However, textbooks are not only 
mediums of knowledge, culture and language. The American creationists’ battle to adapt 
Californian textbooks to their vision of the world is a reminder of the ambivalent nature of 
these objects (Apple 1991: 24-25). Like the national curricula that they embody, textbooks 
participate in the circulation of specific values. Recent business deals between the firm 
Apple and giant publishing companies like Pearson or MacGraw Hill demonstrate that 
textbooks also form a lucrative market for global corporations.348 Western powers have 
also long considered textbooks as a powerful instrument of foreign policy and of diffusion 
their values.  
 
Tanzania’s textbook sector is no exception. At the time of the research fieldwork, the 
textbook policy arena was the subject of an intense power struggle where educational goals, 
ideological values, commercial interests, politics and diplomacy were intricately entangled. 
In 2008-2009, the President and his Minister of Education decided that primary schools 
should shift from a multiple textbook policy – where schools could purchase any textbook 
from an official list of approved titles – to a single textbook policy – where schools 
nationwide had to use the official textbook selected for each grade and each subject. This 
decision profoundly destabilised the sector. In March 2012, the United Kingdom and the 
Government of Tanzania agreed that the £29.5 million refunded by British Aerospace 
Enterprise Ltd in relation to the ‘radar case’. The £29.5 million should primarily be used to 
                                                 
348 ‘Apple and digital publishing - A textbook manoeuvre’, The Economist 19/01/2012.  
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purchase and supply textbooks for Tanzanian public primary schools.349 In July 2012, the 
World Bank and the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) convicted Oxford University Press of 
fraudulent practices in East Africa, including Tanzania; as a result, the Tanzanian Public 
Procurement Regulatory Authority barred the company from public procurement 
activities. 350  Paraphrasing Apple and Christian-Smith (1991: 5), one may argue that 
Tanzanian textbooks ‘are caught up in a complicated set of political and economic 
dynamics’. This chapter attempts to shed light on the intricate forces that have shaped 
Tanzania’s textbook sector. 
 
Initially, a simple research question drove the investigation of the textbook sector: what are 
the implications of an enrolment expansion on market-based production of educational 
goods? Several other reasons further justified dedicating a chapter of this dissertation to 
textbooks. First, full marketization of textbook publishing coupled with the devolution of 
purchasing power to schools constituted core elements of the World Bank SEDP I. 
Schools’ resources to purchase textbooks and other learning materials were again a core 
component of the Bank’s SEDP II. More generally, textbooks manifest two essential 
features of donors-government education dialogue between 2004 and 2012: a centrality of 
the capitation grant and a growing focus on ‘quality’. In public schools, both at primary and 
secondary levels, the capitation grant is the only public source of funding for the purchase 
of textbooks and other educational materials.351 This funding mechanism has been critical 
in shaping Tanzania’s textbook sector, including the conditions of its insertion within the 
global economy, via both North-South and South-South economic links. The health of an 
entire private industry, almost entirely publicly subsidised, relies on effective and timely 
flows of capitation grants to schools. While the capitation grant has been a major site of 
contention between donors and government (Chapter 5), dialogue on, and investigations of, 
the subject have remained confined to the education/public finance management spheres. 
Public expenditure tracking surveys typically follow flows of funds until school doors. The 
economic activities that these educational public resources generate and the social relations 
that they structure remain unknown territory for scholars and donors, in Tanzania as in 
                                                 
349 In December 2010, the UK Serious Fraud Office convicted British Aerospace Defence Systems Ltd of corrupt 
practices in its supply of an air traffic control system to Tanzania. The UK Parliament then ordered that Tanzania be 
refunded the money. Its use was subject to long negotiations between DFID and the Government of Tanzania. 
350  The Guardian 15/07/2012. Had it not been convicted of corruption by the UK SFO, OUP, a major British 
multinational, would have got hold of funds originated in a scam by another major British multinational. 
351 At primary level, 40 per cent of the capitation grant should be dedicated to textbooks; 50 per cent at secondary level. 
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other developing countries. While the private provision of education has been the subject 
of a growing literature (for instance, Heyneman and Stern 2014; Mundy and Menashy 2014; 
Ball 2012 and 2007; Rose 2002), the literature on the market-based production of 
educational goods and its political-economy dimensions remains very thin.352 Finally, this 
chapter offers a direct complement to the Chapter 6 analyses of district elites’ political 
involvement in the ward secondary schools movement. While the SEDP and the ward 
secondary school policy grant the ‘local’ a prominent place, the textbook trade prism allows 
the exploration of the local dimension of elites’ accumulation strategies tied to education 
resources. 
 
The first section covers the historical trajectory of Tanzania’s textbook sector and describes 
the sector in 2011-2012. The second section shows how donors’ ideology and modes of 
intervention have profoundly shaped the textbook industry. The third demonstrates that 
the specific distribution of power within the Tanzanian state has also deeply influenced the 
state of the textbook sector. Finally, the last section explores elites’ multi-sited strategies of 
appropriation of the textbook public manna.  
 
1. The Tanzanian textbook industry: historical trajectory and organisation in 
2011-2012  
 
 
In colonial Tanganyika, the book trade was mainly the affair of religious institutions: 
Christian missions built up small-scale networks of bookshops that have survived until 
today. The early years of Independence coincided with a new stage in the 
internationalisation of British publishing companies that resulted in an increased 
localisation in East African markets (Smith 1975, Golding 1978). In the 1960s and early 
1970s, the Tanzanian publishing scene was dominated by Oxford University Press and 
Longman (Bgoya 1982: 13). Under Ujamaa, the socialist government put in place a state-
owned ‘book industrial complex’ composed of various parastatals: in publishing, Tanzanian 
                                                 
352 In the late 1990s - early 2000s, a comprehensive documentation about textbooks in sub-Saharan Africa was published 
under the auspices of the Association for the Development of Education and Africa, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 
and the Bellagio Publishing Network. This informative ‘grey literature’ mostly had a capacity building purpose to support 
prospective indigenous publishers. 
1.1 An historical account: from state monopoly to state-regulated private 
sector 
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Publishing House, East African Publishing House and Dar-es-Salaam University Press; in 
printing: TanPak and Tanzania Printing Company; for the distribution of textbooks: 
Tanzania Elimu Supplies. Primary textbook authorship was entirely controlled by the 
Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE, then Institute of Curriculum Development). 
Secondary level textbooks were mostly imported: TIE manuscripts at secondary level were 
only developed in the mid-1980s.353  
 
In 1991, with economic liberalisation, a new textbook policy was issued that opened up the 
industry to the private sector. The sector’s parastatals were incorporated in the wide 
programme of divestiture of state assets and their privatised offspring no longer played any 
substantial role in the textbook industry. The liberalisation of the sector was coupled with 
an ambition to build an indigenous publishing industry, indigenous firms being defined as 
‘the majority of whose ownership, production, personnel and profits are African’ 
(Nottingham 1969: 143). The 1991 Textbook Policy allowed for a transitional period to be 
used to nurture the infant industry before full marketization. The government, with 
support from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), facilitated a learning 
process in the private sector: it organised training sessions for local publishers covering all 
aspects from authorship to commissioning manuscript, design, editorial activities and 
illustration. TIE manuscripts were tendered to private publishers in phases between 1992 
and 1999. Seventy-nine titles for primary level were tendered and about eight million 
textbooks produced by private publishers. Textbook procurement and distribution were 
progressively devolved from the Ministry of Education, first to districts, and then to 
primary schools in 2001 and secondary schools in 2004. That same year the Tanzania 
Institute of Education finally stopped its publishing activities and henceforth concentrated 
solely on to curriculum development. Textbook publishing became an entirely private 
activity within a state-regulated framework.  
 
 
The production of books entails a complex process – from authoring, publishing and 
printing to distribution and promotion – and involves a set of institutions and agencies, 
                                                 
353 For a presentation of the book sector during Ujamaa see Bgoya (1982). 
1.2 The Tanzanian textbook sector in April 2012: main organisational 
features 
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domestic and international, public and private. They form what Askerud (1997: 28) referred 
to as a book sector. The term ‘emphasizes the interdependence and interrelatedness of all 
economic, social, cultural and statistical aspects of book production and consumption’.354 
For each activity in the book chain, different modes of production may exist, 
distinguishable by their specific public-private mix. 355  The specific configuration at a 
specific time can be considered as the historical outcome of a contest between and within 
various social forces that include the state, international development agencies, 
multinationals, indigenous capitalists and teachers.  
 
In Tanzania, textbooks account for the vast majority of national book consumption, 
representing between 80 to 90 per cent of the book market.356 Tanzanians’ low purchasing 
power and the absence of a vivid reading culture explain this dominance.357  Since the 
beginning of the 2000s, the potential size of the basic education textbooks market has 
grown in parallel with the dramatic increase in enrolments, both at primary and secondary 
levels. Table 7.1 below provides a rough estimation of the potential size and value of this 
market in 2011:358  
 
Table 7-1: Potential textbook market for Tanzanian primary and junior secondary 
government schools in 2011 
 
  
Primary 
O Level : F1 - 
F2 
O Level: F3-
F4 
F3-F4 
(chemistry) 
F3-F4 
(physics) 
Enrolment (gov. 
schools) 8,200,651 800,597 659,645 263,858 164,911 
Number of subjects 9 9 7 1 1 
Market size (Total 
number of textbooks) 
73,805,859 7,205,373 4,617,515 263,858 164,911 
Theoretical amount of 
public subsidy 
(capitation grant, Tsh) 
4,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 
Market value Tsh 
295,223,436,00
0 93,669,849,000 60,027,695,000 3,430,154,000 2,143,846,250 
Market value € 133,642,713 42,402,774 27,173,534 1,552,773 970,483 
Sub-total Secondary (€) 
    
72,099,565 
Total market size (€) 205,742,278 
    
                                                 
354 In this chapter the terms ‘book sector’, ‘book chain’ or ‘book industry’ are used interchangeably. 
355 The World Bank (2002) proposes a detailed account of possible variations in structuring the various stages of the book 
chain. 
356 Saiwaad (2001: 157), a figure confirmed by several informants. 
357 In 2007, the mean per capita household monthly income in rural areas was Tsh 28,000 (URT 2009b). The average cost 
of a secondary textbook is about Tsh 8,000. 
358 The evaluation is here restricted to textbooks. It does not include teachers’ guidelines, reference books, supplementary 
readings and textbooks used in teacher colleges. 
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Source: the author, based on URT (2011b). Enrolment in chemistry/physics in F3-F4, computed from the number of 
candidates in F4 Examination (CSEE) in 2011. A textbook-pupil ratio of 1:1 was applied. The theoretical life-span of one 
textbook is 3 years. A better approximation of the market should be made on a rolling basis. 
 
Primary education textbooks dominate the market and the state of the industry has largely 
been dependent on demand at this level. However, the movement towards mass junior 
secondary education has created new market opportunities. The secondary education 
market segment is specific in several aspects.359 The publishing language is English and it is 
smaller (in size and value) than the primary segment and is still in its infancy. ‘From a 
business point of view, secondary school publishing cannot give you the market share that you require. You 
need primary textbooks (…) because that’s where most of the money is, for any country’ (international 
publisher, interview 90).  
 
Private schools, which in 2011 represented only 1.9 per cent of primary, but 15 per cent of 
secondary enrolment, constitute a small segment of the market, with its specific 
characteristics: higher purchasing power of parents and schools, at least in high-fee 
institutions; for English medium primary schools, a reliance on internationally published 
books; for publishers and booksellers, a lower supply cost to the schools, which are mainly 
located in urban centres. In a context of unpredictable funding of government schools, 
targeting private schools may be a sound survival strategy for publishers, but it does not 
represent a sustainable business development strategy. Public schools make up the bulk of 
publishers’ potential customers and the textbook industry depends heavily on their ability 
to purchase its products.  
 
The Ministry of Education is responsible for the development of the curriculum and 
related syllabi. The Tanzanian Institute of Education, a parastatal under its authority, 
carries out the operational activities of curriculum development. The Ministry’s Education 
Material Approval Committee (EMAC) approves the content of textbooks and other 
teaching and learning materials, ensuring that they reflect the curriculum and that 
substandard textbooks are not supplied to schools. The EMAC’s 15 members reflect the 
diversity of actors in the sector and include directors in the Ministry of Education and 
representatives of publishers and booksellers. The EMAC Secretariat, a team of three 
                                                 
359 Higher education also entails its own specificities: smaller readership; procurement by universities or purchase by 
students; more expensive, internationally-published textbooks and greater potential for digital publishing. The senior 
secondary level also mainly depends on imported textbooks. 
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technocrats, is in charge of the technical preparation of the committee’s decisions. They 
receive publishers’ manuscripts and submit them to three evaluators for assessment; the 
committee then takes a decision (approve, reject or conditionally approve) on the basis of 
the evaluators’ reports.  
 
In 2012, 45 publishers were officially registered in Tanzania, of which 29 published 
school/university textbooks and other educational materials. Table 7.2 below presents the 
main textbook publishers, according to the number of textbooks approved. 
 
Table 7-2: Main textbook publishers in Tanzania based on the number of titles 
approved by EMAC (Sept. 2011) 
 
  
Total number of 
approved titles 
(Primary and 
Secondary) 
Primary level 
approved 
titles 
Form I - IV 
approved 
titles 
Reference 
books, Suppl. 
readings 
OUPT (Oxford 
University Press Tz) 
90 65 25 0 
Ben & Co. 70 52 18 7 
Macmillan Aidan 69 66 3 83 
Educational Books 59 57 2 1 
Ujuzi Books Ltd 46 33 13 5 
Jadida Book House 42 42 0 0 
Pearson Longman 42 20 22 21 
Mture Educational 39 39 0 0 
Mkuki na Nyota 21 21 0 7 
E&D 19 17 2 14 
Longhorn 11 8 3 0 
 Source: the author, based on EMAC List of Approved Titles (30/09/2011) 
 
These publishers are a mix of multinational or regional companies and indigenous 
publishers. The ‘big three’ British publishers – Oxford University Press Tanzania (OUPT), 
Macmillan and Pearson Longman – are major players. Regional publishers from Kenya – 
Longhorn and Ujuzi Books – have also taken root. Modes of organisation between parent 
companies and their Tanzanian branches vary. In the case of Pearson Longman, the 
world’s largest educational publisher that reopened its Tanzanian office in 2005, a Pearson 
Longman team handles the publishing activities but all distribution activities - pricing, 
importation, stocking, marketing/advertisement, delivery – are managed by a separate, 
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independent distributor - Radar Education, a locally-owned company, with a British 
manager, and Pearson Longman’s exclusive partner in Tanzania.  
 
Macmillan Aidan offers an organisational variation. Until recently, it was a joint venture, set 
up in 1998 between Macmillan and a locally-owned company, Aidan. Aidan was founded in 
1996 by Khalaf Rashid, a Tanzanian citizen, in collaboration with Macmillan International 
Publishers which was eager to improve the distribution of its UK-published textbooks in 
Tanzania. Set up initially as a distribution company, Aidan then diversified to incorporate 
publishing activities; its owner worked as Macmillan Aidan’s managing director until 2009. 
However, in 2010, following its involvement in a corruption scandal in a World Bank-
funded textbook project in Sudan, Macmillan was barred from any World Bank project in 
East Africa for six years. The company halted its operations in Tanzania and, in 2011, 
Rashid bought out Macmillan’s shares in the Tanzanian joint venture. Macmillan 
International no longer has any interest in ‘Macmillan Tanzania’ and Rashid now owns the 
catalogue and the stock; copyrights were transferred and, in March 2012, the name change 
was under way (interview with Khalaf Rashid, Aidan Ltd).  
 
Oxford University Press Tanzania (OUPT) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxford 
Publishing Limited (OPL), a branch of the International Division of Oxford University 
Press. The latter is a department of the University with no separate legal personality. The 
University (and therefore OUP) operates as a charity within the legal framework of the 
Oxford and Cambridge Act 1923 and the University Statutes and Regulations: it is not governed 
by the UK Companies Act and does not have limited liability. As a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
OUPT pays dividends and certain fees to OPL.360  
 
Beyond these key organisational features, it proved difficult to assess the level of control of 
parent companies over their Tanzanian branches or the nature and scope of financial flows 
between them. What share of the locally-generated profits does accrue to the group, to the 
subsidiary? What role do transfer-pricing mechanisms play? Who are the board members of 
the locally-owned subsidiary? Does the parent company a say on subsidiaries’ strategic 
choices over recruitment, pricing or editorial policies? Answering these questions would 
require a dedicated in-depth investigation.  
                                                 
360 Based on Press release by the UK SFO,  03/07/2012  http://www.sfo.gov.uk.  
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Amongst the indigenous publishers, Ben & Co, Educational Books Publishers, Mkuki na 
Nyota and E&D Vision Publishing Ltd may be singled out as ‘big local publishers’; they 
enjoy a rather sound economic situation and the quality of their products is widely 
acknowledged. The other twenty local textbook publishers may be labelled as ‘small’, with 
few titles and small print runs, operating in a precarious financial situation. The big local 
publishers are considered credible competitors to the multinationals, which, however, 
dominate the market. Robust information about companies’ turnover or market shares is 
not available. ‘It’s so secretive in Tanzania. It’s a guarded secret’ (local publisher, interview 91). 
However, according to informants’ estimates, OUPT most likely controls 40 per cent of 
the market, MacMillan 30 per cent and local publishers about 15 per cent. Longman 
Pearson appears to control 28 per cent of the secondary level segment. This concentration 
is not specific to Tanzania.361 
 
Printing represents a large share of publishing costs. Access to quality and affordable 
printing capacities is a critical determinant of publishing profitability. In turn, printing 
capacities depend on the provision of raw materials (mainly paper and ink) and the 
availability/maintenance of adequate technological equipment. The Tanzanian market is 
split between three main printers (Jamana, Colour Print and Tanzanian Printers) and 
myriad small-scale printers. Between 2000 and 2011-12, the number of printers grew from 
10 to more than 40: machinery became affordable and private banks perceived printing as a 
profitable business and were willing to provide loans to prospective entrepreneurs in the 
sector. 
 
The textbook printing market is very competitive: ‘There are too many people going after textbooks, 
too many printers, so profitability is a problem’ (printer, interview 97). The tax/duty structure 
constitutes one of the most critical factors influencing printing costs. In compliance with 
the United Nations Florence Agreement and its Bologna Protocol,362 textbooks are imported to 
                                                 
361 In 1991, in the USA, 75 per cent of the total sales of college textbooks were controlled by the ten largest textbook 
publishers; 53 per cent of the elementary-high school market being controlled by the four largest (Apple 1991: 29). In the 
West, publishing has experienced the following development cycle: small-scale/family businesses, concentration (vertical 
and horizontal integration) and internationalisation. At the end of the cycle, ‘there remain many hundreds of small 
independent publishers, but the bulk of the trade is concentrated into the hands of these larger combines’, vast 
conglomerates that incorporate publishing with other media and digital manufacturing (Golding 1978: 454). 
362 An international agreement adopted by the UNESCO General Conference in 1950, it provides exemption from tax 
and import duties for printed materials, works of art, films and other materials of an educational, cultural and scientific 
nature. 
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Tanzania duty and VAT-free. Imports of raw materials (ink and paper) are subject to a 10 
or 25 per cent excise rate and an 18 per cent VAT rate.363 Duty remission schemes are, 
however, in place for ink and paper imported from the SADEC region or the East African 
Community (by 2012, a 0 per cent rate). Ink and paper used specifically to produce 
educational materials can also be imported duty-free: paper converters request exemptions 
granted annually by a specific committee within the Ministry of Industry and Trade. In 
both cases, however, the 18 per cent VAT rate applies and it is passed on to printers. 
Textbook publishers, which are exempt from VAT, cannot recover the VAT charged by 
their printers and so the cost is ultimately absorbed in the textbooks price. Local paper 
manufacturers are unable to cater for textbook publishers’ demands in terms of quantity 
and quality and the bulk of paper for textbooks is therefore imported, mainly from Sweden, 
Finland and South Africa. 
 
Table 7-3: World main paper exporters 
Country 
Value 
(million US$) 
Avg. Growth 
(%) 
07-11 
Growth (%) 
10-11 
World share 
(%) 
Germany 16,913.6 0.7 8.4 13.7 
USA 11,588.5 4.4 8.3 9.4 
Sweden 10,767.3 2.6 13.4 8.7 
Finland 10,165.1 -2.0 7.3 8.2 
Canada 7,658.7 -6.0 3.6 6.2 
  Source: United Nations International Merchandise Trade Statistics (http://comtrade.un.org/pb/) 
 
In this context, about 75 per cent of books are printed abroad, especially for big print 
runs.364 Asian countries have seized the biggest share of the printing market. OUPT mainly 
prints in India but also in Malaysia and Dubai. Longman Pearson prints in Malaysia, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and China; it imports its internationally published textbooks 
through its UK-based head office which, however, organises wholesale printing in Asia 
before dispatch to its overseas offices.365 As shown in Figure 7.1, the United Kingdom 
clearly lost its leadership position in the book trade with Tanzania, dethroned by India. In 
                                                 
363 EAC (2012) Common External Tariff, Chapters 48 and 49. Data on VAT from the Tanzania Revenue Authority’s web 
site: http://www.tra.go.tz/index.php/value-added-tax-vat. 
364 Estimates provided by informants. 
365 This internationalisation of printing is not specific to Tanzania. Western publishers have outsourced their printing 
component to ‘countries with lower labour costs and most efficient production techniques’ (Altbach 1991: 248). 
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2000, the UK captured 27 per cent of Tanzania’s imports of ‘Printed books, brochures, 
leaflets and similar printed matter’, a figure that had fallen to 14 per cent in 2010.366  
 
Figure 7-1: Evolution of Tanzanian imports of ‘Printed books, brochures, leaflets 
and similar printed matter’ from 2010 top five exporters, 2000-2010 (USD current, 
CIF value) 
 
 
Source: the author based on data from Tanzania Revenue Authority 
 
Asian printers are attractive to Tanzanian publishers because of their paper stock capacity - 
they buy large volumes on international futures markets at very low prices - and the 
comparative quality of their production. They also help Tanzanian publishers to mitigate 
risks related to piracy.367 
 
Since 2004, Tanzania has enforced the principle of school autonomy in the purchase of 
textbooks at secondary level. Teachers now choose books from the EMAC’s list of 
approved titles and submit their choice to headmasters who prepare an expenditure plan 
for the school board’s authorisation. Headmasters submit their requirements to three 
booksellers and select the lowest-priced offer.  
 
                                                 
366 Over the same period, the UK remained the leading exporter of ‘Dictionaries and Encyclopaedias’ to Tanzania, with a 
market share stable at around 60 per cent of Tanzanian imports. 
367 In the early 2000s, piracy caused major disruptions in the sector. At the time of the research, the issue was much less 
pervasive. Publishers introduced anti-piracy devices and conducted joint operations with COSATA (the Copyright Society 
of Tanzania) and the police: illegal copies were seized and about 300 people taken to court for infringement of copyright 
regulations (interview 39, official, COSATA). Also, pirates may have lost interest in this market due to the lack of funds in 
primary schools since 2006-2007 and the end of donor direct support to PEDP and its capitation grant. 
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The decentralised purchasing system propelled the development of the bookshop network. 
According to the Booksellers Association, today there are around 850 booksellers, up from 
68 in 2000 (Saiwaad 2001:159). It is a diversified trade with small-scale district-based retail 
outlets, middle-sized businesses in main urban centres and a handful of big wholesalers 
located in Dar es Salaam. The price of textbooks is fixed; the publishers’ catalogue price 
applies everywhere. Publishers provide booksellers with a discount to cover distribution 
costs and mark-up.  
 
 
The learning crisis mentioned in previous chapters coincided with a textbook crisis. A few 
years after the full opening of the market, complaints were voiced about the poor quality of 
textbooks in circulation. The complaints came from all segments of society: parents, 
teachers, civil society,368 ministerial officials,369 even the EMAC Secretariat ‘has admitted 
errors and poor quality textbooks circulating in schools’.370 Moreover, since the inception 
of the capitation grant, flows of funds have been erratic, largely below the theoretical 
amount of Tsh 10,000 at primary level (see Table 7.4) or Tsh 25,000 at secondary level (see 
Chapters 5 and 6). 
 
Table 7-4: Capitation grant amount disbursed to primary schools through LGAs, 
2006/07 – 2010/11 (in Tsh, current) 
 
  2006/2007  2007/2008  2008/2009  2009/2010  2010/2011  
Budgeted  25,978,639,400 45,507,836,450 56,269,162,000 80,029,920,000 80,029,920,000 
Allocated  25,978,639,400 45,507,836,450 56,269,162,000 45,559,566,300 23,161,111,184 
Average CG 
per pupil 
(Tsh)  
3,124 5,411 6,665 5,411 2,769 
Source: URT (2011c: 47) 
 
Textbooks have been ‘generally in short supply in government schools, especially at the 
secondary level’ (UNESCO 2012a: 36). At primary level, the actual textbook-pupil ratio, 
despite a dramatic improvement in comparison with 2001, fell short of the national target 
                                                 
368 ‘Some are good quality, some are not good quality. Some cover all the syllabus and topics, some don’t… I take these 
books and I read them and it’s very sad to find a lot of mistakes’ (civil society representative, interview 65). 
369 ‘Even mediocre titles go through the screening process and they’re given approval as textbooks‘ (official, MoEVT, 
interview 8). 
370 The Guardian 02/03/2010. 
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of 1 book per pupil by 2010 (Table 7.5). At secondary level, the official ratio was 1:5 in 
2009 (World Bank 2010: 44) and 1:3 in 2012.  
 
Table 7-5: Primary textbook pupil ratio, 2001 - 2010 
  Baseline Date Indicator Value 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Primary Textbook Pupil ratio 2001 1:20 1:5 - 1:12 1:3 1:5 1:5 
Source: URT (2011c: 31) 
 
Responding to the national outcry, factions within the state, chiefly driven by the Director 
of TIE and the then Minister of Education, convinced the President that a single textbook 
policy (initially confined to primary education) would solve the crisis. Consideration was 
also given to reinstating TIE in its former publishing role and to reviving state printing 
capacities, via the import of Chinese machines. Within the state, some contemplated the 
option of recreating a state ‘book industrial complex’.  
 
In 2010, the MoEVT finally organised the selection of two textbooks per subject per grade 
(at primary level): the so-called ‘standard textbook system’, presented as a compromise 
between the single and multiple textbook systems. This policy was interpreted by 
publishers as a catastrophe.371 For the Secretary of Publishers Association of Tanzania 
(PATA): ‘everything is in shambles’. This decision was also perceived as a victory of 
international publishing companies, as OUPT won the lion’s share of the standard 
textbooks.372 This foreign capture of the national market was not believed to have been 
achieved via the natural exercise of market forces: it is widely thought that the selection 
process for the standard textbook system was flawed. Publicly available information about 
the conviction of OUP by the UK SFO does not refer to a specific tender. Nevertheless, 
the corrupt practices occurred between 2007 and 2010, a period which precisely coincided 
with the consolidation of OUPT’s dominant position.  
 
The rest of the chapter shows how this industry, much like the education system, has been 
shaped at the intersection of external and internal forces, dominated by entwined 
ideological and material interests.  
 
                                                 
371 The Guardian 03/02/2012 ‘Single textbook system killing publishing sector’. 
372 OUPT won 57 titles, Educational Publishers 21 titles, MacMillan Aidan 19 titles, Ben and Co 15 titles, Mture 14 titles 
and Jadida: 12 or 13 titles. 
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2. Aid agencies and multinational publishing companies in Tanzania: an 
ambiguous companionship 
 
 
The Tanzanian journey from a state-led textbook industry to private sector domination 
started with a ‘book sector study’ conducted by the World Bank in 1988.373 This document 
directly informed the 1991 Textbook Policy developed during the negotiations of the Bank’s 
Education Planning and Rehabilitation Project (1990-1997). Privatisation, competition and 
decentralisation were the core tenets of the policy. One key objective was ‘to raise the 
levels of efficiency in textbook production and distribution and lower unit costs by 
allowing the commercial sector to compete for textbook publishing, printing and 
distribution services and provide incentives for their participation’ (World Bank 1990: 33). 
The shift to the market was supported by the wider international community, including 
Nordic countries traditionally more sympathetic to state intervention. SIDA provided an 
USD12 million grant in parallel with the World Bank’s project to supply textbooks to 
primary schools and support the Ministry of Education's efforts to privatize textbook 
publishing.  
 
The gradual process of privatisation and marketization, unleashed in 1991, was consistently 
pursued in every subsequent World Bank programme (see Table 7.5 below). But in 2004, 
the SEDP I was underpinned by an implicit diagnosis: all remnants of state intervention in 
the textbook industry needed to be removed. Two key elements of the programme – the 
capitation grant and the confinement of the Tanzania Institute of Education to curriculum 
development activities – were explicitly intended to foster undistorted competition as the 
pathway towards cheap, yet good quality, textbooks (World Bank 2004: 9). The release of 
the first programme tranche was conditional upon TIE’s disengagement from publishing 
activities (World Bank 2004: 18). The programme and its conditionalities were consistent 
with the World Bank’s 2001 Operational Policy on Textbooks and Reading Materials, 
unambiguous on the allegedly ‘indispensable’ role of the private sector: ‘Movement away 
from uneconomical public enterprises toward more efficient contracting with the private 
                                                 
373  In the late 1980s, ‘book sector studies’ were commissioned by the World Bank as a core component of the 
reorientation of its assistance towards marketization of developing countries’ textbook sectors. In 1992, 22 book sector 
studies had been conducted, financed by the World Bank, ODA, other bilateral agencies and UN agencies 
(http://www.unesco.org/education/blm/appendix1_en.php#1-1-2, accessed 18/03/2014). 
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sector should be in evidence for Bank financing to be offered’ (World Bank 2001). 
Marketization was non-negotiable; ‘the government had no choice’ (local publisher, 
interview 88). 
 
Table 7-6 (a): Textbook components in World Bank education projects in Tanzania 
since the late 1970s 
 
  6th Education Project 7th Education Project Education Planning and 
Rehabilitation 
Human Resource 
Development  
Timing 1976-1982 1980 -1990 1990 - 1997 1997 - 2000 
Curriculum Diversification of 
secondary curriculum  
  Curriculum revision (focus on 
science and mathematics in 
secondary schools) 
  
Textbook 
Policy 
    Privatisation/marketization of 
the textbook market 
  
Textbook 
funding 
mechanism 
      Piloting of primary 
capitation grant  
Capacity 
building / 
Equipment 
Feasibility study on TIE 
(future role, staffing 
needs,  physical 
expansion) 
Support to Tanzania 
Elimu Supply: 
- Capacity building 
- Construction  
warehouses  
- Supply of vehicle  
- Strengthening of TIE 
- Strengthening of MoE Book 
Management Unit 
- Strengthening of libraries 
(primary, secondary university) 
  
Book 
provision 
Teaching materials  and 
books (School of 
Accountancy DSM) 
/International 
competitive bidding 
Supply of textbooks for 
secondary schools / 
International 
competitive bidding 
- Supply of secondary textbooks  
- Supply of library books (primary, 
secondary, university levels) / 
International competitive 
bidding 
  
 
Table 7.6 (b): Textbook components in World Bank education projects in Tanzania 
since the late 1970s 
 
  PEDP SEDP I SEDP II 
Timing 2001-2004 2004-2009 2010-2014 
Curriculum Curriculum revision for primary 
(conditionality for three tranches) 
Curriculum revision:    -Decrease in 
number of subjects (initial 
conditionality) 
-Competence-based curriculum 
(3rd tranche conditionality ) 
  
Textbook 
Policy 
  - TIE barred from publishing 
activities (1st tranche 
conditionality)  
- Revision of the textbook selection 
process (2nd tranche 
conditionality)  
Criteria of a 'functional school' (no 
library but laboratory / science 
textbooks and chemicals but no art 
textbooks) 
Textbook 
funding 
mechanism 
- Primary capitation grant system 
- School level textbook procurement 
system:  third tranche 
conditionality  
- Capitation grant (first tranche 
conditionality) 
- School level textbook procurement   
50% of capitation grant for science 
and language textbooks ('equivalent 
of US$5 per student for 
textbooks') 
Capacity 
building / 
Equipment 
    - Support to EMAC  
- To examine cost-effective 
alternatives for textbook provision  
- To improve regulation of 
curriculum        development (TIE) 
Book 
provision 
      
Source: the author, based on World Bank project documents 
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A TIE curriculum developer eloquently described the unequal power relations that 
underpinned the negotiations of the SEDP I:  
I will never forget this lady from the World Bank. I was so threatened that my Institute will be dying 
the next day, the way she was tough… And she was so bitter that the Institute was still behaving as a 
book writer. And actually she had a lot of power in her hands because she had covered the President 
Office, the Minister, the Permanent Secretary; she was dropping from the air, somebody from another 
planet. It’s like receiving a visitor from the sun. So powerful and the way she talks, her hands… “I will 
report this to your President”, “I will do this. I will do that, talk to the Minister”. You are talking to 
the Minister? You are talking to the Permanent Secretary? You have talked to the President? Who am 
I now to answer any of your questions?  Please, will you take everything you wanted and keep me still 
alive?  
 
These words from a middle-rank official illuminate the significance of structural adjustment 
programmes for African bureaucracies. By undermining civil servants’ professional pride, 
these projects represented an attack against what constitutes a structural ingredient of an 
efficient civil service defined in classical Weberian terms: civil servants driven by a core set 
of professional norms and values. This reconfiguration of the textbook sector was a 
component of a much broader economic project, the translation in a specific sector of the 
World Bank’s agenda of market promotion and confinement of the state to an ‘enabling’ 
role.374 The hegemonic nature of this transformative project was described by an official in 
the MoEVT: changes in textbook publishing were inserted ‘in this kind of wave that was 
changing everything. The wind was just too strong that it changed the entire scene … it was flattened so that 
it was just an even ground for everything. So nothing was left standing (…) Whoever was maybe resistant 
or was lagging behind the process, definitely, was forced by the strong wave that was sweeping’ (interview 
8). 
 
 
The World Bank argued that its advocacy for market-based textbook provision was guided 
by ‘cost-effective pragmatism’ in opposition to the ‘political dogmatism’ of state 
proponents (World Bank 2001: paragraph 18). It put forward a classical set of arguments: 
state production leads to poor quality textbooks and supply shortages due to the absence of 
                                                 
374 For a critical presentation of this agenda see for instance Schulpen and Gibbon (2002) or Gibbon (1996). For an 
application to Tanzania:  Gibbon (1995). 
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built-in incentive mechanisms to improve quality, lower prices and circumvent bureaucrats’ 
corrupt practices. Yet, the opening of Tanzania’s textbook market was not based on any 
robust evidence of a comparative lack of efficiency of the state-owned textbook publishing 
complex. 
 
First of all, the World Bank’s textbook policy has not always been exclusively pro-market: 
‘in 1985 Bank staff worked under a view, then common, that a centralized, state-dominated 
system was the most desirable mode of textbook provision (...) between 1973-1985 a 
majority of projects supported state activity in textbooks’ (World Bank 2002: v). In 
Tanzania, under its Seventh Education Project (1980-1990), the World Bank provided direct 
support to Tanzania Elimu Supply, the parastatal in charge of textbook distribution (World 
Bank 1980: 24). In its intervention, the World Bank followed UNESCO and UNICEF, 
leading international educational agencies in the 1960s-1970s. From the 1950s onwards, 
both institutions played an instrumental role in raising international awareness about books’ 
developmental role and in supporting newly independent countries’ efforts to build their 
own publishing industry (Askerud 1997; UNICEF 1979 and 1987). In Tanzania, a 
UNICEF-UNESCO educational programme supported the government’s primary school 
textbooks publishing activities. SIDA gave significant support through free provision of 
paper (Bgoya 1982: 25). In 2002, a World Bank-commissioned review of its past textbook 
operations worldwide even challenged the alleged efficiency of the invisible hand of the 
market: ‘when the private sector has a monopoly in textbook provision, it may find little 
reason to trim prices or improve the quality of its products (…) public-sector textbook 
publishing is a viable option’ (World Bank 2002: 19).  
 
In Tanzania, in the mid-1980s, the state-managed textbook sector was in a very bad state. 
The average textbook-pupil ratio at primary level was estimated at 1:13 for all subjects. The 
shortage was equally acute at secondary level (World Bank 1990: 79). The three main sector 
parastatals were in ‘serious financial trouble’ (World Bank 1990: 75). 375  Nevertheless, 
drawing general conclusions about an intrinsic inefficiency of state-controlled textbook 
production from its peculiar situation at this specific time seems far-fetched. 
 
                                                 
375 During 1987-1994, on yearly average, TES recorded a Tsh115 million loss and Tanzania Printing Company, a Tsh984 
million loss, in 1994 current prices (Fischer 2006: 600-601). 
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Gray’s work on the political economy of Tanzania’s economic transition challenges the 
dominant narrative about the failure of the Ujamaa industrial policy (nationalisation, 
creation of parastatals, limits on the expansion of international and domestic capital). 
Between 1961 and 1979, the country experienced a continuous industrialisation and 
diversification process. The liberalisation/privatisation ‘success’ story was not one of ‘take-
off’. It represented a return to the longer run growth of the industrial sector since 
independence (Gray 2012). Specifically, as shown below (Figure 7.2), the output of the 
printing and publishing industry, starting from a low base, recorded a steady increase 
during the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1979, output grew by 153 per cent. 376  In 1982 
Tanzania Publishing House recorded a turnover of Tsh 26.8 million (USD 2.23 million) 
and a profit of Tsh 6.1million (USD 0.5 million) (Bgoya 1982: 14).  
 
Figure 7-2: Printing and Publishing Output in Tanzania 1970 – 2005, in Tsh 100,000, 
constant prices (base 2000) 
 
 
Source: the author, based on UNIDO data on output production (current prices) and IMF for GDP deflator 1970 - 2005 
 
There was a sharp decline in publishing and printing production between 1985 and 1988 
but this evolution cannot be analysed in isolation from the international crisis that severely 
affected Tanzania and from the impact of structural adjustment programmes. During this 
period, the education system was resource-strapped: ‘Public expenditure on education in 
1986 (…) was only about two-thirds of what it had been in 1982 in real terms’ (World Bank 
                                                 
376 Jerven (2013) cautions about the accuracy of GDP data (volume and composition) in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1990: 12). This shrinking in public spending available for purchasing textbooks had a direct 
impact on publishing and printing parastatals. All became under-financed, while also 
constrained by shortages in raw materials, foreign exchange limitations and insufficient 
capital formation investment.  
 
Parastatals in the book sector, as in other sectors, also displayed dysfunctional features. 
Corruption became rampant. ‘By the early 1980s (…) parastatal managers, with support 
from politicians and bureaucrats, increasingly engaged in illegal activities to bolster their 
falling incomes’ (Gray 2012: 234).377 Specifically in the textbook industry, Walter Bgoya, 
former manager of Tanzania Publishing House between 1972 and 1990, explained: ‘When I 
came in, the love affair between the state and the publishing house was already fading. Other private 
interests for private gains had entered into the game’. However, these inefficiencies derived from 
the contradictions between the industrial policy and the political settlement rather than 
from state ownership and intervention in production. As argued by Gray (2012: 227), ‘the 
experience of industrial policy in Tanzania (…) during the socialist period was of 
ineffective and poorly managed industrial policy rents (…) the Party could not force 
managers to use rents efficiently…Managers were able to maintain their hold on state 
created rents even when their performance was poor’. As Section 4 will illustrate 
privatisation and marketization did not curtail corrupt practices, which have flourished 
throughout the textbook chain. 
 
Moreover, during the socialist period, the relations between the private and public sectors 
were more fluid than commonly perceived. For instance, Tanzanian Publishing House was 
initially set up in 1966 as a joint venture between the state and Macmillan before the state 
bought Macmillan out in 1975, a configuration not specific to this industry (Gray 2012). 
Longman pulled out of the country but OUP (like Macmillan) stayed, although with a 
diminished position. Furthermore, parastatals operated in ‘many ways as any private 
company, expected to make profit and support themselves’ (Bgoya 1982: 14). The state 
also did not have a complete monopoly: in 1982, Bgoya (1982: 13) mentioned five active 
private publishers, all limited liability companies. And it was only in 1981, in a situation of 
economic crisis, that the government’s Confinement Policy restricted the textbook trade to 
                                                 
377 Similarly, Chachage (1995: 241) noted that ‘the parastatals were being directly used for private accumulation through 
corruption, fraud and embezzlement’. 
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state agencies. Ben & Co, one of the major local publishers today, was set up in 1980-1981 
as an educational publisher but specialised in supplementary textbooks.378  
 
Moreover, the impressive growth in the publishing and printing output between 1995 and 
2003 cannot be explained in isolation from the industrial legacy of Ujamaa. As explained in 
Gray (2012: 227), ‘industrial development under liberalisation was built on the industrial 
capabilities that were constructed through state intervention during the socialist period’. In 
the early 1990s, the private textbook industry did not start from a tabula rasa.379 Entry costs 
for commercial publishers and multinationals’ foreign development investments were 
considerably reduced by previous state investments in developing textbooks. In the initial 
phase of marketization, TIE tendered its manuscripts to private publishers whose tasks 
were limited to printing and supply, while the state, with donor support, guaranteed the 
purchase of a certain amount of copies. The private publishing industry not only benefited 
from a transfer of physical assets,380 it was partially built upon human resources who had 
acquired experience and capacities within the public sector. Walter Bgoya provides the 
most topical illustration. A talented, dedicated and internationally renowned publisher, he 
founded his own publishing company, Mkuki na Nyota, in 1991, a difficult economic 
period marked by a highly devalued shilling. However, he benefited from his close contacts 
with printers nurtured, much like his personal publishing skills, during his time at Tanzania 
Publishing House.381  
 
Finally, one core criticism of state-produced textbooks – their poor quality – needs to be 
revisited. First, there is a distinct lack of reliable evidence, i.e., derived from analyses by 
independent curriculum specialists, concerning the quality and relevance of Tanzanian 
state-published textbooks. Instead, available assessments could be seen as examples of a 
posteriori knowledge construction to legitimate a priori ideological positions. The 1988 Book 
Sector Study, for instance, underlined major flaws in state textbooks. The study was, however, 
funded by the World Bank (and ODA), the very same agency that had pushed for 
                                                 
378 According to Chachage (1995: 241), across economic sectors, ‘the number of private business companies rose from 
880 in 1974 to 16,007 by 1984’.  
379  Schulpen and Gibbon (2002: 1) argue that donors’ approaches to private sector development ‘treat developing 
countries’ private sector as tabula rasa’. 
380  Specifically TIE manuscripts. Tanzania Publishing House was privatised in 2002 through a management and 
employees buy-out scheme. It proved impossible to obtain information about the details of the take-over scheme. Some 
questions remain unanswered. Who provided the financial resources of the take-over (in 1995 the company was valued at 
Tsh 71 million)? What concrete assets (catalogue, copyrights…) were divested to whom? Etc. 
381 ‘The old man and the stars’, Interview of Walter Bgoya, 02/11/2011 (http://www.frankfurterbuchmesse.eu). 
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privatisation/marketization. The World Bank’s 2004 SEDP document did not provide any 
evidence or bibliographical references that supported its implicit assumptions: the 
automatic link between market competition and cheap, quality textbooks, and the poor 
quality of Tanzanian state textbooks due to state interventions. The most recent assessment, 
which in 2010 proposed an updated comparative analysis of state vs. commercial textbooks 
(Read 2010), was commissioned by PATA, Publishers Association of Tanzania, instigated 
by its international members whose interests were threatened by the government’s 
single/standard textbook policy.  
 
In terms of price, it is beyond doubt that marketization increased prices. Read (2010: 38) 
gives the example of a TIE biology textbook sold at Tsh 5,860 in 2004; in 2007 the 
Longman Pearson version retailed at Tsh 10,000.382 Yet the report asserts that, when the 
low quality of TIE textbooks is factored in, commercially-published expensive but high-
quality textbooks become the best ‘value for money’. Research informants provided, 
however, a nuanced view of TIE textbooks. Most respondents acknowledged their quality 
in terms of content. The lack of know-how and of access to technology was pointed out as 
the main factor to explain TIE ‘ugly books’.383 Even Pearson Longman acknowledges that 
the ‘TIE label’ is a marketing asset and they manipulate this reputational asset with caution, 
by fear of damaging their credibility when promoting other textbooks not authored by TIE.  
The purpose of this section is not to paint a romanticised picture of state-published 
textbooks: most informants agreed that the quality of textbooks has, in general, improved 
since the opening of the market. But was this improvement directly driven by market 
forces? The contention is that state ownership per se, like the market in the post-1991 
phase, lacks the explanatory power to account for the way the textbook industry has been 
working in practice. Gibbon (1996: 767) insists on an essential characteristic of the private 
sector in sub-Saharan Africa: its ‘virtual inextricability (…) from the state/public sector’, a 
feature denied by the World Bank. It seems more useful to look instead at how the market 
is actually shaped by the social relations within which it is embedded (Polanyi 1957).  
 
 
 
                                                 
382 Comparison in constant prices. 
383 This harsh statement is from a local publisher (interview 70).   
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Four main donor practices are examined here that have critically contributed to shaping the 
Tanzanian textbook market.  
 
First of all, aid agencies have directly acted as representatives of multinationals in Tanzania. 
In the 1980s, the decision to enforce an all-Kiswahili policy throughout the education 
system was defeated, despite Nyerere’s initial support, due to strong pressure from the 
British Council and UK-based textbook publishers (Brock-Utne 2000). Today, British 
publishing companies continue to expect DFID to protect their interests in Tanzania. For 
instance, Pearson Longman took advantage of DIFD’s position as a lead donor in the 
sector: ‘We engaged with them a lot when we were head of the donor committee on education…DFID, 
because they’re British and I’m British and Pearson is British. They seem the more natural fit… But now 
it’s … CIDA and we don’t have close relations with them.’ When, within the standard textbook 
selection process, Tanzanian authorities did not consider titles by Pearson Longman and 
obviously favoured its main competitor, OUPT, the firm ‘requested that the British government 
write on [its] behalf to the Minister of Education in objection to the primary evaluation process because 
obviously it’s a British business, a British owned company’.385 
 
One figure epitomises these intimate relations between aid agencies and multinational 
publishing companies. The 1988 Book Sector Study was co-authored by Anthony Read, an 
international consultant who also worked as a lobbyist for multinational publishing 
companies.386 In 2010, the report commissioned by international publishers to demonstrate 
the comparative advantages of the market was again authored by Read. He also authored a 
DFID Guidance Note on ‘Learning and teaching materials’, DFID’s only publicly available 
strategic document on textbooks (DFID 2011). Read’s long-lasting presence on the fringes 
of the Tanzanian textbook policy arena, at the intersection between donors and 
                                                 
384 A distinction borrowed from Bgoya (1997). 
385 Pearson most probably contributed to initiating the procedure that led the UK SFO to convict OUP. DFID’s actual 
responsiveness to British firms’ demands could not be assessed. 
386 Read worked for Oxford University Press before becoming director of the Book Development Council at the UK 
Publishers Association (http://www.iepartners.co.uk/clients/). In 1989, he co-founded his first consulting company - 
International Book Development Limited. The company’s single shareholder was Cfbt Education Trust, a renowned UK 
charity that provides education services in the UK and internationally, with an annual turnover exceeding £100 million 
and more than 2,000 staff worldwide.  
2.3 Aid agencies between book development and textbook provision384  
257 
 
international publishing companies, testifies to aid agencies’ role as vehicle to advance 
global corporates’ interests in African markets.  
 
Within the donor constellation, SIDA is an exception. The main donor for state textbook 
production and distribution during the socialist period, SIDA forcefully rallied market 
proponents at the end of the 1980s (Brock-Utne 2000: 82-83) but it also embraced the 
cause of the indigenous publishing industry. Between 1993 and 2000, its Publishing Pilot 
Project (PPP) played a critical role in supporting, financially and through technical 
assistance, the government’s attempt to create market conditions conducive to indigenous 
publishers (Grahm et al. 2008). But with the end of the project and the complete 
liberalisation of the market, local publishing companies lost SIDA’s interest. Yet, when the 
single/standard textbook crisis arose and threatened local publishers, SIDA tried to revive 
a policy dialogue on local textbook production. Its attempt to rescue its own legacy largely 
failed, reflecting its now peripheral position within the aid arena, today commensurate with 
its relatively limited financial capacity.387 
 
Donors’ procurement procedures have also played an important role in building up 
multinationals’ dominant position in the Tanzanian market.  
 
Unrestricted competition to source textbooks has always been the World Bank’s main 
mantra, even during Ujamaa. Support for the local publishing base has barely featured on 
its agenda.388Under its Education Rehabilitation and Planning Project, that drove the liberalisation 
of the textbook industry, the Bank organised the provision of secondary level textbooks 
through its traditional procurement modus operandi international competitive bidding, 
which structurally favours international publishing companies. The World Bank’s 
procurement guidelines grant domestic publishers a 15 per cent price advantage over the 
lowest foreign bidder, a rule meant to level the playing field rather than proactively 
promote African publishers (Bgoya 1997). Through its procurement rules, the Bank has 
also been a key engine for the global dissemination of a ‘gold standard’ to assess textbooks 
                                                 
387 When Sweden’s global interest in the paper industry are considered, the progressive aura attached to SIDA’s long-
lasting involvement in the textbook sector may be seen in a different light. 
388 This dichotomy between the World Bank and SIDA in the textbook sector perfectly illustrates Schulpen and Gibbon’s 
(2002: 1) assertion that bilateral agencies have paid more attention to the development of countries’ private sectors while 
multilaterals have been more focused on structural reforms. 
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based on criteria defined in the West, in relation to particular levels of technology and 
specific pedagogical configurations.389  
 
Under its Publishing Pilot Project, SIDA was instrumental in the promotion of ‘local 
competitive bidding’ to tender for TIE’s primary level manuscripts. However, in practice, 
all ‘commercial publishers licensed for business in Tanzania’ were finally allowed to bid: 
tendering was not reserved to genuine ‘indigenous publishers’. This regulation, while more 
favourable to indigenous publishers than international competitive bidders, did not prevent 
international publishing companies from entering the market and competing with 
indigenous publishers.  
 
With the inception of the capitation grant system, the World Bank stopped procuring 
textbooks directly for Tanzania. But under the African Development Bank’s project 
‘Education II’ (1999-2007), 400,000 secondary level textbooks were procured through 
international competitive bidding. This typically favoured international publishing 
companies: Macmillan Aidan, Oxford University Press UK and Cambridge University 
Press.390 The recent USAID Textbooks and Learning Materials Program (TLMP), which 
provided textbooks to public secondary schools, 391  also illustrates the persistent 
contribution of donors’ procurement procedures to the strengthening of multinational 
companies’ market position. Oxford University Press and Uhuru Media Ltd won USAID’s 
unrestricted competitive tender.392 With an obviously ‘indigenous’ name, the second firm is 
actually a subsidiary of ADA group whose Director, Rashid Khalaf is the former managing 
director of Macmillan Publishing who bought out the UK shares after the Sudanese 
corruption scandal. Information on ADA Group and Uhuru Media Ltd is scarce: whether 
ADA Group’s involvement in textbook publishing and distribution can be considered the 
                                                 
389 Altbach (1991: 245) challenges this heteronomy of textbook assessment criteria: ‘the use of glossy paper, illustrations 
and hard covers for most textbooks is related to the conditions in the schools of the affluent countries. While poorer 
countries often produce less elaborate books, everyone is affected by what is considered [the] “gold standard” of 
textbooks’.  
390 Information based on ADF (2007, Annex 6: 4-6). The two other successful bidders – General Booksellers Ltd and 
Mbesa Trading Co Ltd – are Tanzanian companies: the former is Tanzania’s major wholesale bookseller and the second 
specialises in stationary and office supplies. Based on available information, it is not possible to say whether, within this 
contract, they provided textbooks published by local or international companies. 
391 The TLMP is managed by the USAID African Bureau through a cooperative agreement with South Carolina State 
University (SCSU) as part of President Bush’s Africa Education Initiative. SCSU worked in collaboration with the 
MoEVT to produce secondary school science and mathematics textbooks for mainland Tanzania. TLMP received final 
funding in FY 2010 and was supposed to terminate in FY 2011. USAID/Tanzania provided an additional year of funding 
in order for SCSU to meet its second year target of producing 750,000 textbooks (information provided by USAID aid 
manager, Tanzania). 
392 See USAID Request for Proposal nr 621-09-002 (accessible at https://www.fbo.gov). 
259 
 
outcome of a successful indigenisation process similar to the creation of Longhorn in 
Kenya is difficult to say.393 Uhuru Media Ltd could simply be a dummy company set up to 
circumvent the World Bank’s ban on Macmillan and to allow Aidan to bid for USAID’s 
programme.394 
 
DFID’s BAE funded Primary Education Support Project further illustrates how the ‘good 
governance/anti-corruption’ imperative prevails over any educational rationales or long-
term developmental considerations. The modality to channel the BAE funds - centralised 
procurement of textbooks - was imposed by British authorities on transparency grounds. 
Indeed, a large scale tender appeared easier to audit than financial flows channelled through 
the capitation grant mechanism. DFID also commissioned a global private consultancy 
company – Crown Agents USA Ltd – to supervise the project’s procurement process.395 
This scheme was, however, contrary to the Tanzanian national systems and procedures 
whereby textbooks are purchased by schools, through the capitation grant. The centralised 
procurement process has also been widely recognised as being poorly responsive to actual 
school needs.396 With this initiative, DFID was actually acting against its own commitment 
to aid effectiveness.397 It also undermines DFID’s intense involvement within Tanzania’s 
education arena over the last ten years which had aimed to promote a strengthened 
capitation grant system. Western-controlled procurement processes are obviously not 
immune from corruption but even in a transparent case of grand corruption by a 
prominent British firm like BAE, the suspicion of corruption finally ends up on African 
shoulders. 398  Ironically, in October 2011, the World Bank announced a six-month 
                                                 
393 Longhorn Publishers, in Kenya, was created through a buy-out of Longman by local interests. 
394 ADA Group’s publishing activities may also reflect contemporary global trends in publishing: the merger of publishing 
activities within broader, widely diversified global groups dedicated to communication, media and digital information: 
ADA Group owns, for instance, Creative Eyes, an advertising and communication company with offices in Kenya, 
Rwanda and Ghana, which is part of Publicis Africa Group’s network, Publicis being the third largest communication 
group worldwide. 
395 See http://www.crownagents.com/Crown-Agents-supports-Tanzania-education-initiative.aspx (accessed June 2013). 
396 For instance, according to ADB (2007: xii) ‘GoT provides books through capitation grants. This is a more efficient 
way of providing books to schools. A centralized provision of textbooks appears to be less cost effective’. 
397 According to the SFO, the ‘UK Government has been helping BAE and the Government of Tanzania to determine 
what the money should be used for and how it will be delivered and monitored to ensure the funds are used effectively’ 
(press release 15/03/2012, SFO web site). An official in the Ministry of Finance deciphered the real nature of this 
generous guidance that blatantly contradicted the UK’s commitments to the principles of alignment and ownership: ‘You 
see this money was taken from the government. It was not specific to education. We wanted it to be refunded through GBS. It was a hot debate. 
We could not reach an agreement. They were putting conditions… DIFD insisted that funds should be channelled to education ... Why should 
they put conditionality on money that is supposed to be refunded to the government of Tanzania? … We need the money, we had no other way’ 
(interview 34). 
398 Without OUP’s conviction, DFID’s effort to force the government into purchasing primary textbooks would have 
facilitated the return of corrupt funds to the UK through another scam by a British multinational.  
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debarment of Crown Agents and its affiliates – including Crown Agents USA Inc. – due to 
fraudulent practice.399 
 
Finally donors’ utilitarian conception of quality education has had an important impact on 
the organisation of the Tanzanian textbook sector. The concerns over ‘quality’, chiefly 
framed in terms of demand for science (Chapters 4 and 5) have been directly reflected in 
donors’ textbook interventions. The list of minimum criteria to define a ‘functional 
secondary school’, negotiated as a prior condition for the World Bank’s SEDP II, displayed 
a strong bias in favour of science instructional materials: minimum classroom supplies for 
students need to include ‘One textbook per student in six subjects – biology, chemistry, 
English language, Kiswahili language, mathematics, and physics’ (World Bank 2010: 46). As 
a consequence, secondary schools were officially instructed to earmark 50 per cent of their 
capitation grant, partly funded by the World Bank, to purchase science and maths 
textbooks.400 The Headmaster in School T captured this official zeal over science textbooks: 
‘We were asked to buy as many science textbooks as possible’. In 2010-2011, in parallel to the World 
Bank’s pressure, USAID supported, within its TLMP, the provision of science textbooks to 
1,500 Tanzanian public secondary schools. At primary level, the purchase of textbooks 
with the BAE funds concentrated on ‘Kiswahili, English, Maths and Science’. 
 
When encountering the intractable reality of schools on the ground these efforts to 
restructure schools’ incentives towards science resulted in inefficient, sometimes absurd, 
situations. Many schools visited in Lushoto were submerged by science textbooks, while 
facing shortages in arts. In School AA, the headmaster explained: ‘We’ve got an excess of science 
books: 200 are remaining. They’ll remain here for the coming years. So we’ve reached a ratio of 1:1 in 
sciences. But we face a critical shortage of books for art subjects … The shortage of books in art subjects is 
my main challenge’. The World Bank-MoEVT instruction achieved its intended effect: the 
availability of science textbooks improved and the performance targets of the World Bank 
SEDP II were reached in some schools. But the instruction had overlooked the actual 
teaching conditions in ward secondary schools: the lack of science teachers and the fact 
that students preferred arts subjects. As a result, the science textbooks went unused and 
large piles of them lay idle in headmasters’ offices. 
                                                 
399 See https://www.devex.com/en/news/world-bank-slaps-crown-agents-with-temporary-debarment/76327. 
400 The official instruction included ‘language’ in priority textbooks. Nevertheless, based on interviews with headmasters, 
the directive was mainly interpreted as a priority for science and maths textbooks.   
261 
 
It should also be noted that, in limiting socially legitimate knowledge to hard sciences and 
valuable books to science textbooks, donors completely ignore the potential emancipatory 
role that access to books in general could play as an instrument to achieve quality education 
and, more broadly, to support a national developmental project. The World Bank’s 
successive support to the Tanzanian education system demonstrates a steady narrowing of 
the agency’s understanding of the role of books. The 1990 Education Rehabilitation and 
Planning Project acknowledged the critical educational role played by general reading – 
‘access to wider reading materials is essential if primary education is to progress beyond the 
sterile acquisition of functional skills’ (World Bank 1990: 8). It also underlined the 
importance of schools libraries (ibid: 38) and praised the ‘government's recognition of the 
vital role which libraries, access to reading materials and information play in the educational 
and social development’ (ibid: 8). The project supported the provision of secondary and 
primary schools with a selection of reference, nonfiction and juvenile fiction titles. Under 
the World Bank SEDP I, schools were allowed to procure for the construction of libraries 
and the purchase of library materials (World Bank 2004). But with the World Bank SEDP 
II, laboratories became more important than libraries, and laboratory equipment and 
chemicals more important than textbooks in arts subjects. The ambition of nurturing a 
national reading culture completely vanished.401 
 
Tanzania’s textbook sector has been shaped by donors’ contradictory interventions on 
textbooks, rooted in the dual nature of textbooks - vehicles for quality education but also a 
lucrative market for multinational companies. The current state of Tanzania’s textbook 
sector has been equally influenced by the national political settlement.  
 
3. The Tanzanian textbook sector and the national political settlement: the 
impossible reconciliation of competing interests 
 
 
The different stages in the process towards full marketization of the textbook sector gave 
rise to intense frictions between the World Bank and the Tanzanian state. The highly 
                                                 
401 Under Ujamaa the publishing parastal complex was supported by a public library network, created in the early years of 
independence (Bgoya 1982). The network, hit badly by the financial crisis in the 1980s, never recovered nor benefited 
again from donor support (Bgoya 1997: 29). 
3.1 Resistance to marketization of the textbook sector and the unresolved 
state vs. market ideological battle 
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contested nature of the 1991 Textbook Policy became apparent from the World Bank’s 
completion report of its Education Planning and Rehabilitation Project. According to the 
assessment, when the project started, and despite the government’s formal agreement 
underlined in the project appraisal,402 ‘there was no consensus on the textbook policy’. The 
report stressed the enduring ‘absence of a clear and consistent policy framework on the 
textbooks component’, subject to ‘protracted discussions’ that resulted in a ‘slow textbook 
liberalization process’ (World Bank 1998, annex A: 8). The government reluctantly fulfilled 
the project conditionalities: it took more than five years to finally announce the opening of 
the market to private actors (World Bank 1998: 34). Its own assessment of the project also 
underlined the tensions and divergences between the government and donors (World Bank 
1998: Annex C). Khalaf Rashid from Macmillan Aidan confirmed that the government 
resisted the logic of conditionality: ‘Definitely, there was a big resistance, a big resistance’. Similarly 
the design of the SEDP I entailed intense negotiations. An official in TIE recalled: ‘There 
was a lot of struggle, struggle, struggle …there was a lot of power used by the World Bank (…) to suppress 
any initiative of the Institute to write books’.  
 
The change was evidently imposed on the Tanzanian state by powerful external forces. 
Nevertheless, this local resistance did not mean that state power or segments of the 
bureaucracy unanimously rejected the shift. The SEDP I was negotiated at the end of 
President Mkapa’s second term. This leader genuinely embraced the neoliberal agenda to 
such an extent that a scholar from the University of Dar es Salaam argued: ‘Mkapa was the 
neoliberal founder of this country [who] did not tolerate any criticism against neoliberalism’ (interview 73). 
Giving a new impetus to the privatisation process and extending its remit to new sectors – 
energy, mining and railways – were at the heart of his personal political platform. The full 
marketization of the publishing industry was therefore entirely consistent with the top 
leadership’s developmental vision.  
 
In 2011-2012, research interviews confirmed the currency of market arguments in the 
Tanzanian context, across social positions. For instance, OUPT’s Tanzanian director noted: 
‘There will be no quality because there is no competition’. For an official in PMO-RALG: ‘The 
                                                 
402 Literally so: the word ‘agreed’ was actually underlined in the 1990 appraisal document, as if the World Bank’s project 
designers wanted to secure, in a technical-legal form, a hard-won settlement and to force the other signatory party to 
honour an agreement conceded under the constraint, and therefore of a precarious political nature (World Bank 1990: 
34). 
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government had to do away with the production of textbooks because they can produce textbooks, sometimes, 
with low quality. There’s no competition’ (interview 25). Similarly, Walter Bgoya, former manager 
of Tanzania Publishing House, wondered: ‘If it is state-managed, then in the long run what’s the 
incentive to produce good quality books?’ These quotes testify to the internalisation, among 
segments of the elite, of the market mantra. Nevertheless, the single/standard textbook 
decision revealed the state’s persistent ambiguity vis-à-vis capitalists and the private sector. 
 
 
According to Amsden (2001), the East Asian miracle was largely driven by a developmental 
state able, through successful management of market rents, to induce a technological 
learning process in specific industries. To a certain extent, the Government of Tanzania’s 
textbook policy in the 1990s represented an instance of developmental industrial policy in a 
niche sector considered strategic due to its relation to the education system and the 
national culture (Davies 1997).403 The viability of an indigenous publishing industry, able to 
counter the market power of the British ‘big three’, required special treatment to offset 
international companies’ comparative advantages. An official in the MoEVT explained: 
‘Phasing in, phasing out is like weaning a baby from the mother...you are removing the child from suckling 
the mother slowly; you are not starving the child. You’ve got to get some supplement or some other types of 
nutrient in order to take over. The introduction of the new system had to be gradual’ (interview 8). While 
the 1991 Textbook Policy embodied elites’ surrender to market forces, the government’s 
indigenisation project, with SIDA’s support, could be interpreted as the re-articulation of a 
sovereign developmental project within the market framework. In that context, the 
single/standard textbook policy could be considered as the premature weaning of an infant 
industry. Why did Tanzanian authorities decide on an abrupt change in the textbook policy 
that destabilised a local industry that they had been so determined to create? 
 
Even during the PPP project which was geared towards the construction of a local 
publishing base state commitment to indigenous publishers remained ambiguous. The 
                                                 
403  Similarly, the 1996 national industrial policy called for support for indigenous manufacturing: ‘The Tanzanian 
entrepreneurial class is still small in size and in most cases lacks experience in modern industrial management which is 
increasingly becoming globalized. The government will therefore deliberately undertake measures to promote [an] 
indigenous entrepreneurial base’ (URT 1996: 13). 
3.2 The premature weaning of an infant industry and the state anti-capitalist 
ethos 
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principle of local protection of infant industries was only partially applied. The choice of 
the ‘local competitive bidding’ to procure TIE manuscripts for the private sector, that 
allowed multinationals to enter the Tanzanian market, was jointly agreed by donors and 
Tanzanian authorities. Some state factions, indeed, were not ready to close the doors to 
foreign companies. This reluctance was certainly driven by intertwined factors: a firm belief 
in the developmental role of FDIs, the historical prestige that Tanzanian leaders attached 
to British brands404 and multinationals’ successful lobbying. 
 
In 2008-2009, the crisis over the multiple textbook system vividly revealed the enduring 
state ambiguity vis-à-vis business people and the private sector. Since economic 
liberalisation, public officials have engaged in private sector activities and education has 
been one of their favourite areas of investment.405 Nevertheless, hostility towards profit-
making remains entrenched within the Tanzanian state and the local publishing industry is 
not immune to it. According to Khalaf Rashid, of Macmillan Aidan, ‘There’s always been 
distrust between government and the private sector… It’s still very distrusting of private sector and its profit 
motive’. In 2010, PATA proposed monthly meetings with government authorities to discuss 
educational materials issues. The nascent partnership came to a rapid end, the government 
resenting the publishers’ profit-making drive: ‘They told us, “You are just businessmen; you want 
to make profit with the government money”’ (local publisher, interview 95). This anti-capitalist 
acrimony also targeted indigenous publishers, perceived as global capital’s accomplices: 
‘[local publishers] killed us, our killers are local. The killers of this institute are local publishers, not the 
international ones. The local ones are using the power of these internationally established publishers to push 
their demands. They are working together: the birds of the same feather will fly together, always’ (official, 
TIE).  
 
In fact, a profound ideological misunderstanding has influenced the state-local publisher 
relations. Publishers and booksellers consider themselves singular entrepreneurs.406  The 
Secretary of the Booksellers Association noted: ‘We are business people but we are service 
providers… they’re seeing us mostly a hundred per cent as business people.  But for us we are saying, it’s 
not just a business, it’s also a service. What we need is to provide good service to schools instead of just being 
                                                 
404 Leaders ‘want’ Oxford, because they learnt with these books (local publisher, interview 91). 
405 Former Minister of Education Joseph Mungai, who in 1995 opened an English-medium, primary-level boarding 
school, epitomises officials’ enrichment straddling strategies. 
406 They illustrate the distinction made by Bourdieu and Passeron between capital and symbolic profit (1970). 
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business people (…) So we are a part of education’. Publishers interviewed also expressed a candid 
passion for books and reading. To what extent this self-identification as special 
entrepreneurs has affected their business decisions remains subject to a detailed study. 
Publishers’ dedication to educational goals certainly needs to be put in perspective: ‘You 
have those good and genuine publishers who are doing very well. They’re not just publishing for the sake of 
getting money. Yes, but you have others who are not’ (civil society representative, interview 65).407  
 
The strong anti-capitalist ethos has been further fuelled by another key feature of the long-
lasting political settlement: elites’ political survival depends on their egalitarian credentials. 
As argued in Gray (2012: 267), ‘part of the political legitimacy of the Party constructed 
under socialism was its commitment to equality. It is still very difficult for Tanzania to 
promote a capitalist class. Open forms of subsidy to business and the private sector are not 
politically acceptable to most people’. The vast majority of parents considered the multiple 
textbook system as a source of inequality. The market was flooded with poor quality 
textbooks and because national examinations were based, in practice, on a single specific 
textbook, parents considered the market-oriented multiple textbook policy inherently 
unfair, claiming that those children who studied from one of the ‘other’ books were at a 
disadvantage in exams. In promoting a shift to the standard textbook system, the 
Tanzanian top leadership actually responded to the people’s demand for equality. 
According to a NGO representative, ‘Most people, unfortunately, including the majority of parents 
and even teachers, seem to prefer the single-textbook approach. That’s easier and more attuned to the 
national need to create a unified educational system’ (interview 76). In a time when CCM’s political 
clout was shaken by Chadema’s growing political influence, this choice could serve its 
endeavour to reassert its political legitimacy.  
 
 
 
Gray (2012) pointed out a structural obstacle to an effective industrial policy geared 
towards productive accumulation: a fragmented elite and the inability of the top leadership 
to impose discipline on CCM internal factions. This fragmentation appears as a key 
(dis)organising feature of the book sector. 
                                                 
407 In the West, the publishing trade has experienced a gradual normalisation; it has almost completely become dominated 
by pure accountancy logic (Golding 1978: 455). 
3.3 A fragmented sector 
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The absence of an official book development policy testifies to authorities’ lack of 
commitment to a thriving national reading culture and a flourishing indigenous publishing 
industry. Such a strategic document, covering all aspects of the book chain, would 
constitute the starting point for an effective coordination of the multitude of actors, public 
and private, involved in the sector (Bgoya 1997). Education bureaucrats’ divergent attitudes 
towards the single/standard textbook also illustrate this fragmentation. From the beginning 
of the crisis, a number of officials in the Ministry of Education opposed the measure and 
adopted a wait and see attitude. A long serving top civil servant in the Ministry was 
transferred to another administration as a disciplinary measure because of his open 
opposition to the Minister’s decision. In 2011-2012, research informants provided 
contradictory information about the actual policy in place. The Deputy-Permanent 
Secretary for Education in PMO-RALG and the Commissioner for Education in the 
MoEVT invoked the standard textbook policy as a reality. Its extension to secondary 
schools was supposedly under serious consideration.408 At the same time, another senior 
official in the MoEVT firmly stated: ‘The multiple textbook [policy] is still in place. The standard 
textbook policy is not yet in place. There’s been no change. No circular has been issued... When everyone is 
convinced that we need to turn to a standard book policy, we shall change the policy’. As to a possible 
extension to secondary schools, an official in PMO-RALG was forceful: ‘There’s been no 
discussion on a change in the policy’. This cacophony of voices certainly reflects the 
contradictory interests and discordant ideological views among the multiple factions within 
the Ministry of Education and PMO-RALG: those who supported the need for a state 
tightened control over the textbook chain; those who were directly involved in SIDA’s PPP 
project, who gained capacities and continued to strongly believe in this model; those who 
believed that the standard textbook policy would deepen favourably competition among 
publishers and those who were convinced that the new system would restrict Tanzania’s 
chances of benefiting from the global knowledge economy. This also illuminates the degree 
of autonomy/agency of education bureaucrats within the state and their ability to influence 
a policy decided on in higher levels, by politicians. Against this background and in the 
context of the BAE refund, the decision to shift to centralised procurement under PMO-
RALG’s authority also fuelled the power battle between the PMO-RALG and the Ministry 
of Education. 
                                                 
408 Personal interviews. 
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The private sector displayed a similar fragmentation. As pointed out by a representative of 
an international publisher: ‘We’re not a united sector. The Publishers’ Association of Tanzania is itself 
riddled with internal competition, internal agendas…the publishing community is very divided’ (interview 
89). The rivalry between international and indigenous publishers was evident in PATA’s 
refusal to officially endorse Read’s 2010 report commissioned by international publishers. 
A prominent local publisher explained: ‘We do not feel that we needed somebody from the UK to 
come and tell us what we should be doing when we had already done it’. A distrust shared by the other 
side: ‘PATA is not a disinterested body. I would strongly object to PATA being representative without 
[us] being there and sitting there as well… I don’t trust what they would decide on our behalf’ (interview 
89). At the same time, publishers and booksellers were also clashing, each blaming the 
other for the sector’s predicaments. Booksellers viewed the government’s decision on 
centralised procurement as a major threat to their own survival, and one which would 
chiefly benefit publishers.409 
This division of the sector may explain the difficulty it has had in competing for rents with 
other sectors. For instance, for decades publishers and printers have lobbied for a 
duty/VAT exemption on paper imports (interview 91, local publisher). India managed to 
build up a strong domestic printing industry by relaxing the duty/tax system on imports of 
raw printing materials (Indian Institute of Foreign Trade 1982). However, the Tanzanian 
local paper industry, less fragmented and controlled by a handful of people, was more 
effective in securing its protection from the global market. 410  Printers’ only room for 
manoeuvre lies in individual negotiations with the Ministry of Trade about the scope of 
their exemption for education-related imports, negotiations shaped by personal and 
informal relations (printer, interview 97).  
 
Gray (2012: 250) argues that ‘during the socialist period, power within the state was still 
fragmented to the extent that people within the system could forge small coalitions to resist 
their rents being removed’. At the time of the fieldwork, the textbook sector exemplified 
the enduring relevance of this analysis. The state was incapable of disciplining all the 
contradictory interests in a sector finally reduced to a site of ‘primitive accumulation’.411 
                                                 
409 ‘All the bookshops will close and publishers will be well off’ (interview 96). 
410 The paper industry employs more staff and produces a larger output than the printing/publishing industry (UNIDO 
data): protecting the paper industry may therefore be, economically, more sensible. 
411 Gray (2012: 78) defines ‘primitive accumulation’ as the ‘process of accumulation outside the formal market process 
where political power is used to privilege the accumulation activities of particular individuals’. This definition is largely in 
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4. Elite capture of the textbook public manna 
 
‘There was a lot money floating, easy pickings (…) There is a lot of money waiting to buy books, to buy 
education materials. And so many are involved in using public money to buy books so it is very difficult for 
this system, for the safety valves to work in that kind of system because money is everywhere, is given, is 
dished out to almost everyone’ (official, MoEVT, interview 8). This statement reflects the 
perception of most informants: the textbook sector is marred by corruption. It also clearly 
reveals the state’s difficulty in exerting rent control in a hyper-fragmented landscape of 
fraudulent activities. OUP’s corrupt practices have already been mentioned in relation to 
the standard textbook selection process. This section examines three further specific sites 
in the textbook chain where domestic elites and multinational publishing companies have 
deployed accumulation strategies outside the formal market process.  
 
 
 
At central level, the EMAC, the body that controls the conditions of entry into the market, 
has been in a critical position to manage/distribute rents.412 A considerable amount of 
informal negotiations has occurred at this level. The identities of the EMAC reviewers are 
even kept secret to protect them: ‘Otherwise they would be killed’ (interview 100). This 
statement, made in all seriousness, by a local publisher reveals the intensity of the battle 
and the level of financial interests at stake. It is also common knowledge that some ministry 
officials sitting in the EMAC author textbooks under pseudonyms, thus having vested 
interests in the selection process. In the education administration, the ideological battle 
triggered by the standard textbook policy has obviously been coupled to a struggle over 
material interests. 
 
In this particular industry, being first to the market provides a competitive edge that 
latecomers find difficult to overcome. Securing an exclusive and early access to the market 
constitutes therefore a sound – if not legal – business strategy to build up a dominant 
position. This can be achieved through bribing the market gate-keeper to, for example, 
                                                                                                                                               
line with Bayart’s (1993) use of the term to describe elites’ modes of accumulation based on their straddling of the 
business and political/institutional spheres. Bayart prefers this term to ‘corruption’ in order to escape the normative 
charge of the word in global discourses on Africa. This understanding diverges, however, from an orthodox Marxist 
approach that uses ‘primitive accumulation’ to describe the movement of expropriation of the peasantry at the origin of 
capitalism. For an in-depth and critical analysis of the international good governance/anti-corruption discourse and its 
associated interventions in Africa see Vallée (2010). 
412 Here the EMAC does not refer to its Secretariat but to the full institution.   
4.1 The EMAC, the market gate-keeper  
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secure a quick entry into the market for one’s sub-standard textbooks or to ensure a late 
market entry for one’s most serious competitor. An official from the Ministry of Education 
explained: ‘These publishers are also rushing to get the products in the market to sell, to get money. So, 
very hurriedly, they can go and corrupt the EMAC, they can corrupt everybody. They are moving at the 
speed of light so that they grab the money. So it is very easy to forsake even the quality of the books because 
of that kind of gold rush’ (interview 8). In such a context, curriculum changes, while provoking 
massive losses for some publishers, also become ‘very good business’ for others. 413  They 
indeed open up opportunities for market share redistribution, but not necessarily through 
free competition. Getting exclusive access to an early draft version of a syllabus together 
with the EMAC’s early approval can greatly contribute to a swift reactivity to a changing 
demand: when other publishers enter the market, they find it already saturated with 
products from competitor(s) that informally secured privileged access to insider 
information. In this context, international publishers’ financial base provides them with a 
powerful arm to win the rent competition. 414 The Ministry of Education finally disbanded 
the EMAC in June 2013, because of ‘poor performances and corruption’.415  
 
 
The individual trajectory of a Tanzanian publisher and CCM Member of Parliament – 
Nyambari Nyangwine - provides an edifying illustration of productive bonds between 
commercial textbook publishing and the political sphere. As a university student, he began 
to write academic and secondary education textbooks. After finishing university, he started 
to sell books, as a businessman. He then established his own publishing company. To date, 
he has published 176 titles. 416  Teachers in Lushoto were critical of the quality of his 
textbooks: ‘We’re forced to use the current books but there’re many mistakes, especially the ones from 
Nyambari’ (teachers, School H). ‘Teachers don’t appreciate them, there are a lot of mistakes; it’s spoon 
feeding, cramming’ (Headmaster, School A). For teachers, Nyangwine’s products were 
                                                 
413 Words borrowed from an informant (interview 132). Over the last two decades, Tanzania experienced a series of 
curriculum alterations, largely driven by World Bank’s conditionalities (under its SEDP and PEDP projects). Curriculum 
reforms constitute a complex domain that would require a dedicated political economy investigation. But specifically, a 
sudden curriculum change in 2005 ‘started to spell disaster for the industry’ (local publisher, interview 93): publishers 
were left with massive stocks of textbooks in their warehouses. 
414 According to informants, after the 2005 curriculum change, the revised syllabus was made available to publishers only 
in mid-2006. By November, OUPT’s new textbooks had already been approved by the EMAC. But its manuscripts were 
actually consistent with an early draft of the syllabus, not with the final version. 
415http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2013/06/07/newsbrief-07 (accessed 08/04/2014) 
416 Interview with Nyamgwine. 
4.2 The Publisher-Politician: publishing as a political springboard  
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typically textbooks wrongly approved by the EMAC: ‘Lots of books nowadays are authorised by 
MoEVT but some are very shallow. For instance Nyambari Nyangwine’ (teachers, School K).417  
 
Despite the poor quality of his products, he has been successful: ‘In one year, I would sell 
10,000 copies for each title for Forms One to Four and for Forms Five and Six: 5,000 copies in sciences 
and history and 2,000 in maths.’ His success is based on three main factors. First, he was able 
to seize a market opportunity: ‘I became a publisher because I wanted to make a profit. And in 
secondary schools and especially high schools, most publishers were foreigners’. For several years, while 
the other main publishers focused on the primary level, he enjoyed a quasi-monopoly 
position in the secondary textbooks area: ‘Five years ago, Nyambari Nyangwine was the best-selling 
publisher. Today, it’s Oxford (...) Nyambari was the only one on the market few years ago. Now there are 
many more and there’s been a shift from him to the others’ (interview 156, bookshop, Lushoto). For 
Forms Five and Six, he was still, in 2012, the only Tanzanian publisher for social sciences, 
English, History and Economy. Given the high price of imported A Level textbooks, his 
products, even if of lower quality, certainly benefited from greater price competitiveness. A 
second element of success was his ability to secure the EMAC’s approval for some of his 
titles, despite their dubious quality.418 The third factor has been an efficient marketing and 
distribution system. One teacher in School H explained: ‘For instance, we’ve got some books from 
Nyambari Nyangwine: they’re not well prepared. People who bought these books were not keen on the 
information in the books. But the owner promoted his books; he would send posters’. In 2012, 
Nyangwine had become an accomplished entrepreneur, with diversified business activities: 
‘I’ve got four companies: a publishing, a stationary, a bookshop and a security company. I’m the chairman 
of these four companies and each has a director. My wife is the general director and she is the one going to 
China to negotiate printing contracts’. 
 
In 2010, he won the Parliamentary election for Tarime constituency. Born in 1976, he did 
not have a significant militancy life prior to his election.419 In a party that has been reluctant 
                                                 
417  In most cases, teachers interviewed spontaneously mentioned Nyangwine’s textbooks when questioned on their 
textbook challenges. It was rare that the researcher had to prompt them specifically on the subject. 
418 The EMAC’s list of September 2011 only includes 5 titles by Nwangwine (out of his stated 176 titles). His success may 
actually have pre-dated the MoEVT’s 2010 directive to secondary schools to buy only EMAC-approved textbooks. This 
instruction may explain the erosion of his position on the public secondary schools market segment. He explained ‘I mostly 
sell to private schools and individual students. With public schools you need to go through procedures, it’s too complicated’.  
419 His personal page on the Parliament web site has two mentions of political experience: in 2008 ‘youth commander’ 
and in 1993 ‘Youth Secretary in Mara Secondary’. The same web page displays a list of 20 of his published textbooks: 
even in terms of self-promotion, his publishing credentials took precedence over his political credit 
(http://www.parliament.go.tz/index.php/members/mpcvs/1740/ 2010-2015; accessed 13/06/2013). 
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to open up opportunities for the younger generation, his swift political success can be 
considered as quite remarkable. His financial base, derived from his publishing activities, 
certainly contributed to his political take-off. According to his own account, his political 
career cannot be delinked from his business activities. He was among the publishers who 
incurred major losses after the sudden decision to change the curriculum in 2005. ‘That’s 
why I came to politics and stand in the Social Affairs Committee, to try to influence the policy.’  
 
Parliament has not only offered him a platform from which to protect his commercial 
interests, it has also provided him with new market opportunities. At a time when he faced 
the erosion of his market share challenged by OUPT’s market penetration power, his MP 
colleagues purchased textbooks from him. ‘Many MPs have bought my textbooks, about 50 
[MPs] since last year’. An MP confirmed: ‘I also bought some books for secondary schools, with my 
CDF funds. The MP Nyambari, from Tarime, sold me 1,885 books’ (interview 80). Therefore, 
MPs are using public resources – the Constituency Development Fund - to directly 
purchase Nyangwine’s textbooks. While they flood secondary schools in their constituency 
with low quality textbooks, building up their educational credentials at little cost, they also 
contribute to the personal enrichment of their politician-entrepreneur colleague. As for 
Nyangwine, he solved the textbook shortage issue in his constituency by freely providing 
his own poor quality textbooks. Chapter 6 highlighted politicians’ critical need for a strong 
local base. For Nyangwine, his textbooks, initially a mere commodity and then a key to 
unlocking the door of the political arena, became the foundation of his local political 
rooting. This provides an interesting case of an accumulation trajectory where commercial 
profits, political career and local patronage have been symbiotically tied to textbooks.  
 
 
The Lushoto District economy provides another prism through which to explore 
accumulation strategies in the context of the textbook trade.420 All research informants 
pointed to the headmaster-bookseller nexus as the weakest link in the textbook chain. The 
devolution of textbook purchasing to schools in conjunction with the capitation grant 
                                                 
420 While charting out a research agenda to understand the structural effects of economic policies in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Olukoshi (1996: 78-79) identified ‘private trading network and structures’ as an important research theme. This sub-
section sheds some light on key questions Olukoshi raised about ‘the nature of the activities [private trading actors] are 
embarking on’, ‘patron-clientelist ties that are being built or which are being exploited by the traders’ and ‘the 
relationships of the traders (…) to the state’. 
4.3 The textbook trade and the district educational business complex 
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system led to rampant collusion between booksellers and headmasters who arranged over-
invoicing schemes.421 The following account by a local publisher reflects both the scope of 
the phenomenon and the state’s inability to circumvent it:  
One district education officer went to inspect some of his schools. He asked one head teacher … to show 
the books they had bought; there were no books but the documents showed that the books have been 
bought… So he suspended the head teacher and then he went to another one and another one, and 
another one, and another one, and the same thing applied. There were no books but books have 
been…in the ledger books. (…) So he suspended all of them. And then he went to the tenth teacher. He 
found the same. So, he told them, “Go back to work.” The suspension was waived. (Interview 88)  
This ‘vitabu hewa’ phenomenon 422 obviously explains why officials in the Ministry of 
Education do not take the official 1:3 textbook ratio seriously, computed as it is from 
annual census forms submitted by headmasters: the ‘figure does not portray the reality (…) we only 
assume it is 1:3’ (official, MoEVT, interview 15).  
 
The empirical investigation in Lushoto confirmed that arrangements between booksellers 
and headmasters were common practice. In several schools visited, separate interviews with 
headmasters and with teachers’ focus groups led to a divergent picture of the school 
textbook situation. Headmasters provided an inflated textbook ratio compared with the 
teachers’ figure. Members of staff at ELCT bookshop, further illuminated bookseller-
headmaster business relations: ‘[Booksellers] provide teachers with receipts of Tsh 400,000 while they 
only buy for Tsh 200,000. So teachers tend to go there. We’re an institute bookshop. [X]’s is a private 
business; he can decide himself and can provide teachers with commissions or discounts. They talk the 
business language.’ According to the headmaster in School G the label ‘booksellers’ cannot 
even be applied to the local entrepreneurs involved in the textbooks trade:‘[They] are 
“walanguzi offisadi”. 423 They don’t go with the price, with the rules. You don’t get anything from them 
until you give them something. They abuse of money. They bring books which are not recommended.’ 
 
Beyond headmasters’ petty corruption practices, the exploration of the district textbook 
trade provides an instructive entry point to understanding the key structuring features of a 
district economy. Four booksellers were located in Lushoto town: the ELCT bookshop, 
                                                 
421 The words ‘collusion’ or ‘collude’ were systematically used by informants to characterise headmasters-booksellers 
business relations. 
422 ‘Vitabu’ stands for books and ‘hewa’ for air. 
423 ‘Speculators’. 
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‘Mjema’, ‘Bosnia’ and ‘Kimako'. Other textbook traders - Giddeon Gogwe and Soni 
General Traders - were located in Soni, an important district economic centre. Of these, 
only the ETLC bookshop, set up in 1970 by the Lutheran Church primarily to sell religious 
books, was exclusively dedicated to the book trade. In the case of Mjema, Bosnia and 
Kimako, textbook selling was only one activity within a diversified business complex. 
Eliapenda Mjema owns three companies all with school-related economic activities: his 
textbook and stationary company, a construction company which builds classrooms and 
laboratories in ward secondary schools and a hardware company which supplies cement, 
iron sheets and also school desks and chairs. Kimako’s business is similarly organised 
around the textbook and stationary shop, part of Tuvako Ewaka Trading Company which 
is also involved in construction, hardware activities and the supply of school desks and 
chairs. Bosnia Company, owned by Shabani, is also highly diversified: its activities range 
from hardware, stationary, spare parts to cosmetics, construction and coffee growing. The 
company builds schools, laboratories, libraries and teachers’ houses. With the recent 
national emphasis on science, their bookshops have also started to supply laboratory 
equipment and chemicals. Textbook trade, therefore, constitutes only one transaction site 
between these entrepreneurs and the teachers. Actually, teachers largely contribute to 
shaping the town economy: they fuel an entire local business cycle. A staff member at the 
Lushoto branch of the National Microfinance Bank explained:  
Business in town depends largely on teachers, especially at the end of the month, when they come to town. 
They go far away and buy many things. Retail shops benefit a lot from them. The bigger employee 
population is constituted by teachers. There are no private investors. And teachers need to meet their 
social needs: they buy things. Without teachers, we would close. No other sector provides as many 
customers not even district officials. When teachers come to town they buy stationary and the suppliers 
borrow from us to be able to supply. It’s like a cycle. Businessmen come to us so we benefit indirectly 
from teachers. 
 
Kimako, Mjema and Shabani, together with a few others, dominate Lushoto District’s 
economic activities, outside agriculture. The description of their business portfolios reveals 
an important feature: an accumulation strategy driven by a horizontal specialisation. An 
important part of their business chiefly is in acting as an intermediary: thanks to their 
capital strength and often their involvement in transportation, they acquire simple 
commodity goods in bulk in Tanga or Dar es Salaam - cement, iron sheets, sand and 
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textbooks - and retail them locally. The nature of the commodity does not matter, only 
their market outlet - the district council and its offshoots in the area. Shabani underlined 
local entrepreneurs’ dependence on the district: ‘We just deal with them because there’s no other 
work to do. They’re our main customer’. The traded commodity could simply be a tender. For 
instance, thanks to a robust financial base, a ‘tenderpreneur’ could successfully bid for a 
construction contract and then pass it onto another entrepreneur together with a loan to 
acquire the raw materials or with transport facilities to reach the construction site.424  
 
For these entrepreneurs the source of success resides in their robust capital base.425 In the 
case of the textbook trade, this financial base enables them to keep a large stock and 
therefore to be reactive to schools’ demands, especially in peak seasons (January, when the 
school year starts and the beginning of July, half-term time). It also enables them to supply 
textbooks on credit and gain their customers’ fidelity. But above all, these tenderpreneurs 
need to have a robust financial base to be able to deal with the repercussions of the cash-
management issue that constrains the district planning and expenditure plans (see Chapter 
6): tenderpreneurs need to be able to absorb long delays in payment by a cash-strapped 
district. The same characteristic applies to schools: ‘They don’t pay on time, they don’t pay well. 
There were delays, even for one year’ (entrepreneur, interview 160). However, entrepreneurs 
never choose to enforce the penalty clause included in their contract with the district: 
‘Informally we talk with our suppliers. It means that contracts are not really binding documents. Because 
from the signed agreements they could sue us but they don’t. We’re in a good relationship’ (senior official, 
district, interview 126). Entrepreneurs’ over-dependence upon the district explains this 
prevalence of informality. Their economic survival hinges on a sustainable and smooth 
relationship with the district, their only credible market outlet: ‘Tenderers don’t want any conflict 
because tomorrow they won’t be able to work in that place so they don’t use that clause’ (official, district, 
interview 125). Working with the district also requires the ability to absorb a long chain of 
informal financial demands by district bureaucrats from the procurement stage to final 
payment. A local entrepreneur explained: ‘If the money comes from the district, you have to pass 
through the division officer and the ward executive officer to sign and they will delay the signature until you 
give them something. Now a new problem at the district, when you finish your work they tell you to go and 
take a technician, then an engineer and then the ward officer then the internal auditor’ (interview 161). 
                                                 
424 The label ‘tenderpreneur’ seems to have been coined by South African journalists. 
425 The fieldwork did not allow investigation of the origin of this financial base. 
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The distinctions between private and public sectors are blurred. Tenderpreneurs and public 
officials form a small exclusive clique that dominates the political economy district 
landscape with public officials engaging in straddling accumulation strategies. ‘Most of the 
companies are themselves; they set up their own companies’ (local politician, interview 141). ‘In the 
district it’s difficult to get any tender. They give them to each other or they use somebody’s name. They know 
how they pick themselves’ (local entrepreneur, interview 163). School boards translate, at 
community level, this educational business complex. In eleven schools visited, headmasters 
had selected businessmen as members of their school board along with politicians and 
district officials: 426  local petty traders, Lushoto-based hardware businessmen and 
constructors. For instance, Shabani of Bosnia Company was a member of School Y board. 
In School V, the headmaster selected construction businessmen so that ‘they can assist in 
constructions in the school’. In School C, teachers explained the pivotal role of the school board 
and teachers’ inability to influence its decision: ‘Within the board, there’s only one teacher who is a 
member, the headmaster or second master. We don’t have a meeting before to consult on the agenda and 
raise issues. They know themselves… For the books, we submit our list with the titles. They take our list 
but don’t even provide the titles requested. And [the headmaster] told us to use these ones first because due 
to the little money he could get only these titles’.  
 
While ward secondary schools have been turned into a political battlefield for district elites 
(Chapter 6), they have also become ‘business schools’ (mother, School Q), a major site for 
elites’ accumulation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Apple and Christian-Smith (1991: 33) argue that ‘to fully understand how specific cultural 
goods are produced and distributed for (our) public schools…we would need to unpack 
the logic of a fairly complicated set of interrelationships’. This chapter examined Tanzania’s 
textbook publishing and distribution infrastructures and their historical embeddedness 
within intricate political economy dynamics.  
 
                                                 
426 Four schools had not yet established a board; in the remaining schools, only general information was provided about 
the board. 
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The 1990s opening of Tanzania’s textbook market imposed by donors was not based on 
any hard evidence of a comparative lack of efficiency of the state-owned textbook 
publishing complex. It propelled a process of commodification of textbooks, subjected to 
generic market principles. In practice, donors’ modes of interventions – their direct 
promotion of multinationals’ interests, their procurement procedures, the prevalence of the 
‘transparency imperative’ and their utilitarian definition of quality education – were major 
factors in the shaping of the Tanzanian textbook market. These tangential objectives took 
precedence over broader educational goals and the construction of a flourishing national 
publishing industry. 
 
The textbook sector was also affected by the specific political settlement built up in the 
early years of Independence. According to Gray (2012: 246) ‘the problem of devising a 
successful industrial policy system that could channel resources to companies to finance 
the learning period while also imposing discipline on the rent recipient were clearly not 
resolved by the privatisation process’. This chapter demonstrated the relevance of this 
analysis to the textbook sector. The enduring elite fragmentation and the state’s ambiguous 
relationship with capitalists have prevented the re-articulation within the market framework 
of a sovereign project through indigenous publishing companies. They have, on the 
contrary, provided a fertile soil for the advancement of multinational companies in the 
Tanzanian (text)book market.  
 
In this context, the exploration of elites’ capture of the textbook public manna should not 
be misleading. Headmasters’ petty corruption, district entrepreneurs’ accumulation 
strategies and international companies’ corruption practices do not have the same 
significance. Their analytical juxtaposition should not lead to their conflation. But these 
phenomena reveal the state’s persistent inability to impose a discipline upon rent 
beneficiaries. To date, educational ambitions have had little bearing on this struggle over 
ideological and material interests, between and within internal and external forces. The 
future will reveal whether the standard textbook model, coupled with centralised 
procurement and the eviction of the most unruly players – the EMAC and Oxford 
University Press at national level and the headmaster-entrepreneur duopoly in the district – 
constituted a successful attempt by the state to regain control over the sector, an instance 
of effective rent management to achieve educational goals. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In 1988, commenting on the expansion of the government’s programme for secondary 
education, Julius Nyerere stated: 
‘These [openings of new public and private secondary schools] are no plans for teaching 
but for cheating (…) What will it benefit a child if he or she goes from a poor primary 
school to an even poorer secondary school, without facilities or even an adequate 
number of teachers? What we are doing is upgrading primary education for a few, and 
then pretending that it is Secondary Education.(…) Something which is secondary 
education only in name is a deception of an innocent child as well as being useless as a 
preparation for future service to the community. We are training for frustration and 
alienation.’(Nyerere 1988: 184) 
 
Two decades later, ward secondary schools came to materialise, on a large scale, Nyerere’s 
words. The central state did not honour its part of the ‘ward schools contract’ which 
turned into a fools’ game and peasants and parents bore a disproportionate share of the 
costs of the reform. They did not get a fair deal in return for their investment: poor quality 
infrastructure, a shortage of  teachers, scarcity of  educational materials (textbooks and 
science equipment), and massive failures in the national examinations. These poorly 
performing ward schools are also expected to provide the next generation of teachers 
required by an ever-expanding education system. In the absence of a massive financial 
investment in the system, one may argue that the conditions have been created for self-
perpetuating poor quality public education. Nevertheless, following Hirschman’s idea about 
unbalanced growth and bottleneck, one cannot dismiss the possibility that the ward 
secondary schools policy may lead to unintended productive consequences. If one 
embraces the idea that that educational policy 'learning paths' are not always linear or 
predictable, the actual long term developmental effects of the ward secondary schools 
policy remain today undetermined. 
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This thesis has used this specific educational policy as a prism to illuminate educational 
policy-making and implementation in Tanzania. The Tanzanian education system has 
remained since its inception the product of a complex interaction between external and 
internal forces, both material and ideological. This research has been driven by a general 
interrogation of the contemporary interplay between these forces in reproducing or 
transforming this education system. The exploration of the ward secondary schools policy, 
through a historically grounded analysis that posited education policies as sites of power 
and conflict, has, hopefully, shed light on important dimensions of the country’s education 
system.  
 
Within the research field of education and development in sub-Saharan Africa, this thesis is 
novel in several respects. First, it is original in its very subjects, secondary education, which 
has barely been investigated in the last two decades, and an educational policy and its 
budget, which are, here, not reified as technocratic artefacts. The research has also gathered 
rich qualitative material, through interviews with about 180 members of the elite, at 
national, district and village levels. This elite lens constitutes an innovative feature of the 
thesis, which has demonstrated the heuristic value of a systematic analysis of elite narratives 
to make sense of an education policy. The social significance of the policy has emerged 
from the identification of contradictions between elite discourses and the material 
dimensions of the policy. Moreover, the thesis provides rare evidence on the role of 
education in local elites’ patronage strategies. While education has been widely recognised - 
in the literature on African ‘big men’ or on decentralisation - as a site of social mobilisation 
for local elites, this has rarely been thoroughly documented with empirical evidence. The 
thesis also offers significant insights on the financial reality experienced by ‘community 
schools’ and their material significance for the rural population. Finally, the investigation of 
the textbook sector constitutes another distinctive contribution of this thesis. It allows 
insights into the intimate relations between the education and economic spheres, which go 
beyond the production of the labour force. Specifically, the thesis provides evidence, to 
date perhaps unique, on the formation, in a district, of a politico-business complex around 
education resources, an important addition to the understanding of the social role of 
education in rural Africa.  
 
279 
 
The remainder of the chapter summarises the main findings of the thesis and then 
concludes by sketching out a future research agenda. 
 
The comprehensive political economy approach adopted in this research proved more 
useful than alternative available theoretical frameworks. Indeed, Tanzanian authorities, 
when deciding upon the ward schools policy, and more generally on the appropriate 
combination of access and quality, have not been driven by a revealed aggregation of 
individual rates of return, as proponents of human capital theory might argue. Nor, the 
analysis and evidence suggest, can the ward secondary schools policy be effectively 
understood as a policy advanced by self-interested elites engaged in individual optimisation 
strategies, as advocates of new institutional political economy would argue. The role played 
by politicians’ individual ambitions, in national and district arenas, cannot be denied. 
Specifically, Prime Minister Lowassa was instrumental in launching and driving the policy. 
At district level, local politicians, while acting as the central state’s brokers, also 
reconfigured the national policy to serve their own pursuit of power. Nevertheless, 
arguments about elites’ individual self-interest fail to explain why Tanzanian politicians 
have invested in this specific field to fulfil their desire for power and they do not illuminate 
the mechanisms by which the politicians succeed in mobilising the population to 
implement their educational choices.  
 
Education – if  defined as transmission of  knowledge, or learning – was certainly not the 
Tanzanian authorities’ concern when embarking on the process towards mass secondary 
education. The ward secondary school policy is, at its core, a device for youth management. 
It should be understood as the last offshoot of  a process that started in the mid-1980s with 
the introduction of  cost-sharing and the encouragement of  private schools; this process 
steadily remodelled the educational settlement forged during the socialist period. Against 
the reality of public secondary education as a historical site of elite formation, the 2006 
shift towards mass public secondary education marked a displacement of the locus of social 
differentiation in education. The expansion occurred against a background of quasi-
universal primary education coupled with job scarcity and quality private education 
available only to the wealthy. In this context, under-resourced ward secondary schools can 
be interpreted as a renewed educational settlement intended to resolve the structural 
tension, inherent in education systems across the world, between their integrative purpose 
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and their role in social reproduction/differentiation. This might help explain Tanzanian 
elites’ seemingly high level of tolerance regarding the catastrophic Form Four examination 
failures. One might argue that, for Tanzanian elites, the ward secondary schools policy, far 
from being a failure, was adapted to the actual conditions of production in Tanzania today 
– an agrarian economy, capital intensive industrialisation, low-skilled service activities in the 
informal sector – and was pursuing an appropriate goal: a domesticated youth. Contrary to 
prevalent discourses in global spheres, access without learning may not be, from elites’ 
point of view, meaningless. This policy illustrates the enduring relevance of Marxist 
analyses and Foucault’s views on the socialisation function of schooling. 
 
Neither the elites nor donors have met the fiscal challenge of mass secondary education. 
Since 2009/10, donors and domestic elites’ converging concerns over quality have allowed 
marginal budgetary adjustments in favour of secondary education and quality-related inputs. 
But the ward school process did not bring about any substantial budgetary realignment 
from either side. Donors did not provide the additional funding necessary to mitigate, at 
least, the damaging effects of access expansion on the quality of education. Their financial 
treatment of the learning crisis remained overly shaped by a ‘value for money’ approach 
and pressing demands for tight fiscal discipline. Elites’ egalitarian claims to legitimate the 
ward secondary schools policy also did not trigger any reconfiguration of their overarching 
budget preferences. Budget decisions have remained geared towards productive sectors at a 
macro level and to higher education at sector level while the social order imperative 
prevailed over welfare considerations. 
 
For the central state and donors, locally driven secondary education expansion has offered 
an answer to the financial conundrum posed by a narrow national fiscal space shaped by 
their own preferences. In the light of the reality in Lushoto, one may argue that the model 
bears more resemblance to the bricolage of a public-private basic social net for the poor 
than to an effective commitment to quality secondary education for the poor. It marks the 
implicit renouncement of the concept of quality public education as a national public good. 
Given the degree of coercion involved in their collection, communities’ contributions to 
building and running the ward secondary schools may be reckoned a regressive tax on the 
poor. Moreover, far from being sites of human capital accumulation, ward ‘business’ 
secondary schools have mainly opened up a new field of prestige, power and capital 
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accumulation for the international, national and district elites. The capitation grant, 
earmarked for ward schools’ textbook purchases, constitutes a major site of frictions 
between donors and government authorities. It also embodies the symbiotic relation 
between public resources, local private sector development and foreign companies’ 
strategies to penetrate the Tanzanian market. The exploration of the textbook chain also 
illuminated the degree of elite capture of educational resources, via corrupt practices at 
various scales. Ward secondary schools may eventually be interpreted as the privatisation of 
the funding of rural public secondary education for a private gain that did not accrue to 
one of its major financiers, the peasants. In that context, new aid modalities currently 
under consideration – performance-related teacher pay and school funding – would 
radically shift the onus of  quality education from the central state and international aid 
agencies to individuals. In doing so, donors would completely evade the structural question 
of the fiscal space for quality basic education for all and obscure the responsibility of  
domestic and international elites to fund it.  
 
The ward secondary schools policy, whilst marking a break with the post-independence 
educational settlement, also displayed important elements of  continuity with the past. This 
was especially evident in the homogeneous discourse deployed by elites to legitimate this 
education policy, with controversial outcomes. To sustain the policy elites, at national and 
local levels, have mobilised the national ‘imagined community’, historically nurtured by a 
widely shared belief  in the power of  education as an engine for collective, family and 
individual success. This conviction that cuts across social class boundaries partly enabled 
the large-scale social mobilisation that made the construction of  ward secondary schools 
possible. Moreover, the mode of  implementation of  the ward schools policy, which implied 
a large dose of  coercion and ignored the actual financial constraint, bore a marked 
resemblance to historical centrally driven policies that were implemented in a heavy-handed 
fashion by the central state. Tanzania’s history of ‘self-help’ development also offered an 
important discursive resource to justify the choice of communities’ contributions to fund 
the policy. Finally, the dominant class discourse revealed elites’ persistent self-positioning 
as benevolent educators of the masses, bringing development to obscurantist peasants, 
parents and students, who ‘do not value’ education and who are eventually blamed for the 
policy failures.  
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The legitimation discourse of  elites, while deeply rooted in the country’s history, has been 
tangled with international aid agencies’ contemporary rhetoric: an instance of a hybrid 
discursive construct. Specifically, the symbolic system that has conceived secondary 
schooling, since the colonial period, as a site of access to modernity has been reworked in a 
‘globalisation’ and ‘knowledge economy’ idiom. This discourse conceals domestic and 
international elites’ lasting concerns over youth integration as well as their enduring 
inability to chart out a job-intensive developmental path in Africa. In many respects, the 
ward secondary schools policy qualifies as a home-grown educational policy. Yet if donors 
and the Tanzanian executive disagreed on the pace of the expansion, they at least agreed on 
its locally driven model of implementation. Elites’ ‘imagined rural communities’ echo the 
World Bank’s romanticised poor, whose fate is detached from any historical and socio-
economic structures, who need to be empowered to exercise their consumer rights, but 
who are also required to earn their way out of poverty and ignorance.  
 
The actual funding conditions of the policy and elite capture of education resources 
intended for ward secondary schools render donor and elite rhetoric deeply ideological, in 
Marx’s sense of obfuscating or inverting reality. These discourses do, indeed, mask unequal 
material interests. Yet, the findings of this research confirm the importance of not 
overstating the functionalism of elites’ educational policy choices or the homogeneity of 
the state and the donor community. The ward secondary schools policy has been the 
outcome of conflicts between various factions of the dominant class. In particular, the 
study of the decision making process of the ward schools policy, the investigation of the 
national and district budgets and the analysis of the textbook policy demonstrated the 
specific position of education bureaucrats within the state. The interests of these 
bureaucrats may partly diverge from those of senior politicians or the Ministry of Finance. 
At both central and district levels, they enjoy degrees of autonomy and battle with other 
segments of the state to defend their sector-specific interests. In the case of the ward 
schools policy, the top executive had to resort to its coercive power to fully enrol a 
reluctant bureaucracy. The confusion around the actual textbook policy framework, a few 
years after the President’s announcement of the single textbook policy reform, can partly 
be explained by the successful strategies of education bureaucrats in the face of a policy of 
which they disapproved. These tensions are underpinned by diverging modernisation 
philosophies: while technocrats, like their counterparts in foreign aid agencies, firmly 
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embrace the ‘rule of the experts’, politicians, at least the generation in power, adhere to a 
‘big push’ development strategy. The last episode in the capitation grant saga further 
illuminated that, within the aid arena, confrontational lines straddle the boundaries of 
government and aid agencies. In that instance, a coalition was forged between the 
education administration and education aid managers. Their converging interests – more 
funding for quality secondary education – prevailed over the opposing coalition formed by 
the Ministry of Finance and aid agency economists. One may eventually argue that the 
formation of educational policies and budgets in Tanzania can be best understood as 
historical processes animated by interdependent individuals and groups of actors, 
underpinned by a more or less unstable and shifting balance of power. At no point can a 
given manifestation of such processes be considered as definitive. 
 
Finally, while the post-2015 global education agenda will probably incorporate a ‘universal 
lower secondary education’ goal and a ‘learning’ goal (United Nations 2013), the extreme 
case of  ‘access without learning’ that Tanzanian ward secondary schools embody may 
usefully inform on-going reflections about this future agenda. In particular, this research 
has documented the crucial importance of  an expanded fiscal space to support a process 
geared toward mass junior secondary education. Its findings challenge a core tenet of the 
new conventional wisdom that prevails in global spheres: resources do actually matter to 
learning. Furthermore, the findings of this thesis invite a close examination of the role of 
donors’ discourse, practices and competing agendas in the actual failures of traditional 
education policies such as schooling expansion, textbook provision or better pay for 
teachers. In the budget support era, good governance, anti-corruption, value for money, 
and results imperatives have taken precedence over a broader educational agenda. Donor 
micro-management has certainly crowded out the national policy and political spaces, 
hampering a locally specific deliberation on the very meaning of quality education for 
Tanzania. In the case of the textbook sector, donors’ promotion of western multinationals’ 
interests, their market ideology and their narrow, utilitarian definition of quality education 
have certainly prevented the deployment of an imaginative book and reading policy that 
could serve an emancipatory education. 
 
In conclusion, a future research agenda may be sketched out that would address critical 
questions not covered in this thesis. Three main themes may be identified. A first theme 
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concerns the relations between education and the labour market. The ward secondary 
schools policy was certainly not formulated as a response to labour market demands. 
Economic considerations did play a determining role in shaping the policy, but chiefly as a 
critical discursive resource to legitimise it. Understanding of  the actual relations between 
the Tanzanian education and training system and the country’s economy remains 
rudimentary. Quantitative and qualitative empirical data to elucidate the complex channels 
of  interdependence between the two spheres are lacking. What impact has the enrolment 
expansion had on labour markets and wage levels in different sectors? In particular, does 
keeping people in school longer have a positive effect in tightening labour markets and, 
therefore, raising real wages for those employed? How to reconcile claims about the 
scarcity of jobs and the fact that young graduates shy away from the teaching profession? 
What are the specific features of the teaching labour market? To what extent do school fees 
influence parents’ working trajectories, including work-related migration patterns? More 
fundamentally, can the relation between education and economic development be 
subsumed into considerations over the production of the labour force?  
 
A second research theme deals with the growth of  private education provision. To what 
extent has the ward schools movement deepened a process of  exit out of  the public 
education system? What are the actual conditions that enable private schools to deliver 
better learning achievements? Are these performances the result of: a full embrace of  
market principles; specific modes of  organisation and accountability; the social 
characteristics of  their students? What is the effect of  the growing private education sector 
on the labour market for graduates? To what extent do the egalitarian ethos of  Tanzanian 
elites, their conditions of  social reproduction and their straddling accumulation strategies 
contribute to shape the state’s policy vis-à-vis private education providers? To what extent 
would the growth of  private education prevent the formation of  an alliance between low 
income groups and the middle class to pressure the government to improve the quality of 
public education? 
 
The third research axis would focus on a range of  actors not studied in this work: parents, 
communities, teachers, students, the teachers’ trade union and civil society organisations. 
Indeed, the elite lens adopted for this research largely obscured, by definition, their actions. 
It would be interesting to examine how these actors did engage with this policy and 
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contribute to shape, transform or contest it. Investigations in Lushoto already indicate 
various instances of  disaffection and ‘exit’. Student truancy was pervasive. Besides, most 
parents refused to pay the food contribution that school boards imposed on them 
following a ministerial circular. This central level instruction to schools translated a joint 
donor-government determination to address the issue of  poor learning achievements but 
was not supported by any additional funding: parents were summoned to fight the learning 
crisis; they defected. In the media and in informants’ interviews, teachers’ absenteeism and 
lack of  commitment to their professional duties were regularly framed in political terms, as 
a form of  ‘low intensity strike’. The fieldwork in Lushoto revealed that the conditions of  
reproduction of  a teachers’ labour force have become extremely financialised, in part due 
to teachers taking out loans to pay for their children’s private education. Teachers’ high 
level of  indebtedness, rooted in an under-resourced, under-performing public education 
system, may fuel their absenteeism as well as contributing to undermine their ability to 
engage in collective action. Teachers’ actual working, pay and living conditions would, in 
particular, deserve an in depth political economy analysis.  
 
Will the transformed educational organisation prompted by the ward secondary schools 
policy form a stable educational settlement, as enduring as its post-independence 
predecessor? The extent to which, and the mechanisms through which, the existing forms 
of  avoidance may lead to more structured forms of  contestation are a matter of  
speculation or further investigation. The 2015 presidential elections, in which Edward 
Lowassa, the ‘father’ of  the ward secondary schools, may be a prominent contender, may 
turn the ‘learning crisis’ into a major site of  electoral competition between an ailing CCM 
ruling party and Chadema, its most credible opponent. Finally, Tanzania has discovered 
huge reserves of  oil and gas. In this context, the capacity of  the country to circumvent the 
rent curse and to use part of  the new manna to expand the national fiscal space for good 
quality education for all would critically hinge upon the ability of  social forces to radically 
alter the coalition of  interests that currently determine the mobilisation and allocation of  
resources to public education.  
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Annex A Political leaders, development strategies and education policies: historical landmarks 
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Annex B The education and general budget support aid arenas in 2011 
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and Vocational Training Regional Administration and Development, Gender 
Local Government and Children
ESDP Secretariat
High Level Meeting Aide Memoire
Joint Education 
Sector Review
Rating Framework
Education DPG ESDC meetings
GBS/SBS donors GBS / project approach
World Bank&AFDB Annual Performance 
DFID, CIDA, SIDA, Report
France ESDC Taks force
Project apporach
USAID, JICA
Joint Technical Working groups
UN agencies
Unesco, Unicef, WFP Enrolment Quality 
(project approach) expansion improvements
Institutional Monitoring &
Arrangements Evaluation
RACEF Cross cutting 
Issues
TENMET (Civil society)
GENERAL BUDGET SUPPORT ARENA
Macro Economic 
Management Ministry of Finance
DPG / World Bank
PFM Secretariat
National Bureau GBS Secretariat
of Statistics
PFM DPG
AfDB IMF DFID GBS review 
Belgium Ireland USAID Annual Report
Poverty Monitoring Canada JICA WorldBank PRBS/GBS DPG
DPG DenmarkNorway
AfDB UK/DFID KFW SIDA AfDB Finland
EC Switzerland EU UNDP Canada/CIDA Germany GBS Annual Review
Canada Denmark Denmark Ireland
World BankUNICEF EC Japan
UNDP Norway UK/DFID
Sweden World Bank GBS PAF
Household 
budget survey
Civil society organisations
E-DPG Chair and Dep. 
Chair + Secretariat
Mkukuta  
monitoring 
report
Demogr
& Health 
surveys
Labour 
Force 
Surveys
Source: the author
335 
 
 
Annex C Aid and budget data, a methodological note 
 
 
Two main categories of data are used to support the financial analyses of this dissertation: 
the education budget at central and district levels, and overseas development assistance. 
This note intends to clarify their sources, the methodological assumptions that underline 
them and their limitations. 
 
1. Education public expenditures: the budget 
 
Since a seminal education Public Expenditures Review in 1994, Tanzanian education 
finances have been subject to continuous scrutiny. Over the research period, this close 
examination entailed several public expenditures reviews (for instance OPM 2001; World 
Bank 2011b); two public expenditures tracking surveys in 2002 (REPOA 2004) and 2008-
2009 (Claussen and Assad 2010) and one Rapid Budget Analysis (GBS DPG 2007). 
UNESCO (2012a: Chapter 3) provides the most comprehensive and in-depth analysis of 
education finances. However, its analysis only partially covers the period of this research. 
One key limitation of these different studies for the purpose of the present research project 
lies in their various definitions of the scope of the education sector. Indeed, delimitating 
the boundaries of education expenses remains a matter of conventional choice which 
makes the integration of budgetary data from different second-hand sources a delicate 
exercise.  
Budget books are quite widely available, in hard copy for older years,427 and on the Ministry 
of Finance’s website for most recent years. Nevertheless, the construction of a consistent 
time-series of education expenditures scattered over several budget votes, if possible, 
would have been very time-consuming. URT (2011b) provides the only time-series of the 
education budget that covers the entire research period. For this reason, this data was used 
(Table C.1). 
 
 
                                                 
427 In various public libraries, even if each institution cannot provide a time-consistent set of budget books, both for 
recurrent and development: in Tanzania REPOA or the Parliament’s library in Dodoma; in London, SOAS. 
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Table C-1: Budget allocation by education sub-sector, in cent million Tsh (current 
prices) 
Source: URT (2011b) 
 
This table has several limitations. First, it is not accompanied by any information about its 
specific definition of the scope of the education sector and sub-sectors (in terms of budget 
votes and sub-votes) and the institutional organisation of the sector has changed on several 
occasions (for instance, the merger of higher education with the MoEVT or the 
decentralisation of secondary education in 2009). It also does not provide any information 
about vocational training, a sub-sector that has gained attention in recent years. However, 
given that the primary source of the data has not changed – the Ministry of Finance – it is 
assumed that the underlying assumptions have been consistent over time. This choice also 
has the advantage of using the government’s own data on intra-sector budget allocations. 
 
This table provides budgeted amounts rather than actual expenditures; budget 
implementation can give rise to major variations. But given that Chapter 5 is chiefly 
concerned with elites’ budget allocations preferences over large categories of education 
expenditures, the use of ‘budget estimates’ does not constitute a major deterrent factor.  
 
One critical issue is that this table does not discriminate between personal emoluments, 
other charges, capital expenditures from domestic source (‘development local’) or external 
source (‘development foreign’). This lack of disaggregation prevents a refined financial 
analysis; for instance, traditionally, a proper education financial analysis would assess the 
share of non-salary recurrent expenditures and compare it with its counterpart in the total 
 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/
12 
Total 
Governme
nt Budget 2,106 2,607 3,347 4,176 4,850 6,067 7,216 9,514 11,609 
13,52
6 
GDP 
10,444 12,107 13,972 15,965 17,941 20,948 24,782 28,213 32,293  
Education 
sector 
397 488 505 669 959 1,100 1,430 1,744 2,045 2,283 
Primary, 
non-formal, 
supporting 
services 
290 361 322 418 618 619 967 1,211 1,273 1,160 
secondary 
education 
30 32 92 104 120 174 133 108 201 466 
Teacher 
education 
7 8 6 8 10 19 25 48 29 36 
Tertiary 
and higher 
education 
70 86 84 138 210 288 350 377 543 622 
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government budget. In a similar vein, data on the total government budget does not 
discount for the weight of the debt service which is a first order budget priority. The 
distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary is obscured and the assessment of 
the actual budget effort towards education made less meaningful (for a discussion see 
Penrose 1993). Nevertheless, in trading off between time-consistency in intra-sector 
allocation and disaggregation of data, the first parameter appeared more important to the 
argument developed in Chapter 5.  
 
To make up for the absence of data on the teachers’ wage bill, a specific table was 
constructed from two main sources. For FY2008/09, the primary teachers’ wage bill is 
based on data from ‘Login Tanzania’. This website, set up within the donors-funded Local 
Government Reform Programme, provides detailed data on local government finances by 
district, function and sector. Some inconsistencies exist with the Ministry of Finance’s 
Integrated Finance Management Information System (IFMIS). 428  The executed budget 
amount (‘cumulative outcomes’) was used here. In FY 2008/09 secondary education was 
not yet decentralised: secondary teachers’ personal emoluments are therefore based on the 
MoEVT’s budget books (supply vote 46, secondary education directorate, actual 
expenditures). In FY2010/11 and FY2011/12, both primary and secondary education were 
decentralised but data on education personal emoluments provided by Login Tanzania do 
not disaggregate between primary and secondary education. Both teachers’ wage bills were 
directly computed from regional budget books available on the Ministry of  Finance’s 
website (appendices to Volume III). The exercise required adding up, for each district in the 
21 regions, the actual expenditures (FY 2010/11) and the approved estimates (FY 2011/12) 
corresponding to ‘primary education basic salary’ (sub-vote 5007, item line 210101) and 
‘secondary education basic salary’ (sub-vote 5008, item line 210101). The analysis focused 
on ‘basic salary’ and did not include ‘personal allowances’ (sub-vote 210300). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
428 www.logintanzania.net. The website was discontinued in September 2013. District budget data are now provided on 
the PMO-RALG web site, starting with FY 2010/11 (http://lginf.pmoralg.go.tz/lginformation/). 
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Table C-2: Teachers’ basic salaries, primary and secondary education (in Tsh, 
constant prices. 2001) 
 2008/09 2010/11 2011/12 
Primary Teachers 284,851,524,545 227,864,348,510 267,526,654,056 
Secondary teachers 70,507,222,948 62,736,372,962 89,620,886,715 
Total teachers' wage bill 355,358,747,492 290,600,721,473 357,147,540,771 
Source: the author, based on Login Tanzania and MoF budget books. Note: personal enrolment data from Login 
Tanzania (primary teachers, FY2008/09) may not be restricted to ‘basic salaries’ and may also include ‘allowances  
 
2. Education overseas development assistance 
 
The OECD-DAC aid data set is an important source of data on overseas development 
assistance flows. However, when research requires disaggregated data by sub-sector and 
historical trends, DAC statistics are much less practicable. The lack of uniform time series 
data leads Bennell and Furlong (1998), in their evaluation of ‘trends in donor funding for 
education and basic education since the late 1980s’, to ‘re-survey all the bilateral donors in 
order to obtain basic statistical data on education aid expenditures since 1990 (…) as well 
as other relevant policy documentation’. In a similar vein, to compensate for the lack of 
disaggregated and easily available data on external assistance to Tanzanian education, the 
author constructed a specific data set from various sources. The result should therefore be 
interpreted as a composite and highly imprecise construct that only provides general trends. 
The various sources are the following: 
- PEDP funds (FY 2004/05 and FY 2005/06): an official matrix of amounts ‘deposited’ 
by donors in PEDP bank account. The document was drafted by the MoEVT and 
provided to the author by CIDA. Data were in USD; exchange rates were drawn from 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/contracts_grants/info_contracts/inforeuro/inforeuro_en
.cfm. The fiscal year when funds were ‘deposited’ was used even if, due to 
administrative time lags, funds might have been executed in the following fiscal year. 
- PEDP funds (for FY 2006/07 onward, mainly from France): budget books (volume 
IV public expenditures estimates – development) (actual expenditures) 
- For the World Bank SEDP I and II and higher education project: disbursement 
financial information provided by the World Bank’s web page on its Tanzanian 
projects. For instance for the SEDP I, 
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http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P083080/secondary-education-development-
program?lang=en 
- For the African Development Bank’s secondary project (FY 2004/05 and FY2005/06): 
budget books, (volume IV public expenditures estimates – development) (actual 
expenditures) 
- For Nordic projects on higher education and research (SIDA, NORAD): budget 
books (volume IV public expenditures estimates – development) (actual expenditures) 
- General Budget Support: to account for the contribution to education of general 
budget support – a non-earmarked aid modality - a percentage equivalent to the share 
of education in the national budget in a specific year was applied to the GBS total 
amount of that same year. This amount notionally allocated to education was then 
distributed between each education sub-sector along the allocative key derived from 
the education budget pattern as exposed in URT (2011b) (table E.3). Data on GBS 
disbursements by agency are from Ministry of Finance’s Aid Management Platform as 
reported in ADE et al. (2012: 5). However, for FY 2004/05, the data is based on ODI 
and Daima Associates (2005) (table E.4).429 
- Sector budget support: over the period, three agencies have provided sector budget 
support (EC, CIDA and DFID). Disbursements data are provided in ADE et al. (2012: 
5) along with GBS funding (Table E.4). Like GBS, SBS is in theory a non-earmarked 
aid modality. However, in practice in Tanzania, the Ministry of Finance tends to apply 
an ‘additionality’ principle and allocates the entire amount to the education sector. 
Therefore the author decided to allocate 100 per cent of SBS disbursements to the 
education sector and then to apply the distribution key between sub-sectors (Table 
E.3).  430 
 
                                                 
429 To account for general budget support in the calculation of total aid,  UNESCO Institute of Statistics adds up 20% of 
GBS aid to ‘public expenditure on education’ figures reported by countries (UNESCO 2012c) 
430 USAID’s support being off-budget, it is here not accounted for. 
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Source: URT (2011b) 
 
 
 
Table C-4: Disbursements of GBS and education SBS, in million Tsh (current 
prices) 
 
Source: the author; data from ADE et al. (2012: 5) based on the Ministry of Finance’s Aid Management Platform 
 
 
 
Table C-5: Allocation of education external finance across education sub-sector, in 
million Tsh (current) 
Table C-3: Distribution of the education budget between sub-sectors (per cent) 
% of education 
budget 
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Primary, non-formal, 
supporting services 
63.8 62.5 64.5 56.2 67.6 69.5 62.2 50.8 
secondary education 18.2 15.6 12.5 15.8 9.3 6.2 9.8 20.4 
Teacher education 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.8 1.8 2.7 1.4 1.6 
Tertiary and higher 
education 
16.7 20.6 21.9 26.2 24.5 21.6 26.5 27.2 
 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
GBS Total 464,872 591,711 790,334 963,397 940,646 1,214,665 900,330 947,391 
GBS 
Education 
70,196 94,674 156,486 174,375 186,248 222,284 158,458 160,109 
SBS 
Education 
0 0 0 0 63,587 57,448 38,386 138,852 
CIDA     42,097 41,669 38,386 62,742 
EU Education     21,490 15,779   
DfID 0       76,110 
  2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Primary                 
PEDP (basket 
fund and WB) 
172,294 58,197 0 4,410 1,896 2,046 0 0 
GBS/SBS  44,808 59,170 100,949 98,081 168,836 194,305 122,470 151,872 
Other (UN, 
French, 
ICT…) 
2,100 15,182 1,852 2,316 2,325 270 4,170 2,009 
Sub-total 221,302 147,733 104,654 107,124 175,383 196,891 130,810 155,891 
Secondary                  
SEDP World 
Bank 
35,570 42,886   38,236     67,327 41,862 
ADB 5,225 1,725             
GBS/SBS  12,801 14,774 19,583 27,614 23,240 17,376 19,358 60,988 
Sub-total 53,595 59,385 19,583 65,850 23,240 17,376 86,685 102,851 
Higher 
Education/ 
research 
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3. Elements of Lushoto District budget and community contributions 
 
Analyses of Lushoto district budget proposed in Chapter Six are based on two main data 
sources: 
- The Ministry of Finance’s website and the Treasury releases of grants to district 
- Lushoto District Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (or budget), provided to 
the author by Tanga Regional Administrative Secretariat  
In general, district MTEFs have been privileged as sources of information (some minor 
discrepancies occur between the two sources).  
 
Recurrent expenditures: 
 
Treasury releases to LGAs in FY 2010/11 are accessible on the MoF web ite.431 They 
comprise of all grants earmarked for district level recurrent secondary education 
expenditures (district secondary education office’s other charges, examination expenses, 
teachers’ leave travel allowances and moving expenses, capitation grant and school meals). 
In the case of Lushoto, only one government secondary school (Shamabalai A level) is 
affected by school meals. 
 
Treasury releases to Lushoto District for FY 2010/11 confirmed that the level of capitation 
grant sent to districts (for further transfer to schools) reached an approximate amount of 
Tsh 25,000 per student. However, the Lushoto District MTEF based its computation of 
the secondary education grant on 23,950 enrolled students, the figure used by this research; 
the Treasury release to the district was calculated with a different figure: 26,545. Similarly, 
                                                 
431 http://www.mof.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=608%3Amg&catid=55%3Aother-
chargesoc&Itemid=224 
World Bank 0 0 0 0 15,812 7,621 19,092 70,020 
Nordic 
countries 
0 0 0 0 11,715 19,584 12,061 15,400 
GBS/SBS  11,726 19,522 34,250 45,627 61,208 60,418 52,235 81,317 
Sub-total 11,726 19,522 34,250 45,627 88,734 87,624 83,388 166,738 
TOTAL 286,623 226,640 158,487 218,602 287,358 301,890 300,884 425,479 
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there is a slight discrepancy between personal emolument (PE) data provided in district 
MTEFs and in MoF budget books. 
 
Development expenditures 
 
In terms of capital expenditures (or ‘development’), the Treasury releases account for the 
transfer of development grants to districts. In 2009/10, at national level, a specific 
education window – the Education Sector Development Fund – supplemented LGAs’ 
discretionary development funds. It was merged within the general, discretionary Local 
Government Development Fund in FY 2011/12. District MTEFs provide the allocation of 
these discretionary funds between various sectors and sub-sectors. 
 
The district MTEF accounts for the World Bank’s ‘capitation grant’ as ‘development’ 
expenditures and not ‘OC-recurrent’. In FY 2010/11, the World Bank capitation grant was 
not included in Lushoto’s MTEF due to a delayed formal commitment. The author could 
not verify the existence of a supplementary district budget that would have accounted, in 
the course of the fiscal year, for these additional resources. The MTEF implementation 
report does not account for these additional funds. The author did have access to the 
Lushoto SEDP report for that year: this specific report, intended for the national 
authorities as well as the World Bank, may well propose a more comprehensive account of 
the actual capitation grant resources. 
 
The Lushoto FY 2011/12 MTEF includes a budget item on ADB funds. Detailed 
information on these financial resources could not be collected: no one interviewed in any 
of the different structures (district, PMO-RALG, the MoEVT, MoF and even the ADB 
itself) could provide an explanation of these funds.  
Community contributions in Lushoto: a rough estimation 
Based on the standard unit cost of Tsh 7 million for one classroom and considering that a 
school could only officially be registered with a minimum of 4 classrooms, the amount 
contributed by Lushoto communities between 2006 and 2010 for the construction of 
secondary schooling infrastructures could be roughly estimated at Tsh 1.3 billion (current 
prices).  
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